you had written: "We also have mention of the discussions between Churchill and Leach etc regarding the conduct of the action or put another way how the action went."
you have written: "To have discussed the conduct in the action would mean looking at how those participating acted".
conduct" is "how (Leach) behaved during the action" or "how the action was conducted (by Leach)"
Cag wrote: "the conduct of the action is how the action was conducted, ie what occurred and when, how it happened."
Dunmunro wrote: "We have a whole plethora of people who would or should have been "in the know" about a threatened CMDS yet the only source cited by every book that mentions this is ultimately Tovey... Strange don't you think?"
Thanks to Antonio, we have now ALL the needed evidences not only of the CMDS (confirmed even by the official historian of the Royal Navy), but also of its "evolution" into a request for "explanations" (June 2nd War Cabinet), with the involvement of the whole military (up to Pound) and political chain (up to Churchill) in the "embellishment" of the facts (duly accomplished by Tovey with the "despatches"), and in the final "closure....." of the matter (with ADM 205/10 papers).
Antonio Bonomi wrote: "Knowing who Stephen Roskill was,... the Official Royal Navy Historian for WW2, ... his letters exchange with Adm Tovey and the Adm 205/10 document content early on 2013, ... the research about the truth was going to be much faster and would have occurred much easier going very fast from the top down until the final evidences, ... thru the War Cabinet minutes, the Admiralty Official position about Adm Tovey dispatches ( Sir Barnes letter ) and finally to Adm Tovey dispatches point 17 and 19 ( plus 22 and 23 ) and the single Officers account mismatches until the Hood First board signed declaration, ... and the Pound/ Tovey phone call being the reason for all this " regrettable aftermath " of the DS battle story.
We have done it bottom up, ... starting from the very evident mismatches and up until finally finding all the needed confirmation of the complete knowledge and continuous participation on the decision making process of the politicians ( Churchill ) on top of the military command chain ( Pound ) since the very beginning of it, ... until Churchill final solution of the case, ... tersely writing : Leave it !.
It has been much more difficult and complicated, ... more elaborated and complex and full of difficulties and correlations to be done in order to keep on following the right path upwards, ... but I have to admit at the end it provide us a greater research competence value overall, ... since we made very minor mistakes while doing it, ... and I am personally very proud and satisfyed about it now.
Last but not less important, I have to thank the diligent and pragmatic historian capabilities of Stephen Roskill, saving all documents on his Cambridge Churchill archive, ... and leaving on his books clear footnote's indications about this historical facts, ... and in this way allowing every really interested person looking for the historical truth, ... to find it on the proper place.
That is what an historian should do and what we did here in and will do with this story on future publications."
Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,
In reality, the single document of Adm Tovey, his report called dispatches is this one : Home Fleet, 5th July, 1941 No. 896/H.F. 1325.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm
Here you have the Adm Tovey dispatches document for your convenience in their originally printed version on the London Gazette on October 14th, 1947 :
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/L ... /38098.pdf
The Adm 234-509 containing it and all the other documents is something different, lately called Battle Summary Number 5, and carefully analyzed by Ltnt Cdr Pitcairn-Jones which, ... as we all know well, ... corrected on it on 1948 the incorrect 06:13 statement of Adm Tovey and moved it back to the correct 06:03.
Herr Nilsson wrote:...Tovey's own and first despatch is dated 5th July. His second dispatch contains further appendices to his first dispatch and as enclosures Reports from CS1, CS2, CS18, PoW, Rodney, Victorious, Manchester, King George and Suffolk. This despatch is dated 15th July. One can find all about it in the preface of ADM 234-509.
Attention was called to a BBC broadcast made by a military officer who had been on board one of his Majesty’s ships in the Bismarck action, which had given an unfavourable impression of our ships’ gunnery. Enquiry was being made by the Admiralty into this matter, and a copy of the broadcast should be circulated to the War Cabinet.
A full report would also be made regarding certain aspects of the action which, prima facie, seemed to require explanation.
Wadinga wrote: "Firstly I am cutting myself a huge portion of humble pie And attempting to swallow and digest it.
I accept that Pound and Alexander are the origin points of the docs 332 and 333. The sprawling and illegible signature is AVA. I apologise for this error. It seems senior officials were indeed still involved in the matter two and four whole months after the WM 56 on 5th June."
you wrote: "Firstly the main actual point of interest is the broadcast...:"
you wrote: "The important point in docs 331-334 is not who signs what, but the four month delay since no one is interested any more. "
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