Prelude to Matapan

[A Raven]

In the book "The Naval War in the Mediterranean" by green and Massignani. On page 149 (paperback edition), it states that late on the 27th, the Italian Command realized that to continue the mission, would result in its failure, BUT ... and to quote, "Nevertheless, Supermarina accepted the suggestion of Commando Supremo to continue the operation in the waters south of Crete,"
Could somebody PLEASE explain the contradiction, especially as the Italians believed, correctly, that the convoys had been recalled to port, and the ENTIRE purpose of the sortie was to attack these convoys.
Thank you.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi,
you are right and even Iachino himself was not in favor of the operation (see his own books).

However, the Germans were fed up of the inactivity of RM (please see Adm.Reader attitude towards Supermarina at Merano Conference on February '41) and pushed the Comando Supremo to have the fleet deployed anyway. They would have interpreted the (good) reasons not to go on as poor excuses for just staying in harbor as before.

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

Thank you for responding but it does NOT answer my question. Perhaps it is my poor English that makes it difficult to understand.

Hi,
you are right and even Iachino himself was not in favor of the operation (see his own books).

However the German were fed up of the inactivity of RM (please see Reader attitude versus Supermarina at Merano Conference on February 41) and pushed the Comando Supremo to have the fleet deployed anyway. They would have interpreted the (good) reasons not to go on as poor excuses for just staying in harbor.

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi,
I guess it's my poor English....
If I interpret correctly your question, the reason for not giving up the sortie (even if its purpose was evaluated as already compromised) was just political, to show to the Germans that RM was able to control the Mediterranean: of course it was not the case as demonstrated.....

Bye, Alberto

[RF]

I think the last sentence of the above post sums it up quite succinctly.

Italy's whole involvement in WW2 was a political vanity exercise on the part of Mussolini in June 1940, with no proper planning or expectation of having to do any fighting.

The same idiotic vanity that led to the Duce's most absurd war decision - the declaration of war on the USA in December 1941.

But that perhaps is taking us off topic.

[A Raven]

The last sentence played no part in the battle.

I believe that the sighting made at 1220 on the 27th, which was read by the Italians, was key to subsequent events, and had nothing to do with the Germans. It did however cause the cruiser force to abandon the raid through the Anti Kithera Strait, but NOT the main sortie apparently. Regardless, the Italians sailed into Cunningham's trap.

I think the last sentence of the above post sums it up quite succinctly.

Italy's whole involvement in WW2 was a political vanity exercise on the part of Mussolini in June 1940, with no proper planning or expectation of having to do any fighting.

The same idiotic vanity that led to the Duce's most absurd war decision - the declaration of war on the USA in December 1941.

But that perhaps is taking us off topic.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi,
Germans did play an important role in the RM decision not to stop the main operation after the sighting of the Sunderland at 12:28 on March 27 from the heavy cruiser Trieste and the receipt of its transmissions at 12:40 and 12:55: Supermarina had explicitly required (as a prerequisite) to the Luftwaffe (X Fliegerkorps) to keep available in airports several planes (heavy fighters of the III./ZG.26 and bombers of the III/KG.30) to cover the RM mission, distracting them from the Libyan convoys. The Comando Supremo was not therefore in a positon to cancel the mission due "just" to the lack of the surprise factor.....

Adm.Weichold (KM liaison officer to RM) clearly confirmed, after the war, to the director of the "Rivista Marittima" (August-September edition on 1956) that Germans would not have accepted the Sunderland sighting as a good excuse not to pursue the agreed offensive mission in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Supermarina, on its side, estimated, based on the (misinterpreted) available information, that it was still possible to intercept British cruisers South of Crete, despite the fact that the convoys could have possibly already been retreated, without taking too many risks (counting on the superior speed of the Italian ships).....

No comment on the soundness of the Axis perceptions.....

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

Have you actually read the Italian operational orders ?
A yes or know will suffice.
Thank you.

