The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Alberto Virtuani,

I agree on your above statements. The medals delivered on October 14th, 1941 were surely connected on what has been declared.

@ Paul Cadogan,

I agree with you, what has been done to ViceAdm L. Holland is not fair, and not only about the responsibility of a missing order to WW to engage immediately, but also for what has been done about the night before and the missing interception at 2 am, which was going to sum up on the previous fact as detractor for the WW credits.

The medals to WW and Leach have ben delivered based on Adm Tovey incorrect July 5th report/dispatches at point 17 and 19, based on WW June 5th report, obviously accepted by their Lordship, this is for sure.
We do not know what was going to be the judgment of Their Lordship in case of a different set of declarations by Adm Tovey.

@ Wadinga,

we have debated already the 06.03 and the 10 sea miles first hand declarations on many threads.
There is no need to re-open and already closed discussion about it here in now. We have understood how it went.

We are now discussing if there were other reasons rather than the potential Court Martial that could have determined the sudden changes from the First hand declarations of WW ( May 31st ) and Tovey ( May 30th ), to the declarations we have on RearAdm Wake-Walker June 5th, 1941 report and on the subsequent Adm Tovey July 5th, 1941 dispatches you can see above.

The question on the table is :
Were their/his intentions sinister ? That's what's open to interpretation.....
We have the potential Court Martial discussion going on evidence being one supported interpretation, ... do you have any other reason for those occurred facts ?

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
A Raven

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by A Raven »

When is Mr Bonimo's article going to be published?

Will it be this year?

Will it be next year?

Within the next FIVE years?

TEN years?

This endless discussion that will never be resolved on the internet.
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RF
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by RF »

A Raven wrote:
This endless discussion that will never be resolved on the internet.
And on related threads as well....... I couldn't agree more.

I think the answer is to leave everyone open to their own opinion, and if there is no further evidence to produce, to leave it at that.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "We have argued long and hard over whether the first twitch of PoW's rudder in response to Holland's unsent signal for a turn to port constitutes the start of withdrawal, or merely a course change. Until PoW achieved a course of 220 or even McMullen's incorrect estimate of enemy course 240 PoW was still closing the enemy. That is not "withdrawing". You cannot withdraw by getting closer to your enemy. Even opening the range is not withdrawing. Withdrawing is when a commander decides that continuing an engagement is no longer to his advantage. Leach decided that around 06:14. It was obvious to Norfolk, that PoW was withdrawing at 06:14. If an enemy chooses to pursue a withdrawing enemy, and the latter has insufficient speed to escape he is not effectively withdrawing, because he is still in action. However, Lutjens did not pursue because he too was withdrawing, having turned to starboard to avoid an imaginary torpedo attack. "
Hi Sean,
I see you don't give up with this pathetic attempt to question Leach decision to run away at 6:00, just after Hood exploded. Please read again Capt. Leach narrative here:
SECRET - H.M.S."PRINCE OF WALES" - 4th June 1941 - No. 001.B.
Sir,
I have the honor to submit the following account of operations between 22nd May and 27th May, 1941, in which H.M.Ship under my command took part.
2. Throughout the operations, and in particularly during and immediately after the morning engagement on Saturday, 24th May, the behavior of my officers and ship's company was in all respects admirable, and the morale throughout the Ship was unquestionably high. The sinking of the "Hood" produced no noticeable adverse effect. It is intended to submit, as soon as is practicable, a list of those officers and ratings who are considered deserving of special mention for outstanding devotion to duty.
3. Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. "Hood" - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the "Hood" I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with "Bismarck" and her consort. The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three further considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.
Namely:
(a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.
(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.
(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.
In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.
Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favorable opportunity.
4. A detailed narrative is attached as an appendix, and tracks charts are forwarded under separate cover.
I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
Signed : J.C.Leach Captain, Royal Navy
To : The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. (Copy to Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron).
and finally accept that Capt.Leach decision was to withdraw from the fight just after Hood exploded, for his own admission. We can debate endlessly whether it was a good or bad decision (IMHO it was the perfect decision with hindsight but a very bad decision from a military (especially from a Royal Navy) perspective).

Please don't say that PoW was not retreating until she reached 220° course, this is simply a nonsense as you should know that a battleship is not your car and that it can't turn immediately (although this was exactly the hope of Capt.Leach, sorry for you). The fact that PoW still closed the enemy was the effect of pure inertia and not of a deliberated intention to fight. In any case, course 220° was reached already, in response to the hard rudder turn, at around 6:02; after that time distance from BS was only increasing....

