Cover up synopsis

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

if the Admiralty Board did go thru all the documents you are referencing, ... then I cannot believe that they accepted as they did Adm Tovey dispatches point 19 the way it is written, ... because it does NOT correspond to the reality any average RN Officer can easily realize by reading into those documents as I did, ... and I am not a RN Senior Officer.
In fact, on 1948, the Admiralty corrected the event timing of PoW retreat, one of the biggest incorrect statement contained into Adm Tovey point 19 dispatches.

If, like they stated at point 13 on their minute, they commented positively ONLY based on the Adm Tovey point 19 provided " circumstances " explanation ( surely incorrect as we all know ), ... than I can see like everybody does the reasons why a positive comment was provided by the Admiralty Board, ... being based ONLY on the incorrect statements justifications provided by Adm Tovey.

Too easy for me now to tell you that the answer is already contained into Sir Barnes letter :

Admiralty_Point_13.jpg

The " circumstances of the case " positively commented are INCORRECT ! No doubts about it.

The " Cover Up " based on the " Adm Tovey's version " of the fact is consequently well demonstrated.

Bye Antonio

Did PoW turn away after being damaged by Bismarck? BTW, what was PoW's inner immune zone against 38cm AP shells as stated by Rhys-Jones?

I see no reference to time in the above quoted point 13 and I've never found any Admiralty regulation that specifies how long a ship must be under enemy fire before turning away.

Again, do you think that "Their Lordships" were denied access to PoW's GAR and the other reports that were contained in ADM 236/509 and that constituted the classified information that the Tovey's, written for public release, despatch was based upon? If the "Lords of the Admiralty" couldn't read ship's action reports, then who could and why were they even written? Their Lordships were not concerned about the specific timing reported in the despatch but about the conduct of RN officers and men during the course of their operations against the enemy and upon due consideration of all the facts they gave praise to Leach and Wake-Walker for their actions.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Herr Nilsson wrote: "point 13 refers to point 22 and 23 of the despatch. That's quite evident."

Hi Marc,
absolutely not.

Admiralty_Point_13_V1.jpg (62.79 KiB) Viewed 1017 times

The above underlined KEY sentence is NOT referred to point 22, but ONLY related to point 19 of Tovey's totally incorrect reconstruction of the PoW sustained damages and retreat time (see underlined below for the worst "innocent" errors in point 19 where Tovey astutely mixed up all damages including the self inflicted Y turret jam)....

Point19.jpg (83.03 KiB) Viewed 1017 times

We must recognize that Leach explanation (see point 22) is much less incorrect as it NEVER mention any damage, of course, as they happened AFTER the decision to disengage, with the possible (not sure, as Leach says that the sinking of Hood was the reason to decide the disengagement) exception of the compass platform hit.....


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

absolutely NO Marc, ... it is NOT evident at all, ... and you are incorrect this time.

There are no explanations provided by Capt Leach on point 22 explaining why he retreated " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT ", please read yourself :

22. The Commanding Officer of Prince of Wales in his report says:

"Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. Hood - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the Hood I felt that, together, we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three other considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before the action was joined namely:-

a. The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament could not be expected.

b. The working up of the ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.

c. The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage

In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement with two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."

Similarly there are NO statements on point 23 that declare that PoW retreated " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT ", but just after 10 minutes engagement ( 05.53+10 = 06.03 ) :

23. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, in his report says:

"At 1545 Admiralty signal 1445 had been received. At that time I had no evidence that the enemy's speed was in any way reduced by damage and I did not consider it likely that he would fight or that we could catch him, as his policy was obviously evasion.

The question whether I should re-engage with Prince of Wales had been exercising my mind for some time before the receipt of this signal. The factors to be considered were as follows: In the first place the state of efficiency of Prince of Wales. I had seen her forced out of action after 10 minutes' engagement, at the end of which her salvoes were falling short and with a very large spread indeed. As a result of the action she was short of one gun and her bridge was wrecked. She was a brand-new ship, with turrets in which mechanical breakdowns had occurred and were to be expected, apart from damage, and she had had a bare minimum period of working up. I had been unable to observe for certain any hits on the Bismarck and her shooting had given a striking proof of its efficiency. To put it in a nutshell, I did not and do not consider that in her then state of efficiency the Prince of Wales was a match for the Bismarck.

