What cannot be discussed or denied any longer is the fact that on May 1941 Adm Pound requested this type of action for those 2 Royal Navy Officers to Adm Tovey that refused to do it and soon after the initiative was abandoned.
This cannot be put in discussion anymore.
Keep on discussing about Board of Inquiry versus trial for Court martial is just a waste of time, ... simply because the 2 things were tightly connected and one was just enabling the other
Stephen Roskill maintained his commitment to Adm Tovey request not to publish the story until Tovey died ( January 1971)
despite the story was well known into the Royal Navy and by many witnesses Sir Kennedy interviewed for Pursuit,
Dunmunro wrote: "Conduct = conduct of the battle = tactical circumstances. "
you wrote: "You cannot show that they altered their Reports of Proceedings. Period. Full stop. Ever."
Usually the first step is called just to prepare the second step in case of a sure Officer misconduct.
The conduct of the action that ensued was correct and spirited and its success assured the attainment of what had been selected as the primary object of the operation viz the timely and safe arrival of the convoy.
everybody understood and realized that the Court Martial was the real goal of Adm Pound initiative
There are evidence of what I stated regarding Kennedy interviewed persons ( other than Adm Tovey ) and their sure knowledge about this story.
I do not know if Kennedy asked them about it or not, and this fact by itself tells the whole story about Sir Kennedy historical investigation real capabilities.
What is for sure is that they knew about it long before Kennedy published his book on July 1974 since they declared their knowledge about this story soon after the war end.
Alberto Virtuani wrote:Dunmunro wrote: "Conduct = conduct of the battle = tactical circumstances. "
"BofI into conduct of WW and Leach" = examination of their MILITARY behaviour ! Please don't come back with this ridiculous statements and read back here if you don't remember what has been discussed already http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6728&p=76811&hilit=conduct#p76811.you wrote: "You cannot show that they altered their Reports of Proceedings. Period. Full stop. Ever."
I can and we did already.
We have already proven everything here http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799.
To refresh "memory" for everybody, please read Tovey's preliminary report on May 30 (more or less correct) vs his final despatches (totally misleading), intentionally prepared based on incorrect statements from Wake-Walker......
We have many more, but this is largely sufficient.
In the above report, PoW retreated within 2 minutes, at 6:02 (more or less correct) and NO Y turret jamming occurred before the retreat (correct)
Here the retreat time is moved shamefully to 6:13 , with Y turret jamming is intentionally moved BEFORE the retreat decision.
It's you who cannot deny written evidences. Period. Full stop. Ever.(your words)
Dunmunro wrote: "Tovey's preliminary report is irrelevant."
Alberto Virtuani wrote:Dunmunro wrote: "Tovey's preliminary report is irrelevant."
I'm sorry it is NOT. It is the written, undeniable proof of the cover-up as what I have posted above shows to everybody.
It's you who cannot deny written evidences. Period. Full stop. Ever.(your words).
Leach changed his version 3 times (but he just corrected the most incorrect statements like the number of guns in action), Wake-Walker only released a single report (AFAIK), very careful to write nothing compromising (as he had already done in interviews and BofI's like the identification of BC1 at 5:16 and the distance from Hood at 6:00), providing Tovey with most of the "sugar-coating" later used in the despatches (e.g. 6:13 PoW retreat time).
He informed me that the Admiralty would order a trial ( for Court Martial ).
I replied that if they did I would act as " Prisoner's Friend ", if necessary resigning my command to do so.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,
a question that does apply to this argument : what is the role of the " Prisoner's Friend " ?
Into the Royal Navy discipline process in which circumstances this definition is used ?
Where this role apply, what kind of activity is the " Prisoner's Friend " supposed to do ?
Of course I am correlating this definition to the Adm Tovey statement while responding to Adm Pound in relation to his declared initiative versus RearAdm Wake-Walker and Capt Leach.He informed me that the Admiralty would order a trial ( for Court Martial ).
I replied that if they did I would act as " Prisoner's Friend ", if necessary resigning my command to do so.
Bottom line, ... to make a long story short, ... what Adm Tovey exactly meant by declaring that " Prisoner's Friend " role intention to Adm Pound ?
Here what it seems to mean :
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defin ... 27s_friend
Some supporting evidence for the whole Royal Navy discipline process :
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Churchills-Nav ... 1844860353
Saturday 31st May 1941
My Dear First Sea Lord,
I have just received your letter of the 28th and am intentionally replying before I see Wake-Walker or Leach. Naturally, like you, I was hoping P of W might be able to re-engage before dark, possibly when the T/B attack was being made by “Victorious”. I knew, however that both W-W and Leach appreciated the necessity for further damage just as well as I did, and that neither would require the slightest encouragement to take risks if they thought it would help us to achieve the object of all of us, to sink the Bismarck or render her impotent to operate on our trade routes. In any case W-W in his reply to the Admiralty made his opinion perfectly clear, after that the responsibility for ordering P of W to re-engage was mine, and mine alone, unless TLs issued an order which I shall never cease to be thankful they did not.