Please don't say again that PoW was just opening range, as the smoke screen ordered at around the same time (see photos) is a clear indication of the intention to just.....run away. Again, please read Leach narrative above and don't invent that Leach decided to withdraw at 6:14. At that time PoW was running away since 12 minutes already..... :oops:
I know you would like to be able to say that PoW heroically fought for 10 or even 14 minutes alone :wink: : unfortunately for you, it was not the case, the turn to port to disengage was already effective on her course at 6:01:30, that means the rudder was put hard to port at 6:01:10 maximum, following Leach decision (for his own admission).

Finally please don't try to say that at 6:24 Leach heroically "reconsidered his decision to dis-engage" :shock: . At that time, he just took station behind his superior. Would he had run away to Scapa, the Court Martial would have been simply a "waste of time" (to use Lord Fisher words from another thread)...

These are facts, please don't became ridiculous trying to demonstrate that this officer heroically fought alone against BS. He said clearly he did not (please see narrative above) and he even explained why. We can debate if he was right or wrong, not the facts.

I hope it's the last time we come back (after 2 years discussion, albeit very funny) to the retreat time of PoW and the reasons of Capt.Leach...... :stop:

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hi All

I'm touched to have so much of my post reposted :D

Except of course for the unanswerable part:
This is fundamentally incorrect. The Norfolk Log, written at the time, "declared it at first" . Eye witness account recorded at the time.
Oddly this part has not been mentioned.

All the best

wadinga
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,
RF wrote:
A Raven wrote:
This endless discussion that will never be resolved on the internet.
And on related threads as well....... I couldn't agree more.

I think the answer is to leave everyone open to their own opinion, and if there is no further evidence to produce, to leave it at that.
I agree as well, the evidence are all up there and are clear enough to realize what really happened.

The main question remains :
Were their/his intentions sinister ? That's what's open to interpretation.....
Everybody can keep his own opinion ... and I am ok with it.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by KevinD »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:Please don't say again that PoW was just opening range, as the smoke screen ordered at around the same time (see photos) is a clear indication of the intention to just.....run away.
I would hardly call a tactical withdrawal as ‘running away’ but you seem intent on using this term, seemingly with the direct intention of disparaging Leach’s actions. As you yourself say it was the right decision (in hindsight) to turn away and it was the right decision at the time to.
Last edited by KevinD on Mon Apr 06, 2015 10:44 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@KevinD,
Hi,
call it a "tactical withdrawal" or a "run away" , in any case the retreat started at 6:01:30 with the ship changing her course hard to port.

The discussion whether it was a wise or a faint-hearted decision is open, the retreat time is not debatable anymore after 74 years of wrong information, often reflected in books still today.

IMHO, it was the right decision ONLY with hindsight; at 6:00 on May 24 it was a bad decision from a military viewpoint, potentially very dangerous for British merchant vital interests, not in line with the RN traditions and worth of a formal inquiry if not a Court Martial.
At that time, Capt.Leach was not aware of the damage sustained by BS, his ship was in good efficiency with 9 guns out of 10 available, his GO was consistently straddling BS and PoW had sustained no serious damage.
His duty would have been to fight until being sure to have at least damaged BS (and delivered her to Tovey) or until his ship was not able to continue the engagement.

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

A New definition of gallantry :cool:

All

This lengthy thread and its longer, elder sister have sought constantly to denigrate John Leach and Frederic Wake-Walker as “running away” and subsequently lying, falsifying logs and conspiring to “cover up” their actions.

Here, from another thread, one of their accusers characterizes gallantry in command at sea.
IMHO, Lutjens would have chosen alternative 1, but we can't know for sure, as he correctly would have felt himself responsible for the whole German squadron..... In a similar situation, Adm.Iachino at Cape Matapan decided not to leave the Pola alone and sacrificed a full division of 3 heavy cruisers (plus destroyers) instead of just one..... An error, but a comprehensible and, IMHO, gallant one.

Bye, Alberto
From the Italian language RegiaMarina site, and many other published descriptions it is clear Iachino’s actions, whilst “running away” at utmost speed, in his damaged flagship straight to harbour, with no intention whatsoever of re-engaging himself, it was either through muddle, ignorance or incompetence that he ordered Cattaneo and his command to their doom. There is nothing particularly gallant in this, in fact it looks suspiciously like throwing the other passengers out to lighten the sleigh, and delay the slavering wolves.