Those are clearly written ONLY on the point 19 the Admiralty point 13 clearly refers to, where the decision to break off the action is stated " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT " as you can read on the events description sequence :

Read them in here :

19. The Prince of Wales started off well for so new and unpractised a ship and had straddled with her sixth salvo. She had been engaging the Bismarck, while herself being engaged by the Prinz Eugen. After emptying her aircraft in preparation for a night encounter, she had been unable to refuel it in time to fly off before contact was made. It was just about to be catapulted when it was hit by splinters and had to be jettisoned. As soon as the Hood had been disposed of, the Bismarck shifted her main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately on to the Prince of Wales. The range was now about 18,000 yards and the Prince of Wales' starboard 5.25 inch battery had also come into action. Within a very few minutes she was hit by four 15-in, and three smaller, probably 8-in. shells; her compass platform was damaged and most of the people on it killed or wounded; both forward H.A. Directors and the starboard after one were out of action; one four-gunned turret had jammed and the ship was holed underwater aft. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, reports that the Prince of Wales' salvoes were now falling short and had a very large spread. The Commanding Officer considered it expedient temporarily to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under smoke. The range on ceasing fire was 14,600 yards.

Those are the statements that the first part of point 13 by the Admiralty Board refers to as you can read :

Admiralty_Point_13_01.jpg (40.6 KiB) Viewed 1015 times

The ONLY point, ... intentionally incorrectly written despite knowing the truth and the full details about what happened, ... on the Adm Tovey dispatches that clearly and accurately describes the " fully set out circumstances of the case " that forced PoW to retreat " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT " having received ALL the damages is the point 19.

Point 23, is related only to the second part of the point 13 regarding Wake-Walker failure to re-engagé.

Admiralty_Point_13_02.jpg (29.01 KiB) Viewed 1015 times

By the way, I am sure you and everybody else have noticed that in the same document the PoW retreat time does have 2 different times, ... 06.13 on point 19 by Tovey, ... and 06.03 on the point 23 by WW ( after 10 minutes engagement which started at 05.53 ).

So, not a very accurate analysis was done reading thru those dispatches ... ... as we can read ...

@ Dunmunro,

the Admiralty Board commented on " Adm Tovey's version " point 19 description ... as you can read above.

@ Alberto Virtuani,

you got it right !

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

There are no explanations provided by Capt Leach on point 22 explaining why he retreated " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT ", please read yourself :

22. The Commanding Officer of Prince of Wales in his report says:

"Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. Hood - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the Hood I felt that, together, we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three other considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before the action was joined namely:-

a. The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament could not be expected.

b. The working up of the ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.

c. The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage

In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement with two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."

Similarly there are NO statements on point 23 that declare that PoW retreated " AFTER BEING DAMAGED IN THE ENGAGEMENT ", but just after 10 minutes engagement ( 05.53+10 = 06.03 ) :

Antonio, you're quoting Leach's introductory comments not his detailed narrative:

During the approach "Hood" made - "G.I.C." - followed by - "G.O.B.1" - just before opening fire at 0552 1/2. Range approx. 25,000 yards. "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 0553. "Bismarck" replied with extreme accuracy on "Hood". 2nd or 3rd salvo straddled and fire broke out in "Hood" in the vicinity of the port after 4" gunmounting. Lighter ship engaged "Prince of Wales". "Price of Wales" opening salvo was observed over, 6th was seen to straddle. At this time "Prince of Wales" had five 14" guns in action. "Y" turret would not bear. Fire in "Hood" spread rapidly to the mainmast. A turn of 2 blue at 0555 opened "A" Arcs at "Prince of Wales" ninth salvo. "Hood" had a further 2 blue flying when, at 0600, just after "Bismarck's" 5th salvo, a huge explosion occurred between "Hood's" after funnel and mainmast and she sank in three or four minutes. "Hood" had fired five or six salvos but fall of shot was not seen, possibly because this coincided with firing of "Prince of Wales'" guns.

"Prince of Wales" starboard 5.25" battery was now in action. Course had to be altered to starboard to avoid remains of "Hood"; meanwhile "Bismarck" had shifted main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately onto "Prince of Wales". A heavy hit was felt almost immediately. And at 0602 compass platform was hit and majority of personnel killed. Navigating Officer was wounded; Commanding Officer unhurt.

The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.

The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos. "Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

The detailed narrative states that the decision to turn away occurred after suffering battle damage (of course Their Lordships would have known this from reading Leach's various reports including the detailed narrative and the G.A.R).

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, you are shooting your own feet.

Thanks for showing the way the events has been progressively altered and modified by those Officers, if you add also Capt. Leach radio messages and Adm Tovey May 30th, initial document, ... and the whole RearAdm Wake-Walker report the situation will be correctly re-constructed backwards.

