RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote: " To the best of our current knowledge, there are no such "detailed operative orders" from Tovey to either Wake-Walker or to Holland to be found"
Hi Byron,
I would be happy to find an order (detailed or not), it looks like nobody has ever seen orders related to this mission.

youl wrote: "There are, however, terse radio orders/directives to be had in both cases"
well not really, where is the radio order to Holland not to proceed to Hvalfiord and to intercept BS in the DS ? At least this one should have been issued, don't you think ?
I have never seen even this one.

Not to speak of the orders given to W-W. I don't think he sailed without having received a formal, written order.......

you wrote:"..... You are, I think, confusing or conflating mission planning with operational/tactical orders. Strictly my opinion, of course."
Maybe, however we miss both the ones and the other as far as I know.....

you wrote: "All that we do know is that Adm Holland, the senior officer in tactical command, did not issue any tactical orders to Wake-Walker."
We miss so many information, orders and messages (see above) that I would not be so sure about this point...... :think:

Bye, Alberto
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Byron Angel wrote:..I do not possess a copy of the 1939 Fighting Instructions, but I did read through some documents that made reference to British tactical doctrine of the immediate pre-war period. While tactical flexibility and divisional tactics were both highly encouraged, it seems that the underlying assumption was that the senior officer in tactical command was still responsible for dictating the engagement plan, while his subordinates were responsible for carrying out his plan (somewhate akin to German Auftragstaktik at sea). The Fighting Instructions need to be examined.
ADM 239/261: (C.B.04027) The Fighting Instructions (1939)
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Marc

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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Byron Angel »

Thanks so much, Mark!

Here is what I have been referring to when saying that Wake-Walker had a delicate situation before him -

Byron


SECTION IV.-SHADOWING

GENERAL

170. The object of shadowing is to supply the Admiral with continuous information of the enemy's movements. The purpose for which this information is required, i.e., the final object of the shadowing, will have a considerable influence on the conduct of shadowing units and should, if possible, be known to them.

171. As long as the primary object of a vessel is to shadow, offensive action which will defeat this object is unsound. When, by retaining touch, there is every prospect of bringing large forces into a position to deliver attacks on the enemy, shadowing vessels should not, generally speaking, take offensive action until after these attacks have been completed. If, however, a favourable opportunity occurs for firing torpedoes unseen at the enemy main force, shadowing vessels should not hesitate to do so. Shadowing may be carried out by surface vessels, submarines or aircraft.
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote: "Here is what I have been referring to when saying that Wake-Walker had a delicate situation before him -"
Hi Byron,
we have already discussed this in the other thread "The Fighting Instructions" where Dunmunro posted this same articles here
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6802


However the key point in this articles is:
"As long as the primary object of a vessel is to shadow, offensive action which will defeat this object is unsound.
Definitely, in my personal opinion of course, the primary object of Norfolk and Suffolk (also, being heavy cruisers and not scouting ships) was NOT ANYMORE shadowing, after the "enemy in sight" message from BC1 ships.

In his autobiography, Capt. Ellis said that in his mind the tactical function of Suffolk was still "follow and flank-mark"..... I disagree and I think that the good choice would have been to engage.....

Bye, Alberto
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Byron Angel »

[1] No, Alberto - The key phrase is underlined below -

171. As long as the primary object of a vessel is to shadow, offensive action which will defeat this object is unsound. When, by retaining touch, there is every prospect of bringing large forces into a position to deliver attacks on the enemy, shadowing vessels should not, generally speaking, take offensive action until after these attacks have been completed.

It is very straightforward. Wake-Walker's ships were without question the shadowing ships. They delivered Holland to his quarry and, in accordance with the underlined language of Clause 171, refrained from taking offensive action until after Holland's attack had been completed. Unfortunately, Holland met with defeat. Wake-Walker's obligation at that moment, by my reading of the Fighting Instructions, was to revert to shadowing duty in order to draw in additional forces against Bismarck.


[2] Wake Walker's cruisers were the scouting ships. Tovey sent them to cover the Denmark Strait expressly in a scouting capacity. The fact that they were heavy cruisers has zero to do with the issue at hand. Nowhere do the Fighting Instructions exclude any class of surface ship (except perhaps for motor torpedo boats) from performing shadowing duty; in fact, small cruisers are mentioned as a preferred vessel type for that function.



