Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: " I don't have to write an entire history of the action to examine a ~30 second slice of time. I'm sorry if the evidence is at odds with some theories as to what happened"

...and I'm sorry you are among the ones unable to put together a reliable complete scenario, but only able to criticize someone else work, on the base of observations cherry-picked from unreliable witnesses or ships sailing far away.


Demonstration: you are unable to answer questions VERY CLEARLY posed, insisting now in this new speculation about BS open fire time (after your incredible story about Leach re-engagement maneuver at 6:04...), just because unwilling to accept the reality.

FIRST QUESTION:
1) According to Pinchin's Plot, Suffolk, at open fire was 21 sm away from Bismarck and 36 sm from Hood
2) According to Antonio's reconstruction, Suffolk was at 17 sm from Bismarck and 32 sm from Hood ,after her turn away to north due to the "mirage". Due to your answer re. Ellis autobiography, these are also the distances at open fire.

Please decide which distances you trust: Pinchin's or Antonio's ? .


SECOND QUESTION:
How can you reconcile your theory of Bismarck open fire at 5:53 with her RoF, salvo count, output loss %, hit rate ? According to you, BS was firing to PoW from 5:58 till 6:03, on stable course herself, and ordering 16 shots ONLY (your calculations, 40 shots to Hood, 48 to PoW after 6:03 at least as present in film and photos and 108 total ordered as per your assumption of a 10% output loss). See viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.

Have you at least realized how in error you are with such assumptions ?


To present something credible you have to prepare a complete scenario, because at the end everything MUST reasonably fit.


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "Jasper and Schmalenbach's accounts are not official reports as such."

They are official reports signed by them, as well as the PG KTB signed by Brinkmann. What are you saying now ?


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Alberto Virtuani,

we do have the official documents signed by Schmalenbach, Jasper, Brinkmann and we do have the Adm Lutjens original message.

The timings are clear, ... both for 05.55 ( German open fire ) as well as for 06.00 ( Hood explosion ), ... and in fact the Royal Navy Admiralty had no other option than accept it and amend their publication Battle Summary Number 5 accordingly.

But the Royal Navy Admiralty do understand the chain of command and the orders, ... while apparently Dunmunro does not, ... despite the Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg detailed account confirmation of it.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Ted Briggs own declaration from the documentary " Sunk by the Bismarck " on 1997 :

We fired about 2 or 3 salvoes, ... before Bismarck replied, ...

Here Ted Briggs book chapter dedicated to that occurence, where it is basically confirming his above personal statement :

Briggs_Hood_02.jpg (121.36 KiB) Viewed 978 times

Here you can see Ted Briggs battle map with his KEY timing milestones, ... confirming the above :

Briggs_timings.jpg (46.92 KiB) Viewed 976 times

To be noticed :

1 ) 05.53 -> Hood and PoW open fire

2) 05.55 -> Bismarck opens fire on the Hood

3) 06.01 -> Hood blows up

4) 06.03 -> PoW turns away

5) 06.09 -> Last salvo fired

Clear enough, ... regarding the timing of Bismarck opening fire in response to the Hood ...

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

"The clock showed 05.53. (The Baron must be using German timing as we know Hood opened fire first and at 05.52:30 my italics) The range I figured was less than 25000 meters. There were flashes like lightning out there! Still approaching nearly bow on the enemy had opened fire. Donnerwetter Those flashes couldn't be coming from a cruisers medium caliber guns. Certain that we would immediatly return the fire, I braced myself for 'Permission to fire' and the thunder of guns that would follow. Nothing happened.

We in the after station looked at one another in bewilderment. Why weren't we doing something? The question hung in the air. Schneiders voice came over the telephone.
'Request permission to fire'
Silence. Schneider again.
'Enemy has opened fire'
'Enemy salvos well grouped' (Schneider must have meant the British half salvos fired by Hood at approx 05.52:30 and 05.52:50 my italics)
And anew
'Request permission to fire'

Still no response Lütjens was hesitating. The tension laden seconds stretched into minutes. The British ships were turning slightly to port, the lead ship showing an extremely long forecastle and two heavy twin turrets. (Hood turned at 05.55 my italics) On the telephone I heard Albrecht shout 'The Hoods - it's the Hood!' It was an unforgettable moment.

