The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "you don't consider Winston Churchill's account of the interest he and the Admiralty took simultaneously in the Crete and Bismarck battles"
Hi Sean,
I assure you that I do, but I have posted the evidence that almost the whole Admiralty War Room was only focusing on the tactical decisions to be taken to sink Bismarck between May 24 and 27, apparently leaving Cunningham to handle the decisions needed to face Crete crisis, just sending him signals asking to do his utmost and leaving him the operational decisions how to sacrifice the whole Mediterranean Fleet if needed......Apparently WSC wanted to actively participate in the tactical decisions regarding the Bismarck.....

It's you who fails to produce any evidence that in the War Room any special attention was given to the tactical decisions regarding Crete during that days, because it was not.



you wrote: "How do you know what the certain aspects and the prima facie are?"
Are you joking ? :stop: possibly you have not yet digested the ADM 205/10.....most indigestible for the "deniers", I see.....
Starting page 331 to Pound from the Admiralty Board secretary:
ADM205-10_331.jpg
ADM205-10_331.jpg (29.13 KiB) Viewed 1292 times
and page 332 (from Pound to Alexander):
ADM205-10_332.jpg
ADM205-10_332.jpg (63.65 KiB) Viewed 1292 times
As you see, the "aspects" are made fully explicit by people who should have been able to understand them and this explicit explanation should be "heard" by deaf ears and "read" by blind eyes, as a very wise person (who refused to continue this useless discussion with the deniers) wrote here recently.

Please, before posting, read the documents that are in your hands and that we have explained to you in several pages in this same thread, avoiding to have people loosing time repeating again and again the same things that YOU SIMPLY DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT "a priori", exposing yourself in this miserable way to desperately support your own denying agenda.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
exposing yourself in this miserable way to desperately support your own denying agenda.
After four whole months have passed, even Pound can't remember what the "certain aspects" and "prima facie" were since they are never specified on June 2nd and takes his cue from the guesswork made back in July by his underling. Report? Report about what? Leach? He is already back in command after his operation and PoW will fight in the Mediterranean.

Alexander is the same case. Some bureaucrat reckons it was about Leach, but is it really what you are after? What's the point? Here's an excerpt from the Board of Admiralty saying they are happy with everything.

Do you understand that "it would appear that" means the July writer actually had no idea what the "certain matters" and "prima facie" were and just guessed, based solely on Pound's ill-informed interim report?



Read Grenfell again who makes it perfectly clear the War Room was dealing with two crises simultaneously. Phillips majored on Bismarck, it would appear Pound probably spent more time on Crete. Graham Rhys-Jones says the same P 134

"For the naval authorities in London, the weekend of 24th/25th May was one of exceptional tension and anxiety. The Admiralty faced not one crisis but two. The battle for Crete was reaching its climax, and with the luftwaffe dominant over the Aegean, the cost of continued support for the island garrison was becoming clearer by the hour. Hard decisions were pending."

As you must have understood if you have read the passage from Gilbert, Churchill spent the early hours of Saturday morning "buttering up" Harriman with the promise of British success against Bismarck to counteract the overwhelming American perception that after experiencing blitzed London, convoy losses in the Atlantic, the British forces being thrown out of Greece, and seeing the unfolding disaster in Crete, Britain was losing the War, and there would be little point in continuing to support and throw expensive aid to a losing side. A few hours later Hood is sunk, and WSC starts carrying on about the Death March and the worst thing since Troubridge and how he will give up alcohol and cigars and take over from Wavell. By the time he reaches London on the Monday, Cunningham and Pound are at loggerheads and the Admiralty is countermanding Cunningham's orders to his own ships.

Ordering the Glenroy force back to Crete was a direct tactical decision taken in the War Room in London. The War Room ordered Cunningham to send his ships north of Crete even though there was nothing to fight. Only Pound had that authority over C in C Mediterranean. Neither Pound nor Phillips ordered Wake-Walker to re-engage. They described his actions as "admirable".

Cag, you keep saying somebody criticised W-W movements in the War Room. Does it say who? BTW the full Colville quote is in the Gilbert pages I posted. It is clear most of the berating of Pound and Alexander is over Cunningham and has nothing to do with Bismarck.