Several minutes went by before word of the torpedo hit reached Cattaneo, who commanded the ships of the First Cruiser Squadron, i.e. Zara, Pola, and Fiume, as well as the four destroyers of the Ninth Flotilla, (Alfieri, Carducci, Oriani, and Gioberti). Iachino found out even later, but just before receiving the disconcerting news he was given another, extremely important, report: a new set of radio intercept bearings put the enemy flagship a little over seventy miles Southeast of the Vittorio Veneto[2]. An exchange of messages then ensued between the Zara and the Veneto flag bridges; their texts and times of arrival show that signals got crossed in the attempt to obtain more detailed information about the stricken ship and to decide what to do, causing yet more confusion and delay. The gist of this flurry of messages leaves many open questions about Cattaneo’s train of thought, as he initially recommended sending two destroyers but then, once he found out that the Pola requested assistance and towing[3], requested permission to reverse course with the entire squadron, i.e. to do what Iachino had already ordered in a previous message which had not yet reached him. Whether Iachino’s staff generally agreed with the admiral’s decision is not certain, but at least an officer, the cryptographers’ leader Cdr. Porta, did express some misgivings. However, his arguments - which in truth were based more on his keen intuition than on objective facts - failed to convince his boss.

While Cattaneo was reversing course, Iachino sent him two messages: the first one contained the last position estimate of the British flagship received from Rome, the other one ordered his junior to abandon the Pola rather than engage superior forces. If the second message was almost redundant, since it did nothing more than restate the Regia Marina’s general operating principle, in the first one Iachino, adopting Supermarina’s style, merely passed data on to his subordinate without giving him any clues as to how the data should be interpreted. In any case, although Iachino was far from explicit, it would seem that he did at least have some creeping suspicions that things could turn out for the worse. Cattaneo’s behavior, by contrast, can only be justified if the admiral had not considered as likely any possibility of an unpleasant night encounter or in any case he was convinced that, like his own, British capital ships were incapable of fighting at night. This judgment is not consistent with the statements made by some of the Zara’s surviving officers, who said that the message containing the latest British position estimate caused grave concern on that ship.
http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text_ ... id=1&cid=5

Seems to be a dual standard here, one judgement on the Royal Navy officers who continued to pursue their flying enemy and a different one when the Regia Marina is involved. :negative:

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

To Wadinga,
This lengthy thread and its longer, elder sister have sought constantly to denigrate John Leach and Frederic Wake-Walker as “ running away ” and subsequently lying, falsifying logs and conspiring to “ cover up ” their actions.
Sean, you are forgetting Adm J. Tovey and the Royal Navy Admiralty, both involved on the " cover up " as well, as the existing documents do demonstrate.

It must be said that the Royal Navy Admiralty partially recovered it with their own corrections some years later, on 1948.
But, in this way, they basically confirmed the incorrect previously released declarations.

It is very simple to realize it, ... and it is all still available on the official documents.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Seems to be a dual standard here, one judgement on the Royal Navy officers who continued to pursue their flying enemy and a different one when the Regia Marina is involved. :negative:"
Hi Sean,
welcome back even if you speak of something not strictly related to this same thread topic..... :wink:

I can assure you that I am one of the most critical in Italy regarding the lack of offensive attitude of the Italian admirals during WWII, at least as I am regarding the behaviour of three British high officers at the Denmark Strait (you always forget Ellis and his turn to north after the enemy in sight signal was sent out.....). I don't even answer your insinuations about the real reason why Iachino sent back Cattaneo: in your opinion, should he have done himself with a Vittorio Veneto that had already received a very serious damage (not just "superficial " as PoW....) and had to be brought back to port asap ? :negative:

Adm Iachino wrote some intreresting books in which he explains why he took this decision (the most difficult for him as per his own admission) and I was very impressed by this paragraph that I will try to translate in a decent English (from the preface to the Italian version of S.W,C. Pack 1972 book about Cape Matapan action):
Adm Iachino wrote:"..... confermo che, a mio modo di vedere, era doveroso, soprattutto per ragioni morali, fare quel tentativo di salvataggio (del Pola). Mi e' stato di conforto il giudizio positivo, espresso in proposito, alla fine della guerra, degli ammiragli Cunningham, de Bélot e Weichold....... "
In English: "....I confirm that , in my opinion, it was my duty, first of all for moral reasons, to attempt to rescue (the Pola). I was supported by the positive judgement, at the end of the war, of Adm Cunningham, de Bélot e Weichold......"
For sure, Iachino decision was not an easy one and, with hindsight, it was the worst one. However it was a proof of moral courage to refuse to leave the Pola to her destiny and in this sense I defined it a proof of gallantry, the same that could have pushed Lutjens to try to protect a crippled Prinz Eugen in that possible scenario (what if Hood had hit PG in first minutes of the battle....).


