@Cag:
Hi Mr.Cag,
thanks for your nice words and your (usual) balanced way of seeing things....
you wrote: "If however we hypothetically want to imagine when Wake-Walker should have attacked we must also ask at what point in time this would be? "
I would say that at 5:37 he should have realized that his shadowing mission was (successfully, despite all problems during the night) over and he should have started to order Norfolk and Suffolk to reach the most favorable position for the battle (Suffolk was already close to the enemy, but Norfolk took a "timid" course until 5:55). At 5:53 (after Hood and PoW opened fire and the enemy ships were fully engaged, with BS unable to return fire to the two cruisers), he definitely should have ordered to open fire.
@Byron Angel:
Byron Angel wrote: " It was not a fleet engagement."
Hi Byron,
it was what then ? What chapter of the fighting instruction would you apply to a battle between 6 ships (3 battleships and 3 heavy cruisers) ?
you wrote: "From what I read (sorry to have neglected to record the citation), Holland had discussed (with Leach?) his intention to call upon Wake-Walker's cruisers to concentrate upon Prinz Eugen ..."
No Byron, the only primary source is (as I already said) Adm.Tovey dispatch point 17 that is anyway incorrect regarding distances and just mention Holland "intention". This incorrect statement was taken and repeated by many authors.
Again, we miss the operative orders and we miss many messages sent to the ships once at sea (e.g. Holland order not to proceed to Hvalfiord anymore.....this one exists for sure, else Holland would have entered Hvalfiord as per his last received order.....), so
we can't say anything yet about the actual operative orders received by Holland and of W-W. If we want to assume they were left completely free, without orders, (I don't believe that, having been an officer myself), then clearly W-W seriously lacked the initiative that is required to cruisers.....
you wrote: "Lacking such tactical instructions from Holland, Wake-Walker was obliged to observe the guidelines in Clause 171 of the Fighting Instructions. One is certainly free to assume that "there must have been an order" but then the burden is upon him to produce some proof of its existence; so far no such order from Holland to Wake-Walker has ever come to light."
Even assuming he did not have orders from Holland (that is possible), for sure he did have orders from Tovey for his mission with the objective given to the cruisers: where are these orders ? Without them, your assumption of W-W shadowing ONLY mission, subject ONLY to shadowing fighting instructions, is just an assumption.
You are of course free to keep your personal opinion that shadowing was not over anyway at 5:37 (or at least at 5:52, for sure), but my personal opinion is that W-W was unable to understand what was his duty after Hood opened fire.
you wrote: ". I declined to respond because it is a complete theoretical with no bearing on the topic at hand; Wake-Walker was not commanding a battleship. If you are otherwise interested in my personal opinion of your battleship vs battleship scenario, If I were the senior officer in tactical command, I would call the shadowing battleship to join me in the engagement."
It is not, as it is a pure example of blind application of the fighting instruction interpreted as you interpret them. The clause 171 doesn't mention the type and number of ships.....
Coming back to this hypothetical scenario, I agree with you being the senior officer. However, had you been the Captain of the shadowing battleship, would you have waited the explicit order from him before joining the battle ?
In the absence of this order (we know from Capt.Ellis autobiography that they were unable to communicate to Hood for flank-marking, so there could have been problems for transmissions on board the involved ships), would you have avoided to join the battle ? I hope not........
Always in full respect of your viewpoint and in friendship.
Bye, Alberto