All the best

wadinga

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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Do you understand that "it would appear that" means the July writer actually had no idea what the "certain matters" and "prima facie" were and just guessed, based solely on Pound's ill-informed interim report?"
Hi Sean,
thanks for confirming that you are joking. :negative:
If the July writer (btw, he is Sir R.Brokman, secretary to D.Pound) uses a "courtesy" formula at pag.331 before expliciting these regrettable "aspects" to his boss, Pound writing to Alexander uses a clear indication of what they were (pag.332). Both Alexander and Churchill knew very well what they were as they don't even need to specify them again at pages 333 and 334.....

Now, in your denier obstinacy, you will be able to shameless say that the "full discussions" on the "certain aspects" between Churchill and both Tovey and Leach were regarding the meals served on board PoW...... :lol:


you wrote: "it would appear Pound probably spent more time on Crete."
It would appear to you ONLY, this is your own speculation. You have posted histporians evaluation of the importance of Crete but you have NO proof at all of what you impudently say above, while Adm.Davies says that Pound and Alexander were mainly restraining Churchill from sending direct instructions to Tovey and to the other commanding officers involved in the Bismarck hunt. Please read what I posted above from Davies notes.

I have already admitted that Crete was a serious crisis, but apparently there was no need to interfere too much in the operational decisions for Crete as the whole War Room was entirely concentrated on Bismarck. You insist on Crete, but this crisis has NOTHING to do with Bismarck, Leach or Wake-Walker. Again, you insist about Colville passage, that is clear to everybody except to you (Troubridge comparison is for Leach, not for Cunningham even if you say that the major criticism is for Cunningham) :stop:


you wrote: "Cag, you keep saying somebody criticised W-W movements in the War Room. Does it say who? "
I beg pardon to Mr.Cag, but of course it does. Here Davies words:
"The shadowing by W-W's two cruisers could not have been bettered and excited the admiration of all of us. Tom Phillips's criticisms of him have no substance whatever, and our opinion was that W-W never put a foot wrong.".

Tom Phillips (V.C.N.S.) is the man who, according to Davies: "was right on the ball the whole time, and took a decisive part in the co-ordination of all British forces engaged in the hunting of Bismarck". :wink:



Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Cag »

Hi All

Hi Wadinga as Alberto posted (thanks Alberto it would have taken me a while to find it) it was Phillips who had some kind of criticism of him, what it was is unspecified but I would suggest it may have been his response to the Admiralty signal, and as posted Davies does suggest the criticism was unwarranted.

Best wishes
Cag.
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
even if you say that the major criticism is for Cunningham)
You underlined YOU because with your understandable bias towards inventing a case against Leach and Wake-Walker to sell your co-author's Conspiracy Supposition, you will not accept the largest measure for Churchill's ire is Cunningham.

I say it because "The PM's line is that Cunningham must be made to take every risk: the loss of half the Mediterranean Fleet would be worth while in order to save Crete"

So the "action this day" required by the Prime Minister is not punishing Leach and Wake-Walker but forcing Cunningham to send his fleet out again into the Luftwaffe killing zone. Which he does the following day, and for the price of putting a few holes in Scarpanto airfield, Formidable is put out of action for months.

Crete started before the Bismarck episode and continued straight through it and long afterwards. Only Pound had the authority to override Cunningham's instructions to HMS Glenroy's force, therefore the Crete situation was being monitored just as closely in London as the Bismarck Chase. Only by monitoring the situation very closely indeed would Pound intervene in giving instructions to a particular group of ships, telling them to do the opposite to what C-in-C Mediterranean told them to do.
Tom Phillips (V.C.N.S.) is the man who, according to Davies: "was right on the ball the whole time, and took a decisive part in the co-ordination of all British forces engaged in the hunting of Bismarck".
So not Pound then? :wink:


I appreciate and applaud your honesty in supplying;
"The shadowing by W-W's two cruisers could not have been bettered and excited the admiration of all of us. Tom Phillips's criticisms of him have no substance whatever, and our opinion was that W-W never put a foot wrong.".
I don't know who the "our" are, but I guess the excited admiration is why Wake-Walker was told his actions were admirable.


In the VCNS comments on Tovey's report there is no mention of criticism of either Leach or Wake-Walker. Of Dalrymple-Hamilton yes, but not the two people we are concerned with. Obviously he realised his earlier comments were of "no substance whatever".

