Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

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wadinga
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by wadinga » Sun Mar 12, 2017 9:10 pm

Hello Antonio,

You have said,
The overall analysis will easily determine that Adm Lutjens was right with his radio message

whereas you have now supplied (and once again I applaud you making this public :clap: :clap: :clap: ) an official KM summary document, presumably using all evidence including interviews with surviving officers, signals and other material available in 1941, some of which may not have survived to the present day, confirming the inference from the PG KTB that Hood exploded not at 06:00 at all, but after 06:01 as reported in the KTB.

You further observe you referenced and were aware of, this document in your 2005 publication. You are quite right that many of us here have not been as diligent as you in discovering this original material, although Marc has published much original material.

Is it true to say that your "overall analysis" developed over all the years since then, concluded that the KM document is incorrect?

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Mon Mar 13, 2017 4:24 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you asked :
Is it true to say that your "overall analysis" developed over all the years since then, concluded that the KM document is incorrect ?
Not all the document and his contained information are incorrect, ... for the above part only the 06.01 is an incorrect input based on the PG KTB, as I already wrote several times on the dedicated thread.

This is valid for this document as well as for many other documents, ... both sides, ... some contains not intentional incorrect statements written on them, ... some intentionally written incorrect for the known war time propaganda reasons / needs.

But please, ... I do not want to re-open a new discussion about it here now, ... so take my words just as a recap of what we have been thru on last years.

This battle re-construction work has been based on all the official available documents I have found on 14 years of researches on both sides.

The battle time is defined between 05.52 and 30 seconds, when HMS Hood opened fire until 06.09 when Bismarck ceased fire on the first main morning action.

All the events have been recorded on many documents both sides with some milestone times.

We have gone thru all those events on many threads on this forum.

The events sequence and their timing is well described by Hunter-Terry and Jasper, ... other inputs can be correlated on many different ways, ... as you have seen done by me, ... and not only me, ... thru those years.

A very good example was Thorsten Wahl discovering the Bismarck shell splashes close to PoW on the PG film when PoW salvo 16th departed from her being aside the Hood sinking wreck smoke cloud, ... that was a great help, ... one of the many I received here in.

That 06.01 entry is incorrect because we have the photo NH 69724 telling us more precisely when that event occurred, ... at it was very close to the PoW fired salvo 14th, ... as we can all easily see ourselves.

But again we have already long discussed about it on the dedicated Hood exploding time thread, ... so nothing new about it.

I provided the KM document so everybody can see the timings before that event listed, ... especially the PG and Bismarck open fire time.

The 05.57 synch timing with Hunter-Terry is the key, ... to link both sides correctly ... and after it will be the photo NH 69731 to become the second key timing checkpoint both sides ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Sat Mar 25, 2017 8:57 pm

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you asked :
What about "Storia Militare" 281? :think:
It is just a summary of all the many discussions we had in here recently, ... mainly regarding the " Cover Up " and the " Articles of War ", ... on the British side of the battle, ... not the definitive second version of the whole DS battle work.

https://www.facebook.com/pg/STORIA-MILI ... 5972013949

But you should not be surprised about this summary, ... having long discussed with me about it here in.

Bye Antonio :D
I cannot find this edition online. Is there a way to purchase or read it online?

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun Mar 26, 2017 10:03 am

@Duncan and all:

Hi, the article (only available for the time being in Italian language) published on "Storia Militare" 281 (February 2017) by Antonio (with a very limited contribution from my side) is available as part of the magazine (formerly directed by E.Bagnasco and now by M.Brescia), and old copies can be usually ordered to the following address "arretrati@edizionistoriamilitare.it". For shipment in Italy the total price is 10€ (to be paid to IBAN IT 80 I 03332 01400 000000947741), but in case of shipment abroad, I would suggest to write an email to the above address and to specify the shipment location to check the feasibility and cost of the shipment.

Of course, Antonio and I have a (decent quality) PDF copy that we would be glad to share with the friends here who have contributed to a (heated but fair) discussion over the past years.

