Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

[alecsandros]

Bismarck returned fire at 5:55.

The reasons for the delay are not necessarily known to us.

At Stromvaer Luetjens decided to avoid confrontation, just as in all others capital ship "meetings" he had with the twins.

[dunmunro]

Bismarck returned fire at 5:55.

The reasons for the delay are not necessarily known to us.

At Stromvaer Luetjens decided to avoid confrontation, just as in all others capital ship "meetings" he had with the twins.

How does allowing your ship to be fired at for 3 minutes without reply = avoiding confrontation? In fact there was no delay in opening fire at Stromvaer except for that caused by the weather. Lutjens did not withdraw from the action until it was clear that his ships could not fight under the prevailing weather condition.

There was a ~30 sec delay in Bismarck opening fire at Denmark Straits. This is what the evidence tells us.

However, it is apparent that PE's commander was tardy in reading signals from Bismarck and/or passing them to his FC team:

05.55/ 0555 hours-
Feuereröffnen auf "Hood". Feuervereinigung mit "Prinz Eugen" auf das gleiche Ziel.
First salvo on "Hood". Combining fire with "Prinz Eugen" on the same target.
Winkspruch von Flotte an "Prinz Eugen": "Zielwechsel auf den Gegner am weitesten links."
Semaphore signal from Fleet to "Prinz Eugen": "Change target to the opponent farthest to left."
Beide Schiffe liegen nach der ersten Salve am Ziel.
Both ships are zeroed in on target after the first salvo.
05.57 / 0557 hours-
In Höhe vor dem achteren Mast auf "Hood" ein sich schnell ausbreitendes Feuer beobachtet.
Wahrscheinlich Flugzeughalle oder Benzin in Brand bei Aufschlag der 2. Salve von "Prinz
Eugen".
Observing a fast spreading fire on "Hood" in front of the level of the quarter [aft] mast. Probably
plane hangar or gasoline fire from impact of the second salvo from "Prinz Eugen".
05.59 / 0559 hours-
Zielwechsel "Prinz Eugen" nach der 6. Salve auf "Prince of Wales".
"Prinz Eugen" [ordered] to change target after 6th salvo to "Prince of Wales"
Bis. KTB, P.129

Note the delay from Lutjens signalling to Jasper receiving the order.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,

you wrote: "there was no way that Lutjen's could avoid battle except by reversing course immediately (which both Suffolk and Norfolk feared would happen), however, there is no logical reason why Lutjen's opening fire would preclude this possibility! "

Had he opened fire and then withdrawn, he would have left to his crew the "unpleasant" taste of retreat and defeat in a fight against the enemy. Not accepting a fight is NOT at all the same as retreating from a fight when action has started already, as you should know very well from this battle.....

you wrote (my italics): " the Baron's character assassination of him (Lutjens)"

Where ? Have you ever read the Baron book ? I think not....

Lutjens character assassination came only from British sources.

you wrote:"The Baron and Brigg's accounts are, unfortunately, mostly fiction. "

What should we say then about Adm.Tovey's "official" despatches ? Science-fiction ?
Come on, if an evidence is annoying, it's becoming a fiction...... while Sir Kennedy battle account, an absolute fiction (very well written, I must say), or Busch account, a propaganda book (that could not admit Germans "hesitated" answering fire), are more close to reality for you.....

Your speculation is without any solid base. The official documents point to 5:55, sorry for you.



So said, if you refuse to admit the evidences, go ahead (full speed against a wall, IMO) and try to produce a complete scenario with this new open fire timing. In this regard, may I remind you that you have not yet answered the (first) objections to your speculation?
1) Where was your favorite witness, HMS Suffolk, at open fire ? 36 sm or 32 sm from Hood ? 21 or 17 sm from enemy ?
2) How can you fit the BS shell count with this unrealistic open fire timing (see viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.)


Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

@Duncan
I think you need to take a break and analyze what has been written to you these past few days.
Best,

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,

you wrote: "there was no way that Lutjen's could avoid battle except by reversing course immediately (which both Suffolk and Norfolk feared would happen), however, there is no logical reason why Lutjen's opening fire would preclude this possibility! "

Had he opened fire and then withdrawn, he would have left to his crew the "unpleasant" taste of retreat and defeat in a fight against the enemy. Not accepting a fight is NOT at all the same as retreating from a fight when action has started already, as you should know very well from this battle.....

you wrote (my italics): " the Baron's character assassination of him (Lutjens)"

Where ? Have you ever read the Baron book ? I think not....

