first of all I want to thank personally both CAG as well as Paul Cadogan for their post's above and coming back into the discussion, ... and I invite everybody else to do it like they did, ... because it is by the inputs of everybody here in that this work as become so precise and deeply analyzed, ... because as many and valuable inputs I have ( and I do not care if you agree, lightly disagree or strongly disagree with me ) ... that this work is carefully scrutinized, ... washed and re-washed many times ... and becomes hopefully better, ... which is my real objective.
So, welcome back ! This said I will go into the responses.
@ CAG,
I think you got my point now.
What I have demonstrated is that Adm Tovey, despite knowing precisely the reality, wrote a different story to Their Lordships with point 19. This was accepted being the reality by the Admiralty and determined their actions after ( no inquiry and the King rewarding recommendation ) and only on 1948 the Admiralty itself realized that those inputs by Adm Tovey were incorrect.
This is the " Cover Up " occurred, and nobody can write that it did not happen, since there are Official documents demonstrating it, I have just listed them and presented to you all, ... nothing more.
I see your point 18 and it does contain other incorrect statements for timing and events. My personal opinion about it is that Adm Tovey wanted to "embellish" the story for the Hood since the Admiralty was strongly looking and asking for something positive about Hood to be declared for positive propaganda reasons on that particular moment. This can be easily realized by reading some other documents too.
@ Wadinga,
Wake-Walker awareness and the Flank Marking by the heavy cruisers are very important points, one related to the other, and of course everything is related to their distance from the enemy before and during the battle, so to point 17 of Adm Tovey dispatches.
We have long discussed in details above about Wake-Walker awareness and I will not repeat myslef about it.
About the Flank Marking we have Capt Ellis autobiography that explains it in full details, including the trial to contact the Hood to communicate it. On the other hand, the Flank Marking intention is also clearly mentioned on the Norfolk gunnery report by the gunnery Officer Ltnt Cdr Duncan Lachlan Johnston : " Attempt to Flank Mark for battleships failed owing the inability to find a suitable frequency before action was broken off. " As you can read it is just a perfect match with Capt Ellis declaration about that intention on Suffolk too on that moment : Flank Marking !
Johnston report is very interesting to be read about all this, since he wrote that he was ready to Flank Mark, but failed the radio contact Hood/PoW in order to do it, while he did not open fire because : " Fire was not opened owing the impossibility to see the fall of shot ". So it seems to me by reading his report that he could see the battleships fall of shot, and consequently do the Flank Marking successfully if he only could contact via radio them on the assigned gunnery frequency, which he failed, ... but he decided not to open fire because he was not sure to be able to correctly spot his own fall of shot inside the main battleship ones he could spot and communicate, ... since he was ready to do it.
Am I reading correctly those statements ? What do you think about it ?
At what distance from the enemy this could have happened for both Norfolk and Suffolk ?
@ Paul Cadogan,
you asked me :
Are you saying that the honors conferred on Leach an WW were based entirely on the DS battle?
Of course NO ! The recognition's took in consideration the whole efforts and not only the Denmark Strait engagement.
But I am stating that if Adm Tovey dispatches had been written the way they should have been, very likely the things would have gone a lot differently, because at that point the Admiralty would have had to manage both positive as well as some negative inputs, and nobody knows today ( and never will ) where those additional evaluations would have driven the Admiralty toward to, even if is not that difficult to realize it.
This is what the " Cover Up " is all about, and as I wrote above is well demonstrated. Somebody ( Adm Tovey ) took the freedom to change the event descriptions on his Official Dispatches ( point 17 and 19 ) and by doing so he removed any possibility for a negative potential evaluation to be done by the Admiralty, that consequently had only positive things to put together and went for the recognition recommendations.
I hope you will agree with me that the above occurrence cannot be ignored given the documents we have at hand today and the Admiralty own admission about that declaration error on 1948.
You very properly asked me about the point 13 of the Admiralty where one can read what was the evaluation done, based on what input and realize what could have been the evaluation in case something different was going to be declared.
By reading thru it now, ... you can respond yourself to your statement here below :
Here it is :... and instead both officers would have been left off the award list and an inquiry/court martial held instead ?
- Admiralty_Point_13.jpg (41.57 KiB) Viewed 1169 times
You can read yourself in that statement how everything is ONLY DIRECTLY CORRELATED to Adm Tovey incorrect descriptions of the event sequence and timing contained on his despatches point 19 to sustain Their Lordships positive evaluation of the facts. The timing and consequent damages event description being declared incorrect on 1948 by the Admiralty itself.
SIMILARLY ( I use Their Lordships word here ) ... you can read in which way they evaluated Wake-Walker failure to re-engage, and you can just imagine the evaluation in case they had to judge the reality that was hidden to them ( real awareness, close distance to the enemy and failure to engage it ) by Adm Tovey writing the point 17 on that way.
Here the guy that signed that document for Their Lordships on September 10th, 1941 : Sir James Sidney Barnes
- Sir_James_Sidney_Barnes.jpg (39.57 KiB) Viewed 1169 times
- Admiralt_Board_6_December_1939_Barnes_Churchill_02.jpg (78.72 KiB) Viewed 1169 times
All I am asking here to you all is to realize and acknowledge what has been done by Adm Tovey and the way it was read, accepted and used by the Admiralty, and I can hardly see anyone able not to agree and accept the reality given what I showed you with the Official documents.You have indeed built a good circumstantial case on the face of it, but the problem is there is so much that can be argued to the contrary, whether each individual accepts it or not, that "reasonable doubt" will persist and you are ending up with a hung jury ! I for one, cannot vote to convict Tovey on his intentions, but on making statements that were erroneous to some shape or form (e.g. 18 and 19) however ... that he certainly did.
I do wholeheartedly agree however that V-Adm Holland deserves MUCH better.
That occurrence is what I call the " Cover Up " and it was real, a true occurrence, and I read with satisfaction that you are ready to agree with me of course.
I like a lot your final statement about ViceAdm Lancelot Holland, which memory I try to respect as much as I can too, he deserved MUCH, MUCH BETTER !
Bye Antonio