Please, in case you are interested to receive the PDF copy of the article, send me a private message with an email address able to receive a 9.3 Mbytes file, and I will let you have it.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Fri Sep 08, 2017 9:12 pm

dunmunro wrote:It is stated that PE opened fire at 0555, fired 6 salvos at Hood, then switched targets to PoW at ~0559

We need to look at this more closely. The first issue is that it is claimed that PE took ~4 minutes to fire 6 salvos! Really?

2ndly Jasper states that the last salvo fired at PE was unobserved by him because of an order to change targets to PoW. Schmalenbach states that Hood was destroyed just after the 6th salvo landed.

Here's the timing of events as recorded by Suffolk:
Phase 0550 (B) to 0851 (B)

18. 0550 (B). Suffolk's course 220°, 29 knots, following the enemy.

0553 (B). Heavy gun flashes bearing 185°. Half a minute later Bismarck opened fire to port.

0556½ (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire to port.

0559 (B). Hood blew up.

0600 (B). Enemy bore 208°.

(Suffolk/Ellis narrative)
Suffolk was not firing nor being fired at and consequently could make accurate notes.

If we correct the timing to match PoW's salvo chart we get:

0552:30 Hood opens fire
~0553:00-05 Bismarck open fire (confirmed by Leach, Rowell, Brooke)
0556 PE opens fire
0558:30 Hood blows up just after PE's 6th salvo lands and is witnessed by Schmalenbach.

The KM states that PE received no open fire order from Bismarck but PE's war diary states that PE did receive an order from Bismarck to change targets to PoW. Brinkman must have decided to get into the battle but it is clear that he did so only after Bismarck opened fire.

What seems to have happened:

0552:30 - Hood opens fire (all times as per PoW's AFCT timing)
Lutjens delayed the order to open fire until 0553 causing some anxiety amongst Bismarck's FC team.
0553 - PoW and Bismarck open fire nearly simultaneously.

0556 - PE and Brinkmann opens fire without orders from Lutjens. Somehow the impression is gained on PE that Bismarck did not open fire until 0555 but this is clearly not the case and it seems certain that Bismarck fired first and PE followed her lead.

0558 - PE fires her 6th salvo. Jasper is ordered to change target to PoW. His director moved over to PoW and he doesn't observe the FoS nor does he see Hood explode.

0558:30 - PE's 6th salvo lands and is witnessed by Schmalenbach through the (10.5cm) director.
~0558:35 - a salvo from Bismarck straddles and Hood explodes about 3-5 seconds after PE's 6th salvo lands and is witnessed by Schmalenbach just before he changes the 10.5cm battery target to PoW.


Paymaster Bailey from Norfolk:
"...I noted in my notebook that "HOOD" was on fire two minutes after she first opened fire, and that she blew up four minutes after that..."
Commander Porter from Suffolk:
"...The gun flashes started from the port quarter and were immediately followed by gun flashes ahead..."
Wake-Walker's recorded statements:
4:38:
"...very soon the Hood opened fire, followed by Bismark, PoW and the cruiser...".

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sat Sep 09, 2017 7:18 am

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

to correctly realize the open fire sequence, ... you must use both sides information and ... the photo evidence too, ... especially the photo NH 69722.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Mon Mar 05, 2018 10:14 pm

As per

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8249&start=30#top

post date: Sun Mar 04, 2018 5:36 pm
dunmunro wrote:
dunmunro wrote:Thanks so much for that. I found the open fire time for Bismarck especially interesting.
Rowell states that Hood blew up at Bismarck's 6th salvo and just after PoW's 8th salvo which puts the fatal hit at ~0558. This also fits well with the "heavy hit", felt in the 14in TS, which effected the AFCT:
"During the first action after firing salvo 12, a heavy hit was felt on the starboard side and the director setting mechanical pointer was seen to be oscillating violently."

PoW Salvo 12 = 0559:10, which gives Bismarck just enough time to switch targets to PoW.

We have Bismarck opening fire at 0553:30, firing 6 salvos from then until 0557:30, with the fatal salvo landing at 0558. This ~5 minute interval is also supported by Bismarck's war diary.
This new data strongly supports my contention that Bismarck opened fire at ~0553 and that Hood was sunk at ~0558 as per the PoW salvo timings.

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Tue Mar 06, 2018 9:03 am

Hi Duncan,
thanks for posting here.

I understand your point, even if I'm a bit surprised you have not given up this speculation after the very full discussion in this long thread.