Hi,
Germans did play an important role in the RM decision not to stop the main operation after the sighting of the Sunderland at 12:28 on March 27 from the heavy cruiser Trieste and the receipt of its transmissions at 12:40 and 12:55: Supermarina had explicitly required (as a prerequisite) to the Luftwaffe (X Fliegerkorps) to keep available in airports several planes (heavy fighters of the III./ZG.26 and bombers of the III/KG.30) to cover the RM mission, distracting them from the Libyan convoys. The Comando Supremo was not therefore in a positon to cancel the mission due "just" to the lack of the surprise factor.....

Adm.Weichold (KM liaison officer to RM) clearly confirmed, after the war, to the director of the "Rivista Marittima" (August-September edition on 1956) that Germans would not have accepted the Sunderland sighting as a good excuse not to pursue the agreed offensive mission in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Supermarina, on its side, estimated, based on the (misinterpreted) available information, that it was still possible to intercept British cruisers South of Crete, despite the fact that the convoys could have possibly already been retreated, without taking too many risks (counting on the superior speed of the Italian ships).....

No comment on the soundness of the Axis perceptions..... :(

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@A.Raven:

hi,
yiu are welcome. Answer to your question is yes in any case, however

which orders do you refer to ?
1) the Comando Supremo orders to Supermarina and Superaereo (21/3) ?
2) the Supermarina orders to the Comandante in Capo della Squadra Navale (chief of the fleet) (23/3) and in this case:
- a) the full text whose subject is "Puntata offensiva in Egeo", defined together with the chief of the fleet himself ?
- b) the short operative orders transmitted from Supermarina to the fleet command and to the command of the 3 involved divisions ?
3) the chief of the fleet detailed orders to the involved divisions + RN Vittorio Veneto + destroyers (24/3) ?

A document number will suffice for univocal identification.....

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

Mr Virtuani,
Now that I know that there are three types of operational orders, I refer to all three.

A question, that applies to ALL three.

If in the event that the intended target/targets, ie that the convoys cannot be found or engaged, then what do the three different operational orders ACTUALLY state should be done?

I have tried to state my question as clear as my very poor english allows.

If my question gives you ANY difficulty in terms of understanding it, please let me know before you answer.

Thank you.

@A.Raven:

hi,
yiu are welcome. Answer to your question is yes in any case, however

which orders do you refer to ?
1) the Comando Supremo orders to Supermarina and Superaereo (21/3) ?
2) the Supermarina orders to the Comandante in Capo della Squadra Navale (chief of the fleet) (23/3) and in this case:
- a) the full text whose subject is "Puntata offensiva in Egeo", defined together with the chief of the fleet himself ?
- b) the short operative orders transmitted from Supermarina to the fleet command and to the command of the 3 involved divisions ?
3) the chief of the fleet detailed orders to the involved divisions + RN Vittorio Veneto + destroyers (24/3) ?

A document number will suffice for univocal identification..... :wink:

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

Mr Virtuani,
I replied to your message two days ago, but it appears to have been lost/delayed in the mail, as have others in the past.
My answer is, all three.
Thank you.
If you have any problem in understanding my english, please tell me, and I will try and re-write my answer.

@A.Raven:

hi,
yiu are welcome. Answer to your question is yes in any case, however

which orders do you refer to ?
1) the Comando Supremo orders to Supermarina and Superaereo (21/3) ?
2) the Supermarina orders to the Comandante in Capo della Squadra Navale (chief of the fleet) (23/3) and in this case:
- a) the full text whose subject is "Puntata offensiva in Egeo", defined together with the chief of the fleet himself ?
- b) the short operative orders transmitted from Supermarina to the fleet command and to the command of the 3 involved divisions ?
3) the chief of the fleet detailed orders to the involved divisions + RN Vittorio Veneto + destroyers (24/3) ?

A document number will suffice for univocal identification..... :wink:

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@A.Raven
Hi,
answer is yes for all 4 messages (1,2a, 2b and 3) that I have read in original.