There she was, the famous warship, one of the largest in the world, that had been the 'terror' of so many of our war games. Two minutes had gone by since the British opened fire (05.52:30 by British watches and 05.53 by German timepieces my italics) Lindemann could restrain himself no longer and he was heard to mutter to himself (Perhaps by someone on the bridge my italics) 'I will not let my ship be shot out from under my a**'. Then at last he came on the intercom and gave the word 'Permission to fire'.

Both the German ships concentrated their fire on the Hood, while she, deceived as our enemies often were by the similarity of design of our ship types, was firing at the Prinz Eugen in the belief that she was the Bismarck. The Captain of the other ship, which turned out to be the Prince of Wales, realising what had happened, began firing at the Bismarck despite Admiral Hollands order to concentrate fire on the leading German ship.

About four minutes after the firing began (which firing I'm not sure my italics) And after six salvos had been aimed at the Hood, Lütjens ordered the Prinz Eugen to take the Prince of Wales, which he referred to as the King George V, under fire. Having been ordered to keep our fellow travellers, the Norfolk and Suffolk, under continuous observation in case they launched torpedoes at us, I could not longer watch what was going on off our port beam. I had to depend on what I could hear over the fire control telephone.

Lindemanns permission for us to open fire was immediately followed by our first heavy salvo. (This would suggest an immediate salvo not any further delay ie 20 or 60 seconds my italics) The Bismarck was in action and the rumble of her gunfire could be heard as far away as Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland. I heard Schneider order the first salvo and heard his observation on the fall of shot, 'short', He corrected the range and deflection then ordered a 400 meter bracket. (about 20-30 seconds? My italics) The long salvo he described as 'over' the base salvo as 'straddling' and immediately ordered 'full salvos good rapid' (about 15-20 seconds? My italics) He had thus laid his battery squarely on target at the very outset of the engagement."


Hope this helps
Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Antonio:
Hi Antonio,
(as usual factual data, not speculations)

BTW, Briggs' book count of salvos (6 fired in two minutes, 3 landed before BS replied) almost perfectly match Schmalenbach official gunnery report accounting for 4 to 5 salvos before BS and PG return fire, giving an interval of 2 to 3 minutes before Germans got permission to fire by Lutjens.


Unfortunately, I guess now someone will say that Suffolk, from 36 sm, was better positioned to count Hood salvos and (from 21 sm) BS ones than Ted Briggs and Schmalenbach.....


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Cag:
Hi Mr.Cag,
thanks for being the only one fairly posting the Baron account.
I would say it was perfectly translated in Italian by a competent Navy officer and researcher like Erminio Bagnasco. (the most respected author of books re. Italian warships).

Just some comments on your mostly wise "italics" annotations:

1) Schneider's "Enemy salvos well grouped" can mean 2, 3 or several semi-salvos, not necessarily only 2, we have Briggs that says he observed at least 3 landed Hood salvos before BS was seen opening fire (but it can be that Schneider second request came before the landing of the third one....)

2) You seem to assume that after 2 minutes delay the permission came immediately. We still have to add the time for Lindemann words, Lutjens order to be transmitted (flag or voicepipe or telephone?) to Lindemann, and "Then at last" that can easily be another 30 to 60 seconds, the permission from Lindemann to Schneider. Nowhere in the Baron account it is written that BS opened fire exactly 2 minutes after Hood.
According to Schmalenbach (4 to 5 salvos) BS opened fire 2 to 2.5 minutes after Hood, according to Briggs account, we have BS opening fire at earliest around 5:55:30+ (6 semi-salvos), thus 3 minutes after Hood.


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

That's ok Alberto no problem. In my post I put in my comments to try and understand The Baron's account as it does go back and forward a little.