Moving to:
before expliciting these regrettable "aspects" to his boss,
He can't explicit anything because he doesn't know what the June 2nd "certain matters" and "prima facie" are. Please supply the words from the Cabinet Minutes of June 2nd which tell him what they are. He merely guesses about what they might be. Nearly two months after the action.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "you will not accept the largest measure for Churchill's ire is Cunningham"
Hi Sean,
I don't accept it because it's ONLY your interpretation. Thanks anyway for posting it in a clear format from "Finest Hour":
Colville_Gilberts_Finest_Hour.jpg
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In Colville sentence the two crisis are of the same importance. However, in one case we have a clear accusation for an already committed dereliction of duty in front of the enemy, with the Troubridge comparison for Leach, in the other one Churchill sees a "tendency" of Cunningham to potentially derelict his duty to prevent a sea borne attack to Crete.

you wrote: "So not Pound then?"
No, Pound was busy restraining Churchill from sending messages himself to Tovey, as per Davies account......Apparently he did not comment on Wake-Walker decision not to re-engage in front of the other officers, clearly speaking to Tovey via phone about the disciplinary actions he requested for "such a great admiral" (your words) :wink:

you wrote: "I don't know who the "our" are"
I have already listed the ones in the War Room who contributed to the operation according to Davies:
the Bismarck hunt was followed by WSC, Eden, Alexander, Mr.Winant (Special US representative), Adm.Ghormley (US Naval representative), and apparently Lord Beaverbrook.
The following naval officers were working on the Bismarck chase: Pound (albeit he had to mainly manage.... WSC fury), Tom Phillips (who actually managed the operation according to Davies), Ralph Edwards (Director of Ops), Charles Daniel (Director of Plans) and the Director of Naval Intelligence, who were just the most active. In addition J.Terry and Bowhill (CinC Costal Command) and Davies himself (Director of Operations (Foreign)) were involved too.


you wrote: "He merely guesses about what they might be"
You keep joking. :stop:
If he guesses, apparently his guess is correct because everybody understand what they are and anwser/act being happy to intrerpret them as Leach disengagement in front of the enemy, from Pound to Alexander to Churchill. They had no doubt about what the "aspects" were. This (pag.332 from ADM 205/10) is written to Alexander, are you able to read ? Do you need any help with the translation ? :wink:
ADM205-10_332.jpg
ADM205-10_332.jpg (68.54 KiB) Viewed 1251 times
Is it clear enough now what were the "certain aspects" referred to in the War Cabinet minutes (41) 56th Conclusions, Item 1 ? It was well clear to Alexander, who, based on the above, asked Churchill what he intended to do after his "full discussions" with both Tovey and Leach. It was clear for Churchill too.....

Please, stop playing games like this. :stop:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Since you have become such a great fan of Roskill, although he does not cover the Cretan campaign in any depth in Churchill and the Admirals, he says the following P 185

"While Cunningham was straining every nerve to get reinforcements and supplies to Crete, and losses were mounting all the time, he was harassed by extraordinary interference from London- in one notorious case by the Admiralty directly contradicting his orders*- and by high level messages from the COSs in which Churchill's hand may surely be detected, to the effect that greater efforts were needed and greater risk must be accepted. Cunningham, who reasonably found such prodding " singularly unhelpful" replied with exemplary patience, and continued to do all that was possible."

Clearly the Cretan campaign was taking up a lot of time for the Admiralty and the PM. At the same time as Bismarck. Says Roskill.

Also a very revealing letter between Pound and Cunningham from Dec 1st 1940 on P 178:
"The PM is very difficult these days, not that he has not always been," he told Cunningham. "One has however to take a broad view because one has to deal with a man who is proving a magnificent leader, and one just has to put up with his childishness as long as it isn't dangerous. Also with a man like that it is not good policy to present him with a brick wall unless it is [about?] a thing which is really vital", which was a pretty fair summary both of Churchill's character and of Pound's way of handling him.
The childishness manifests itself as Churchill's petulant behaviour in front of his house guests at Chequers "I know it's the Death March and worst thing since Troubridge, which was obviously followed with telephonic tirades at Pound and Alexander. Pound's "handling" technique is evinced in his interim report, which does not present a brick wall by a clear defence of Leach, but merely says his actions will be justified or found wanting when the reports have been studied. That is to say never, because WSC, with his childish memory, will have forgotten all about this soon enough.



