The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

Moderator: Bill Jurens

HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by HMSVF »

Alberto Virtuani wrote: Fri Jun 29, 2018 9:24 pm Hi HMSVF,
thanks for your reply,
you wrote: "Do you think Lutjens should/would have faced censure for not continuing the action against HMS Prince of Wales? "
I don't think so, his orders, differently from Leach ones, were to avoid combat and only attack convoys and merchantmen, not to engage battleships. Marshall lost his place for endangering the "twins" to sink Glorious.....

The game was not yet over, many convoys were already at sea and they were easy preys for an untouched Bismarck.
She was not, but Leach was unaware of the damages and this is the reason why I say he was wrong in breaking off the engagement with just "superficial damages" (his words), even if there is an obvious risk in remaining under BS fire until you are "sure" that she is damaged.

Lutjens realized the game was over when the attempts to recover the fore fuel did not succeeded, but in any case his duty was to get back Bismarck, not to attack RN units.


Bye, Alberto

Hi Alberto


The problem with staying till you have guaranteed that you have effectively finished Bismarcks mission is that its reliant on HMS Prince of Wales being capable of doing the job. I suspect that after Y turret has jammed thats there is a fair degree of skepticism in regards to her fighting ability. I have Santari's book (a very good read!) and I understand that POW fired pretty damned well for what in RN terms was a green ship. It was hardly without issue or malfunctions though. To put it bluntly she was unreliable. If you are going to fight toe to toe wth your enemy you want to be reasonably sure that you are able to take the offensive. Its akin to having a machine gun that in theory can shoot "X" amount of rounds but is liable to have jams lasting anywhere from a few seconds to a few minutes with no idea or warning when they are going to occur. All this whilst your opposite number is taking potshots at you.
If however you can regroup with others the reliability issue is not so much of an issue as others can keep up suppressing fire.Alternatively you can keep contact till another force has zoned into the area.

In regard to Churchill and his Troubridge comments. Well, there is a certain amount of irony in this. If Churchill and the Admiralty hadn't tried to manage from afar, giving ambiguous instructions in the process history might have been different. IMHO Churchill and his interference were directly responsible for the real disaster that followed the Goeben saga - The Battle of Coronel. Cradock stated that that "he had no intention of ending up like Troubridge" the knock on effect of this was that Cradock took his seriously outmatched force to battle Von Spee with pretty forceable results. Cradock took the line similar to yours by fighting regardless. HMS Good Hope and HMS Monmouth achieved nothing apart from depleting their opposite numbers ammunition stocks.

Churchill was a meddler and amateur strategist with a short temper. I have no doubt that he "threw his teddys out of the pram" and I acknowledge what you say in regards to AV Alexander. Could it not be the case however that Alexander was suggesting to Churchill that he was going to make a fool of himself by stamping his feet before he actually understood the what had occurred and the circumstances? This was a pretty tumultuous time. The UK was losing in pretty much every theatre it fought. It was being hammered off Crete. Churchill going off half cocked at the RN when the actual facts of the event were unclear was hardly likely to improve things. Could this not be the reason why he (Churchill) said "leave it" as the old meddler realised that he had been a bit of an arse(again)?



Best wishes


HMSVF
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,

Sorry to interrupt this charming tete a tete but
and it would be very unlikely (but not impossible ) to find any other independent proof in addition to Tovey letters,
Err A&A claim they have it, it's just that they won't show it until they sell a "sensational" book and make some money on the back of it.
It would be a far more "concrete" case if their were other sources to reinforce the POV that is being put forward.
Indeed it would..................HMSVF would like to see the the Silver Bullet too.

(thinking Pound,Wake Walker,Churchill)

The deadness of all three make it difficult for them to contest Tovey's imaginings. Convenient :!: Delaying the story's release until Tovey too was dead, made it difficult to cross examine him except with a Ouija board. :shock: However Paffard who knew the truth, because Tovey told him in 1941, called Tovey's imaginings an exaggeration when he spoke to Kennedy.


If only they'd waited until Paffard was dead too. :cool: Roskill observed that Tovey wasn't a hermit, but then we talking about veracity not the cave-lifestyle thing. :D


all the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
Wadinga wrote: "Sorry to interrupt this charming tete a tete"
the frustrated anger of poor Mr.Wadinga is evident from the above, because whoever is not a stubborn hooligan/denier (like D&S or worse) is able to have a fair discussion, recognizing the points of the people he is discussing with. Mr.Wadinga is not, because he has a side-taken approach, being "devoted" (his words) to defend the honor of these two timid officers. His problem: he will see the "Silver Bullet" (only after Antonio publication) and he will be rubbished forever in his ridiculous attempt of denial of the "regrettable aftermath".
Wadinga wrote: "However Paffard who knew the truth, because Tovey told him in 1941, called Tovey's imaginings an exaggeration when he spoke to Kennedy"
Only according to Kennedy who never provided any evidence of what Paffard said/wrote (???) while Roskill demolished Paffard's referred insinuation. Kennedy was a poor historian, while Roskill was a professionist and knew personally Toivey. All subsequent historians accepted Roskill judgement, discarding Kennedy. End of story.



@HMSVF:
Hi,
coming to your observations:
"I acknowledge what you say in regards to AV Alexander. Could it not be the case however that Alexander was suggesting to Churchill that he was going to make a fool of himself by stamping his feet before he actually understood the what had occurred and the circumstances?"
Thanks for fairly recognizing what the deniers were trying to reduce to....a Brockman's guess....
I agree with you that, after Bismarck had been sunk, Churchill would have made a fool of himself insisting (however he did want to clarify with both Tovey and Leach an occurrence that was clearly not in line with the Royal Navy traditions). Churchill was a navigated politician and choose to "leave it".
Had Bismarck sunk the WS8B convoy however, no doubt a Court-Martial would have judged the officers who left her free to raid in Atlantic (and criticism would have involved Tovey too).

Re. PoW gunnery performance, it was really good, with an acceptable output efficiency of 75% versus 83% (estimated) of Bismarck, a decent precision and a RoF that was even higher than the one of the German ship. It's a fact that Bismarck got more severely damaged than PoW during the battle and that she was probably lost at the end due to PoW hits. Leach however was not yet aware of this, when he decided to break off the engagement.