Byron
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,


more food for thoughts ... :think:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRUISERS

INITIATIVE

286. Initiative on the part of cruiser Captains is to be encouraged to the utmost ; the speed of these vessels and their ability to gain favorable positions for attack cannot be properly used if Captains are not given plenty of latitude by their Senior Officers.

This does not imply that imprudence in taking the offensive is either suggested or required, and Senior Officers of cruiser squadrons and cruiser Captains are cautioned not to close the enemy capital ships until they are fully engaged ; it would be disastrous to allow our light forces to be defeated by the enemy battleships before the latter became engaged with our own.
Bye Antonio :D
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Antonio, this passage is for fleet action and refers to cruisers of the approaching fleet.
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Marc

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Byron Angel:
Hi Byron,
respectful of your personal opinion, I disagree and for me the key sentence is the first one:

171. As long as the primary object of a vessel is to shadow, offensive action which will defeat this object is unsound. When, by retaining touch, there is every prospect of bringing large forces into a position to deliver attacks on the enemy, shadowing vessels should not, generally speaking, take offensive action until after these attacks have been completed.

The shadowing was well over since at 5:37 for W-W ships.

Would a possible formal inquiry/Court Martial have accepted such a "bit captious" and "based on a literal interpretation" defense from W-W side ? I personally doubt, but I do see your point and in some way Capt.Ellis (in his autobiography) confirmed that, for him, the tactical function of Suffolk, when fire was open, was still just "follow and flank-mark" ...... :think:

However, if you respect literally the last sentence, then please answer the same question I asked to Dunmunro some time ago: in an hypothetical scenario, you have one battleship shadowing 3 enemy battleships. At a certain moment, the main force (3 battleships as well) intercepts the enemy and open fire, starting the battle. According to you, is the forth (shadowing) battleship allowed by the fighting instruction just to watch at the following battle as a mere spectator ? :negative:


In any case, we still miss the operative orders given to W-W, as these orders could have overwritten any fighting instruction......



@Herr Nilsson :
Hi Marc, you are right ! After 5:52, only the "Fleet Action" fighting instructions apply, in the absence of different orders; for sure not anymore the shadowing ones ! :clap:
Apparently, due to the very quick and dramatic development of the action, W-W and Ellis failed to realize that their function was not anymore a "shadower" one and that the opponent ships were fully engaged by BC1, allowing them to engage......


Bye, Alberto
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Alberto, even then the task of the cruisers in the rear of the battle line is to take position in the rear of the enemy. Norfolk an Suffolk had to fight damaged and slowed enemy ships, but they were not part of the fleet action.
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Marc

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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Herr Nilsson:
Hi Marc,
I agree, but still:
Cruiser Instructions: 286. Initiative on the part of cruiser Captains is to be encouraged to the utmost ;
I consider (my personal opinion of course) 2 heavy cruisers as more than valuable in such a battle, as they were definitely on May 27 and as PG was on May 24...... The problem here is the lack of initiative from W-W (and Ellis) side, especially if compared to Lutjens bold (and unconventional) decision......

Bye, Alberto
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Byron Angel »

Alberto,

This was not a "fleet action". It was an engagement between six ships.

Clause 171 must be read in its entirety. it explicitly outlines the duties of shadowing vessels once they have delivered the enemy into the hands of their attacking force: i.e., that they should refrain from engaging until the attack by that force has been consummated. This is exactly what Wake-Walker did. The historical record does indicate that Holland had intended Wake-Walker to assume an active role in the engagement, and such an order would indeed IMO override the Fighting Instructions. But Holland never communicated that desire to Wake-Walker. Lacking any such special tactical orders from Holland, Wake-Walker quite correctly governed his actions according to the tactical guidelines set forth in the Fighting Instructions.

Re orders, there clearly were orders issued by Tovey and received and acted upon by both Wake-Walker and Holland. They did not randomly proceed in the manner they did without any orders from above authority. My guess is that these orders (if they still exist) might be found in the radio logs. If you can find clear evidence of expansive and detailed "operative orders" from Tovey or the Admiralty that cast matters in a different light, then by all means we can re-visit this. But, as mentioned earlier, I very much doubt that they exist in the form that you envisage.