This is what the " Cover Up" is all about, ... from the correct data initially reported, ... thru a new set of reports by Capt Leach and RearAdm Wake-Walker on June 1941, ... changing the event sequence and their timing, ... to the final wrap up of Adm Tovey dispatches on July 5th, 1941, ... with some more alterations added/made by Adm Tovey while summarizing them.

Again, the Admiralty board ONLY positively commented on the FINAL incorrect wrap up, ... on the " Tovey's version " of the facts that we all know is incorrect, ... just ONLY on Adm Tovey dispatches as they clearly stated on their response.

If, for example, the Admiralty Board was going to evaluate Adm Tovey May 30th, 1941 initial report and Capt Leach May 27th,1941 radio message, ... there was NO WAY that they could have written the statement they wrote, ... and in fact they commented positively by referencing ONLY to Adm Tovey dispatches, ... to the intentionally modified version of the events, ... and CLEARLY stated that in writing it on the response at point 13.

Doing that, ... they closed the problem, ... accepting the incorrect " Tovey's version " of the facts, ... and the " Cover Up" was done, ... with their approval.

Is it clear enough for you now ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Is it clear enough for you now ...

Antonio, I have no idea what you are talking about. Your byzantine reasoning is impossible to follow.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "The detailed narrative states that the decision to turn away occurred after suffering battle damage"

Hi Duncan,
we know that even the detail narrative (not speaking of the May 27 message) is only (very) partially true, as the order to turn away was given at 6:01:10 maximum (the ship was already turning sharply at 6:01:30 as per her own maps), therefore just after the first heavy hit received in compass platform (6:00:50).
All the other hits occurred when the order to disengage was already in execution, not speaking of the self inflicted Y turret jam that Tovey's point 19 (intentionally) incorrectly attribute to a battle damage (and that is IMO the only serious ballistic efficiency reduction able to justify a retreat under such circumstances).

However, the final report of Leach clearly suggests that his decision to disengage was taken at the time Hood blew up (almost a minute before): of course this would not have been a "nice enough story" to allow decorations.


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "The detailed narrative states that the decision to turn away occurred after suffering battle damage"

However, the final report of Leach clearly suggests that his decision to disengage was taken at the time Hood blew up (almost a minute before): of course this would not have been a "nice enough story" to allow decorations.


Bye, Alberto

What "final report"?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,
we speak always of June 4 Leach report. I mean the words quoted by point 22 of Tovey despatch, of course.......these were the only ones that Tovey considered to insert here as final report (I should have said "summary" instead of final report....).......

We have to recognize that even the details in Leach report are less "intentionally" incorrect that the shameful point 19 from Tovey that allowed the Admiralty to approve PoW retreat "AFTER BEING DAMAGED" with Y turret jammed as result of the battle and 6:13 as retreat time.....


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,
the words quoted by point 22 of Tovey despatch of course.......these were the only ones that Tovey considered to insert here as final report.......


Bye, Alberto

Tovey's despatch, which is necessarily an abbreviated document as it was meant for publication, is not Leach's "final report". As I pointed out previously Tovey quoted only the summary portion of Leach's narrative in his despatch but Their Lordships read Leach's entire narrative and the other enclosures to Tovey's despatch that were not meant to published.

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,
we speak always of June 4 Leach report. I mean the words quoted by point 22 of Tovey despatch, of course.......these were the only ones that Tovey considered to insert here as final report (I should have said "summary" instead of final report....).......

We have to recognize that even the details in Leach report are less "intentionally" incorrect that the shameful point 19 from Tovey that allowed the Admiralty to approve PoW retreat "AFTER BEING DAMAGED" with Y turret jammed as result of the battle and 6:13 as retreat time.....


Bye, Alberto

Again, Leach's entire narrative and PoW's G.A.R. were read by the Admiralty review board.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,
possibly they were read, but they approved Leach decision to retreat PoW,"after being damaged", basing their approval on the "CiC despatches" (their words), therefore based on the incorrect point 19, where the Y turret jam is listed in between the battle damages received from the german ships.......

It's absolutely clear.


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Does "after being damaged" refer to any particular point in time?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

you are right, in reality what has been done is a mix of a " bizantine " approach and a " shameful " progressive alteration of the truth, ... that I was able to realize at once, ... and many here are apparently still unable to understand and mostly to accept, ... despite the evidences one can easily read and the many explanations provided about them.

Lets see if by putting the evidence one after the other you are finally able to realize the differences among them and the reasons why ONLY the last " Tovey's version " was accepted and positively commented by the Admiralty Board.