Resuming, German precise timings from PG KTB and Lutjens report set open fire time for both Bismarck and PG at 5:55:xx.
Photo NH69722 analysis confirms Bismarck opened fire at the same time as PG (even some seconds after) and in NO way Bismarck may have fired ONLY 93 shells in 16 minutes, because this would mean a terribly slow RoF or an unrealistically high loss of output. :negative:
Please also don't forget we can count around 11 salvos fired by BS after 06:03 from film/photos (accounting already for 48 to 52 ordered shots).


Therefore, simply, British witnesses are (as well understandable in such critical situation) unreliable (as German witnesses are not reliable about the British ships fire) and your theory needs to be supported by a map + salvo plot JUSTIFYING all photos and film that are the only non-debatable available evidences.

If you can build such a salvo plot, following the British witnesses observation but fitting all the available battle timings, I will be happy to discuss and confront it with my COMPLETE one already shared and commented on this forum.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Mon Mar 26, 2018 4:32 pm

From William L. Shirer's The Sinking of the Bismarck:
The moment the British navy had been waiting for so impatiently had come. It
was a moment that Admiral Luetjens on the Bismarck had hoped to avoid. His or-
ders were to sink British merchant shipping and evade battle with the British navy if
he could. That was no longer possible. Two British capital ships were converging
on him at top speed. One was certainly the Hood, which he knew to be the most
powerful warship in the British navy. The other, he decided, must be the new bat-
tleship King George V, though actually it was the sister ship, Prince of Wales.
Despite the fact he was outgunned by the British ships, Admiral Luetjens did not
flinch. At 5:52 A.M. he radioed Berlin: “Am engaging two heavy units.”
At that very moment the 15-inch guns of the Hood went off at a range of 25,000
yards. The 14-inch guns of the Prince of Wales opened fire a few seconds later. Im-
mediately the Bismarck replied with a broadside from her 15-inch guns. The Ger-
man cruiser Prinz Eugen joined in with her own 8-inch cannon.
A great naval battle was engaged in the icy, northern sea.

First Battle: The Bismarck Sinks the Hood

The battle was all over in exactly seventeen minutes.
At the outset Vice-Admiral Holland ordered the Hood to fire at the wrong ship.
He mistook the German cruiser Prinz Eugen for the battleship Bismarck and di-
rected the opening 15-inch gun salvos of his flagship against the smaller enemy
vessel.
The captain of the Prince of Wales realized the mistake at once and disregarded
the Admiral’s signal to follow suit. Instead he aimed his 14-inch guns immediately
at the Bismarck. But his turrets were new and untried and his first shots landed
wide of the target.
Vice-Admiral Holland had put his two battleships at a disadvantage from the
moment the engagement began. Two minutes after sighting the German squadron
he had turned his ships directly toward the enemy to shorten the range. The result
was that the four rear guns on each of the British ships could not fire. Only the fore
turrets, pointing toward the Germans, could be used.
Admiral Luetjens, on the other hand, steered a course so that all of his eight
heavy guns could bear on the enemy. Had the British ships turned their full broad-
sides on him, they would have had the advantage of eighteen big guns against his
eight. (There were ten guns on the Prince of Wales and eight on the Hood.) As it
was, only the six forward cannon of the Prince of Wales and the four of the Hood
could be employed. This reduced the British advantage to only ten heavy guns
against the Germans’ eight, and after the first shot one of the Prince of Wales’ for-
ward guns was unable to fire further. Thus Vice-Admiral Holland’s superiority was
reduced to a mere nine to eight.
Since the German gunnery proved to be much more accurate than the British,
this was not much of an advantage. In fact, not only the Bismarck but also the
smaller Prinz Eugen, with guns of only 8-inch caliber, soon found the range. Con-
centrating her fire on the Hood, the Prinz Eugen scored a hit in less than a minute
with an 8-inch shell. It caused a large fire to break out near the Hood’s mainmast.
Observers on the British cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk saw the flames spread forward
and leap high above the upper deck. Then the fire seemed to subside...