Byron
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote: "This was not a "fleet action". It was an engagement between six ships."
Still this chapter applies, as no chapter mentioning engagement between six ships is available......

you wrote: " The historical record does indicate that Holland had intended Wake-Walker to assume an active role in the engagement,"
I have not seen any operative order in this sense yet.... the only historical evidence is the very doubtful point 17 of Adm.Tovey dispatch, where an incorrect distance from enemy for both two heavy cruisers is mentioned.....
Do you know any other document ?


Even assuming that no order was available (quite impossible in a military environment), W-W was unable to realize that shadowing was over after 5:37 and that his contribution was important. Was this a behavior to be severely punished by an inquiry / CM ? Not sure, but definitely not one to be awarded with a decoration.

Bye, Alberto


P.S. re. point 171, you failed to answer my hypothetical scenario, re.the literal application of the fighting instructions...... :wink:
you have one battleship shadowing 3 enemy battleships. At a certain moment, the main force (3 battleships as well) intercepts the enemy and open fire, starting the battle. According to you, is the forth (shadowing) battleship allowed by the fighting instruction just to watch at the following battle as a mere spectator ? :negative:
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Cag »

Dear All,
I think as always Alberto has some valid points, maybe if the cruisers had made an attempt to engage then this discussion is null and void (And we would now be debating the validity of such a move instead!) as it would also be if the cruisers were only ever meant to shadow (No subsequent orders from Holland). In the scenario of a single shadowing battleship instead of the cruisers, would it have been of benefit in a three on three battleship battle for the single shadowing battleship to have engaged? Quite possibly, better armoured and armed than a cruiser but as Alberto also correctly says that would depend on the orders given to the shadowing battleship (PoW became a shadowing battleship in support of the cruisers).The two cruisers would always have to be considered as the main shadowing force as cruisers were the kind of forces Tovey placed in the main entry routes to the Atlantic to achieve such a goal and would have to follow fighting instructions for cruisers. Hood and PoW were a covering/attacking force to either attack and/or turn back the BC and PG. If however we hypothetically want to imagine when Wake-Walker should have attacked we must also ask at what point in time this would be? Approx 0537 is when he knows PoW is in contact, 0543 is when he knows Holland is in contact (0542 on Suffolk for both Hood and PoW showing time differences on the ships) and 0550 is when he actually sights BCS 1, but would again stress this at the moment would be a hypothetical scenario.
Cag.
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Byron Angel »

Byron Angel wrote: "This was not a "fleet action". It was an engagement between six ships."
Still this chapter applies, as no chapter mentioning engagement between six ships is available......

..... Sorry Alberto, but I cannot accept that logic as being sensible. It wass either a fleet engagement or not a fleet engagement. It was not a fleet engagement.

- - -
you wrote: " The historical record does indicate that Holland had intended Wake-Walker to assume an active role in the engagement,"
I have not seen any operative order in this sense yet.... the only historical evidence is the very doubtful point 17 of Adm.Tovey dispatch, where an incorrect distance from enemy for both two heavy cruisers is mentioned.....
Do you know any other document ?

..... From what I read (sorry to have neglected to record the citation), Holland had discussed (with Leach?) his intention to call upon Wake-Walker's cruisers to concentrate upon Prinz Eugen while Hood and Prince of Wales concentrated upon Bismarck. It was a perfectly sensible plan, but Holland never imparted it to Wake-Walker.

- - -

Even assuming that no order was available (quite impossible in a military environment), W-W was unable to realize that shadowing was over after 5:37 and that his contribution was important. Was this a behavior to be severely punished by an inquiry / CM ? Not sure, but definitely not one to be awarded with a decoration.

..... You must read Clause 171 more closely, particularly the part I had underlined. Wake-Walker's shadowing role was manifestly NOT ended at 0537 hrs. The only way he could have been relieved of the status of shadower was if Holland had issued superseding tactical instructions to him to participate in the engagement. Lacking such tactical instructions from Holland, Wake-Walker was obliged to observe the guidelines in Clause 171 of the Fighting Instructions. One is certainly free to assume that "there must have been an order" but then the burden is upon him to produce some proof of its existence; so far no such order from Holland to Wake-Walker has ever come to light.