I have no intention of ordering a B of I into the conduct of W-W and Leach under any circumstances but I am only too ready to submit to B of I or C M if Their Lordships see fit to order to enquire into my own actions.
We frequently have to curb our wish to interfere in politics, it is a very great pity politicians cannot be so strong minded when they become critical of our strategy or skill or our tactics. They have done more than enough harm surely in giving information of real value to the Hun – surely the mere fact that the Bismarck was sunk without the loss of another British life or damage to our ships was dramatic enough for anyone.
I refrain from objecting to dangerous talk and ideas when they do not affect directly me or my command but as long as I am in command of the H F I will not submit quietly to information being made public in any place if it endangers ships under my command or prejudices the success of their operations.
Apart from this one point may I say how very deeply I value your letter, and I am sure that you know the last thing I wish to do is to increase your very heavy burden but I must make my stand on this point.
The one thing I value above all is the confidence of my subordinate commanders, and I think you will agree that it was this confidence of officers in TLs and their CinC that was largely responsible for their magnificent work in this operation.
The RD/F question is most important, but we are inclined to attribute most of the jamming to the ship’s own wireless. The night before we got into action I told my COS I intended closing in end-on and that I was convinced the sight of our two ships charging at them would shake the nerves of enemy control officers and rangetakers. COS remarked but unfortunately it won’t affect the R D/F operator. Yesterday evening our own operator told me how fascinating it was to see on the screen our own projectiles going at the enemy, but that, to see the enemy projectiles coming towards him was not nearly so amusing. I now believe one of the reasons for the Bismarck’s shooting going off so soon was their operator was scared stiff by the sight of swarms of bullets approaching him from two directions at once and that quite likely he was the winner in the race to jump over the stress.
I am afraid Andrew is having a terribly trying time but if anyone can pull through he will. I am always trying to think of some way we could operationally relieve the strain on him, but I can’t find any unless the () gives us an opportunity like the other day. But I would recommend most strongly that the Bomber Command should operate at () to the maximum of its capacity and so possibly draw () air forces back from the Near East.
No ship could have stood up to the punishment Bismarck got from the guns of Rodney and KG V and I much doubt that any British ship would have taken the torpedo hits so comparatively lightly- but it is difficult to say without knowing how many times Bismarck was hit or where.
What really causes me concern is that I do not think one KG class ship can by herself be relied to defeat the Tirpitz . Their ships, in addition to excellent instruments & rangefinder glasses have the enormous advantage of being able to spend months training in the Baltic without restriction or embarrassment of any kind, nor, presumably are they constantly having officers and men shifted. I intend missing no opportunity for giving this ship the necessary opportunity for practices, but we are handicapped particularly at night. The limit of the Hun’s effective use of his R D/F appears to be about 24,000 yds: though I shall always seek close action. It would be of inestimable value if our R D/F could range at 30,000 yds and so improve our chances of getting in the first hit, particularly as the Tirpitz unless reduced in speed by T/Bs is almost certain to avoid close action. I urge very strongly that no effort should be spared to give us this increased R D/F range and that drafting from this ship, “The” battlefleet, should be absolutely stopped except by the consent of the Captain.
I am very sad at the loss of the Mashona, I feel it should not have happened, but I will write again after I have seen the () L O Coastal Command who is coming up to see me.
I grudge the FAA none of the credit they have been given, they deserve every bit of it, starting from Rotherham’s reconnaissance from Hataton [sic] but I deeply regret the Hun being given so much valuable information. Apart from anything else, it is encouraging him to include the “Graf Zeppelin” in the next sortie which would be most unfortunate.
I am extremely anxious that any future public references should emphasise as strongly as possible the absolutely devastating effect of our battleship’s gunfire, it was so, and the sailors in the Tirpitz will hate to hear about it. I would even recommend publishing my tribute, so unpopular in political circles, and rub in that it spite of such gallantry no human being could stand it and that even these brave men preferred drowning rather than remaining another instant in the ghastly inferno aboard what was, so short a time before, the pride and hope of the Nazi Navy “invincible and unsinkable”.
Yours very sincerely, even if a trifle obstinate,
Jack C Tovey
Dunmunro wrote: "Show us a before (unaltered) and after (altered) official Report of Proceedings by Leach or W-W."
Are you saying that you have actual evidence, which you may be unwilling to show, that some of the 42 people Kennedy communicated with, knew about the threat to Wake-Walker and Leach and declared it shortly after the War? Just a simple yes or no will suffice for now, I expect we will have to wait for your book to get this proprietary information which you "own". Two of them, of course, would be Admiral R W Paffard and Admiral Bingley. The former clearly told Kennedy, and maybe Roskill too, that Tovey's 1961 recollections were not to be trusted.
Wadinga wrote: "Sometimes I forget who is pulling the strings"
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