And if more were really needed there is P 180, where after description of an embarrassing failure of a commando raid we have:
On reading Cunningham's signalled report, his [Churchill's] mystification turned to anger, and he demanded of Alexander and Pound "What disciplinary or other measures are going to be taken on this deplorable piece of mismanagement after we have had 18 months' of war?" Alexander sensibly remarked on this example of Churchill's addiction to head-hunting that considered view must await receipt of the full reports by the three C-in-Cs and nothing more was heard of it- probably because this minor operation was soon overshadowed by the ordeals of the Greece and Crete campaigns
So Alexander and Pound used exactly the same technique on Churchill over his Chequers tantrum. BTW there is no record of a WSC memo like
What disciplinary or other measures are going to be taken on this deplorable piece of mismanagement


regarding Leach and Wake-Walker. So don't have:
However, in one case we have a clear accusation for an already committed dereliction of duty in front of the enemy
Just as there no words in the June 2nd War Cabinet meeting linking "certain matters" or "prima facie" to these fine and justly decorated officers.

Thank you for confirming that the "our" in the phrase "our excited admiration" means all of the following:
I have already listed the ones in the War Room who contributed to the operation according to Davies:
the Bismarck hunt was followed by WSC, Eden, Alexander, Mr.Winant (Special US representative), Adm.Ghormley (US Naval representative), and apparently Lord Beaverbrook.
The following naval officers were working on the Bismarck chase: Pound (albeit he had to mainly manage.... WSC fury), Tom Phillips (who actually managed the operation according to Davies), Ralph Edwards (Director of Ops), Charles Daniel (Director of Plans) and the Director of Naval Intelligence, who were just the most active. In addition J.Terry and Bowhill (CinC Costal Command) and Davies himself (Director of Operations (Foreign)) were involved too.
Although surely Phillips apparently demurred :think: Maybe he realised he was wrong.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
another very long (and interesting, if put in another thread) post on Crete and Cunningham, but we are discussing here the CM threat for the Denmark Strait...... :stubborn:

If you have any proof of the contrary, please list them. As already posted we have so far in favour of a Court Martial threat and of the "regrettable aftermath" of the DS battle:

1) letter from Tovey to Roskill (this is a written proof and can be countered ONLY by another evidence, or by a medical certificate stating Tovey was somehow insane in 1961), that you don't have),
2) McMullen testimony (same as above),
3) several historians and writers advise (Roskill, Correlli Barnett, Graham Rhys-Jones) that are possibly more able than you to judge what had happened between Downing Street and the Admiralty at that time....
4) Sir Henry Leach confirmation (if he had even a minimum doubt about the "saga", he would have said that in the Wills book),
5) War Cabinet Minutes (41), 56th Item 1 and ADM 205/10 papers , clearly showing (if you finally try to open your eyes) that "certain aspects" were under investigation.
6) Even this modern DS battle author (before he decided to join the "RN hooligans" side, refusing "a priori" all evidences), was apparently convinced of the Pound threat to Tovey, despite he still apparently lacked, according to mentioned bibliography, Roskill late books, McMullen, Sir Henry, War Cabinet minutes and ADM 205/10...(http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... olland.htm, last paragraph of "Finding the Range" chapter). :wink:

Doubtful about the CM threat is ONLY Kennedy with his insinuation on Tovey memory based on Paffard. His doubts were however countered by Roskill letter to Kenendy, in which Roskill confirms Tovey reliability about this occurrence.

Against the CM threat we have only ..... the denier at any cost that today refuse to understand what happened...... :negative:


However, the final proof, that allowed Antonio to understand everything bottom-up even before having entirely the above material available, is the intentional "embellishment" (or "sugar-coating", or "cover-up") of the facts in the reports presented after the battle[/b] to get to the final official version.
As Graham Rhys-Jones wisely said in his "The loss of the Bismarck": "it was Tovey's version which went to the printers".



you wrote: "no words in the June 2nd War Cabinet meeting linking "certain matters" or "prima facie" to these fine and justly decorated officers." :negative: :negative: :negative:

A vivid example of your obstinacy in refusing any evidence at any cost. I will re-post here the official document (ADM 205/10 pag.332, referencing the War Cabinet minutes) where the reference to these "fine and justly decorated officers" (explicitly for Leach, implicitly for Wake-Walker) is actually linked to to the "certain aspects" that "prima facie" required explanations: repetita juvant, at least let's hope you will be able to finally understand.... :stop:

ADM205-10_332-1.jpg
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Bye, Alberto
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"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

I am sorry if your consider my posts long-winded, but I consider I bring new evidence, such as Pound's opinion of Churchill's behaviour (on occasion) and his preferred technique for handling these irrational outbursts. Exactly as we see in the 26th war minutes. Pretend he might just have a point worth investigating without actually agreeing with him, then quietly ignore it and do nothing until it goes away.

