The Fighting Instructions

[dunmunro]

ADM 239/261: THE FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, 1939 (C.B.04027)

SECTION IV.-SHADOWING

GENERAL

170. The object of shadowing is to supply the Admiral with continuous information of the enemy's movements. The purpose for which this information is required, i.e., the final object of the shadowing, will have a considerable influence on the conduct of shadowing units and should, if possible, be known to them.

171. As long as the primary object of a vessel is to shadow, offensive action which will defeat this object is unsound. When, by retaining touch, there is every prospect of bringing large forces into a position to deliver attacks on the enemy, shadowing vessels should not, generally speaking, take offensive action until after these attacks have been completed. If, however, a favourable opportunity occurs for firing torpedoes unseen at the enemy main force, shadowing vessels should not hesitate to do so. Shadowing may be carried out by surface vessels, submarines or aircraft.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

when one reads those fighting instructions :

If, however, a favorable opportunity occurs for firing torpedoes unseen at the enemy main force, shadowing vessels should not hesitate to do so.

... and thinks about what Adm Lutjens ordered to the Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, ...

Bye Antonio

[Byron Angel]

"... shadowing vessels should not, generally speaking, take offensive action until after these attacks have been completed. If, however, a favourable opportunity occurs for firing torpedoes unseen at the enemy main force, shadowing vessels should not hesitate to do so. Shadowing may be carried out by surface vessels, submarines or aircraft."

Two points, Antonio -

[1] The guideline clearly precludes offensive action by a shadower (stipulated as being either surface vessels, SUBMARINES or aircraft), unless a favourable opportunity occurs for torpedo attack while remaining unseen. The likelihood of such a torpedo attack being carried out by a surface vessel is infinitely remote, but possible for a submarine.

[2] Prinz Eugen was not shadowing.


Dunmunro presents a powerful and valid argument re Wake-Walker's conduct.


B

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Byron Angel:
hi Byron,
I agree, my only doubt is that after 5:37 "enemy in sight" message, the shadowing phase is clearly over, as the main force is going to engage the enemy.
This is why we should be able to find the operative orders for W-W.

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I take everybody suggestion and opinion about what happened that morning ... as well as the fighting instructions in place.

All I am saying is that I would like to know if ViceAdm Holland and RearAdm Wake-Walker received any order before sailing for that mission.

Additionally I would like to find out if they communicated those orders to the involved units and when, ... and if they changed or not the orders during the operation execution itself.

I know that probably I will never be able to find all those answers, ... but those are the questions on the table.

In order to give you an example of what the Military process required, ... how it worked, ... as soon as Capt Leach joined the CS1 heavy cruisers, ... he immediately asked RearAdm Wake-Walker his orders and intentions.

Just the Military way to do things, ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

@Byron Angel:
hi Byron,
I agree, my only doubt is that after 5:37 "enemy in sight" message, the shadowing phase is clearly over, as the main force is going to engage the enemy.
This is why we should be able to find the operative orders for W-W.

Bye, Alberto

Holland never signalled W-W that he should engage, and in that case the Fighting Instructions take precedence and the correct action for Suffolk and Norfolk was to remain out of range pending the outcome of the action, and all the documentation recorded at the time states that this is, in fact, what they did do.

W-W could not have known Holland's strength nor his dispositions, so it is very unlikely that W-W could have been given prior instructions on taking offensive action in the absence of explicit tactical orders from Holland.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "Holland never signalled W-W that he should engage, and in that case the Fighting Instructions take precedence and the correct action for Suffolk and Norfolk was to remain out of range pending the outcome of the action,"

Hi Duncan,
shadowing was already over after 5:37, as the main force was there, ready to fight the enemy. Ther ewas no more need to "shadow".

Are you telling me that if a battleship is shadowing an enemy division (let's say 4 battleships), and the main force (4 battleships) come in sight, the fighting instructions say that the shadower should not take part in the battle ?

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "Holland never signalled W-W that he should engage, and in that case the Fighting Instructions take precedence and the correct action for Suffolk and Norfolk was to remain out of range pending the outcome of the action,"

Hi Duncan,
shadowing was already over after 5:37, as the main force was there, ready to fight the enemy. Ther ewas no more need to "shadow".

Are you telling me that if a battleship is shadowing an enemy division (let's say 4 battleships), and the main force (4 battleships) come in sight, the fighting instructions say that the shadower should not take part in the battle ?