Coming back to this thread topic, I can just fully confirm what I said:
Capt Leach decision at 6:00 on May 24 was a bad decision from a military viewpoint, potentially very dangerous for British merchant vital interests, not in line with the RN traditions and worth of a formal inquiry if not a Court Martial.
At that time, Capt.Leach was not aware of the damage sustained by BS, his ship was in good efficiency with 9 guns out of 10 available, his GO was consistently straddling BS and PoW had sustained no serious damage.
His duty would have been to fight until being sure to have at least damaged BS (and delivered her to Tovey) or until his ship was not able to continue the engagement.
I'm sorry for you, there is no "new definition of gallantry", it's just a matter of duty of any Navy officer.

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Well they do say when caught in an indefensible position- attack is the only option! :D Difficult with your trousers round your ankles.

Here are Iachino's own words from P 70 of Pack's book in english, on sending Cattano back

"That we were within a relatively short distance of the entire British force never occurred to me". wrote Iachino "I thought the British cruisers had decided to turn back leaving only two destroyers to deal with us".

Pack mentions little of the signals muddle revealed in the RegiaMaria account, but it is clear there is nothing "gallant" about sending two heavy cruisers and four destroyers against two destroyers.

The unyielding anti-RN agenda in this argument since page 1 has never been clearer. :wink:

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Wadinga:
Hi Sean,
sorry but this is not the right thread to discuss in depth Cape Matapan action and Iachino decision to rescue Pola.
Just to be clear, since the beginning of the mission, Iachino was given wrong information by Supermarina (the Italian Admiralty) regarding Cunningham heavy ships (in harbour at Alexandria, then at sea but very distant, etc.).
Sure, Iachino was not aware that the British battleships were so close to Pola, however he was aware that the Italian heavy cruisers were totally unable to fight at night, blind without any radar and dangerously exposed to any air attack at dawn. Therefore sending them back to tow Pola to Italy was a high risk even against simple torpedo boats, a risk taken due to "moral reasons" not to leave alone a disabled ship......

BTW, Iachino is not at all one of my favourite admirals, especially for the behaviour at the second battle of Sirte, where, in clear superiority, he decided not to engage decisively the British ships and the convoy. :kaput:


In any case, my point in another thread was just related to the hypothetical scenario where Hood hits PG before blowing up. What had Lutjens decided to do ? Protect PG or abandon her ? The parallel with Iachino is just related to this decision.


Regarding trousers (an image that I would not have choosen myself first), it's clear that defending Capt.Leach (disengaging a battleship with "superficial" damage), Adm Wake-Walker (keeping away from the enemy, ridiculously changing declarations at the 2 boards of inquiry and refusing to re-engage) and Capt Ellis (turning away from the enemy after the battle signal was flying) behaviour on May 24, is like entering a battle not having trousers at all and your hands tied behind your back......


Finally, you are totally wrong with your theory of anti-RN agenda from my side. :shock:
It's exactly the opposite: it's becuase I have always considered (since I was in the Italian Navy) the RN as the best Navy in the world (at least up to the late 80's, having personally seen the results of joint maneuvers of the Italian Navy with the RN , US Navy and other "western" Navies) and the RN traditions as the example to be followed by any sailor, that I can't approve the behaviour of the above officers and their decoration (instead of the due inquiry).

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by pgollin »

.

I do NOT want to be drawn into this stupidity, however I couldn't let this particularly wrong statement go by unchallenged ;

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
.......... however he was aware that the Italian heavy cruisers were totally unable to fight at night, blind without any radar ...........


Whilst I agree that radar gives ships advantages at night, the Italian ships should have been capable of fighting at night and to have been much more wary of the approach of enemy ships. To let the British battleships to get so close was very poor practice.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@pgollin
I DO NOT appreciate that you use terms like "stupidity" in a forum where we should avoid them, but this is not the first time we are faced to your verbal intemperance... :stop:


The Italian ships had no radar and could not detect British ships by means other than direct sight; the resulting military doctrine did not envisage night actions and the Italians had their main gun batteries disarmed at night. Therefore, the Italian heavy cruisers were unable to fight at night.

I totally agree with you on the poor Italian practice and on the obsolete Italian fighting instructions. On the other side, ABC direct approach in the night (against his own staff opinion) is remarkable, demonstrating his offensive spirit.



From the link (Regia Marina) Wadinga has posted:

[7] It is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have happened had Pridham-Wippell engaged Cattaneo, but it is likely that the British, who were not only alert but were also capable of night time fighting, would have had the upper hand. Zara class cruisers, however, were rather sturdy ships, so they could have taken a fairly severe punishment in the form of 6 in shell hits before being forced to stop. Hence, it is possible, especially if Toscano’s destroyer had acted promptly, that Cattaneo’s ships might have gotten away, though somewhat worse for the wear....

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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