Disaster now struck swiftly at the British. Both sides had opened fire at 5:52 A.M.
Three minutes later Vice-Admiral Holland finally gave the order to his two ships to
turn 20 degrees to port away from the Germans. This would enable them to em-
ploy their aft guns and fire broadsides at the enemy from all their big cannon.
The move came too late. As the British ships veered around, a salvo from the
Bismarck hit the Hood midships. Observers on both sides saw a scene they had
never before looked upon at sea. Between the two funnels of the Hood there was
suddenly a volcanic flame that erupted skyward for a thousand feet. Then in a sec-
ond or two it burned out, and a dense cloud of smoke settled over the sea. For a
moment the wind seemed to part it and through the smoke could be seen the sev-
ered bow and stern of the great ship jutting high in the sea, like two mammoth
sharks. Then they sank below the waves.
The Hood had blown up.
...Every high officer in the British navy had known that the mighty battle cruiser
had an Achilles heel. There was a chink in its armor between the funnels. Years be-
fore the Admiralty had decided to correct this, but for one reason or another the
job had been postponed. Then the war had come, and there was no time.
Thus it was that at precisely four minutes to six o’clock on the morning of May
24, 1941, just four minutes after the battle had begun, a 15-inch shell from the Bis-
marck hit the Hood in its weakest spot. It pierced through half a dozen decks to the
magazine, where it exploded among 300 tons of high-explosive shells.
Out of a crew of 1,419 only three men were picked up alive. Vice-Admiral Hol-
land, Captain Ralph Kerr and all the rest went down with the ship...

...Between the two funnels of the Hood there was
suddenly a volcanic flame that erupted skyward for a thousand feet. Then in a sec-
ond or two it burned out, and a dense cloud of smoke settled over the sea. For a
moment the wind seemed to part it and through the smoke could be seen the sev-
ered bow and stern of the great ship jutting high in the sea, like two mammoth
sharks. Then they sank below the waves.
The Hood had blown up.
Every high officer in the British navy had known that the mighty battle cruiser
had an Achilles heel. There was a chink in its armor between the funnels. Years be-
fore the Admiralty had decided to correct this, but for one reason or another the
job had been postponed. Then the war had come, and there was no time.
Thus it was that at precisely four minutes to six o’clock on the morning of May
24, 1941, just four minutes after the battle had begun, a 15-inch shell from the Bis-
marck hit the Hood in its weakest spot. It pierced through half a dozen decks to the
magazine, where it exploded among 300 tons of high-explosive shells.
Out of a crew of 1,419 only three men were picked up alive. Vice-Admiral Hol-
land, Captain Ralph Kerr and all the rest went down with the ship.

Chapter Four

“Avenge the Hood!”

The sinking of the Hood plunged the British Isles into deep gloom. The seafaring
nation, whose navy had ruled the waves for so long, had suffered a bitter defeat at
sea.
There were cries from high and low that the Hood be avenged. At once! But the
prospects were not high. For after the Hood blew up, the battle had continued to go
badly for the British.
On disposing so quickly of the Hood, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen had
turned their undivided attention to the smaller surviving British battleship, the
Prince of Wales. For five minutes the Prince of Wales had been firing away at the Bis-
marck undisturbed. Because she was so new that civilian mechanics were still
working on her gun turrets, her firing had not been very accurate. And there had
been several breakdowns. One gun was completely out. Others could be fired only
with difficulty.
With the Hood gone, the Prince of Wales now received a murderous hail of fire
from the two German warships. One 15-inch shell smashed her bridge, killing or
wounding everyone on it except the captain and a signal man. The ship’s side was
pierced by several hits both below and above the water line. Several compartments
were flooded. All the time the Prince of Wales continued to fire defiantly with what
guns she could.
But it was an unequal struggle. For some reason the cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk
were not joining in, as was the German cruiser. Captain Leach therefore decided to
withdraw—at least momentarily. He knew that strong reinforcements were not far
away. So at 6:03 A.M., just eleven minutes after the battle had begun, the Prince of
Wales turned sharply around and retired behind her own thick smoke screen. The
Bismarck fired a parting salvo at her six minutes later. The astonishing German vic-
tory had been won in exactly seventeen minutes.
The German admiral now made his first mistake. He failed to follow the crippled
Prince of Wales and dispatch her as he had the Hood. Instead he resumed course
southwest toward the mid-Atlantic.
After such a resounding triumph, why did Admiral Luetjens not pursue the dam-
aged British battleship, sink her and then turn back to Germany? There he and his