Lutjens character assassination came only from British sources.

So running away without firing a shot wouldn't be viewed a retreat...!

The Baron repeats a story about about Lutjens hesitating to open fire with Lindemann breaking the chain of command by ordering Bismarck to open fire. You say these stories came from British sources...so why are they in the Baron's book? And, if the Baron is repeating these "British sources" how does that make him a reliable source?

you wrote:"The Baron and Brigg's accounts are, unfortunately, mostly fiction. "

What should we say then about Adm.Tovey's "official" despatches ? Science-fiction ?
Come on, if an evidence is annoying, it's becoming a fiction...... while Sir Kennedy battle account, an absolute fiction (very well written, I must say), or Busch account, a propaganda book (that could not admit Germans "hesitated" answering fire), are more close to reality for you.....

Your speculation is without any solid base. The official documents point to 5:55, sorry for you.

Tovey or Kennedy's accounts accuracy has no bearing on this.
The official documents don't point to 0555, they decisively point to 0553.

So said, if you refuse to admit the evidences, go ahead (full speed against a wall, IMO) and try to produce a complete scenario with this new open fire timing. In this regard, may I remind you that you have not yet answered the (first) objections to your speculation?
1) Where was your favorite witness, HMS Suffolk, at open fire ? 36 sm or 32 sm from Hood ? 21 or 17 sm from enemy ?
2) How can you fit the BS shell count with this unrealistic open fire timing (see viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.)


Bye, Alberto

To create a history of an event, one must first assemble all the facts, then fit them into framework. You don't create a framework and then try to twist the facts to fit. You state that Hood's gun flashes were not visible from Suffolk, yet there were multiple witnesses who saw them and Suffolk's timings of the flashes fit very neatly into the recorded time (aboard PoW and Norfolk) to when Hood opened fire, and also with the recorded time aboard PoW and Norfolk as to when Bismarck opened fire. Your denial of the facts here is a classic case of trying to twist the facts to support an untenable theory.

[dunmunro]

@Duncan
I think you need to take a break and analyze what has been written to you these past few days.
Best,

I think you need to sit down and consider the solid evidence for Bismark opening fire at 0553, compared to the flimsy evidence against it.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "The Baron repeats a story about about Lutjens hesitating to open fire with Lindemann breaking the chain of command by ordering Bismarck to open fire."

Hi Duncan,
this is YOUR personal interpretation: whoever has worn an uniform, cannot think seriously such a way.
The Baron just says that Lindemann gave order to open fire (as normal, on board any ship in the world, being the C.O. who gives orders to the crew, not the admiral), NOT that he broke the command chain... Of course, he had to receive an order from Lutjens before doing so.

you wrote: " To create a history of an event, one must first assemble all the facts, then fit them into framework...........Your denial of the facts here is a classic case of trying to twist the facts to support an untenable theory."

As I said, go on (full speed against a wall IMO) and try to produce your framework and complete scenario....

Antonio Bonomi has already done it and his one is a complete work that I trust as the more reliable, Paul Cadogan has done another one (that I still don't embrace) but also his one is a complete work.
if you are able to produce a scenario with this new fantastic time for BS open fire (got from doubtfully skilled or self-contradictory witnesses and from ships far away), I will be curious to see it.

For the time being, you are UNABLE to answer my very first 2 questions, therefore your theory is already under severe difficulties:
1) Where was your favorite witness, HMS Suffolk, at open fire ? 36 sm or 32 sm from Hood ? 21 or 17 sm from enemy ?
2) How can you try to fit the BS shell count, output loss and RoF with this 5:53 timing (see viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.)


The only reliable sources for German open fire time are (as logical for everybody) the German ones: PG GAR, PG G.O. reports (Schamlenbach and Jasper), Lutjens message and the Baron (3rd gunnery officer of BS).
The RN, at the end, had to embrace this timings in battle summary No.5, because of these overwhelming evidences, correcting the previous documents in error.