Sorry if my italics are not clear, Schneider mentions an 'enemy' open fire and that the 'enemy salvos' were well grouped which seem to suggest they are one and the same. Maybe I misinterpreted but if Schneider meant other salvos then we must then start to include the PoW salvos who would by that time have opened fire as Hoods 3rd salvo (fired after PoW 1st and 2nd) would land approx 05.54:30 or so. I presume then Schneider would have said a plural eg. 'enemies salvos' but I may be wrong as it is just my interpretation of the text.

As for timings I'm just working off the Baron's account as he does state that 2 minutes elapsed up to Lindemanns utterance, and that after his permission to fire Bismarck's salvo was immediate. So if Lindemann said permission to fire (over the tannoy i think the Baron said) and we started a stopwatch at 00.00:00 then the first salvo would occur 'immediately' as he stated as the guns would be loaded and ready. So perhaps 00.00:08 or 10 but it is hard to see it being 00.00:20 or 30 or 00.01:00 as Lindemann would have repeatedly his order but again this is just my interpretation of the Baron's account.

Hope that it helps in any case.
Best wishes
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

the sequence of the orders on board the Bismarck and on Prinz Eugen is clear.

After having seen the Royal Navy warships opening fire there was a message from Adm Lutjens to SKL, ... telling them he was engaged by battleships, ... at 05.52 ... probably immediately after Hood opened fire on Prinz Eugen ...

... according to the Prinz Eugen battle map inputs Adm Lutjens at first gave the PoW as target to Prinz Eugen at 05.54 ( gegner links ) ... to change it soon after to Hood at 05.55 ( auf rechten gegner ) and still no order to open fire was associated with it ... just the target selection ... so the famous JOT-DORA flags were not yet visible on the Bismarck mainmast ...

... on this elapsed time, ... the Baron is very clear about what was happening on board the Bismarck, .... and Ted Briggs is very clear about what was the Hood doing too, ... firing to the Prinz Eugen some salvoes ... with no reply from the Bismarck ...

... at last, ... and after 05.55 battle time, ... Adm Lutjens decided to give his 2 warships the order to " OPEN FIRE ", ... by the famous flags JOT-DORA on Bismarck mainmast ( permission to open fire when you are ready ) to BOTH Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, ... of course this order was given to both warships on the same moment, ... and the 2 warships commander could finally tell their 2 Gunnery officers that they could open fire ... and Jasper recorded this event at 05.55 on his official report, ... perfectly matching the above timings.

What happened after Jasper and Schneider received the permission to open fire from their ship commanders, ... is clearly showed on the photo Nh 69722, ... where we can see that Jasper was a bit faster ( maybe few seconds only ) than Schneider, ... and in fact Prinz Eugen first salvo was alreay on the air when Bismarck fired her first salvo, ... well after 05.55 battle time.

No room for fantasy here, ... everything was well recorded on both sides, ... and the radio message from Adm Lutjens summarizing to SKL the timing of Hood exploding at 06.00 after around ( innerhalb = within ) 5 minutes engagement, ... is a perfect recap of the occurrences.

The Bismarck opened fire after 05.55, ... and Hood exploded after 06.00 battle time.

It is more than 13 years that those milestones were established ... and nothing will change them given the evidence at hand.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Mr.Cag,
you are right. We have to take into account PoW salvos as well (I'm even wondering whether Schneider referred to PoW salvos, not to Hood fire directed to another, 2000 meters distant ship, but I may be wrong, we cannot know. In this case we should move open fire even later).

Still I don't understand why

you wrote: " 2 minutes elapsed up to Lindemanns utterance"

would mean that 2 minutes plus 10 seconds we have the open fire.

Lindemann muttering must have been at a time the permission had not yet been given by Lutjens. We don't know (and the Baron doesn't say) anything re. "immediately". The Baron says "then at last" that can be very few but also several seconds after.