IMHO there was no sufficient reason at all to turn away at 6:01 (with such a hard turn to port that caused the jamming of the "Y" turret, back in action in few hours), and the intentionally invented point 19 of the despatches (with the 06:13 retreat time and the added jam of turret "Y" within the battle damages, before the decision to turn away) is for me a clear proof of the fact that Tovey himself logically felt that Leach had disengaged too early, and needed to provide further justifications.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by dunmunro »

Re. PoW performance, it was really good, with an acceptable output efficiency of 75% versus 83% (estimated) of Bismarck, a decent precision and a RoF that was even higher than the one of the German ship.

IMHO there was no sufficient reason at all to disengage at 6:01, and the intentionally invented point 19 of the despatches (with 6:13 retreat time and the added jam of turret "Y" within the battle damages, before the decision to turn away) is for me a clear proof of the fact that Tovey himself felt that Leach had disengaged too early, and needed to provide further justifications.


Bye, Alberto
You just can't help lying about PoW's combat power. You've been corrected on this multiple times.
No one knows what Bismarck's 38cm output efficiency was, since Lutjens never signalled it to anyone.

PoW's command team and command centre had suffered a crippling hit.
PoW's gunnery radar systems had all failed and she was facing two opponents each with an efficient FC radar system.
PoW had one 14in gun out of action and the equivalent of another out of action as well. She also had a basic fault in her turret loading mechanism that made them prone to jamming.
PoW's 5.25in FC directors had been knocked out so she had no effective secondary armament and no means to engage PE.
PoW had suffered a funnel hit and damage to her boiler machinery and two further underwater hits aft that eventually flooded a shaft alley.
PoW was rapidly closing the range and thus losing her main armoured belt immunity to 38cm hits, which could have led to her machinery being severely damaged and PoW immobilized, which would have almost certainly led to her loss, leaving KGV as the RN's only modern fast battleship to face 2 x Bismarck class and 2 x Vittorio Veneto class.

PoW had effectively 8 x 14in guns to oppose 8 x 38cm, 8 x 20.3cm, 6 x 15cm, 14 x 10.5cm guns and 8 x 21in TTs. Any calibre KM shell hits could knock out PoW's remaining 14in gun directors leading to the loss of centralized 14in FC and thus a further drastic reduction in 14in gunnery efficiency

Given the above PoW had a vanishingly small chance of a successful outcome unless she could open the range ASAP to nullify Lutjens' massive advantage in medium calibre guns.
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by HMSVF »

dunmunro wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 9:23 am
Re. PoW performance, it was really good, with an acceptable output efficiency of 75% versus 83% (estimated) of Bismarck, a decent precision and a RoF that was even higher than the one of the German ship.

IMHO there was no sufficient reason at all to disengage at 6:01, and the intentionally invented point 19 of the despatches (with 6:13 retreat time and the added jam of turret "Y" within the battle damages, before the decision to turn away) is for me a clear proof of the fact that Tovey himself felt that Leach had disengaged too early, and needed to provide further justifications.


Bye, Alberto
You just can't help lying about PoW's combat power. You've been corrected on this multiple times.
No one knows what Bismarck's 38cm output efficiency was, since Lutjens never signalled it to anyone.

PoW's command team and command centre had suffered a crippling hit.
PoW's gunnery radar systems had all failed and she was facing two opponents each with an efficient FC radar system.
PoW had one 14in gun out of action and the equivalent of another out of action as well. She also had a basic fault in her turret loading mechanism that made them prone to jamming.
PoW's 5.25in FC directors had been knocked out so she had no effective secondary armament and no means to engage PE.
PoW had suffered a funnel hit and damage to her boiler machinery and two further underwater hits aft that eventually flooded a shaft alley.
PoW was rapidly closing the range and thus losing her main armoured belt immunity to 38cm hits, which could have led to her machinery being severely damaged and PoW immobilized, which would have almost certainly led to her loss, leaving KGV as the RN's only modern fast battleship to face 2 x Bismarck class and 2 x Vittorio Veneto class.

PoW had effectively 8 x 14in guns to oppose 8 x 38cm, 8 x 20.3cm, 6 x 15cm, 14 x 10.5cm guns and 8 x 21in TTs. Any calibre KM shell hits could knock out PoW's remaining 14in gun directors leading to the loss of centralized 14in FC and thus a further drastic reduction in 14in gunnery efficiency

Given the above PoW had a vanishingly small chance of a successful outcome unless she could open the range ASAP to nullify Lutjens' massive advantage in medium calibre guns.
PoW's command team and command centre had suffered a crippling hit.
PoW's gunnery radar systems had all failed and she was facing two opponents each with an efficient FC radar system.
PoW had one 14in gun out of action and the equivalent of another out of action as well. She also had a basic fault in her turret loading mechanism that made them prone to jamming.
PoW's 5.25in FC directors had been knocked out so she had no effective secondary armament and no means to engage PE.
PoW had suffered a funnel hit and damage to her boiler machinery and two further underwater hits aft that eventually flooded a shaft alley.
PoW was rapidly closing the range and thus losing her main armoured belt immunity to 38cm hits, which could have led to her machinery being severely damaged and PoW immobilized, which would have almost certainly led to her loss, leaving KGV as the RN's only modern fast battleship to face 2 x Bismarck class and 2 x Vittorio Veneto class.

PoW had effectively 8 x 14in guns to oppose 8 x 38cm, 8 x 20.3cm, 6 x 15cm, 14 x 10.5cm guns and 8 x 21in TTs. Any calibre KM shell hits could knock out PoW's remaining 14in gun directors leading to the loss of centralized 14in FC and thus a further drastic reduction in 14in gunnery efficiency

Given the above PoW had a vanishingly small chance of a successful outcome unless she could open the range ASAP to nullify Lutjens' massive advantage in medium calibre guns.