Thanks once again for Alexander's letter, but I can see clearly that it was solely motivated by Sir R Brockman's deduction that whatever the "certain matters" and "prima facie" were, although nowhere actually specified, they might be something to do with Leach and Wake-Walker. Far better to see if Winston wants to pursue a head-hunt he thought about 4 months ago (and probably forgot 4 months ago) than answer awkward questions about why British battleships blow up easily or why Tovey went charging off in the wrong direction. In the event, the Great Man, dimly remembering (a lot has happened in 4 months), his puerile and ungracious behaviour at Chequers, when not in possession of any of the important details, testily responds "Leave it!"

Nice of you to put my own humble offering in the company of the pantheon of naval writers :oops: but:
The story of his offer to haul down his flag and act in Wake-Walker’s defence at any court martial is well known and reflects well on the Home Fleet commander.
Even when I wrote this over ten years ago, it was only a "well known story" (because even Kennedy didn't really believe it) and despite you and Antonio's efforts to turn it into a fact after building your fanciful Conspiracy Theory on top of it, all we have seen in the last few years has shown it to be increasingly less likely even than Kennedy's caveats suggested.

I am disappointed your are so sensitive about the term Conspiracy Filter :( Can you just tell me whether Ellis actually uses the word timid or whether you have............ interpreted his opinions for me? Alternatively, Cag, could I ask you to say what Ellis actually says?

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "I can see clearly that it was solely motivated by Sir R Brockman's deduction"
Hi Sean, the "deduction" (as you call it) was accepted by Pound (pag.332), Alexander (pag.333) and Churchill (pag.334), who differently from you, immediately understood it, therefore it was the good one. :wink:
I know it's annoying but it's written black and white..... The "certain aspects" are related with PoW disengagement and there is nothing you can say that will change this.

Regarding your article from 10+ years ago, you seemed to easily accept the "story" of the Court Martial at the time, when it was not founded on evidences like the reconstruction of the battle and not yet handled by the intentional alteration of the facts. :think:

Only now, that the "can of worms" is wide open, you find it "doubtful"..... :negative:


Bye, Alberto


P.S. as no one else seems to be willing to post Ellis' account of the loss of touch (very long, 5 pages), the word timid is not present in Ellis autobiography but the meaning is clear, here a few sentences from it (my underlined):

"What I did not add (to his official report, quoted above), for reasons of tact, was that I was handicapped by having the Norfolk and wounded Prince of Wales trailing me closely.......
The Admiral’s decision to keep the partly crippled battleship close to the Suffolk with her radar eyes was correct from the viewpoint of Security
, in guarding from a surprise night attack which could have been fatal.....
Let to myself, of course, I would have resumed the correct shadowing station astern of the Bismarck, after the late afternoon action.....As it was, my Admiral had called me over to port, and the enemy movements sucessively broadened the bearing, until it was quite unsuitable for a single shadower. The other two ships, being close to us, contributed nothing.....
Having reported loss of touch, at 0401/25, I began my search at once. But it seems that in the Norfolk the signal was not shown to the Admiral, who was sleeping for an hour or so. He made no signal between 0401/25 and 0552/25"
(ref. pag 16, 18 and 19 of Ellis autobiography chapter 19)

Are these few sentences enough to corroborate your view of such a "great Admiral", who postponed effectiveness of shadowing to security :oops: and apparently asked not to be disturbed when sleeping :shock: at the time Bismarck was lost ?
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi all,
I got some time to transcript Ellis autobiography pages regarding the loss of touch from chapter 19.

I have posted them however in a new thread (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244) to avoid to divert the discussion from the main topic here, being the Court Martial threat from Pound to Tovey.

