Cag wrote:Put simply was this hit similar to the others, from a forward direction or as is shown on the Hood website from aft?
Cag wrote: "....I'm just wondering if this was the immediate heavy hit felt and mentioned by Captain Leach.... "
Cag wrote: "...these four hits happened within a very short period of time..."
Alberto Virtuani wrote:@all: my best wishes to everybody here !Cag wrote: "....I'm just wondering if this was the immediate heavy hit felt and mentioned by Captain Leach.... "
I was always puzzled as well by Capt.Leach statement about a "heavy hit aft" just before the compass platform hit.
However, looking at the damage report and at Paul's posted drawing above from Hood website, my 2 cents opinion is that the only hit that could have reached PoW before the compass platform one (hit No.1) is the one on the fore directors support (hit No.2), that would have been felt from the bridge as coming from aft, bouncing over the roof of the chart room just behind the compass platform. Possibly this came very few seconds before the No.1 and it was probably a PG 8" one or even a Bismarck 6" one (as per damage report conclusions).
The UW 15" hit looks too much from a different direction to have hit when the ship was on course around 280°, even accounting for a deflection due to the travel under the water. I also strongly doubt that such a shell (traveling under water, hitting low in the ship, piercing thin bulkheads and resting without exploding) could be felt at all from the bridge during the battle.
Cag wrote: "Does it seem more likely that................the decision and opportunity to break off was later than that first proposed as just after the compass platform hit? "
Capt.Leach on June 4th (my bold and underlined): "Course had to be altered starboard to avoid remains of Hood; meanwhile Bismarck shifted main and secondary fire quickly and accurately to Prince of Wales.
A heavy hit was felt almost immediately and at 06.02 compass platform was hit, and majority of personnel killed.
Navigating Officer was wounded; Commander Officer unhurt.
Same salvoes put both 5.25 directors out of action.
Considered expedient to break off action and consolidate position and ship, after being manoeuvered round remains of HMS Hood, turned away behind spelt smoke screen.
Y turrets fired in local during turn as smoke disagreed with after director.
"......Prior to the disaster to the Hood, I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation and there were three further considerations......In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement..... Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action......
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