The Fighting Instructions

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

Moderator: Bill Jurens

alecsandros
Senior Member
Posts: 4349
Joined: Wed Oct 14, 2009 2:33 pm
Location: Bucharest, Romania

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by alecsandros »

@Don't forget Suffolk responded with fire to Prinz Eugen from 28900 yards.
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by dunmunro »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:Hi Duncan,
please make up your mind.

One day you say that the fighting instructions justify both cruisers for not opening fire:
you wrote: "
"Are you telling me that if a battleship is shadowing an enemy division (let's say 4 battleships), and the main force (4 battleships) come in sight, the fighting instructions say that the shadower should not take part in the battle ?"
As you can read for yourself, in the lead post,"
One day later you say:
you wrote: "If either cruiser had been in effective gun range, then they would have opened fire. Neither were, and said so in their reports."
Now, assuming they were in range, I agree with your last statement, absolutely NOT with your first one. Assuming they were not (and unable to join the battle), then the question is not even on the table.


Regarding the real position of the 2 cruisers, please refer to Antonio's reconstruction in the "Plot" thread, here we are speaking of another topic. My personal opinion is different than your personal opinion: I believe Antonio has presented more than enough evidences of the fact that Adm.Tovey's point 17 is incorrect. Both cruisers were closer than 15 sm to the enemy both at open fire (5:52) and when Hood blew up (6:00).


Bye, Alberto
W-W had lightly armoured cruisers not battleships.

Antonio hasn't presented any evidence that either of W-W's cruisers were in effective gun range at 0552 onward.
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Dunmunro wrote: "W-W had lightly armoured cruisers not battleships. "
Hi Duncan,
the fighting instructions you referenced make no difference between ship types....... in any case the heavy cruisers did NOT risk to be engaged by BS as she had to deal with 2 battleships at the same time.....
you wrote"Antonio hasn't presented any evidence that either of W-W's cruisers were in effective gun range at 0552 onward."

I totally disagree, he did, but this is NOT the right thread to discuss this aspect, please refer to "the Plot", else we mix things together.....

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1656
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Byron Angel »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:@Byron Angel:
Hi Byron,
I'm pleased to see that you start evaluating the situation as reconstructed by Antonio: with the 2 cruisers both well within maximum 8" gun range. :clap:
Hi Alberto - Whether the distance was 10m or 15m, Wake-Walker was within maximum 8in gun range. I do not think that was ever in dispute.

You say, as usual, very sensible things, however some remarks about your points:

1) At point 22 of his own report, Wake-Walker states that the fire of his 8" guns could be effective at 20000 yards, not 17000.
..... 17,000yds was a doctrinal figure for effective 8in range set by the Admiralty. Beyond that, a good deal would have depended upon local conditions. See the Battle of the Komandorskis for the efficacy of 8in gunfire at 20,000yds.
2) PG open fire at 22000 yards with her 8" guns and apparently is well able to spot the fall of shells......
..... With all respect Alberto, the local visibility condition for Prinz Eugen along one particular line of sight is not proof of local visibility conditions for Wake-Walker 10m distant elsewhere on the battlefield and viewing along a completely different line of sight.
3) PG was firing at Hood as well as BS without apparently confusing her spotting and effectively concentrating fire..... Only after 5:59 PG switches fire to PoW to engage her that was firing undisturbed..
..... Conducting a fire concentration is very far from being as simple as you imply. It was not possible for Wake-Walker to organize any sort of impromptu fire concentration with Holland under the circumstances of the engagement. The mechanics of concentration fire are too complicated and lengthy to repeat here, but a good discussion can be found in some of the Progress in Naval Gunnery documents available @ the HMS Hood archives. OTOH, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, operating in close concert with reliable inter-ship communications immediately available were in a position to do so if desired (I do not know for a fact that the German ships did opt to conduct any concentration fire during the short engagement).
4) I agree on this point, W-W should have taken quick decisions and he was unable to do so. This can be a justification, but a subsequent inquiry would not have appreciated such an incertitude.....
..... A state of indecision on Wake-Walker's part is strictly an assumption. It is also quite possible that Wake-Walker was awaiting orders from Holland - by no means an unreasonable act.
5) The hypothetical case of a Wake-Walker's "Nelsonian" spirit attack (and I feel very uncomfortable putting together the two names....), is interesting but without any solid certitude that things would have developed as you imagine. When you enter a battle you never know the outcome. The opportunity to stop BS was there and I think a flag officer should have got it immediately. With hindsight, you can be right, but even with hindsight W-W managed (for his errors) to loose the BS in the following night despite the preserved Suffolk radar......
..... "without any solid certitude that things would have developed as you imagine" is exactly my point, Alberto. Wake-Walker did not possess a crystal ball. His operational shadowing obligation did not disappear with the appearance of Holland; it was only subordinated, pending the results of the engagement. Wake-Walker's contingent operational burden would have weighed quite heavily.