crews would have been hailed as victors, and Nazi propaganda could have made
the most of it. The blow to British prestige would have been all the stronger. In
Berlin Adolf Hitler, the Nazi German dictator, posed the question to Grand Admiral
Erich Raeder, commander in chief of the German navy.
Admiral Luetjens had a good reason for continuing on, as was later learned from
the secret German naval records. Though the British did not yet know it, the Bis-
marck had been hit by the Prince of Wales. Because of that, the Admiral made a
decision which was to be fateful for both sides. At one minute past eight o’clock on
the eventful morning of May 24, he informed Berlin in a coded radio message:

1. Electric engine room No. 4 broken down.
2. Port boiler room No. 2 is making water, but can be held. Water in the fore-
castle.
3. Maximum speed 28 knots.
4. Two enemy radar sets recognized.
5. Intentions: to put into St. Nazaire. No losses of personnel.
Fleet Commander

It seems a reasonable decision, considering all the circumstances. The Bismarck
was crippled, though not badly. If Admiral Luetjens turned back through the Den-
mark Strait, he might run head on into the rest of the British Home Fleet. If the
weather cleared, he would be subject nearly all the way to attack from British
bombers based in Iceland and the northern British islands. Probably the German
Fleet Commander calculated too that the British had no heavy ships between him
and refuge at St. Nazaire on the French coast. On the way in he might knock off a
British convoy or two. (As a matter of fact, the British convoy WS8B with 20,000
troops was almost directly in his path.)
Furthermore, at St. Nazaire, Admiral Luetjens would find his old battle cruisers
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. As soon as repairs were completed on them and on the
Bismarck, he could then sally out to sea again with an even more formidable fleet.
There was a sharp argument between the Admiral and Captain Lindemann, skip-
per of the Bismarck. The latter, a determined man who was very popular with his
crew, advised turning back. A few minutes earlier he had urged in vain that they
pursue the Prince of Wales (which they still believed was the King George V) and
sink her. Now again his advice was rejected...

A Note on Sources

All who write of the sinking of the Bismarck are indebted to Captain Russell Grenfell
of the Royal Navy for his brilliant book, The Bismarck Episode. After the war he
questioned all the British naval officers who took part in the chase, from Admirals
of the Fleet, as they later became, Lord Tovey and Sir James Somerville on down.
And he received much material from the Admiralty and other British official
sources.
The official British account of the great drama at sea is given in Volume I of The
War at Sea by Captain S. W. Roskill. This is part of the United Kingdom Military
History Series.
I found much fascinating German material in the secret German Naval Archives,
which were captured by the Allies at the end of World War II. A mimeographed vol-
ume entitled Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941, gives the text of the mes-
sages exchanged between Admiral Luetjens on the Bismarck and German Naval
Headquarters. It also contains the official confidential German naval report on the
episode drawn up a few weeks afterward by Admiral Kurt Assmann. Finally there is
in it the story told by one of the surviving seamen who was picked up by a German
submarine.
The best German book I have seen on the subject is Fritz Otto Busch’s Das
Geheimnis der Bismarck (The Secret of the Bismarck). Busch was an officer on the
cruiser Prinz Eugen. Admiral Friederich Ruge has also given a good account in his
book, Der Seekrieg, 1939–45 (The War at Sea, 1939–45).
Sir Winston Churchill gave a memorable picture of the drama as it looked to him
from London in The Grand Alliance, the third volume of his memoirs of the Second
World War.

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Mon Mar 26, 2018 5:59 pm

Hi Duncan,
thanks for posting this interesting account (this is a book I don't have). :clap:

However Shirer just "copied" Russel Grenfell (mentioned as his first source) battle timing (please see R.Grenfell battle plan n.2 pag 210) and his obvious errors (05:52 for all 4 ships open fire.... :shock: , just one order for a 20° turn to port at 5:55 (ignoring the last signal saw from PoW and never executed).... :shock: , Hood blowing up at 05:56.... :shock: and (less seriously wrong) PoW retreat time at 06:03) :negative:


It looks like Shirer studied neither the German sources as PG KTB's + maps (only F.O.Busch), nor even the British "official version", the Tovey's despatches + the PoW maps....