Therefore I will post here the transcription of the famous letter, written by Adm.Tovey to S.Roskill, the content of which has been already discussed several times on this thread, in his complete form for what concerns the Court Martial, including the reasons why Tovey did not want these "happenings" to be published:
Tovey_Roskill_Court_Martial.jpg
Tovey_Roskill_Court_Martial.jpg (74.49 KiB) Viewed 1197 times
Luckily, Tovey calligraphy was very well understandable, compared to the one of most of the other officers I have seen in Roskill papers, so I have not many doubts about the correct transcription.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Thank you for supplying a treasure trove of new source material over several threads. :clap: :clap: :clap:

It is interesting that Ellis considered Norfolk and PoW were "trailing him". As we know it was concern for Suffolk's safety that caused Wake-Walker to concentrate his force to protect her, and the logical choice was on the "interior lines", ie to the east, but such tactical matters are to be covered elsewhere. We know W-W decisions were considered "admirable" after having created "excited admiration" amongst the War Office Staff. Suffice to observe that nowhere, even after tens of summers have passed by, while questioning decisions with hindsight, does Ellis call W-W "timid" or impugn his courage in any way. Unlike some Johnny-Come-Latelies. "A couple of Cowards" :kaput: :negative:

As you transcribe more of Ellis' late life account you will, I imagine, find the part where he describes his own poor performance due to lack of sleep, as Rhys-Jones says P155
...Ellis felt his mental processes had been sluggish. He had been shadowing the enemy for more than thirty hours and, before that, had been on his bridge for the best part of two days while negotiating pilotage waters off the coast of Iceland.
As Kennedy describes in his excellent account:
The crews of Norfolk and Suffolk, the captains and bridge officers especially, were near to exhaustion. In Norfolk Wake-Walker and Captain Phillips had been kept going by the ship's doctor on Benzadrine and black coffee, now they agreed to split the night watches between them. In Suffolk Captain Ellis had no-one similar to delegate authority to.
Suffolk's radar had been losing contact regularly and there was no reason to assume she might not recover it soon. CS1 had ordered Suffolk to act independently for RDF purposes, Ellis' choice of zigzag and radar resting were his own.

I would put down to ignorance and lack of experience an observation like:
and apparently asked not to be disturbed when sleeping
if it were anyone without your naval experience, I could make allowances, but apparently your desperation to blacken Wake-Walker's name as the Ziggurat collapses around your ears, knows no limits. :stop:

It is the responsibility of any naval officer to create a delegate who can take over in case he is incapacitated. Captain Phillips may have considered there was nothing Wake-Walker could do if he were called. Since nowhere is there criticism of Wake-Walker's performance there can be no accusation of being asleep on duty.

Tovey's letter (thanks once again) reveals he never felt Wake-Walker had anything to be ashamed of, despite your accusations that the C-in-C himself falsified evidence in order to hide W-W lies and shortcomings. He was apparently less concerned about "cracking" Pound when describing the Run Out of Fuel signal, even if he was confused and inaccurate about timing, as " the stupidest signal ever sent". However it should be noted Churchill had already admitted responsibility for it in the Grand Alliance.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
thanks for your applause, however I see that you insist to post on the WRONG THREAD, even if a new one is available: I do understand your difficulty regarding the Court Martial evidences. Anyway I will answer to your nonsense regarding Wake-Walker in the new thread, dedicated to his brilliant shadowing tactics during the night 24-25, not here. :negative:

I re-post here the famous letter from Tovey to Roskill (just underlining for you some statements/kewords) to give you an opportunity to open your eyes and see why Roskill did not publish this information before 1971.
Tovey_Roskill_Court_Martial_1961.jpg
Tovey_Roskill_Court_Martial_1961.jpg (111.62 KiB) Viewed 900 times
As you see, Tovey was well aware that the publication of this letter would have attracted criticism on both Pound (excused anyway by Churchill endorsement) and Wake-Walker and possibly also feared unpleasant consequences as Wake-Walker's family was very influential, due to his relations..... :think:
I anyway tend to believe that Tovey's fairness was sincere.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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wadinga
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