This was the impression that I always had in regards to POW's condition after Hood had been sunk. Could it not be the case that Leach simply left the line (so to speak) initially to open the range ? I've read several accounts of such an manoeuvre by Hipper's battlecruisers. Could it not be the case that after the having the initial plan to simply open a up a bit of range Y turret jammed and that turned out being the "straw that broke the camels back" resulting in disengagement. I would imagine that unjamming Y turret was not a quick business - wasn't there an inherent flaw in the design of the turret training ring ? I was under the impression that the tolerances were too tight and didn't allow for any flex in the hull structure? Personally I don't think that 74% is that great and I'm pretty sure that during KGV's action with Bismarck she was down to around 25% for a short period. Luckily Bismarck was going nowhere and Rodney was doing the business (another ship which had turret issues which took 10 years to sort out!) Given this lack of reliability would you continue to fight with 40% or so of your main armament jammed? I know I wouldn't.


Best Wishes



HMSVF
User avatar
Antonio Bonomi
Senior Member
Posts: 3799
Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 10:44 am
Location: Vimercate ( Milano ) - Italy

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@HMSVF,

the attempt to delay the HMS Prince of Wales turn away disengagement, ... breaking off the action, ... is an old story that has been already discusssed many times and always easily demostrated being incorrect by Capt J.C. Leach own report.

Here the statements describing those events that Capt Leach wrote :

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.
"Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.

The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen.
True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
From here :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

Alberto is right, ... because the fact that Adm Tovey on his dispatches "moved in " intentionally the Y turret jamming event is one of the so called " Cover Up " actions, ... together with the battle time enlargement until 06:13, ... both made on purpose to make the report acceptable by the Admiralty, ... enabling the recognition proposal.

For Wake-Walker the same action was done to change his signed declaration of being at 20.000 yards from the sinking Hood, ... and consequently at around 12 sea miles from the enemy well within his main guns range, ... was changed during the Hood second board to 30.000 yards ... and on Adm Tovey dispatches to around 15 sea miles, ... removing Wake-Walker from a very dangerous position he put himself thru his own superficial signed declarations, ... surely he was not a " fox ", ... despite his fast growing career, ... but we know the reasons why his career has been like that, ... :wink:

Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by HMSVF »

Antonio Bonomi wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 11:34 am Hello everybody,

@HMSVF,

the attempt to delay the HMS Prince of Wales turn away disengagement, ... breaking off the action, ... is an old story that has been already discusssed many times and always easily demostrated being incorrect by Capt J.C. Leach own report.

Here the statements describing those events that Capt Leach wrote :

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.
"Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.

The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen.
True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
From here :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

Alberto is right, ... because the fact that Adm Tovey on his dispatches "moved in " intentionally the Y turret jamming event is one of the so called " Cover Up " actions, ... together with the battle time enlargement until 06:13, ... both made on purpose to make the report acceptable by the Admiralty, ... enabling the recognition proposal.

For Wake-Walker the same action was done to change his signed declaration of being at 20.000 yards from the sinking Hood, ... and consequently at around 12 sea miles from the enemy well within his main guns range, ... was changed during the Hood second board to 30.000 yards ... and on Adm Tovey dispatches to around 15 sea miles, ... removing Wake-Walker from a very dangerous position he put himself thru his own superficial signed declarations, ... surely he was not a " fox ", ... despite his fast growing career, ... but we know the reasons why his career has been like that, ... :wink:

Bye Antonio



Thanks for the reply (& the link)


I may be being a little thick here but bear with me!

From the link...
The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.
Whilst not point blank range it was still pretty damned close with the likelyhood of being hit pretty good. 20 years earlier Beatty was fighting at this range with BCF. Bismarck and POW were 2 generations later than those that fought WW1 with the optics and FC to match. A battle turn away was probably very prudent given the fact that because Holland had sailed his squadron in close formation Schneider had very little corrections to make as he had obviously got the range on Hood and merely had to train his guns on POW and continue the carronade.


After retiring on a course of about 160 degs. "Prince of Wales" circled to port, steadying up on a course of 250 degs. And joining "Norfolk" came under orders of C.S.1 who at 0633, stated his intention of keeping in touch with the enemy. The extent of the general damage to the ship was reported to C.S.1. At 0707 C.S.1 ordered "Prince of Wales" to follow at her best speed giving his course 210 degs. Speed 26 knots. Two guns of "Y" Turret were again in action by 0720 and an amplifying report of damage was made to C.S.1.
So he has called for reports from his damage control parties and reported to his senior which is now WW. Even at this point 2 out of the four guns of Y turret are still jammed as is the actual turret, which is not free till 08:25 and the ships best speed was down a couple of knots

At 1923 temporary breakdown of two guns in "A" Turret was reported to C.S.1

So the turret mechanisms still could not be relied on 10 hours later. Would argue that if you are going to stand toe to toe with the Bismarck you don't want to worry about whether you will be able to actually fire.
At 0511 C.S.1 had signalled his intention to keep "Prince of Wales" in support if visibility was low, otherwise to detach her to join C-in-C H.F.

Isn't this sensible? Indeed wasn't it RN policy to keep 2 KGV's (or 1 US battleship and a KGV) to deal with Tirpitz.


Indeed from your link...


(
a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.

(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.

(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.

Well in the first instance POW obviously was having issues hence the workmen on board. 74% output isn't great. He obviously took the view that POW would do ok in the presence of another, more experienced vessel (HMS Hood). I don't think that is an unreasonable premise. Also its not just about gunnery. This was the ships first operation,she was new, her crew were new.They needed to get to "know" each other, certainly when it comes to damage control and dealing with mechanical breakdowns. When Hood was afloat it was 2 v 1 effectively. Bismarck could either fire at Hood or POW,if she fired at Hood (as actual) POW has a free shoot at Bismarck . IF Bismarck fires at POW,Hood gets a free shoot at Bismarck. If Bismarck splits her fire then the chances of causing significant damage are probably reduced. Now flip back to what actually happened - Hood sinks within minutes, because of the formation sailed POW gets hammered (as does Leach on the bridge). He is now facing the worst case scenario 2v1 in a ship he hasn't got full confidence in (teething issues) and a crew he considers inexperienced. He thinks he has been hit reasonably hard already and is thinks he is in deep trouble.