Byron
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Byron Angel:
Hi Byron,
again your points are sensible and could be true but not demonstrated (effective range, visibility, difficult communication, difficult fire concentration, lack of orders, etc.).

However the fact is that, assuming distances were the ones Antonio reconstructed (Norfolk at 11-12 sm and Suffolk at 9-10 sm) , the two British cruisers decided not to engage (Capt. Ellis autobiography explains why), possibly considering that their shadowing function was not over (I disagree) and that it was still more important than fighting an enemy (I totally disagree).
PG engaged (she could have left the line of fire), did not disrupt BS spotting and inflicted severe damage to 2 battleships.

At the end Germans won the battle and PG contribution is sharply contrasting with the British cruisers passive attitude.

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1656
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Byron Angel »

Dear Alberto/Antonio,

Re Prinz Eugen's gunnery, it is worth noting the following regarding the five hits scored:

> 1 hit was scored at 20,000m;

> 1 hit was scored at 17,000m;

> the other 3 hits were scored at ranges between 14,500m and 13,000m.

IMO, this suggests that 20,000 yds was not by any means "effective range" for 8in guns - at least not in the sense that I understand the term. Given their position relative to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and their respective speeds and headings, I doubt that Wake-Walker's cruisers had any realistic hope of closing to a range where they could offer meaningful material aid to Holland.

In a broader sense, I am greatly troubled by the vigor with which every alternate interpretation of the evidence, no matter how reasonable or plausible, is being attacked and arbitrarily dismissed in order to preserve this "cover-up scandal" scenario - which, to be kind, I find highly speculative and still absent of any real definitive proof. I say this in complete friendship and respect for the otherwise terrific research you have performed I hope that you will pause to take an intellectual breath and re-consider your position.

FWIW.

Byron
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote: "...... 1 hit was scored at 20,000m;> 1 hit was scored at 17,000m, the other 3 hits were scored at ranges between 14,500m and 13,000m.... ";
Hi Byron,
of course very respectful and in friendship, your above post is exactly demonstrating what I meant. The first 2 hits were scored by PG at distances where the British Cruisers could have been (or actually were) during the engagement.
The 3 hits scored after, show that even reducing the distance PG didn't get a terrific improvement of her effectiveness, but possibly this is due to the hard turn away of PoW at that time...... :think:

2 hits from a 8" gun can cause severe damage even to BS (not penetrating vitals of course), as the first 2 hits from PG actually did to Hood. This is exactly the thought of Capt.Ellis at page 14-15 of chapter 19 in his autobiography, in some way complaining that the broadsides fired at 21150 yards at 18:55 the same day (the 3rd one straddled BS) were just unlucky......

I would say that even a few hits on BS in the morning would have been more than useful from Suffolk side (plus, can we assume a few from Norfolk (a bit less, of course, being a bit more distant ?)