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "The Baron repeats a story about about Lutjens hesitating to open fire with Lindemann breaking the chain of command by ordering Bismarck to open fire."

Hi Duncan,
this is YOUR personal interpretation: whoever has worn an uniform, cannot think seriously such a way.
The Baron just says that Lindemann gave order to open fire (as normal, on board any ship in the world, being the C.O. who gives orders to the crew, not the admiral), NOT that he broke the command chain... Of course, he had to receive an order from Lutjens before doing so.

The Baron stated:

...why weren’t we doing something? The question hung in the air. Schneider’s voice came over the telephone. “Request permission to fire.” Silence. Schneider again: “Enemy has opened fire,” “Enemy’s salvos well grouped,” and, anew, “Request permission to fire.” Still no response. Lütjens was hesitating. The tension-laden seconds stretched into minutes. The British ships were turning slightly to port, the lead ship showing an extremely long forecastle and two heavy twin turrets. On the telephone I heard Albrecht shout, “The Hood— it’s the Hood!” It was an unforgettable moment. There she was, the famous warship, once the largest in the world, that had been the “terror” of so many of our war games. Two minutes had gone by since the British opened fire. Lindemann could restrain himself no longer and he was heard to mutter to himself, “I will not let my ship be shot out from under my ass.” Then, at last, he came on the intercom and gave the word, “Permission to fire!”

The obvious inference is that Lutjens froze and Lindemann had to assume command, overrule Lutjens and issue the order to open fire. By repeating such a ridiculous and unfounded rumour the Baron destroyed Lutjens reputation, and doubtless if Lutjens was still alive, a libel suit would have been launched.

you wrote: " To create a history of an event, one must first assemble all the facts, then fit them into framework...........Your denial of the facts here is a classic case of trying to twist the facts to support an untenable theory."

As I said, go on (full speed against a wall IMO) and try to produce your framework and complete scenario....

Antonio Bonomi has already done it and his one is a complete work that I trust as the more reliable, Paul Cadogan has done another one (that I still don't embrace) but also his one is a complete work.
if you are able to produce a scenario with this new fantastic time for BS open fire (got from doubtfully skilled or self-contradictory witnesses and from ships far away), I will be curious to see it.

Antonio has created a fragile theory and then tried to make the facts fit into it. I say fragile because it completely breaks apart if Bismarck opened fire at 0553. Paul's theory is not critically dependent on Bismarck opening fire at 0555.

For the time being, you are UNABLE to answer my very first 2 questions, therefore your theory is already under severe difficulties:
1) Where was your favorite witness, HMS Suffolk, at open fire ? 36 sm or 32 sm from Hood ? 21 or 17 sm from enemy ?
2) How can you try to fit the BS shell count, output loss and RoF with this 5:53 timing (see viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.)

This thread is about when Bismarck opened fire.

The only reliable sources for German open fire time are (as logical for everybody) the German ones: PG GAR, PG G.O. reports (Schamlenbach and Jasper), Lutjens message and the Baron (3rd gunnery officer of BS).
The RN, at the end, had to embrace this timings in battle summary No.5, because of these overwhelming evidences, correcting the previous documents in error.


Bye, Alberto

As I've patiently explained, the RN ships could observe when Bismarck opened fire just as easily as PE. All three RN ships state that Bismarck opened fire at ~0553. There is no power on earth that can alter these facts, and if PE's KTB says otherwise , then it is wrong, since PE had no special means of determining when Bismarck opened fire, that the RN ships didn't have - it was plain to see for all ships involved. We also have two accounts from onboard PE that state that Bismarck did open fire shortly after Hood and nearly simultaneously with PoW and we have Brinkmann apparently concurring with this. We also have PE's KTB stating that Bismarck fired before PE. We have Lutjens signalling to the KM at 0552 that Bismarck was in a fight with two capital ships. We also have Bismarck's reconstructed KTB which states that it took 4 minutes for Jasper to receive the order to shift targets indicating problems on PE. Finally, a war diary is not an official report and we don't know what Brinkmann's official report, if it ever existed, actually says.