I think that its extremely harsh to criticise Leach given these circumstances. Losing Hood was bad enough. To have lost POW would have been a disaster. The RN was not endowed with a large number of modern or modernised ships - KGV, POW, Renown,Warspite, Queen Elizabeth,Valiant,Rodney and Nelson. The first 2 are new,Renown was a battlecruiser, the Q.E's were 23 knotters at best and nowhere near as well armoured as Bismarck,the last 2 were way overdue for overhaul. The others ships were all aged and suffering from varying degree's of battleship infirmity!
The reason why the RN rules the seas for 300 + years was not just because it was full of valour and zeal, it was because it knew how to take a calculated risk. The IJN took the view that death was better than surrender. Didn't do much good though. Once you lose experience crew for zero gains its very difficult to replace them. Japan found that to their cost. The reason that Ozawa used his carriers off Leyte as bait was simple - he didn't have enough pilots.Why ? Well because the bushido code was big on self sacrifice, which meant that a lot of experienced pilots were lost on glory rides to meet their maker. Which meant that up and coming pilots were not mentored, they were given x amount of flying hours and sent on their way.

Did Churchill go off on one when the initial reports came back? Undoubtably. The problem with Churchill is that he thought that he knew about seapower inside and out. In actual fact he was clueless. for the one thing he got right - Queen Elizabeth class he got a multitude wrong (Operation Catherine,Dardenelles,Norway to name 3). He probably heard "Hood sunk,Prince of Wales disengaged" and nothing else. I can just see the old bugger erupting like Mount Vesuvius, quoting shakespeare and getting his big pointy stick out. It's not until the later reports come in that he realises he has been a complete fool but rather than lose faith (and face) he says "leave it".As a result nothing official ever occurs and Tovey, Leach and WW carry on.


Bill Jurens has already discussed the charts issue and what he thinks about them. I bow to his far greater knowledge and experience, he seems a level headed chap and I thought that his previous comments were about right. My other query about the idea of "cover up" is that the RN surely would have done a better job of it and more pertinently had other bigger cock ups to hide? To me the far greater cover up is the HMS Glorious incident. This has had the 100 year rule slapped on the files, even in the 90's calls to declassify were refused (and this was discussed in Parliament in the 90's).



These are my musings, no degeneration, insult or disrespect are meant by them. I just don't see it the same way from whats been presented.



Best wishes

HMSVF
Last edited by HMSVF on Sat Jun 30, 2018 2:21 pm, edited 2 times in total.
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by HMSVF »

HMSVF wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 2:02 pm
Antonio Bonomi wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 11:34 am Hello everybody,

@HMSVF,

the attempt to delay the HMS Prince of Wales turn away disengagement, ... breaking off the action, ... is an old story that has been already discusssed many times and always easily demostrated being incorrect by Capt J.C. Leach own report.

Here the statements describing those events that Capt Leach wrote :

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.
"Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.

The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen.
True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
From here :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

Alberto is right, ... because the fact that Adm Tovey on his dispatches "moved in " intentionally the Y turret jamming event is one of the so called " Cover Up " actions, ... together with the battle time enlargement until 06:13, ... both made on purpose to make the report acceptable by the Admiralty, ... enabling the recognition proposal.

For Wake-Walker the same action was done to change his signed declaration of being at 20.000 yards from the sinking Hood, ... and consequently at around 12 sea miles from the enemy well within his main guns range, ... was changed during the Hood second board to 30.000 yards ... and on Adm Tovey dispatches to around 15 sea miles, ... removing Wake-Walker from a very dangerous position he put himself thru his own superficial signed declarations, ... surely he was not a " fox ", ... despite his fast growing career, ... but we know the reasons why his career has been like that, ... :wink:

Bye Antonio



Thanks for the reply (& the link)


I may be being a little thick here but bear with me!

From the link...
The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.
Whilst not point blank range it was still pretty damned close with the likelyhood of being hit pretty good. 20 years earlier Beatty was fighting at this range with BCF. Bismarck and POW were 2 generations later than those that fought WW1 with the optics and FC to match. A battle turn away was probably very prudent given the fact that because Holland had sailed his squadron in close formation Schneider had very little corrections to make as he had obviously got the range on Hood and merely had to train his guns on POW and continue the carronade.


After retiring on a course of about 160 degs. "Prince of Wales" circled to port, steadying up on a course of 250 degs. And joining "Norfolk" came under orders of C.S.1 who at 0633, stated his intention of keeping in touch with the enemy. The extent of the general damage to the ship was reported to C.S.1. At 0707 C.S.1 ordered "Prince of Wales" to follow at her best speed giving his course 210 degs. Speed 26 knots. Two guns of "Y" Turret were again in action by 0720 and an amplifying report of damage was made to C.S.1.
So he has called for reports from his damage control parties and reported to his senior which is now WW. Even at this point 2 out of the four guns of Y turret are still jammed as is the actual turret, which is not free till 08:25 and the ships best speed was down a couple of knots

At 1923 temporary breakdown of two guns in "A" Turret was reported to C.S.1

So the turret mechanisms still could not be relied on 10 hours later. Would argue that if you are going to stand toe to toe with the Bismarck you don't want to worry about whether you will be able to actually fire.
At 0511 C.S.1 had signalled his intention to keep "Prince of Wales" in support if visibility was low, otherwise to detach her to join C-in-C H.F.

Isn't this sensible? Indeed wasn't it RN policy to keep 2 KGV's (or 1 US battleship and a KGV) to deal with Tirpitz.


Indeed from your link...


(
a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.

(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.

(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.

Well in the first instance POW obviously was having issues hence the workmen on board. 74% output isn't great. He obviously took the view that POW would do ok in the presence of another, more experienced vessel (HMS Hood). I don't think that is an unreasonable premise. Also its not just about gunnery. This was the ships first operation,she was new, her crew were new.They needed to get to "know" each other, certainly when it comes to damage control and dealing with mechanical breakdowns. When Hood was afloat it was 2 v 1 effectively. Bismarck could either fire at Hood or POW,if she fired at Hood (as actual) POW has a free shoot at Bismarck . IF Bismarck fires at POW,Hood gets a free shoot at Bismarck. If Bismarck splits her fire then the chances of causing significant damage are probably reduced. Now flip back to what actually happened - Hood sinks within minutes, because of the formation sailed POW gets hammered (as does Leach on the bridge). He is now facing the worst case scenario 2v1 in a ship he hasn't got full confidence in (teething issues) and a crew he considers inexperienced. He thinks he has been hit reasonably hard already and is thinks he is in deep trouble.



