The Fighting Instructions

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Byron,
I know the London Gazette and there are no operative orders in it......

you wrote: "See Admiralty communiqué (No. 427) B dated 27 May 1941."

I think I have never seen this document: can you please post the orders or tell us what they say (both for W-W and Holland if you have them ) ?
The date is not clear to me, as, of course, operative orders must be issued before a mission, not after, so I'm expecting to see an order to W-W dated before May 21.......

Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

Alberto,

Admiralty Communique 427B = http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/briti ... niques.pdf. No, it does not quote the "operative order".

Re the "operative order" to Wake-Walker - Considering the number of documents obtained from the NA, I am fascinated that you and Antonio do not already hold "the operative order" to Wake-Walker in hand. I must confess as well, that I wonder what you expect to find. Are you expecting to see detailed step-by-step instructions from Tovey about what to do after contact was made with Bismarck - i.e. shadow or don't shadow; stay at this distance depending upon that visibility condition; send me radio reports every X hours; engage or don't engage? If so, I think it is foolish to expect such micro-managing ABC kindergarten details being tendered to a senior flag officer. Tovey would have expected Wake-Walker to possess a professional grasp of the requirements of his mission, what was necessary to be done and to perform accordingly ...... which is exactly what Wake-Walker displayed in delivering Bismarck to Holland.

After that, it is a matter of a 5-10 minute period during which Wake-Walker, lacking orders/instructions from Admiral Holland to do so, did not engage Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Only in the light of doctrine laid down in the Grand Fleet Fighting Instructions of 1939, under which the Denmark Strait action was managed and fought, can any such verdict be reasonably rendered. Do you and Antonio possess a copy of this doctrinal document? As complicated as this matter is, it is nevertheless ALSO necessary to understand the doctrinal assumptions and expectations which influenced and guided the participants.

Byron

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Byron,
from your answer, I therefore conclude that you have not seen any operative order, as well as all the other people on this forum....

Regarding the importance of these orders, why they should exist, and why we are interested in them, I will answer you in the thread dedicated to the operative orders here below (to keep this one dedicated to the fighting instructions):
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6792

Bye, Alberto

[Francis Marliere]

if PG was able to score a hit at 20000 yards in 2 minutes, I would say that in the 8 minutes of battle (and more than 8 minutes as I don't think they should have ceased fire at 6:00 anyway...), the 2 (undisturbed) British cruiser could have scored more hits, being at 18000 yards (Ellis autobiography) and 23000 yards (Norfolk at 1st board of inquiry, despite her "timid" maneuvering), as per Antonio's reconstructed distances.....

Alberto,

I fear that your estimation does not match historical exemples such as the battles of the Java Sea or of the Komandorsky islands. I don't believe neither that admirals of the time expected a couple of 8" SAP shells to cause dramatic damage to Bismarck (it was possible but unlikely).

Best,

Francis Marliere

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Francis,
of course nobody can say what the result of opening fire (Suffolk from 18000 and Norfolk from less than 23000 yards, maneuvering against the enemy, respectively) would have been.

However our friend Alec has posted several examples of 8" fire in "The Plot" thread here below:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6495&start=1185

Alecsandros wrote: ".......HMS Devonshire chose to attack KGM Atlantis from 15km. HMS Cornwall withdrew out of KGM Pinguin gun range, and responded with fire from 15-16km. But those are exceptions - when the 8" cruisers could dictate the range.

At River Plate, Exeter fired on the Graf Spee at a range of 19400 yards according to British records, and probably 23000yards according to German records. The average would be around 21500yards, or 19km. Exeter obtained 2 direct hits and 1 damaging near miss, all from ranges between 16 to 18km.

At Bismarck's final battle, HMS Norfolk opened fire from around 22000yards (20km), despite the storm, heavy seas, and continous fire by other ships, all making spoting fall of own shot much more difficult than in the conditions present at Denmark Strait. 14 minutes or so after opening fire, Norfolk scored a first devastating hit on Bismarck's foretop, killing and wounding a number of personell, and disabling the equipment in the tallest (and with the highest range) command position of the battleship. So she could do big damage to Bismarck, even with her 8" guns.

It is always a thing to wonder - what if Norolk and Suffolk had opened fire on Bismarck on May 24th, in effective range or not ? What would that have caused Luetjens to do ? Perhaps he would be more anxious, perhaps he would split his fire ?
Who knows.