In fact the RN's official history was written by Roskill in 1954. He states:

All four ships opened fire at a range of about 25,000 yards between 5.52 and 5.53 a.m. and the two German ships concentrated their fire initially on the Hood.
(Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea Volume I. 1954)

Roskill had access to all the same material as the editors of Battle Summary 5 did including PE's KTB. Roskill evidently discarded the opening fire times in the KTB as highly questionable

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,

Dunmunro wrote: "The obvious inference is that Lutjens froze and Lindemann had to assume command"

a mutiny ? Are you serious ?

I'm afraid the "inference" is obvious ONLY for whom has NO idea what is a military command chain and NO idea who gives orders to the crew on board a ship.

you wrote: "This thread is about when Bismarck opened fire. "

Q.E.D. (you are unable to answer elementary questions arising from your "theory")......
...but BS opening fire at 5:53 is NOT compatible with her expended shells and RoF, as "I have patiently explained" here viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, see my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.

you wrote: "Roskill evidently discarded the opening fire times in the KTB as highly questionable"

If Roskill is correct, then "All four ships opened fire at a range of about 25,000 yards between 5.52 and 5.53 a.m."....therefore your theory of PG only delaying fire is ....gone forever, buried by Roskill himself.

But, fortunately for you, in this case Roskill is clearly wrong, therefore you will be "allowed" to go on with your speculation, except that the revised Battle Summary No.5 establish a more reliable timing also from British side.


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,

Dunmunro wrote: "The obvious inference is that Lutjens froze and Lindemann had to assume command"

a mutiny ? Are you serious ?

I'm afraid the "inference" is obvious ONLY for whom has NO idea what is a military command chain and NO idea who gives orders to the crew on board a ship.

I guess you didn't read the book or the passage above. I'll make it clear for you:

...why weren’t we doing something? The question hung in the air. Schneider’s voice came over the telephone. “Request permission to fire.” Silence. Schneider again: “Enemy has opened fire,” “Enemy’s salvos well grouped,” and, anew, “Request permission to fire.” Still no response. Lütjens was hesitating. The tension-laden seconds stretched into minutes. The British ships were turning slightly to port, the lead ship showing an extremely long forecastle and two heavy twin turrets. On the telephone I heard Albrecht shout, “The Hood— it’s the Hood!” It was an unforgettable moment. There she was, the famous warship, once the largest in the world, that had been the “terror” of so many of our war games. Two minutes had gone by since the British opened fire. Lindemann could restrain himself no longer and he was heard to mutter to himself, “I will not let my ship be shot out from under my ass.” Then, at last, he came on the intercom and gave the word, “Permission to fire!”

The above passage is quite clear; Lutjens hesitates and Lindemann unable to restrain himself issues the command to open fire. By issuing the command to open fire, Lindemann did assume command and yes, it would have been mutinous...which is, of course, why it never happened. Lutjens signalled at 0552 that he was in a fight with two capital ships and then gave the command to open fire.

The Baron repeated a libellous story that he did not witness and could not possibly verify was true.

you wrote: "This thread is about when Bismarck opened fire. "

Q.E.D. (you are unable to answer elementary questions arising from your "theory")......
...but BS opening fire at 5:53 is NOT compatible with her expended shells and RoF, as "I have patiently explained" here viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, see my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.

Of course it is. You create a theory that states that Bismarck fires X numbers of salvos at certain times, then use that completely theoretical and unprovable construct to try and dispute the actual recorded facts...

you wrote: "Roskill evidently discarded the opening fire times in the KTB as highly questionable"

If Roskill is correct, then "All four ships opened fire at a range of about 25,000 yards between 5.52 and 5.53 a.m."....therefore your theory of PG only delaying fire is ....gone forever, buried by Roskill himself.

But, fortunately for you, in this case Roskill is clearly wrong, therefore you will be "allowed" to go on with your speculation, except that the revised Battle Summary No.5 establish a more reliable timing also from British side.


Bye, Alberto

It isn't my theory. It is a fact clearly stated in Suffolk's official report. PE's KTB claims they waited for two minutes to open fire.