- - -

P.S. re. point 171, you failed to answer my hypothetical scenario, re.the literal application of the fighting instructions...... :wink:
you have one battleship shadowing 3 enemy battleships. At a certain moment, the main force (3 battleships as well) intercepts the enemy and open fire, starting the battle. According to you, is the forth (shadowing) battleship allowed by the fighting instruction just to watch at the following battle as a mere spectator ? :negative:

..... I declined to respond because it is a complete theoretical with no bearing on the topic at hand; Wake-Walker was not commanding a battleship. If you are otherwise interested in my personal opinion of your battleship vs battleship scenario, If I were the senior officer in tactical command, I would call the shadowing battleship to join me in the engagement.


Byron

I do not argue that having Wake-Walker's cruisers concentrate upon Prinz Eugen was bad idea per se. I am simply arguing that it was not Wake-Walker's decision to unilaterally make under the command and tactical doctrine which prevailed at the time.
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Re: RN Operative Orders for the Bismarck chase

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Cag:
Hi Mr.Cag,
thanks for your nice words and your (usual) balanced way of seeing things....
you wrote: "If however we hypothetically want to imagine when Wake-Walker should have attacked we must also ask at what point in time this would be? "
I would say that at 5:37 he should have realized that his shadowing mission was (successfully, despite all problems during the night) over and he should have started to order Norfolk and Suffolk to reach the most favorable position for the battle (Suffolk was already close to the enemy, but Norfolk took a "timid" course until 5:55). At 5:53 (after Hood and PoW opened fire and the enemy ships were fully engaged, with BS unable to return fire to the two cruisers), he definitely should have ordered to open fire.



@Byron Angel:
Byron Angel wrote: " It was not a fleet engagement."
Hi Byron,
it was what then ? What chapter of the fighting instruction would you apply to a battle between 6 ships (3 battleships and 3 heavy cruisers) ?

you wrote: "From what I read (sorry to have neglected to record the citation), Holland had discussed (with Leach?) his intention to call upon Wake-Walker's cruisers to concentrate upon Prinz Eugen ..."
No Byron, the only primary source is (as I already said) Adm.Tovey dispatch point 17 that is anyway incorrect regarding distances and just mention Holland "intention". This incorrect statement was taken and repeated by many authors.

Again, we miss the operative orders and we miss many messages sent to the ships once at sea (e.g. Holland order not to proceed to Hvalfiord anymore.....this one exists for sure, else Holland would have entered Hvalfiord as per his last received order.....), so we can't say anything yet about the actual operative orders received by Holland and of W-W. If we want to assume they were left completely free, without orders, (I don't believe that, having been an officer myself), then clearly W-W seriously lacked the initiative that is required to cruisers.....

you wrote: "Lacking such tactical instructions from Holland, Wake-Walker was obliged to observe the guidelines in Clause 171 of the Fighting Instructions. One is certainly free to assume that "there must have been an order" but then the burden is upon him to produce some proof of its existence; so far no such order from Holland to Wake-Walker has ever come to light."
Even assuming he did not have orders from Holland (that is possible), for sure he did have orders from Tovey for his mission with the objective given to the cruisers: where are these orders ? Without them, your assumption of W-W shadowing ONLY mission, subject ONLY to shadowing fighting instructions, is just an assumption.

You are of course free to keep your personal opinion that shadowing was not over anyway at 5:37 (or at least at 5:52, for sure), but my personal opinion is that W-W was unable to understand what was his duty after Hood opened fire.


you wrote: ". I declined to respond because it is a complete theoretical with no bearing on the topic at hand; Wake-Walker was not commanding a battleship. If you are otherwise interested in my personal opinion of your battleship vs battleship scenario, If I were the senior officer in tactical command, I would call the shadowing battleship to join me in the engagement."
It is not, as it is a pure example of blind application of the fighting instruction interpreted as you interpret them. The clause 171 doesn't mention the type and number of ships.....

Coming back to this hypothetical scenario, I agree with you being the senior officer. However, had you been the Captain of the shadowing battleship, would you have waited the explicit order from him before joining the battle ?
In the absence of this order (we know from Capt.Ellis autobiography that they were unable to communicate to Hood for flank-marking, so there could have been problems for transmissions on board the involved ships), would you have avoided to join the battle ? I hope not........ :negative:


Always in full respect of your viewpoint and in friendship.

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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