Based on which part of them, please, explain why do you disagree with my answer (25/8) to your point of view re. the reasons why the main mission was not cancelled (17/8).

If you have any problem in understanding their Italian, please tell me, and I will try and translate the sentence(s) you refer to.

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

Mr Virtuani,
I do NOT disagree with your answer.

Let me try ... AGAIN.

What do the operational orders ACTUALLY STATE what is to be done, if the objective of the operation cannot be met, failed, what ever word/s one wishes to choose.

I cannot/am unable understand any word of the Italian language.

This message was sent at 3.14 EST

Thank you.

@A.Raven
Hi,
answer is yes for all 4 messages (1,2a, 2b and 3) that I have read in original.

Based on which part of them, please, explain why do you disagree with my answer (25/8) to your point of view re. the reasons why the main mission was not cancelled (17/8).

If you have any problem in understanding their Italian, please tell me, and I will try and translate the sentence(s) you refer to.

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@A.Raven
Hi,
first of all I have to apologize with you.
I just saw now your post on 28/8 and my answer was related to your following post on 29/8 that was meaningless for me and that (I'm quite sure) appeared on this thread before the preceding one.... Possibly this is due to the fact that you have not registered yourself as a user of this forum and your posts are "guest" ones, therefore they need to be inspected and shown by the moderator. I would suggest that you register yourself (to be able to discuss online with us).


I have gone again through all the 4 above order messages to be 100% sure, and I can confirm you that they never mention the case of the convoys not found or impossible to engage. The offensive scope of the mission is outlined in message 1 and detailed in message 2a and 3 (with slightly different wording) as "attaccare il traffico nemico sulla rotta Grecia - Alessandria a ponente di Creta" ("to attack enemy traffic on route Greece - Alexandria at west of Crete".....very bad translation I'm afraid, I hope the mean is clear enough.
No explanations on message 2b (just "operative orders" like timings, courses and speeds to be kept for the 3 days mission).
The orders are related just to the courses of the 2 groups (Vittorio Veneto + 3rd division (south of Crete) and 1st + 8th division (north of Crete)) with fixed timings for the turns and the return (disregarding the convoys possibly met or not). All timings in them are given relatively to "X day" that was not specified in these messages (separate communications).

In message 2a and 3 is explicitly mentioned that both merchant ships and warships had to be considered as targets (however the warships had to be attacked only in case of relative superiority of forces).

Therefore I think my first answer is still valid: basically after the sighting from the Sunderland of Italian cruisers on March 26 and the loss of the (wrongly estimated) "surprise factor", Supermarina decided not to abort the mission for 2 reasons: 1) German pressure to change RM attitude in order to become offensive in view of their intervention in the Balkans and 2) hopes to be able to intercept anyway the British cruisers sighted by axis airplanes south of Crete. Also, up to March 27, the battleships and the carrier of the Mediterranean Fleet were reported at harbor in Alexandria.
In order to cope with the increased danger of air attack against the two groups, and to increase the "relative superiority" against the British cruisers, Supermarina ordered to Cattaneo (north group) to join Iachino (south group) at dawn on March 28 to form a single force and continue the mission together.

On March 28, Supermarina and Iachino were unable to correctly interpret some (confused and sometimes totally wrong) sightings and recognitions over Alexandria and did not understand that the MF (alerted, since March 25, that X day was March 28 thanks to Ultra decrypted message) was at sea since the night of March 27 with all available battleships and the carrier...... we know how it ended in the night of March 28......

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@all: on my previous post I stated "....sighting from the Sunderland of Italian cruisers on March 26.... ".
My mistake, of course I meant March 27.

In addition, the order from Supermarina to Cattaneo (2nd group, 1st and 8th cruisers division) in order for him to join Iachino (1st group, Vittorio Veneto and 3rd cruisers division)) at dawn on March 28, was sent out at 21:45 on March 27.
It clearly states that "....alt - Programma Iachino resta invariato - alt" ("The mission orders of the main group (Iachino) is unchanged").......

Bye, Alberto