Since we have endured all the stuff, again, which proves that such and such a splash in the water is definitively and immutably a particular shell fired at a particular time, and we will not get an acknowledgement of what "Gegner fliegt in die luft" means when Hood is both graphically depicted and texturally described as being destroyed after 06:01
? let us specifically discuss PG's firing.
As is clear from the remarks which annotate the PG map there was distribution of fire muddle in the inadequate "Open Fire" instruction from Lutjens. Jasper, and probably Brinkmann, in his illegible annotation, observe on this. Is it possible that a native Gernan speaker can estimate what the PG captain wrote? Jasper obviously considered this a failure in the command structure that fire distribution had not been originated correctly by the flagship, or was inadequately transmitted to him as Gunnery Officer by his own Commander. He took the responsibility of choice himself, and engaged the leading vessel in the absence of the instructions he should have had. He made a point of highlighting, in the official record this inadequacy of instruction. He had a point to make. He knew, as did the British that it would be preferable to avoid his shells landing at the same time as Bismarck's but target designation and de-synchronisation were not organized. Brinkmann annotated again. What did he say? That he approved, or that an instruction had been received from the flagship, but accepted that it had not been passed to Jasper? The deciphering of these annotations are essential to the understanding of PG's firing. These obviously had to be added to this copy of the Official Record after Brinkmann had signed it off as Commanding Officer. What additional amplification did Brinkmann need to add in "illegible" handwriting that was not in his first submission?
That there was criticism of Jasper in Brinkmann's annotations is clear from the next one, where he describes Jasper's decision to continue to use HE, as he had inaccurately identified his targets as cruisers, when the splashes nearby are clearly major calibre. "Beachtlich!" is translated as "remarkable" but is not Brinkmann actually saying "remarkably stupid- considering we were being shot at by battleships!" It was surely Brinkmann's responsibility to identify the nature of the target, and Jasper's to recommend the correct ammunition. Again, Command had let Jasper down, and subsequently criticised him.
It goes without saying that target designation should have been established for Jasper long before the actual open fire instruction, so as to let him create a viable FC solution before the first salvo left the guns. He must have been as frustrated as McMullen was when PoW slewed towards the enemy, spoiling McMullen's firing, when having started hitting, he was suddenly ordered to switch to the left target, and all the more galling to be told that was the specified target all along.
Later, with nobody firing at PG, Jasper's target practice is disrupted by PG gyrating all over the ocean, dodging imaginary torpedoes, supposed fired by a ship never closer than 18,000 yds and which timing-wise would have to fired them when at about 25,000 yds!
It is interesting to read in the KTB that he had to order the targeting officer to switch to the second target, suggesting that even with the British ships so close to one another, it was no easy matter. This is important when it is alleged that Bismarck saw Hood explode at 06:00, absorbed the stunning fact that she was finished as a threat, re-desigated PoW as target via the Lutjens/Lindemann/Schneider/targeting officer command chain, got a firing solution and including flight time managed to hit her 50 seconds later. But then this is a "proven incontrovertible/uncontestable fact"
The "facts" are not yet established and there is still much to learn.
All the best