Anyway, Biritish 8" cruisers had effective range of about 15km, but they did fire out to 20km , sometimes with good results, and they returned fire out to 25km when needed (the case of Suffolk returning fire to Prinz |Eugen)."

Bottom line, if you open fire you can expect some hits (lucky o not lucky as Suffolk 3rd salvo straddling BS at 18:55 on May 24, but not hitting her), if you choose to stay out of gun range, you are sure that you will get nothing, of course.....

In line with the (still valid) Horatio Nelson doctrine:

Adm Lord Nelson said: "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.""

Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Dear All,
I am in agreement with Alberto that to 'chance one's arm' and rely on luck was definitely an option for Wake-Walker, however to get within 20,000yds of BC and or PG at the rate of excess speed that was available to HMS Norfolk and at the distance of 11nm to BC shown on Diagram B would have taken slightly over 22 minutes and to PG slightly over 59 minutes (Even longer for Suffolk as her top speed was lower according to their logs). I think that a decision on the distance in which to engage an enemy is, as Alecsandros correctly states, up to the commander of the vessel and therefore also whether he relies on luck.
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Cag:
Hi Mr.Cag,
as I said to Dunmunro, all this discussion is based on Antonio reconstructed distances, 18000 yards for Suffolk (so no need to close at all) and 23000 for Norfolk after a timid maneuvering...... If distance were more than these (as per Pinchin), the discussion should not even take place.....

However I agree with you when you say:

Cag wrote: "I think that a decision on the distance in which to engage an enemy is, as Alecsandros correctly states, up to the commander of the vessel and therefore also whether he relies on luck."

Apparently Ellis was relying on luck when he fired at BS at 18:55 from 21150 yards, while he was not at 5:53 when (according to him) he was at 18000......
I think he regretted what he did not in the morning......


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I think you should look at this battle from 2 clearly divided perspective.

1) Before HMS Hood exploded at 06.00.

2) After HMS Hood exploded at 06.00.

That event changed ALL the situations.

Before we have to realize what was the perception of the CS1 heavy cruisers ( mostly Suffolk ) having finally driven the successful interception despite all the night occurrences, ... and we have read a shadowing perception and a flank marking felt duty, ... leaving initially the job on the appeared RN battleships, ... and also the Baron on his book account gave us this way to read the events.

In this perspective the distance they where from the enemy, ready to do flank marking ( just as the Sunderland was supposed to do - ref. McMullen IWM interview ) was close to perfection in my personal opinion.

After the 06.00 and Hood explosion is going to be a different story, ... just as Capt Leach declared on his report.

In any case we need to realize the orders they had at any level : before, during ( if any ) and after the action as best as we can.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Dear All,
I am in agreement with you Alberto and have studied Antonio's plot and his fair approach towards distances etc, but I do think we also have to be fair to those present on the 24th May as well. I do understand how hard it is to present a case against a lot of opposition and have tried to refrain from a directly opposing style of posting. My objective is to try and represent what was tactically and logically possible, even at the expense of disproving my own opinion on the matter. I believe that both sides have valid points and must not be dissmissed and as always try to keep an open mind. In my post above my idea is to try and suggest that because we have the log entry for Norfolk and Suffolks top speeds we know what excess of speed was available (And have even discounted BC's speed increase) around 89yds per minute and if we take into account from when Wake-Walker and Ellis were aware that BCS 1 was in contact (As you suggest the 'shadowing' phase was at an end) we can, from those points, work out how long it would have taken to be in effective range. I agree that opening fire at longer ranges was possible and am trying to get to a point where we can see what value that would have been, what effect that would have caused, and what use or what hinderance that would have placed on Holland (No value or some value,no effect or good or bad effect such as BC turning on Norfolk or BC and PG turning away from BCS 1, and help to Holland by dividing fire or hinderence in spotting fall of shot) as opposed to the value there would have been to being in effective range. If we come to the conclusion that fire would have been inaffective but at least something that should have been attempted I would be happy that we at least have an agreement however that would still only be our opinion, it was Wake-Walkers and Ellis's opinion that on that day counted, right or wrong, and if they considered the shadowing phase to be over or what they considered their role to be. After that if you either believe in a cover up or not that again is an opinion but not I'm affraid for either side a proven fact as there are as many pieces of individual circumstantial evidence for as there is against and argument for and against them all! I have tried to remain a gentleman in all my posts and will continue to do so long as they are of value.
Cag.