Bye, Alberto

"Are you telling me that if a battleship is shadowing an enemy division (let's say 4 battleships), and the main force (4 battleships) come in sight, the fighting instructions say that the shadower should not take part in the battle ?"

As you can read for yourself, in the lead post, The fighting Instructions state exactly that. Of course, W-W's elderly, lightly armoured, cruisers are in no way individually comparable even to Prinz Eugen, to say nothing of Bismarck.

Ellis, W-W, and probably Holland, expected Lutjens to reverse course upon realizing that he was facing two RN battleships, and Holland never gave W-W tactical instructions, so in no way did anyone consider the shadowing to be over at 0537.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
Hi Duncan,
I see your point but I disagree. For me the shadowing was over after the British battleships were present on the battlefield and opened fire; no fighting instruction can justify the fact of not opening fire during a battle (once shadowing mission is clearly completed) when in effective gun range, except an explicit order received.

You yourself stated: " It would have been a violation of the articles of war for Suffolk not to engage the enemy " ... and more about this argument : " Suffolk's 8in guns posed a serious danger to Bismarck and a deadly danger to PE and the possibility that the KM would ignore such a threat is zero, just as the possibility is zero that an RN captain and gunnery team would ignore two such important targets during a crucial engagement ".

and I fully agree with you !


Whether in this case Norfolk and Suffolk were due for opportunity reasons to participate or not, may be debatable, also for the reasons listed by Capt.Ellis in his memoirs, for sure someone could have asked why they did not during a subsequent inquiry, even if I agree that the same inquiry could have absolved the involved officers...... for sure, they could not be decorated for just obeying blindly to the fighting instructions, defending themselves with this against the Articles of War !

Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

HI All,
I understand the reasoning behind the argument of Norfolk and Suffolk engaging PG, and have asked three questions on other threads on this matter (Don't worry I won't again!) which I think it is important to consider. In the end the PG was the lead ship and to engage her the British cruisers would have to close to have got within gunnery range of PG, and therefore also well within gunnery range of BC the nearer ship (A Battleship and not just any old Battleship!) and risk damage and loss of contact (At odds with the fighting Instruction for shadowing) and is not as simple as it may seem to be. Would it also be correct to assume that this would either force BC to engage the British cruisers meaning perhaps both British cruisers turning away, or force a course change possibly away from BCS 1 worsening the situation for Holland? I presume all of this would have had to have taken place prior to BCS 1 engaging PG and BC and after they knew both PoW and Hood were in contact (0537 or 0543 take your pick and 0552.5?)
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "In the end the PG was the lead ship and to engage her the British cruisers would have to close to have got within gunnery range of PG, and therefore also well within gunnery range of BC the nearer ship"

Hi Mr.Cag,
I don't mean that the British cruiser should open fire at PG. Assuming Antonio reconstruction is correct, (with Norfolk and Suffolk in gun range during the engagement), being closer to BS, and not risking to be engaged by her (already busy with 2 battleships), the British Cruisers could have open fire at BS. HE shells do cause serious damage to a battleship (optics, radars, unprotected bow and stern, etc.). PG did a good job against battleships.

you wrote: "I presume all of this would have had to have taken place prior to BCS 1 engaging PG and BC "

No, I mean they should have open fire just after Hood did at 5:53.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Cag wrote: "In the end the PG was the lead ship and to engage her the British cruisers would have to close to have got within gunnery range of PG, and therefore also well within gunnery range of BC the nearer ship"

Hi Mr.Cag,
I don't mean that the British cruiser should open fire at PG. Assuming Antonio reconstruction is correct, (with Norfolk and Suffolk in gun range during the engagement), being closer to BS, and not risking to be engaged by her (already busy with 2 battleships), the British Cruisers could have open fire at BS. HE shells do cause serious damage to a battleship (optics, radars, unprotected bow and stern, etc.). PG did a good job against battleships.

you wrote: "I presume all of this would have had to have taken place prior to BCS 1 engaging PG and BC "

No, I mean they should have open fire just after Hood did at 5:53.

Bye, Alberto

If either cruiser had been in effective gun range, then they would have opened fire. Neither were, and said so in their reports.

In the absence of orders from Holland to the contrary, the cruisers primary mission remained that of shadowing the enemy, and that, in turn, meant remaining outside of effective gun range. When the shooting started neither cruiser had the speed to close sufficiently to engage.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,
please make up your mind.