Roskill weighed the evidence and decided that PE opened fire before 0555 and that Bismarck opened fire as per the RN official reports. He remains silent on whether PE delayed before following Bismarck's lead. However, the available evidence, IMHO, suggests that PE did delay for ~ 2 minutes after Bismarck opened fire and so I don't agree with Roskill on that point, but in fact, if PE did fire, say ~45 seconds after Bismarck, say at ~0553:55 it would actually make little difference to the overall history. Perhaps Roskill is correct; he may have talked to Brinkmann about it. Information available to me suggests, however, that Roskill is wrong about PE's open fire time.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "I guess you didn't read the book or the passage above. I'll make it clear for you:"

Hi Duncan,
I'm afraid you are not reading the same book.

"Lindemann could restrain himself...........under my a**." is a sentence describing something he heard from someone who was probably in the conning tower with Lindemann.

"Then, at last, he came on the intercom and gave the word, “Permission to fire!" " is a separate sentence. He heard these words.

Only your umpteenth speculation can imagine a statement in between: "He decided therefore to assume command, committing mutiny".....

you wrote: "You create a theory that states that Bismarck fires X numbers of salvos at certain times"

please, don't invent things. I started from YOUR number of salvos and just corrected your evident error (proved by photos and film) in the estimation of shots ordered after 6:03, as everybody can read here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736&start=195, in my post from Feb.7 at 10:27 pm.
Your theory simply can't be true, and you are simply unable to answer my above post.

you wrote: ".... Perhaps Roskill is correct; he may have talked to Brinkmann about it. Information available to me suggests, however, that Roskill is wrong about PE's open fire time."

I see you are a bit confused. I suggest you listen Alec suggestion to take a break and re-think what has been told to you before you write other non-sense.....

Roskill is simply wrong in his statement, as he just copied Tovey's despatches version without taking into any account the German documents, thus saying that: "All four ships opened fire at a range of about 25,000 yards between 5.52 and 5.53 a.m" .


Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

Clearly so.
We can also observe the 3 torpedo tracks just around 6:04.

[paulcadogan]

Hi guys,

Just sticking my nose in since my name's been being called in a few posts. And I do appreciate the spirit in which it has been called whether by those who think my scenario bears some credence or those who think it's wrong.

But, for the discussion on Bismarck's open fire time (which this thread has evolved onto) I just wanted to clarify how Duncan's theory might affect mine. Please be patient with me...this is a long post!

Now I try to keep an open mind, because in matters such as this there are some things that are cast in stone (like the fact that Hood blew up) but others that are open to how one interprets the available information. Duncan's thoughts are very intriguing, and do rationalize to some extent the discrepancy (I know I've commented on this before, but no one really addressed it until now) between the British accounts given at the inquiries, and written into the earlier historical accounts and the German one that emerged later, regarding when Bismarck opened fire. I had chalked it up to faulty recall by the British observers following the traumatic effect of Hood's destruction on all of them.

But how does Bismarck opening fire at 0553 affect my theory of an earlier fatal hit time for Hood? Well it puts me right back to the same situation that made me question 0600 in the first place. 5 "salvos" observed by the British in 5 minutes is too slow, based on the firing procedure described by the Baron, cross referenced with the British observations.

We know the German procedure - vollsalve followed by a gabelgruppe of 3 4-gun salvos - long, middle(base) and short, then if the range is found in one of them it is Wirkungsschießen (did I get that right?): full salvos, good rapid.

Now the British observations (as determined by the inquiries) of the falls-of-shot that fell around Hood, which they numbered as salvos, were as follows:

1st salvo: fell ahead of Hood

2nd salvo: fell astern of Hood

3rd salvo: straddled, believed to be the cause of the boat deck fire

4th salvo: fell short (Bradford's description; "Just as the pendant dropped from the Hood's yard-arm, a fourth salvo from the Bismarck fell close to her. Both British ships began to execute the turn."

5th salvo: straddled, hit, Hood blew up.

Now the Baron's description of Schnieder's procedure and description:

1st salvo: Vollsalve: Short

gabelgruppe: Long salvo: Over; Base (middle) salvo: straddling

He does not mention the 3rd (short) component of the gabelgruppe as the base had given him the range - but we assume it had to have been fired and would have fallen short.

He then ordered Wirkungsschießen, noting that Hood was burning. His next comment is "Wow was that a misfire? That really ate into him. He's blowing up!!!"