R.Grenfell (writing in 1947-1948) can be excused, Shirer can be much less. :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Tue Mar 27, 2018 12:17 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:Hi Duncan,
thanks for posting this interesting account (this is a book I don't have). :clap:

However Shirer just "copied" Russel Grenfell (mentioned as his first source) battle timing (please see R.Grenfell battle plan n.2 pag 210) and his obvious errors (05:52 for all 4 ships open fire.... :shock: , just one order for a 20° turn to port at 5:55 (ignoring the last signal saw from PoW and never executed).... :shock: , Hood blowing up at 05:56.... :shock: and (less seriously wrong) PoW retreat time at 06:03) :negative:


It looks like Shirer studied neither the German sources as PG KTB's + maps (only F.O.Busch), nor even the British "official version", the Tovey's despatches + the PoW maps....

R.Grenfell (writing in 1947-1948) can be excused, Shirer can be much less. :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
Shirer did look at the KM archives and evidently concluded that Grenfell's timing was correct. Certainly Lutjen's signal seems to fit nicely with the timing. Grenfell seems not to have consulted German records.

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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Tue Mar 27, 2018 7:15 am

Dunmunro wrote: "Shirer did look at the KM archives and evidently concluded that Grenfell's timing was correct."
Hi Duncan,
yes he did, and in doing so, he was clearly wrong.

Shirer looked into KM archives but NOT into PG KTB, PG battlemap (including Jasper and Schmalenbach GAR), McMullen GAR (and salvo plot), PoW battlemaps, not speaking about the PG film and the photos, that is, he didn't look into the only evidences that can time correctly the action, proving Grenfell to have been wrong.... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Tue Mar 27, 2018 7:35 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Dunmunro wrote: "Shirer did look at the KM archives and evidently concluded that Grenfell's timing was correct."
Hi Duncan,
yes he did, and in doing so, he was clearly wrong.

Shirer looked into KM archives but NOT into PG KTB, PG battlemap (including Jasper and Schmalenbach GAR), McMullen GAR (and salvo plot), PoW battlemaps, not speaking about the PG film and the photos, that is, he didn't look into the only evidences that can time correctly the action, proving Grenfell to have been wrong.... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
I don't know that he didn't look at the PE war diary and map, and it's possible that he dismissed the timings recorded there as out of line with all the other evidence, especially Lutjen's signal at 0552. He probably thought it not possible that all three RN ships could somehow all state that Bismarck opened fire when she actually didn't (as now claimed) open fire for 3 minutes.

Over reliance on a single source is always problematic... :think: The balance of probabilities is that PE's war diary timing is flawed.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Tue Mar 27, 2018 7:54 pm

Dunmunro wrote: "He probably thought it not possible that all three RN ships could somehow all state that Bismarck opened fire when she actually didn't "
Hi Duncan,
I think it's not possible that 3 German gunnery officers (Jasper, Schamlenbach and the Baron) all states that both their ships opened fire at 5:55, at least 2 minutes after the British, when they actually did not. :negative:

The problem here is that you insist to use British sources to establish the German open fire time, that is obviously a nonsense..... :stop:
Try and use German observation of British fire to establish whether Hood fired against PG or BS..... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

dunmunro
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Re: Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos...

Post by dunmunro » Wed Mar 28, 2018 9:45 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Dunmunro wrote: "He probably thought it not possible that all three RN ships could somehow all state that Bismarck opened fire when she actually didn't "
Hi Duncan,
I think it's not possible that 3 German gunnery officers (Jasper, Schamlenbach and the Baron) all states that both their ships opened fire at 5:55, at least 2 minutes after the British, when they actually did not. :negative:

The problem here is that you insist to use British sources to establish the German open fire time, that is obviously a nonsense..... :stop:
Try and use German observation of British fire to establish whether Hood fired against PG or BS..... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
Any observer with at least one good eye could determine when Bismarck opened fire and all 3 RN ships agree that she did open fire nearly simultaneously with PoW.

The Baron's account was written decades after the fact and was obviously influenced by later accounts just as Toveys later letter were influenced by Churchill's account.

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