RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello,
I have read recently the Regia Marina operative orders related to the mission that ended with the Cape Matapan disaster, to provide some info on an aspect of them.
I have found once more very interesting them for the overall comprehension of this important episode of WWII.

However, I realized that I have never seen the original detailed operative orders for the interception of the Bismarck.
I mean the orders given to Adm.Tovey (from the Admiralty), Adm. Holland (from Tovey, I guess) and Adm.Wake-Walker (from Tovey or from the Admiralty ?). I'm not even sure they exist, as perhaps there was no time to plan in detail and to put them in written form, having to react to such an urgency....
Are they available in any form ? Is anybody able to post a link to them or to indicate the document number that I should look for ?

They are not available, AFAIK, in the "usual" sites like this very site, the Hood association site, etc.

Thanks in advance for any help here !

Bye, Alberto

[paulcadogan]

Hi Alberto,

Though I certainly cannot help with official documents, but Ted Briggs quotes 3 signals from Tovey to Holland:

8 PM, May 21

"Flying your flag in Hood and taking Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Icarus and Electra under your orders sail at 0001 on May 22 and proceed with moderate dispatch to Hvalfiord."

Later than night:

"Raise steam with all dispatch and be prepared to leave harbor 0001 on May 22."

Then at 2030 on May 22, after the discovery that the Germans had left Norway:

"Bismarck and consort sailed. Proceed to cover area south-west of Iceland."

Though I'm sure you are looking for something much more than this, I have to wonder how come the B-Dienst did not alert Lutjens to that last signal (or did they?). That surely was a big indicator that British forces were deploying......

Paul

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Paul,
many thanks !
These messages would suggest that there was no time to prepare and plan in detail the operation, except there were already operative dispositions for all the officers involved in a possible BS sortie.....

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul cadogan,

as usual a very interesting and valuable information from your side :

8 PM, May 21

" Flying your flag in Hood and taking Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Icarus and Electra under your orders sail at 0001 on May 22 and proceed with moderate dispatch to Hvalfiord."

Can you post the reference scan of the book page from where you got that statement. Thanks ...

So it seems we have the evidence that Adm Tovey did order to ViceAdm Holland to fly his flag on HMS Hood.

This is very interesting ... indeed ... especially if we correlate this now with Colin McMullen IWM interview and Adm Tovey after war declarations about this occurrence and order given ...

Moving to the Operative orders, ... most likely they received them, ... since RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker briefed also the HMS Suffolk crew in Iceland into the Hvalfjord before departing for the Bismarck interception mission, ... just as Coote IWM photos clearly demonstrate.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205138484

WW_Suffolk.jpg (70.55 KiB) Viewed 3626 times

... and after the briefing they sailed together for the interception mission into the Denmark Strait, ... just like this photo taken from Coote from Suffolk showing the HMS Norfolk sailing close, ... clearly demonstrate.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205138528

Norfolk_from_Suffolk_May_1941.jpg (54.27 KiB) Viewed 3626 times

Paul, ... you see that the photos do help ... realizing a bit more ... about all this ...

Bye Antonio

[Guest]

Hi all,
Just found this site which seems very interesting and congrats to all very distinguished contributors! I am intrigued and a little worried at some of the threads but will read through with open mind! My uncle served aboard HMS Prince of Wales from January to December 1941 and so have tried to research her story and have all her logs from Jan-Oct as well as other significant documents. I also have the logs of ships associated with her, Indomitable, Repulse and, of more relevance to this thread, the May logs of Norfolk and Suffolk. From the 10th May to the 21st Suffolk was at sea off Iceland, Norfolk was at Scapa and Rosyth until the 17th of May when she sailed for Hvalsfjord arriving on the 18th. She sailed the same day and met Suffolk at sea at 1520hrs on the 21st and both ships anchored in Adalvik. Norfolk transferred ratings and ships correspondance and the two ships sailed at 1700hrs on the 21st and proceeded to carry out RiX exercises (Range and Inclination) until they parted at 1815hrs. HMS Norfolk was at sea until the 22nd when she anchored in Hesteyri Fjord. HMS Suffolk was also at sea until the 22nd when she anchored in Hvalsfjord. Both ships were at sea again on the 23rd and met at 1010hrs and finally parted at 1103hrs Norfolk receiving the enemy sighting report later that day, their further movements are contained in reports and of course National Archives UK map MFQ 1/219. Hope this is of some help, will endeavour to try and read other subjects but work curtails any prolonged viewing!
Best wishes to all,
Cag

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

I think I have got it, ... but the book original scan will help anyhow.