Here the first version :

From : Prince of Wales
To : Admiralty
Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron - CS1

Time/Sent: 08.00 of May 24th, 1941

At 05.53-30 seconds PRINCE OF WALES opened fire, range 23,000.
BISMARCK opened fire immediately on HOOD.
HOOD opened fire just before PRINCE OF WALES.
PRINCE EUGEN engaged PRINCE OF WALES.
BISMARCK fire extremely accurate - straddling HOOD on second or third salvo.
Fire immediately broke out in HOOD near after port 4inch A.A. twin mount, spreading rapidly to mainmast.
At 06.00 an explosion occurred between the after funnel and the mainmast in HOOD and she sank within 3 to 4 minutes.
HOOD had fired 3 to 4 salves prior to being sunk.
Destroyer picked up only 3 survivors from HOOD, a midshipman, a signalman and a seaman.
PRINCE OF WALES straddled on 6th.
PRINCE OF WALES was astern of HOOD and had to manoeuvre to avoid parts of HOOD. BISMARCK immediately shifted fire to PRINCE OF WALES and almost immediately a violent explosion was heard in PRINCE OF WALES.
At 06.02-30 seconds the bridge of the PRINCE OF WALES was hit, casualties, heavy, Captain unhurt.
Same salvo placed both forward antiaircraft directors out of action.
At this time only 3 (three) of the 10 (ten) 14inch guns of the PRINCE OF WALES were in action. Y turret would not bear.
I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.
I therefore turned away firing Y turret in local control on the turn and making smoke.
BISMARCK alto turned to follow but immediately thereafter broke off action.
PRINCE OF WALES fired a total of eighteen 14nch gun salvos and three secondary battery salvos. PRINCE OF WALES then took station astern...

Here the second version :

From : Prince of Wales
To : Admiralty
Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron - CS1

Time/Sent: from 09.48 until 10.29 of May 27th, 1941

Your 2317B/25?

Burnt camouflage account has been compiled from preliminary examination record,
Further scrutiny? May disclose some minor inaccuracies
At 05.35/24 Hood and Prince of Wales in close order course 240° 28 knots sighted enemy hulls down on similar course bearing 335°, Bismarck astern lighter ship. Within gun range turns brought the enemy 30°.
Hood ordered G ( ? ) I C just before opening fire at 05.53. Range approximately 25.000 yards.
Prince of Wales opened fire at 05.53 and ½ ( 30 seconds ). Bismarck replied with extreme accuracy on Hood, second or third salvo straddled and fire broke out in Hood in vicinity port aft 4 inch mounting.
Lighter ship engaged by Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales’s opening salvo at Bismarck observed over, sixth seen to straddle.
At this time Prince of Wales had 3 (three) 14inch guns in action. Y turret would not bear.
Fire in Hood spreading rapidly to main mast.
A turn for 2 blue opened a valve at Prince of Wales 9 th salvo ( 4 main guns more from this moment onward ) and Hood has a further 2 blue flying when she was straddled again and at 06.00 a huge explosion occurred between after funnel and main mast. ( 2 blue = turn to port 20° together )
She sank in 3 to 4 minutes.
Prince of Wales saw whole incident.
Hood had fired 5 to 6 salvos but falling shot was not seen possibly because this coincided with the firing of Prince of Wales’s guns.
Prince of Wales starboard 5.25 inch battery was now in action.
Course had to be altered starboard to avoid remains of Hood; meanwhile Bismarck shifted main and secondary fire quickly and accurately to Prince of Wales.
A heavy hit was felt almost immediately and at 06.02 compass platform was hit, and majority of personnel killed.
Navigating Officer was wounded; Commander Officer unhurt.
Same salvoes put both 5.25 directors out of action.
Considered expedient to break off action and consolidate position and ship, after being manoeuvered round remains of HMS Hood, turned away behind spelt smoke screen.
Y turrets fired in local during turn as smoke disagreed with after director.
Enemy followed but turned away after a rocket salvo.
HMS Prince of Wales fired 18 main armament salvoes and 3 from secondary armament.
Target was crossed and re-crossed and 3 straddles observed.
No hits seen.