One day you say that the fighting instructions justify both cruisers for not opening fire:

you wrote: "

"Are you telling me that if a battleship is shadowing an enemy division (let's say 4 battleships), and the main force (4 battleships) come in sight, the fighting instructions say that the shadower should not take part in the battle ?"

As you can read for yourself, in the lead post,"

One day later you say:

you wrote: "If either cruiser had been in effective gun range, then they would have opened fire. Neither were, and said so in their reports."

Now, assuming they were in range, I agree with your last statement, absolutely NOT with your first one. Assuming they were not (and unable to join the battle), then the question is not even on the table.


Regarding the real position of the 2 cruisers, please refer to Antonio's reconstruction in the "Plot" thread, here we are speaking of another topic. My personal opinion is different than your personal opinion: I believe Antonio has presented more than enough evidences of the fact that Adm.Tovey's point 17 is incorrect. Both cruisers were closer than 15 sm to the enemy both at open fire (5:52) and when Hood blew up (6:00).


Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

Antonio,

[1] The Admiralty considered 17,000 yards to be effective range for an 8in cruiser.

[2] IIRC, did not one of the cruiser gunnery officers express doubt that fall of shot could be spotted at that range under prevailing visibility conditions?

[3] With Hood firing upon Prinz Eugen and Prince of Wales firing upon Bismarck, Wake-Walker risked throwing off the shooting of Holland's capital ships by having his cruisers open fire since it was impossible for his ships to properly cooperate with them in any sort of concentration fire.

[4] Wake-Walker's window of time to decide to abandon his essential shadowing duty and engage the German ships lasted for somewhere between five and eight minutes before events decided the issue for him. I take longer than that to order lunch from the menu.

[5] Let's assume a truly Nelsonic alternative case. Wake-Walker somehow storms into an effective range of 15,000 yards and engages Prinz Eugen. Prinz Eugen's return fire then destroys the sole radar set in Wake-Walker's possession capable of effectively tracking the German ships at night. Hood is then destroyed and Prince of Wales breaks off the action. Bismarck withdraws from the scene. Or Bismarck blows up and Prinz Eugen flees. Night falls and/or the visibility closes in again. What is Wake-Walker's next move?

The case you seek to make is a great deal more simplistic than the reality of the actual event. Wake-Walker had a heavy responsibility and had to carefully play the odds in a number of different respects. Putting his tracking/shadowing capability at risk in exchange for a likely ineffectual contribution to the impending gun action was not a choice I would have made under those circumstances unless explicitly ordered to do so by Holland.

It might be interesting to compare the degree of aggressiveness displayed by British cruisers present at the final destruction of Bismarck and the sinking of Scharnhorst. Did they close in boldly while their quarry still retained an efficient gunnery capability?

B

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Byron Angel:
Hi Byron,
I'm pleased to see that you start evaluating the situation as reconstructed by Antonio: with the 2 cruisers both well within maximum 8" gun range.


You say, as usual, very sensible things, however some remarks about your points:

1) At point 22 of his own report, Wake-Walker states that the fire of his 8" guns could be effective at 20000 yards, not 17000.

2) PG open fire at 22000 yards with her 8" guns and apparently is well able to spot the fall of shells.....

3) PG was firing at Hood as well as BS without apparently confusing her spotting and effectively concentrating fire..... Only after 5:59 PG switches fire to PoW to engage her that was firing undisturbed.

4) I agree on this point, W-W should have taken quick decisions and he was unable to do so. This can be a justification, but a subsequent inquiry would not have appreciated such an incertitude.....

5) The hypothetical case of a Wake-Walker's "Nelsonian" spirit attack (and I feel very uncomfortable putting together the two names....), is interesting but without any solid certitude that things would have developed as you imagine. When you enter a battle you never know the outcome. The opportunity to stop BS was there and I think a flag officer should have got it immediately. With hindsight, you can be right, but even with hindsight W-W managed (for his errors) to loose the BS in the following night despite the preserved Suffolk radar......


I still think that, assuming the distances were the ones reconstructed by Antonio and confirmed by Capt.Ellis in his autobiography, 16 8" guns (or 12 only if Suffolk was unable to bear the aft turrets) would have been useful at least as the 8 guns of PG surely have been.

Bye, Alberto