Tovey_order_Holland_01.jpg (96.53 KiB) Viewed 3604 times

From here :

http://www.hmshood.com/crew/remember/tedflagship.htm

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Hi Antonio, Alberto and all,

Yes Antonio, that is one of the quotes from Ted Brigg's book. He does not give references from them as I believe he is probably considered the primary source as he carried the messages. (Were signalmen supposed to read the signals they carried or was it unavoidable??)

But wasn't it a given that Holland would fly his flag in Hood as BC1 since he had raised his flag just days ealrlier? I guess Tovey could have ordered him to transfer his flag to PoW, just as V-Adm Whitworth transferred from Renown to Warspite for the Narvik attack in 1940, so it is indeed an interesting quote (and "What if" for that matter!).

The photos of Suffolk and Norfolk are not necessarily taken during the Bismarck alert since they were on patrol in the DS from much earlier:

Suffolk's chrono:

March to April Carried out convoy defence and interception duties based in Iceland.

May 8th Deployed in Denmark Strait

19th Relieved by HM Cruiser NORFOLK to refuel at Hvalfjord.

22nd Joined HMS NORFOLK in Denmark Strait.

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... uffolk.htm

Norfolk:

March Deployed for Northern Patrol in Denmark Strait.

April Continued deployment on interception in Icelandic waters.

May 19th Relieved HM Cruiser SUFFOLK for Denmark Strait patrol.

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... orfolk.htm

Great photos though! Are there dates associated with them? Also, I doubt an admiral would discuss specific operational orders with a crew, worse when in harbour!

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan

I agree with you, ... and those are all argument of deep thoughts in the future.

It seems demonstrated now that it was Adm Tovey to order ViceAdm Holland to raise his flag on the HMS Hood, ... and in fact in McMullen interview he was stating the he was thinking about suggesting Holland to change position of the ships before engage the enemy ... putting PoW on the lead to drew the enemy fire and keeping Hood at distance ... not to move his flag from one warship to the other, ... well knowing and perfectly remembering ( so no dementia yet on Adm Tovey while speaking to McMullen and Adm Blake ) what he had ordered him in writing on May 8th, 1941.

Read again McMullen :

McMullen_reel_3_court_martial_IWM.jpg (142.95 KiB) Viewed 3576 times

Regarding the RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker briefing, ... it must have been a " special " occasion for him to make a speak to the HMS Suffolk crew ... and I cannot see many other possibilities on May 1941 in Iceland ... while for sure the photos were not taken after the Bismarck operation ... since we saw where Norfolk was and with who at Scapa Flow ... ... and it was a pity that Suffolk was still at sea and even not in condition to participate to the Hood First Board of Inquiry declarations ... ... and Capt Ellis did not release his own report until June 11th, 1941 ... when everything was already decided ...

It is regretted that, owing to the ship having been continuously at sea on other operations since the above until 9th June, ...

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09suff.htm

Still what will be very interesting is to find out the real orders delivered from the Admiralty to the Home Fleet ( Adm Tovey ) and from the Home Fleet to both ViceAdm Holland (BC1) and to RearAdm Wake-Walker (CS1) ... and everybody else ( CS2 etc etc ).

Has anybody seen or actually read them ?

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Regarding the RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker briefing, ... it must have been a " special " occasion for him to make a speak to the HMS Suffolk crew ... and I cannot see many other possibilities on May 1941 in Iceland ... while for sure the photos were not taken after the Bismarck operation ...

Antonio if you look at the movements of the two ships at the time the Bismarck alarm came through, that "special occasion" had nothing to do with that specific operation. Chances are it was in March when the ships arrived in Hvalfiord to begin their mission of patrolling the strait. It was nothing unusual for an admiral to visit the ships under his command when in port - I'm sure such visits had the objective of morale boosting and squadron cohesion.

(Certainly the British were aware at the time of the threat posed by Bismarck - we know that Hood, under V-Adm Whitworth, was deployed in the area all by herself during April when there was a false alarm - "deck armour" worries and all.)

On May 19, when Bismarck was still in the Baltic, Suffolk was on patrol in the strait and was relieved by Norfolk so she could go to Hvalfiord to refuel. When the Bismarck alarm came through she was there, Norfolk was out on patrol. On the 22nd, the Bismarck alarm saw her ordered to immediately rejoin Norfolk. So at no time during that specific period were the two ships together in harbour.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

I agree with you, ... as said it should have been a " special occasion " either the fact that HMS Suffolk being placed under his command, ... or a briefing to boost up the morale and the ship cohesion before departing for the Bismarck interception duty.