I think that its extremely harsh to criticise Leach given these circumstances. Losing Hood was bad enough. To have lost POW would have been a disaster. The RN was not endowed with a large number of modern or modernised ships - KGV, POW, Renown,Warspite, Queen Elizabeth,Valiant,Rodney and Nelson. The first 2 are new,Renown was a battlecruiser, the Q.E's were 23 knotters at best and nowhere near as well armoured as Bismarck,the last 2 were way overdue for overhaul. The others ships were all aged and suffering from varying degree's of battleship infirmity!
The reason why the RN rules the seas for 300 + years was not just because it was full of valour and zeal, it was because it knew how to take a calculated risk. The IJN took the view that death was better than surrender and to make the ultimate sacrifice in the name of honour . Didn't do them much good though. Once you lose experience crew for zero gains its very difficult to replace them. Japan found that to their cost. The reason that Ozawa used his carriers off Leyte as bait was simple - he didn't have enough pilots.Why ? Well because the bushido code was big on self sacrifice, which meant that a lot of experienced pilots were lost on glory rides to meet their maker (that honour thing again). Which meant that up and coming pilots were not mentored, they were given x amount of flying hours and sent on their way. Sometimes discretion really is the better part of valour and there is nothing more pitiful than a meaningless sacrifice. Especially in the long term.

Did Churchill go off on one when the initial reports came back? Undoubtably. The problem with Churchill is that he thought that he knew about seapower inside and out. In actual fact he was clueless. for the one thing he got right - Queen Elizabeth class he got a multitude wrong (Operation Catherine,Dardenelles,Norway to name 3). He probably heard "Hood sunk,Prince of Wales disengaged" and nothing else. I can just see the old bugger erupting like Mount Vesuvius, quoting shakespeare and getting his big pointy stick out. It's not until the later reports come in that he realises he has been a complete fool but rather than lose faith (and face) he says "leave it".As a result nothing official ever occurs and Tovey, Leach and WW carry on.


Bill Jurens has already discussed the charts issue and what he thinks about them. I bow to his far greater knowledge and experience, he seems a level headed chap and I thought that his previous comments were about right. My other query about the idea of "cover up" is that the RN surely would have done a better job of it and more pertinently had other bigger cock ups to hide? To me the far greater cover up is the HMS Glorious incident. This has had the 100 year rule slapped on the files, even in the 90's calls to declassify were refused (and this was discussed in Parliament in the 90's).



These are my musings, no degeneration, insult or disrespect are meant by them. I just don't see it the same way from whats been presented.



Best wishes

HMSVF
User avatar
Antonio Bonomi
Senior Member
Posts: 3799
Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 10:44 am
Location: Vimercate ( Milano ) - Italy

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ HMSVF,

having re-constructed in full details with this article I wrote around 15 years ago the HMS Glorious story, ... I fully agree with you, ... that was another even more evident " Cover Up " done by the Royal Navy Admiralty.

https://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharn ... njuno.html

In this case there were surely some events that needed the Admiralty attention, ... and I personally think that it was the Royal Navy tradition and presence of the Articles of War the reason why the first obvious reaction was to go for a Board on Inquiry -> Court Martial, ... instead of a delayed scrutiny done inside the Admiralty, ... similar to the one I have posted recently for the Prinz Eugen missed torpedo launch occurrence.

The Royal Navy had a very different discipline standards, ... that is why, ... but at the end given the final events, the Bismarck being sunk and the war propaganda needs, ... we know what was the final solution decided by WSC, ... allow the " Cover Up " and the recognition like for everybody else, ... with no differences.

Anyway, ... the documents are still all there for the ones that want to realize the historical truth.

Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by dunmunro »

HMSVF wrote: Fri Jun 29, 2018 11:20 pm
Alberto Virtuani wrote: Fri Jun 29, 2018 9:24 pm Hi HMSVF,
thanks for your reply,
you wrote: "Do you think Lutjens should/would have faced censure for not continuing the action against HMS Prince of Wales? "
I don't think so, his orders, differently from Leach ones, were to avoid combat and only attack convoys and merchantmen, not to engage battleships. Marshall lost his place for endangering the "twins" to sink Glorious.....

The game was not yet over, many convoys were already at sea and they were easy preys for an untouched Bismarck.
She was not, but Leach was unaware of the damages and this is the reason why I say he was wrong in breaking off the engagement with just "superficial damages" (his words), even if there is an obvious risk in remaining under BS fire until you are "sure" that she is damaged.

Lutjens realized the game was over when the attempts to recover the fore fuel did not succeeded, but in any case his duty was to get back Bismarck, not to attack RN units.


Bye, Alberto

Hi Alberto


The problem with staying till you have guaranteed that you have effectively finished Bismarcks mission is that its reliant on HMS Prince of Wales being capable of doing the job. I suspect that after Y turret has jammed thats there is a fair degree of skepticism in regards to her fighting ability. I have Santari's book (a very good read!) and I understand that POW fired pretty damned well for what in RN terms was a green ship. It was hardly without issue or malfunctions though. To put it bluntly she was unreliable. If you are going to fight toe to toe wth your enemy you want to be reasonably sure that you are able to take the offensive. Its akin to having a machine gun that in theory can shoot "X" amount of rounds but is liable to have jams lasting anywhere from a few seconds to a few minutes with no idea or warning when they are going to occur. All this whilst your opposite number is taking potshots at you.
If however you can regroup with others the reliability issue is not so much of an issue as others can keep up suppressing fire.Alternatively you can keep contact till another force has zoned into the area.

In regard to Churchill and his Troubridge comments. Well, there is a certain amount of irony in this. If Churchill and the Admiralty hadn't tried to manage from afar, giving ambiguous instructions in the process history might have been different. IMHO Churchill and his interference were directly responsible for the real disaster that followed the Goeben saga - The Battle of Coronel. Cradock stated that that "he had no intention of ending up like Troubridge" the knock on effect of this was that Cradock took his seriously outmatched force to battle Von Spee with pretty forceable results. Cradock took the line similar to yours by fighting regardless. HMS Good Hope and HMS Monmouth achieved nothing apart from depleting their opposite numbers ammunition stocks.