We need to add time for someone in Lutjens's staff to call Lindemann to give him permission to fire (AFAIK, someone can correct me if I'm wrong, the 2 of them were not, as incorrectly depicted in "Sink the Bismarck" movie, in the same place during the battle. The admiral was in the admiral bridge with his staff, Lindemann was in the armored conning tower, that's why he was free to express his utterance to whom was around..... ), for Lindemann to go to the tannoy and "pass" the permission to Schneider.

I don't know how Lutjens staff was communicating to Lindemann, I guess telephone or voicepipe (while JD was hoisted for PG), but this I'm not sure at all.


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto I'm not sure I understand either sorry!

In the Barons account he states that 2 minutes elapsed after the enemy had opened fire and that Lindemann could restrain himself no longer and he was heard to mutter to himself I will not let my ship be shot out from under my a**.

He then later states that on receiving 'Lindemanns' intercom order for permission to fire the Bismarck's salvo followed immediately.

I'm afraid this bit is not my interpretation of what occurred but the Baron's account of what he thought happened so I can't help further with that sorry.

I think I understand your confusion over the salvos. The British fired GIC, in progress of gunnery tactics a 2 ship squadron would fire in 30 second time sectors. It was meant to allow a constant rain of fire on a single target. The British would fire in half salvos to accomplish this not doubles (Which ironically would still be counted seperately) or full salvos (broadsides I think is the term not sure).

If you note on PoW salvo plot each half salvo was numbered, and had an approximate 20 seconds time gap between each half salvo. Therefore when Briggs says Hoods forward turrets fired six salvo each he may have meant Hoods sixth half salvo? Hood would have fired her 3rd half salvo at about 05.53:50, if we follow PoW salvo map and her fourth about 05.54:10. She would have fired her sixth around 05.55:20 or so landing around 05.55:58 so too late but I'm not sure about the 6 fired 3 landed.

I hope this helps a bit
Best wishes
Cag.

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

Ted Briggs own declaration from the documentary " Sunk by the Bismarck " on 1997 :

We fired about 2 or 3 salvoes, ... before Bismarck replied, ...

Here Ted Briggs book chapter dedicated to that occurence, where it is basically confirming his above personal statement :

Briggs_Hood_02.jpg

Here you can see Ted Briggs battle map with his KEY timing milestones, ... confirming the above :

Briggs_timings.jpg

To be noticed :

1 ) 05.53 -> Hood and PoW open fire

2) 05.55 -> Bismarck opens fire on the Hood

3) 06.01 -> Hood blows up

4) 06.03 -> PoW turns away

5) 06.09 -> Last salvo fired

Clear enough, ... regarding the timing of Bismarck opening fire in response to the Hood ...

Bye Antonio

Briggs has Hood firing at Bismarck...do you accept that? If Hood was firing at Bismarck , then who was firing at PE? Briggs account is obviously deeply flawed but if Hood thought they were firing at Bismarck, and in fact it was the PE, then the 2 minute open fire delay for "Bismarck - Actually PE" makes some sense. Briggs did not witness the actual firing and had no idea where Hood's salvos landed. Briggs had clearly defined duties that kept him from observing the battle. Briggs account was written many decades after the action.

Busch clearly states that Bismarck opened fire shortly after PoW and before PE. Bismarck opening fire before PE was also noted in PE's KTB. Busch was not a direct observer to the firing but seems to have been a supernumerary with no clearly defined duties, hence he was able to make some mental notes of what was happening. Busch's account was written closest to the actual event.

The Baron, by his own admission did not witness the action. His account was written almost 40 years after the action and he had no opportunity, in captivity, to make notes, and his story seems to incorporate experiences and recollections other than his own.

Brooke, did witness the event first hand with his attention solely focused on Bismarck in the performance of his duties. His account was also written some 40 years after the event, but he doesn't seem to have incorporated other's material into his observations of what he saw and heard.

Of these 4 accounts, only Busch's and Brookes are of any value to us. Briggs account is clearly false.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you seems not to have understood the events timing and the military logic on the German side I have explained you above.