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1656
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Byron Angel »

Alberto,

Given the respective headings and speeds of Wake-Walker's cruisers and the German ships, I cannot see how the British cruisers could have closed range in any meaningful manner; they possessed no meaningful margin of speed superiority and very little in the way of positional advantage. Suffolk's radar was incapable of spotting fall of shot at 20,000 yds and, at 28,000 yds, Norfolk was too far distant to lend anything more than moral support. Assuming that Suffolk's gunnery efficiency was broadly on a par with that of Prinz Eugen (which I am by no means certain would have been the case) and adding a dollop of generosity from Lady Luck, my estimate would be 2 or perhaps 3 hits at best. 8in gunfire does not inflict damage of a serious nature upon a battleship at any range; it produces annoying damage at best. Can you point out any really dramatic contribution made by any of the hits scored by Prinz Eugen upon Hood or Prince of Wales?

Holland's presumed/inferred intention for Wake-Walker's cruisers to cooperate in a joint attack is meaningless because he never issued any such orders and Wake-Walker was not capable of reading minds. Wake-Walker's operative Admiralty orders were to shadow Bismarck and commanders are not supposed to tactically "free lance" without orders. Wake-Walker had to weigh all that, plus the potential loss through battle damage of his ability to perform his shadowing function. This is what I mean when I say that the command burden for Wake-Walker was considerable.

I understand that you cannot accept this viewpoint. To do so would remove the foundation upon which the "cover-up scandal" scenario sits. Nevertheless, it remains a great thorn in the side of your argument. What really concerns me is that all your other very good work will be lost to sight in the maelstrom of controversy and legitimate criticism which this entirely speculative and unproven "cover-up scandal" argument will inevitably generate.

B
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote: "my estimate would be 2 or perhaps 3 hits at best."
Hi Byron,
if PG was able to score a hit at 20000 yards in 2 minutes, I would say that in the 8 minutes of battle (and more than 8 minutes as I don't think they should have ceased fire at 6:00 anyway...), the 2 (undisturbed) British cruiser could have scored more hits, being at 18000 yards (Ellis autobiography) and 23000 yards (Norfolk at 1st board of inquiry, despite her "timid" maneuvering), as per Antonio's reconstructed distances.......

However, even assuming your estimation of 3 hits on BS, they were more than valuable in such a situation !

you wrote: "Can you point out any really dramatic contribution made by any of the hits scored by Prinz Eugen upon Hood or Prince of Wales?"
Sure I can. Hood large fire on the boat deck (attributed to PG) was perhaps not dangerous, but it apparently prevented the rear turrets from firing for a long period of time and it caused several casualties on board.
PoW was hit twice under water by PG (hit n.5 and 6) and these hits (together with the unexploded 15" shell from BS) caused 600 tons of water to enter the ship aft, reducing her speed by 2 knots.... One shell (hit n.2) put one of the HALA director out of service for the whole mission, and the last one (hit.4) penetrated 2 decks and luckily did not explode against a secondary turret barbette.....

I would say that such damages on BS from the British cruisers would have been more than welcome to support Hood and PoW action, don't you ?

you wrote: " Wake-Walker's operative Admiralty orders were to shadow Bismarck "
Could you please reference any source for what you say ? Nobody was able/willing, up to now, to post the operative orders for the BS interception mission...... :think:

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by dunmunro »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Byron Angel wrote: "my estimate would be 2 or perhaps 3 hits at best."
Hi Byron,
if PG was able to score a hit at 20000 yards in 2 minutes, I would say that in the 8 minutes of battle (and more than 8 minutes as I don't think they should have ceased fire at 6:00 anyway...), the 2 (undisturbed) British cruiser could have scored more hits, being at 18000 yards (Ellis autobiography) and 23000 yards (Norfolk at 1st board of inquiry, despite her "timid" maneuvering), as per Antonio's reconstructed distances.......