Churchill was a meddler and amateur strategist with a short temper. I have no doubt that he "threw his teddys out of the pram" and I acknowledge what you say in regards to AV Alexander. Could it not be the case however that Alexander was suggesting to Churchill that he was going to make a fool of himself by stamping his feet before he actually understood the what had occurred and the circumstances? This was a pretty tumultuous time. The UK was losing in pretty much every theatre it fought. It was being hammered off Crete. Churchill going off half cocked at the RN when the actual facts of the event were unclear was hardly likely to improve things. Could this not be the reason why he (Churchill) said "leave it" as the old meddler realised that he had been a bit of an arse(again)?



Best wishes


HMSVF
Doubtless Churchill was disappointed with the outcome of the battle and Leach's decision to open the range and W-W's decision not to renew the battle straightaway . OTOH, if you read Churchill's History of the 2nd WW, you'll also note that he was very cognizant of the fact that the RN's capital ship strength was a critical factor in the RN being able to contain the European Axis navies and deter the IJN. He was also aware that a fatally weakened RN could undercut US aid to Britain, in favour of increased US domestic defence spending. Anyways here's Churchill's summation:

Grand Alliance, p263:
The command now passed to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker
on his bridge in the cruiser Norfolk. It was for him to decide
whether to renew the fight at once or hold on to the enemy till
the Commander-in-Chief should arrive with the King George
V and the aircraft-carrier Victorious. A dominant factor was
the state of the Prince of Wales. This ship had only recently
been commissioned, and scarcely a week had passed since
Captain Leach had been able to report her "fit for battle."
She had been severely mauled, and two of her ten fourteeninch
guns were unserviceable. It was highly doubtful whether
in this condition she was a match for the Bismarck. Admiral
Wake-Walker, therefore, decided not to renew the action, but
to hold the enemy under observation. In this he was indisputably
right.
The Bismarck would indeed have been wise to rest content
with what amounted by itself to a resounding triumph. She
had destroyed in a few minutes one of the finest ships in the
Royal Navy, and could go home to Germany with a major
success. Her prestige and potential striking power would rise
immensely, in circumstances difficult for us to measure or
explain.
Moreover, as we now know, she had been seriously injured
by the Prince of Wales, and oil was leaking from her heavily.
How then could she hope to discharge her mission of commerce
destruction in the Atlantic? She had the choice of returning
home victorious, with all the options of further enterprises
open, or of going to almost certain destruction. Only the
extreme exaltation of her Admiral or the imperious orders by
which he was bound can explain the desperate decision which
he took. When I saw my American friend at about ten o'clock,
I had already learned that the Bismarck was steaming southward,
and I was, therefore, able to speak with renewed confidence
about the final result...

p271:
...former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 28 May 41.
I will send you later the inside story of the fighting with the
Bismarck. She was a terrific ship, and a masterpiece of naval construction.
Her removal eases our battleship situation, as we should
have had to keep King George V, Prince of Wales, and the two
Nelsons practically tied to Scapa Flow to guard against a sortie of
Bismarck and Tirpitz, as they could choose their moment and we
should have to allow for one of our ships refitting. Now it is a
different story. The effect upon the Japanese will be highly beneficial.
I expect they are doing all their sums again.

Removing PoW from the above equation would have been disastrous. OTOH, Hitler as per the Fuhrer Naval Conferences, closely questioned the KM as to why Lutjens didn't attempt to sink PoW and/or why he didn't simply return to Norway in triumph after sinking the Hood. Churchill concludes that Lutjens followed his orders too closely, without due regard for the overall strategic situation, or seriously overestimated Bismarck's capabilities. Yet, A&A want us to believe that Churchill demanded that Leach and W-W to emulate Craddock's suicidal conduct in 1914, rather than intelligently weigh tactical risk versus strategic benefits.


Additionally, as we've discussed at length in the past (it's a pity that this forum doesn't have an option for a text only, extended page lengths to enable rapid reading of older topics) Leach and W-W were aware that CiC Home Fleet was at sea with another battle squadron, a squadron of cruisers and the carrier Victorious (albeit with a weak scratch airgroup) and there was every prospect of W-W's squadron joining the CiC (Tovey) and subsequently overwhelming Lutjens with a massive superiority of force, whereas if PoW allowed herself to be crippled and/or sunk then Tovey is back to trying to tackle Bismarck and PE with an even weaker battle squadron (KGV and Repulse) than possessed by Holland. The best case scenario then would have been Bismarck sunk but at the cost of serious damage to KGV and Repulse with all the RN fast battleships out of commission. Naturally Tovey strongly defended Leach and W-W's actions because it strengthened his hand in his own coming confrontation with Lutjens.
northcape
Senior Member
Posts: 350
Joined: Wed Mar 06, 2013 6:31 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by northcape »

Alberto Virtuani wrote: Fri Jun 29, 2018 9:24 pm
is the reason why I say he was wrong in breaking off the engagement with just "superficial damages" (his words), even if there is an obvious risk in remaining under BS fire until you are "sure" that she is damaged.

Bye, Alberto
Alberto, I'm sorry, you are just a blunt liar.

You pretend to be so proud to be an officer, and your whole motivation for this stupidity here is to accuse other officers of "cowardice". Well, I don't know about your bravery, but everybody can see your dishonesty, which puts a lot of shame on your profession.

Your sentence above implies that Leach himself said: "Despite that my ship has only have superficial damages, I'm breaking off the action (action=battle in the DS)."

What Leach said, was that after the battle the damage to Y-turret (for sure no superficial) damage has been fixed, and the remaining damage is superficial. The quote you mention ("superficial damage - his own words") have not been used in the context which you imply, and you know that since you have posted the original transcript in this very thread. So, this simply makes you a blunt liar.