Here the third version :

Appendix to "HMS Prince of Wales" NO.001.B. dated 4th June, 1941.
TO : The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Copy to Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron – CS1
SECRET
During the approach "Hood" made - "G.I.C." - followed by - "G.O.B.1" - just before opening fire at 0552 1/2. Range approx. 25,000 yards. "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 0553. "Bismarck" replied with extreme accuracy on "Hood". 2nd or 3rd salvo straddled and fire broke out in "Hood" in the vicinity of the port after 4" gun mounting. Lighter ship engaged "Prince of Wales". "Price of Wales" opening salvo was observed over, 6th was seen to straddle.
At this time "Prince of Wales" had 5 (five) 14" guns in action. "Y" turret would not bear.
Fire in "Hood" spread rapidly to the mainmast.
A turn of 2 blue at 0555 opened "A" Arcs at "Prince of Wales" ninth salvo ( 4 main guns more from this moment onward 5+4 = 9 ). "Hood" had a further 2 blue flying when, at 0600, just after "Bismarck's" 5th salvo, a huge explosion occurred between "Hood's" after funnel and mainmast and she sank in three or four minutes. "Hood" had fired five or six salvos but fall of shot was not seen, possibly because this coincided with firing of "Prince of Wales'" guns.
"Prince of Wales" starboard 5.25" battery was now in action. Course had to be altered to starboard to avoid remains of "Hood"; meanwhile "Bismarck" had shifted main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately onto "Prince of Wales". A heavy hit was felt almost immediately.
And at 0602 compass platform was hit and majority of personnel killed. Navigating Officer was wounded; Commanding Officer unhurt.
The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.
It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.
It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.
The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.
The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
After retiring on a course of about 160 degs. "Prince of Wales" circled to port, steadying up on a course of 250 degs.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J.C.Leach Captain, Royal Navy

Here the fourth and final " Tovey's version " on Adm Tovey dispatches :

19. The Prince of Wales started off well for so new and unpracticed a ship and had straddled with her sixth salvo. She had been engaging the Bismarck, while herself being engaged by the Prinz Eugen. After emptying her aircraft in preparation for a night encounter, she had been unable to refuel it in time to fly off before contact was made. It was just about to be catapulted when it was hit by splinters and had to be jettisoned. As soon as the Hood had been disposed of, the Bismarck shifted her main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately on to the Prince of Wales. The range was now about 18,000 yards and the Prince of Wales' starboard 5.25 inch battery had also come into action. Within a very few minutes she was hit by four 15-in, and three smaller, probably 8-in. shells; her compass platform was damaged and most of the people on it killed or wounded; both forward H.A. Directors and the starboard after one were out of action; one four-gunned turret had jammed and the ship was holed underwater aft. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, reports that the Prince of Wales' salvoes were now falling short and had a very large spread. The Commanding Officer considered it expedient temporarily to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under smoke. The range on ceasing fire was 14,600 yards.

... and finally the Admiralty Board point 13 related ONLY to the final " Tovey's version " of the events at point 19 on his official dispatches that " went to the printers ", ... using Graham Rhys-Jone definition of it.

Admiralty_Point_13_01.jpg (40.6 KiB) Viewed 962 times

Since the difference is VERY EVIDENT, like the progression of the events sequence and timing alteration, ... like the Y turret jamming moved before the turn away and the retreat timing moved from 06.02 to 06.13, ... I hope that it should NOT take much now for you and everybody else to realize the differences and evaluate the reasons why the Admiralty board ONLY positively commented on Adm Tovey official dispatches point 19.

The Admiralty board positively commented based MAINLY on the incorrect statement that PoW firing capability was for sure considerably reduced ( Y turret jamming BEFORE the turn away according to the Tovey's version ) and that ALL the damages ( so AFTER BEING DAMAGED ) have been received on board PoW during an " invented " engagement that rested for 12 more minutes ( until 06.13 according to the Tovey's version ).

Hope now it is more clear for you ... the written facts are all up here for you to go thru them easily ... in case.

@ Herr Nilsson,

YES Marc, it does refer to a particular time, ... the one invented by Adm Tovey and RearAdm Wake-WAlker, ... the very famous and incorrect 06.13 you can read above and that we ALL agreed is incorrect for the PoW turn away.
Just the time that the RN Admiralty declared being INCORRECT on 1948, ... so, Officialy incorrect !

I am sure you remember our long discussion about it ...

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Marc,

you wrote: "Does "after being damaged" refer to any particular point in time?"

yes "after being damaged in the engagement" is referred to PoW decision to break off action, based on the "circumstances" described in Tovey's despatches (of course point 19 as no mention to damages is present at point 22....).


As I see that someone has still difficulties in reading with plain logic (not Byzantine) and correlating these points, I re-post them here below; first Tovey's shameful point 19 and then Admiralty answer (point 13).....

Point19.jpg (83.03 KiB) Viewed 963 times

Admiralty_Point_13_V1.jpg (62.79 KiB) Viewed 963 times

Bye, Alberto