For there to be credible threat of court martial there must be criticism of Wake-Walker's actions in 1941. You have supplied evidence that the War Room were approving of his actions at the time and there is no record of Pound, Phillips or anyone else recording criticism afterwards. There is no time for criticism to be generated after studying reports track charts etc etc because Tovey alleges the threat was made before any of this material was even seen by Pound.
I anyway tend to believe that Tovey's fairness was sincere.
despite the fact you allege he lied in his report and is the main Cover-Up instigator! :shock:
feared unpleasant consequences as Wake-Walker's family was very influential, due to his relations.....
What more influential than Sir Henry Leach, future First Sea Lord whose relative was also apparently threatened! This story was hidden because Tovey knew Pound had no intention of going through with it, even if he did make such an empty threat. Why bother to tell anyone at all? One of the two people in the letter he did tell was Paffard and he said Tovey misremembered and exaggerated. Brind was dead so Kennedy could not check the story with him.

Roskill knew the story was fishy, and sat on it for years because he knew it was either said in a fit of unreasoning temper by Pound, whilst Tovey was giving him a hard time over the Stupidest signal, or Tovey plain misunderstood. Or Pound said he was asked to CM the Denmark Straits Two and Tovey reacted to this hypothetical situation and exaggerated it into reality. Only when Tovey was dead and could no longer be questioned over his veracity, did he pass it to Kennedy knowing he could not resist publishing it. Once it was published Roskill would be free to use it to castigate Churchill and Pound in his later works, citing Kennedy.

What is in the letter in Para 1? Is it to do with the Stupidest Signal? Why is it higher priority?

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
as said already, we don't need your concurrence witht he CM threat as being a real occurrence. We have already (and you cannot counter in any way):

1) the above letter from Tovey to Roskill (this is a written proof and can be countered ONLY by another evidence, or by a medical certificate stating Tovey was somehow insane in 1961), have you found it?),
2) McMullen testimony that Tovey told him too about it, independently from the letter (same as above),
3) several historians and writers advise (Roskill, Correlli Barnett, Graham Rhys-Jones) that are surely able to understand what had happened between Downing Street and the Admiralty at that time....
4) Sir Henry Leach confirmation (if he had even a minimum doubt about the "saga", he would have said that in the Wills book, while he accepted it as a real fact and felt the need to defend his father),
5) War Cabinet Minutes (41), 56th Item 1 and ADM 205/10 papers , clearly showing (if you finally try to open your eyes) that "certain aspects" were indeed under investigation, albeit they refer explicitly only to PoW retreat, just mentioning Barnes' W-W conduct evaluation based on Tovey despatches.

Kennedy only doubt (I have however in my hands a letter where he speaks to Roskill about this occurrence, apparently considering it as a real fact, possibly being only afraid to unveal this "regrettable aftermath".... :think: ) was based on Paffard and it was demolished by Roskill in his letter to Kennedy and in his subsequent books.

Everybody (including you) was accepting the CM as a "well known story", UNTIL Antonio has discovered the intentional alteration of the facts and reports that was done to counter the menace and stop any further criticism. Now it is more difficult to digest, but it's not possible to deny it.

you wrote: "there must be criticism of Wake-Walker's actions in 1941"
There was, officially at least from Tom Phillips, who drove the operation, and Pound, who was not very unhappy when he asked the Court Martial to Tovey. Also the comment of Davies who (unquestioned) said that "W-W never put a foot wrong" looks like an "excusatio non petita", confirming that rumors were circulating.
We don't have Churchill comments re W-W, but the fact that both Pound and Alexander were busy restraining the PM to send his own signals to the officers involved, leaves some doubts about his mood...... :think:

you wrote: "despite the fact you allege he lied in his report and is the main Cover-Up instigator"
Tovey had to present a report that could stop any further criticism (see Barnes answer) and that could allow the rewarding by the King. Years later, when retired, I don't think his fairness toward Pound and W-W was false, at least reading his letter.
The content of the letter clearly explains why Roskill did not publish its content until Tovey's death, in 1971.

you wrote: "What is in the letter in Para 1? Is it to do with the Stupidest Signal? "
Bravo! Correct, but to speak about this signal (repeated to other ships too, so a well meditated stupidity, I would say... :think: ) means to start from other letters from 1950 and 1954 (the ones I remember by heart) in which this is fully discussed by Tovey to Roskill.
Apparently, the towing signal was felt by Tovey as a personal offense much more than the CM threat for a couple of "a bit timid" subordinates and he wrote about it to Roskill starting at least 1950.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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