I'm wondering if your all previous works and battle maps are based on similiar omissions and intended twisting of the truth, and if your future publications will follow this same style. So this maybe is also the reason why you don't show the silver bullet yet - you are still working out the story.
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,

while I have to try to respect anyone personal opinion about PoW suffered battle damages, these were declared to be "superficial" by her own Commanding Officer to his new flag officer very few minutes after the battle (06:25 message) and his opinion is definitive (and actually correct). :negative:

* Disengaging a battleship from a fight after having got one single 15" hit (the other 2 were received while disengaging) is not in line with the RN traditions.
* Turning away from the enemy after having sustained only superficial damages is not in line with the RN traditions.
* Breaking off an engagement because her Captain has in his mind potential (not actual) problems (as per Leach report) is not in line with the RN traditions.
* Leaving a dangerous enemy free to raid in Atlantic, apparently undamaged, is not in line with the RN traditions.

What is needed more to justify and explain the menace of a Court Martial ? Blatant treachery ? Let's admit that Leach behavior at the Denmark Strait was surely not "Nelsonian" (to say the least) and that he (and Wake-Walker) were saved by the mere fact that Bismarck had been sunk.


Capt.Leach duty was to fight and to ensure Bismarck was (further) damaged, not to open her the door to Atlantic. The simple fact that Tovey invented his sugar-coated point 19 in the despatches (including the self-inflicted "Y" turret jamming, that was in no way a "battle damage") demonstrates that, even in his view, the reasons presented by Leach in his report were not sufficient.



Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Sat Jun 30, 2018 10:01 pm, edited 6 times in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,

a poor "RN hooligan", unable to understand any military matter, wrote a low post (http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopi ... 779#p78778) insulting, insinuating, giving no added value (as usual from him) and being so dull to even try to "demonstrate" his offenses. :lol: :lol: :lol:

His post has been duly reported to the webmaster in the hope to have such a low person banned from this forum for his uncivilized behavior and to have him forced to behave in such way ONLY in his pub with his peers, instead. :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by dunmunro »

HMSVF wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 10:47 am


PoW's command team and command centre had suffered a crippling hit.
PoW's gunnery radar systems had all failed and she was facing two opponents each with an efficient FC radar system.
PoW had one 14in gun out of action and the equivalent of another out of action as well. She also had a basic fault in her turret loading mechanism that made them prone to jamming.
PoW's 5.25in FC directors had been knocked out so she had no effective secondary armament and no means to engage PE.
PoW had suffered a funnel hit and damage to her boiler machinery and two further underwater hits aft that eventually flooded a shaft alley.
PoW was rapidly closing the range and thus losing her main armoured belt immunity to 38cm hits, which could have led to her machinery being severely damaged and PoW immobilized, which would have almost certainly led to her loss, leaving KGV as the RN's only modern fast battleship to face 2 x Bismarck class and 2 x Vittorio Veneto class.

PoW had effectively 8 x 14in guns to oppose 8 x 38cm, 8 x 20.3cm, 6 x 15cm, 14 x 10.5cm guns and 8 x 21in TTs. Any calibre KM shell hits could knock out PoW's remaining 14in gun directors leading to the loss of centralized 14in FC and thus a further drastic reduction in 14in gunnery efficiency

Given the above PoW had a vanishingly small chance of a successful outcome unless she could open the range ASAP to nullify Lutjens' massive advantage in medium calibre guns.



This was the impression that I always had in regards to POW's condition after Hood had been sunk. Could it not be the case that Leach simply left the line (so to speak) initially to open the range ? I've read several accounts of such an manoeuvre by Hipper's battlecruisers. Could it not be the case that after the having the initial plan to simply open a up a bit of range Y turret jammed and that turned out being the "straw that broke the camels back" resulting in disengagement. I would imagine that unjamming Y turret was not a quick business - wasn't there an inherent flaw in the design of the turret training ring ? I was under the impression that the tolerances were too tight and didn't allow for any flex in the hull structure? Personally I don't think that 74% is that great and I'm pretty sure that during KGV's action with Bismarck she was down to around 25% for a short period. Luckily Bismarck was going nowhere and Rodney was doing the business (another ship which had turret issues which took 10 years to sort out!) Given this lack of reliability would you continue to fight with 40% or so of your main armament jammed? I know I wouldn't.


Best Wishes



HMSVF
I have argued in the past that Leach did turn to open the range and then decided to withdraw when Y turret failed. Unfortunately, the sequence of events on PoW, after the Compass Platform hit, haven't been brought to light and we have no insight into what Leach knew and/or his subsequent intentions. We do know that Leach was stunned, and was unconscious for a brief period of time, and suffered a hernia from the 38cm shockwave. There's actually a good possibility that Leach's memory of subsequent events was extremely hazy, which is a common occurrence after a concussion and exacerbated by lack of sleep, hence no letters to his son and/or wife describing the subsequent events (that I am aware of) have come to light. As I've stated in the past, it is a pity, from a historical perspective that there wasn't a BofI convened to question all concerned, and thus piece together what happened.

The flaws in the 14in turrets were mainly related to being too lightly constructed to save weight. The turret jamming issue was related to the interaction of the circular 14in loading (carousal) trays; there was an inner tray that was locked to the turret and rotated with it, and an outer tray that could be stopped to allow 14in shells to be loaded onto it from the magazine, and then rotated to match the position of the inner tray. The 14in shells were loading into hoppers that had hinged antisurge plates at either end to prevent the shell from moving as the ship rolled. Unfortunately these antisurge plates were not strong enough and if the wrong combination of tray position and ship roll occurred a shell from one ring could foul the loading hoppers of the other and when the turret rotated the nose/tail of the shell would distort and damage the loading hoppers of the other tray. Additionally, the outer tray could contact the ship's structure (mainly in A turret) due to flexure of the hull, especially when the ship rolled in heavy weather.

It's true that KGV's 14in firepower declined dramatically after her first 50 salvos or so, when a 14in turret jammed and multiple guns jammed due to loading issues and/or misfires. KGV's gunnery report specifically mentions the reliability of her 5.25in guns and their ability to smother Bismarck with 5.25in hits, which helped to offset the loss of 14in output. Leach, OTOH, didn't even have a functioning secondary armament FC system.
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by HMSVF »

dunmunro wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 10:51 pm
HMSVF wrote: Sat Jun 30, 2018 10:47 am


PoW's command team and command centre had suffered a crippling hit.
PoW's gunnery radar systems had all failed and she was facing two opponents each with an efficient FC radar system.
PoW had one 14in gun out of action and the equivalent of another out of action as well. She also had a basic fault in her turret loading mechanism that made them prone to jamming.
PoW's 5.25in FC directors had been knocked out so she had no effective secondary armament and no means to engage PE.
PoW had suffered a funnel hit and damage to her boiler machinery and two further underwater hits aft that eventually flooded a shaft alley.
PoW was rapidly closing the range and thus losing her main armoured belt immunity to 38cm hits, which could have led to her machinery being severely damaged and PoW immobilized, which would have almost certainly led to her loss, leaving KGV as the RN's only modern fast battleship to face 2 x Bismarck class and 2 x Vittorio Veneto class.