I like to point out to you some coincidences that may help to realize that what I am saying can be the reality as shown.

First, all the IWM photos taken by Lt R.G.G. Coote ( RN Official photographer ) while on board the HMS Suffolk, only refers to the Bismarck episode.

Second is that the photo of HMS Norfolk was taken by HMS Suffolk while at sea ... and not in harbor, ... so most likely the 2 cruisers where at sea together, ... and not exchanging duty during the previous period patrol ...

Anyhow, what really count now are the Official orders Wake-Walker and Holland received, ... and we need to find them.

Bye Antonio

[A Raven]

Mr Bonomi
has asked about "real orders".
There is no such thing.

I have seen orders as they relate to the Bismarck episode.

The First Sea Lord had telephone conversations with the C in C Home Fleet before he sailed. C in C Home Fleet stated his intentions a to his course/s of action, depending as to how the situation developed.

THERE WERE NO WRITTEN ORDERS GIVEN to C in C Home Fleet as to how he should operate or fight.

Orders issued by C in C Home Fleet to ships under his command were NOT detailed, but general; where to patrol etc. NOT ON HOW TO ENGAGE etc. Orders of this type were not needed, as ships would act in accordance with standing tactical instructions.

I apologise in advance for my very poor English, in that some will not understand.

This message was submitted on the 4th of September at 9.04 am EST.

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan

I agree with you, ... and those are all argument of deep thoughts in the future.

It seems demonstrated now that it was Adm Tovey to order ViceAdm Holland to raise his flag on the HMS Hood, ... and in fact in


McMullen interview he was stating the he was thinking about suggesting Holland to change position of the ships before engage the enemy ... putting PoW on the lead to drew the enemy fire and keeping Hood at distance ... not to move his flag from one warship to the other, ... well knowing and perfectly remembering ( so no dementia yet on Adm Tovey while speaking to McMullen and Adm Blake :wink: ) what he had ordered him in writing on May 8th, 1941.

Read again McMullen :

McMullen_reel_3_court_martial_IWM.jpg

Regarding the RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker briefing, ... it must have been a " special " occasion for him to make a speak to the HMS Suffolk crew ... and I cannot see many other possibilities on May 1941 in Iceland ... while for sure the photos were not taken after the Bismarck operation ... since we saw where Norfolk was and with who at Scapa Flow ... :wink: ... and it was a pity that Suffolk was still at sea and even not in condition to participate to the Hood First Board of Inquiry declarations ... :shock: ... and Capt Ellis did not release his own report until June 11th, 1941 ... when everything was already decided ... :think:

It is regretted that, owing to the ship having been continuously at sea on other operations since the above until 9th June, ...

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09suff.htm

Still what will be very interesting is to find out the real orders delivered from the Admiralty to the Home Fleet ( Adm Tovey ) and from the Home Fleet to both ViceAdm Holland (BC1) and to RearAdm Wake-Walker (CS1) ... and everybody else ( CS2 etc etc ).

Has anybody seen or actually read them ?

Bye Antonio :D

[Herr Nilsson]

Try ADM 199/2227. It's full of orders.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

thanks Marc ! ...

ADM-199-2227.jpg (29.15 KiB) Viewed 3495 times

The hunting is in progress already ...

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Byron Angel wrote in the thread "The Fighting Instructions": "Considering the number of documents obtained from the NA, I am fascinated that you and Antonio do not already hold "the operative order" to Wake-Walker in hand."

Hi Byron,
I'm astonished as well that for such an important mission we just have a few words of the operative orders given to Holland and to Wake-Walker, that is the order from Tovey to Holland to sail to Hvalfiord, that is not what we are looking for anyway, reported by Tedd Briggs......

" Flying your flag in Hood and taking Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Icarus and Electra under your orders sail at 0001 on May 22 and proceed with moderate dispatch to Hvalfiord." "

However, as you know very well, we miss many other key documents (e.g.the Tactical Plots of Norfolk and Suffolk that should have been included in W-W report, the gunnery report of Suffolk (that fired twice that day), the radio log of the "appropriate frequency" for flank-marking (as reported by Ellis and W-W)).......

you wrote: " I think it is foolish to expect such micro-managing ABC kindergarten details being tendered to a senior flag officer.........Tovey would have expected Wake-Walker to possess a professional grasp of the requirements of his mission,"

As you see from Tedd Briggs reported order above, Tovey did not leave to his most senior officer even the choice of the flagship....... I don't really think he did not issue clear operative orders.

you wrote: " I wonder what you expect to find."