However, even assuming your estimation of 3 hits on BS, they were more than valuable in such a situation !

The fact that Norfolk and Suffolk didn't open fire is, in itself, proof that they weren't within effective gun range. (~24k yds or closer). Norfolk's report states exactly that.

As an aside, the KM 20.3cm gun had about a 1/3 longer range at the same elevation, making it proportionately more accurate. The KM also used nose fuzed HE shells which burst upon striking the water, giving them a much more visible splash than the time delayed RN 8in SAP shell.
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Dunmunro:
Hi Duncan,
of course the whole discussion here is based on the assumption (for me it is a well proved assumption now) that Norfolk and Suffolk were where Antonio's reconstructed battle-map puts them.

If they were where Pinchin put them (but I hope you don't believe Pinchin was correct anymore.....), the debate would not even be started.

Wake-Walker says in his report (point 22) that the fall of shell was visible at 20000 yards, so we have to believe him.........well, as he was saying incorrect things even when cautioned in front of an inquiry, perhaps we should not...... :think:
203mm effective range - W-W report point 22.jpg
(33.79 KiB) Not downloaded yet
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1656
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Byron Angel »

Byron wrote: " Wake-Walker's operative Admiralty orders were to shadow Bismarck "

Alberto wrote: "Could you please reference any source for what you say ? Nobody was able/willing, up to now, to post the operative orders for the BS interception mission...... :think:"

- - -

Come now, Alberto. Isn't that being rather disingenuous? Pretty much the entire Home Fleet had been on alert in anticipation of a sortie by Bismarck. Wake-Walker had been expressly dispatched to Denmark Strait to watch for Bismarck. Once Wake-Walker had located Bismarck, pray tell what his duty was other than to maintain a shadow and call in heavy support?

Byron
User avatar
Alberto Virtuani
Senior Member
Posts: 3605
Joined: Mon Jul 08, 2013 8:22 am
Location: Milan (Italy)

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

@Byron Angel:
Hi Byron, the general scope is clear. My question is: do you have a copy of the actual operative orders given to W-W?

IMHO, they are key to understand whether the Heavy cruiser were meant to shadow only or to engage the enemy once the mail force was engaged.

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
User avatar
Antonio Bonomi
Senior Member
Posts: 3799
Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 10:44 am
Location: Vimercate ( Milano ) - Italy

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :
Antonio, your "plot" has Norfolk and Suffolk only 13.9 nm apart yet they cannot see each other ... :negative:
Sometimes I wonder if it is only blind trust on what one likes to believe ... or what else ... because surely it cannot be lack of competence or ingenuity ... :think:

Given what we are discussing, where it is well demonstrated that almost ALL the Officers involved declared one thing ... and immediately after something else, ... how you can blindly believe that for sure they cannot see each others ... even at the point to refute a demonstrated work on real available data, ... I simply find it incredible.

Even assuming that what you are stating was true only due to the distance, ... surely there are other incorrect statements, ... for example if Norfolk at 05.50 was at 14 sea miles from Hood/PoW having them on bearing 220° while sailing herself at 30 knots on course 220°... than tell me Duncan where Norfolk was 9 minutes before at 05.41 ?

Just bring her backward 9 minutes and tell me where Norfolk is going to be on your map ?

You to decide now according to your logic which one of the 2 statements is less reliable and/or incorrect ... :think:

... additionally you wrote :
Your plot cannot be correct.
Everything can be, ... also that I am not correct.

Can you please try to demonstrate it ? ... surely NOT with " The Plot ", ... if you like to demonstrate my work being NOT correct, ... I am OK with it, ... you just have to tell us/me where it is NOT correct, ... and produce yourself the correct version of it.

Please, go ahead ... just do it.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1656
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: The Fighting Instructions

Post by Byron Angel »

See Admiralty communiqué (No. 427) B dated 27 May 1941.

See also the Admiralty Oct 1947 London Gazette communique.

B
Post Reply