PoW had effectively 8 x 14in guns to oppose 8 x 38cm, 8 x 20.3cm, 6 x 15cm, 14 x 10.5cm guns and 8 x 21in TTs. Any calibre KM shell hits could knock out PoW's remaining 14in gun directors leading to the loss of centralized 14in FC and thus a further drastic reduction in 14in gunnery efficiency

Given the above PoW had a vanishingly small chance of a successful outcome unless she could open the range ASAP to nullify Lutjens' massive advantage in medium calibre guns.



This was the impression that I always had in regards to POW's condition after Hood had been sunk. Could it not be the case that Leach simply left the line (so to speak) initially to open the range ? I've read several accounts of such an manoeuvre by Hipper's battlecruisers. Could it not be the case that after the having the initial plan to simply open a up a bit of range Y turret jammed and that turned out being the "straw that broke the camels back" resulting in disengagement. I would imagine that unjamming Y turret was not a quick business - wasn't there an inherent flaw in the design of the turret training ring ? I was under the impression that the tolerances were too tight and didn't allow for any flex in the hull structure? Personally I don't think that 74% is that great and I'm pretty sure that during KGV's action with Bismarck she was down to around 25% for a short period. Luckily Bismarck was going nowhere and Rodney was doing the business (another ship which had turret issues which took 10 years to sort out!) Given this lack of reliability would you continue to fight with 40% or so of your main armament jammed? I know I wouldn't.


Best Wishes



HMSVF
I have argued in the past that Leach did turn to open the range and then decided to withdraw when Y turret failed. Unfortunately, the sequence of events on PoW, after the Compass Platform hit, haven't been brought to light and we have no insight into what Leach knew and/or his subsequent intentions. We do know that Leach was stunned, and was unconscious for a brief period of time, and suffered a hernia from the 38cm shockwave. There's actually a good possibility that Leach's memory of subsequent events was extremely hazy, which is a common occurrence after a concussion and exacerbated by lack of sleep, hence no letters to his son and/or wife describing the subsequent events (that I am aware of) have come to light. As I've stated in the past, it is a pity, from a historical perspective that there wasn't a BofI convened to question all concerned, and thus piece together what happened.

The flaws in the 14in turrets were mainly related to being too lightly constructed to save weight. The turret jamming issue was related to the interaction of the circular 14in loading (carousal) trays; there was an inner tray that was locked to the turret and rotated with it, and an outer tray that could be stopped to allow 14in shells to be loaded onto it from the magazine, and then rotated to match the position of the inner tray. The 14in shells were loading into hoppers that had hinged antisurge plates at either end to prevent the shell from moving as the ship rolled. Unfortunately these antisurge plates were not strong enough and if the wrong combination of tray position and ship roll occurred a shell from one ring could foul the loading hoppers of the other and when the turret rotated the nose/tail of the shell would distort and damage the loading hoppers of the other tray. Additionally, the outer tray could contact the ship's structure (mainly in A turret) due to flexure of the hull, especially when the ship rolled in heavy weather.

It's true that KGV's 14in firepower declined dramatically after her first 50 salvos or so, when a 14in turret jammed and multiple guns jammed due to loading issues and/or misfires. KGV's gunnery report specifically mentions the reliability of her 5.25in guns and their ability to smother Bismarck with 5.25in hits, which helped to offset the loss of 14in output. Leach, OTOH, didn't even have a functioning secondary armament FC system.


We do know that Leach was stunned, and was unconscious for a brief period of time, and suffered a hernia from the 38cm shockwave. There's actually a good possibility that Leach's memory of subsequent events was extremely hazy, which is a common occurrence after a concussion and exacerbated by lack of sleep

Having worked with people who have suffered traumatic injuries for the last 20 years I would say I wouldn't be surprised. Of course this was way before the advent of CT (computed tomography),but I find it hard to believe that you could have such a near miss without any injury (or at least a detectable one in 1941). Thank you for the explanation in regard to the KGV turret issues. In some respects I always feel that the ghosts of Jutland had a long term affect on the RN in regard to propellant safety. Both the Nelson and KGV's had pretty complex interlocks to make them flash tight,I sometimes wonder if the actual problem (at Jutland) was (relatively) thin armour + a laissez-faire approach to munition practice + the fact that cordite could be unstable. you could get away with one of the three but not 2 or three out of 3. The RN certainly took the flash problem seriously but perhaps over complicated things ?

Personally I think Leach did ok. Its easy to say that a person should have done x,y,z. Im sure in our different professions (whatever they may be) we have trained for the worst case scenario.Its a whole different ball game when you play it out for real.


For me Leach found himself in an impossible situation. Hood sunk, the Bismarck has his range ,he has just had his bridge staff wiped out. He is in a weapons system thats has some serious flaws and a relatively green crew.

At 14000 yards.


(which seems ludicrously close to me.As I mentioned, these were WW1 ranges)


I was reading Tarrant's book on the KGV class this evening - he is of the opinion that only 3 of the 18 salvo's fired (and it would appear that some of these were incomplete) were straddles and that of them there were 3 hits.If this is correct Leach would have been 'hors de combat' pretty damned quickly if he had stuck it out - with no guarantee that he would cause significant damage.Just because you can "loose them off" doesn't mean that you are performing effective fire.

Indeed surely if POW had continued in the same vein as per actual history she may well have ended up with zero FC,no command structure and a waterlogged hulk. That would leave the RN with 1 new battleship till HMS Duke of York commissioned. This at a time when the RN was running out of ships (given the situation in Crete).


As I have already alluded to . I think that Leach is being treated harshly. Wake Walker ? I leave that to you scholars.




Best wishes HMSVF
Locked