Very simply, having been an officer, I know that any operation is planned and executed based on official orders given following the chain of command. In this case I expect to have orders given from the Admiralty to Tovey (as Home Fleet chief), from Tovey to Holland (as BC1), from Tovey to Wake-Walker (as CS1), from Holland to Leach, from W-W to Ellis, etc.
Even assuming that the RN was leaving much more independence and flexibility to the officers at sea compared to KM and RM, I still assume these orders exist, giving precise instructions, e.g. ordering Holland NOT to proceed to Hvalfiord anymore and to cover the Denmark Strait passage, ordering W-W where to cruise to intercept BS and instructing him to shadow and to deliver the enemy to Holland, detailing/confirming e.g. the frequencies to be used for communication, for flank-marking, the signals to be made, etc.

" it is nevertheless ALSO necessary to understand the doctrinal assumptions and expectations which influenced and guided the participants."

I agree with you, this is true IF different operative orders do not exist. However orders can overwrite fighting instructions, as Adm Lutjens did keeping PG in the line of fire and firing on Hood and PoW. That's why it is important to see the actual, original operative orders of the mission, to see if everyone was compliant with them.

Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

Dear Alberto,

Alberto wrote -
"As you see from Tedd Briggs reported order above, Tovey did not leave to his most senior officer even the choice of the flagship....... I don't really think he did not issue clear operative orders."

..... IMO, you are dramatically overstating the import of a simple phrase which may simply have been a declarative acknowledgement that Holland was flying his flag aboard Hood and, on that basis, assuming that there must have been a highly detailed, comprehensive, all-encompassing set of mission orders issued. I not believe they exist. To the best of our current knowledge, there are no such "detailed operative orders" from Tovey to either Wake-Walker or to Holland to be found in the archives; nor is there any reference to such documents in the record. There are, however, terse radio orders/directives to be had in both cases. If it were Tovey's practice to issue expansive and highly detailed tactical order such as you describe, then an investigation into other operations conducted under the senior command of Tovey (such as the concentration of ships for the final destruction of Bismarck) should yield up examples of such documents. My bet is that you not find any.


Alberto wrote -
"Very simply, having been an officer, I know that any operation is planned and executed based on official orders given following the chain of command. In this case I expect to have orders given from the Admiralty to Tovey (as Home Fleet chief), from Tovey to Holland (as BC1), from Tovey to Wake-Walker (as CS1), from Holland to Leach, from W-W to Ellis, etc.
Even assuming that the RN was leaving much more independence and flexibility to the officers at sea compared to KM and RM, I still assume these orders exist, giving precise instructions, e.g. ordering Holland NOT to proceed to Hvalfiord anymore and to cover the Denmark Strait passage, ordering W-W where to cruise to intercept BS and instructing him to shadow and to deliver the enemy to Holland, detailing/confirming e.g. the frequencies to be used for communication, for flank-marking, the signals to be made, etc.

..... You are, I think, confusing or conflating mission planning with operational/tactical orders. Strictly my opinion, of course.


Alberto wrote -
"I agree with you, this is true IF different operative orders do not exist. However orders can overwrite fighting instructions, as Adm Lutjens did keeping PG in the line of fire and firing on Hood and PoW. That's why it is important to see the actual, original operative orders of the mission, to see if everyone was compliant with them."

..... True. But, as mentioned, I do not believe that the sort of ultra-detailed orders you describe ever actually existed. All that we do know is that Adm Holland, the senior officer in tactical command, did not issue any tactical orders to Wake-Walker. Hence, the entire question of Wake-Walker's conduct can only be answered by examining it in the context of the degree of tactical freedom available to him under the governing Fighting Instructions. I do not possess a copy of the 1939 Fighting Instructions, but I did read through some documents that made reference to British tactical doctrine of the immediate pre-war period. While tactical flexibility and divisional tactics were both highly encouraged, it seems that the underlying assumption was that the senior officer in tactical command was still responsible for dictating the engagement plan, while his subordinates were responsible for carrying out his plan (somewhate akin to German Auftragstaktik at sea). The Fighting Instructions need to be examined.

Byron