many maybe do not know that Rear-Adm L. Holland was involved before been sunk with HMS Hood by Bismarck on another important WW 2 Naval battle ( Cape Teulada or Cape Spartivento as many call it too ) on the Mediterranean sea.
Many thinks ( I have same type of personal opinion ) that is very courageous conduct showed leading HMS Hood into the fight against the Bismarck was due to some criticism he received for his conduct on Cape Teulada battle while in command of a British Cruiser division against the Italians.
Hm – I do think Admiral Holland had much justification for his conduct of Battle.
As for his approach: It worked! He had already bridged the gap of vulnerability to plunging shellfire from Bismarck. His ship did not fall victim a one of the feared and dreaded deck hits but was probably simply hit through the side armour. Well – that happens but naval battle comes with risks. But he successfully evaded hits through his weakfish deck armour by a fast approach at unfavourable angle.
Well done for the approach. It then just all ended where state of the art guns found an elderly side protection system.
As for leading the line: I think ha had reasons enough to do so. His own ship was decades and generations away from the ‘eggshells with sledgehammers’ that blew up at Jutland. He commanded what could well be regarded one of the first fast battleships; at least on paper a worthy match for Bismarck.
The ship he wanted out of harms way, was as green as green could be with shipyard workers on board. I think there was – hindside taken away – every justification for the formation.
One only imagines for a moment the court martial that would have hit him like a ton of bricks if the Prince, leading the line would have been blown out of the water by Bismarck (technically possible as well) and Hood got away. “Admiral scarifies civilians on a barely commissioned ship” The papers would have eaten him alive and he would have swept the floors at Whitehall for the rest of his career.
As for leaving the cruisers out: He was a more than mighty match for the Germans on paper. Covering his approach under wireless silence as long as possible and have the cruisers engage when only torpedoes are called for to finish of the German ships makes sense.
It is funny – both commanders fell on duty at their respective posts and both are not treated well by later generations and yet if one looks closely into Lütjens and Hollands conduct there is little to criticise.
So – I think you have a good point. Admiral Lutjens’ conduct should not be looked at without recalling experiences out of Operation Berlin and in the same way one probably learns about Admiral Holland’s moves, looking closer into his career.
But – as I said – I think there is little he could have made different.
From the link:
"The chessboard was ready and Campioni made a critical decision; he would not engage. Before leaving Naples he had received precise orders to this effect."
Nuff said. Big difference between the mindset of Somerville and Campioni, wasn't it? Fortunately for Holland, he had a leader to learn from, Campioni didn't. Lame excuses wouldn't do for Somerville. Holland's lesson (aggressiveness in the face of the enemy) may have have taken him to his grave but it got him some self respect. It wasn't Somerville's fault that the Hood blew up.