The JOT DORA was given by Adm Lutjens to both warships, ... and Jasper recorded precisely when he received it at 05.55, ... the photo NH 69722 shows clearly when Bismarck opened fire in relation to Prinz Eugen, ... after Jasper did it, ... so after 05.55 battle time.

You can continue to imagine what you like to ... the evidences we have are overwhelming and definitive.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you seems not to have understood the events timing and the military logic on the German side I have explained you above.

The JOT DORA was given by Adm Lutjens to both warships, ... and Jasper recorded precisely when he received it at 05.55, ... the photo NH 69722 shows clearly when Bismarck opened fire in relation to Prinz Eugen, ... after Jasper did it, ... so after 05.55 battle time.

You can continue to imagine what you like to ... the evidences we have are overwhelming and definitive.

Bye Antonio

Busch records that Bismarck opened fire before PE saw the JD signal. The "evidences" that you cite are extremely weak and unclear.

What probably happened on Bismarck was something like this:

0551 Bismarck recognizes Hood and PoW - Schneider may have requested permission to open fire.
0552 Lutjens signals "engaging two heavy units and gives permission to Lindeman to open fire.
0553 Schneider opens fire -
0555 Brinkmann gives permission to open fire . He waits because there is no clear signal given for fire distribution (as noted in the PE KTB and by others in the KM high command:

The cruiser did not receive a signal for fire division – indeed no battle signals were given at all – although this is unusual, it can be explained that the Chief of Fleet either considered the placing of the cruiser into the fire lee as self-evident and did not feel a fire division signal was not required or that the situation was so clear that a fire division signal was superfluous.
But I do agree also with the commander that a directive could be expected by him, particularly, since this is customarily always done when sailing in the line of battle.

) Jasper may have felt that cruisers were unlikely to be hit at the initial range.
0555 Jasper Opens fire.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
Hi Duncan,
I'm sorry you are left the only one unwilling to accept the overwhelming evidences that put BS open fire at 5:55 instead of 5:53.

Your evidences are Suffolk observations, clearly from too far away, Norfolk contradictory timings, an ambiguous detail in Busch propaganda book (what could he say to Germans in wartime: that Lutjens hesitated? The Baron was free to comment this way, Busch was not. Busch doesn't give any explicit time interval) and Brooke account.

I stay with German official records, ALL in sync from PG KTB, Jasper and Schmalenbach report (let's forget the few seconds difference between PG and BS open fire, totally irrelevant in this discussion here). I stay with Lutjens message, Raeder report to AH, with RN "analytical" conclusions. I also trust the excellent book of the Baron who did NOT copy from randomly picked documents (e.g. he was clever enough NOT to copy the blatantly incorrect Tovey point 17 and 19, regarding PoW retreat time and SF / NF distance, while other authors slavishly did....). He was there, he was the 3rd G.O. and he did hear Schneider repeated requests to open fire.

Jasper says clearly that he received permission to fire and he fired....as obvious, cruisers, destroyers or battleships. Antonio's has explained very well to you the command chain and it is impossible that JD was hoisted 2 minutes after BS opened fire. PG KTB and Schmalenbach salvo count / timings perfectly match Briggs account.



Still you concentrate ONLY on this 5:53 timing for BS, forgetting that it SHOULD fit in an overall reconstruction of the battle, and it doesn't:
1) Suffolk was too far away to be precise even re. who was who (and you are unable to decide where this ship was compared to enemy AND Hood and which course she was sailing on),
2) Bismarck expended shells and output loss will NEVER fit your timetable (and you are unable to answer my observations here viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm) and
3) photo NH69722 is showing the very first salvos in the air, whether they are first and second from BS or (as I think) the very first ones from BS and PG, the image is clearly showing the 2 German ships opening fire almost TOGETHER.


You are showing that you are unable to put together a reliable complete scenario, thus your interesting theory will unfortunately remain just....a speculation.


Bye, Alberto