In my estimation, the correlation between what the British observed and the Baron's description is uncanny. The long salvo of the gabelgruppe went "over", equivalent to the 2nd fall of shot seen by the British (i.e. Bismarck's "2nd salvo"). The base salvo straddled, equivalent to the straddle seen by the British as the 3rd fall of shot (salvo). The short salvo of the gabelgruppe would have been the 4th fall of shot seen by the British - Bismarck's "4th salvo" falling a close short as the ships executed the turn to port.

The 5th fall of shot observed by the British would therefore have been the first salvo of Wirkungsschießen and Hood blew up.

If you work out the salvo timings, based on Bismarck's firing procedure with due tolerance for time of flight, observation of FoS, reloading, correction etc that process should have taken approximately 3 minutes. With Bismarck opening fire just after 0555 that takes you to 0558. If Bismarck opened fire at 0553, that would take you to 0556! (Interestingly, that is the time noted on PoW's salvo plot as "Hood out of action"!! )

Anyway...all this long diatribe is trying to say is that.... Duncan, your theory, intriguing and logical as it is, does not really support my idea, but in fact puts me back in the same situation that got me thinking and analyzing in the first place!

If the British consensus about 5 FoS (salvos) was wrong, and there were more than that ...fine...that again moves us towards 0558 with a 0553 open fire time, or towards 0600 with a 0555 open fire time. But for either of those, the British should have seen at least 7 separate FoS (opening vollsalve, 3 from the gabelgruppe, and 3 from the Wirkungsschießen) before Hood blew up. The most I recall any witness reporting was an uncertain 5 or 6.

So...I remain "comfortable" with accepting the German version of their open fire time...0555, remaining cognizant of what Suffolk, Norfolk and PoW noted and was determined by the Boards. But I also recognize that there are so many variables here that some things just cannot be cast in stone.

None of us can change what really happened and when. All we can do as individuals is weigh the evidence, decide for ourselves, argue our cases, and accept with tolerance that we may never all be in complete agreement.

That's my story and I'm stickin' to it!

Paul

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Paul Cadogan:
Hi Paul,
I would just add that not only BS open fire at 5:53 would logically put your theory back to a situation that was the one in which you did not feel comfortable with 6:00 as explosion time, BUT it also leaves a huge "gap" in BS firing between 5:58 and 6:03, when many shots should have been ordered due to engagement geometry.

Re. the Baron account, I don't see it fully in sync with British observations. He refers Schneider to have ordered "fire for effect" twice (in my Italian translation): once just after the initial gabelgruppe, then it was followed by the observation of the Hood deck fire that he heard from Schneider, and once after Hood was already on fire due to the deck hit. It looks therefore, IMO, that other adjustments were needed to Schneider in the meantime (possibly some minutes and salvos more ?)....



Still sticking to 6:00, mostly because of Hunter-Terry dictated timings (that state a 3 minutes delay between the deck hit and the final explosion) and the analysis of NH69724 vs NH69731 (distance covered in around 3 or 3.5 minutes, not in 5 or 5.5 IMO), I must say that I'm still very doubtful about what really happened on board Hood in the interval between the deck hit and the final explosion......


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Paul, thanks for the reply.

some thoughts:

The Baron.
The Baron's account was written almost 40 years after the event. The Baron undoubtedly read every account of the battle that he could find as is witnessed by his extensive bibliography but by his own admission he was not a participant in the action and he wasn't directly observing the key events. Consequently, I fear that his apparently personal account of the events from 0550 to 0610 had been influenced by by other accounts and I do not trust it's veracity.

Bismarck RoF. Bismarck has a high theoretical RoF but practical considerations would have reduced it considerably. Recycle time was probably about 40 seconds or so per turret and probably a bit longer for a twin turret salvo.
Reload time consisted of:
time to fire and eject the spent casings
time to flush the bore of gas
time to open the breech
time to transport the shell and propellant casings to the gun, ram them and close the breech
time to elevate the gun and time to steady the gun before firing
time to wait for slowest loading gun in the salvo group
time waiting for the correct point in the ship's roll to fire the gun.
time for minor course changes to steady before firing (probably happened after PoW's hit at salvo six)
time for observation of FoS and spotting corrections

Consequently the time to fire 5 x 8 gun salvos could easily have been 240-280 seconds and then the ToF of the fatal salvo would increase this to ~300 seconds.