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Hello everybody,

while working on my Tirpitz book number 4, ... I spent some time to read thru the book Nr 3 od Sir Winston Churchill, ... and found something interesting to be shared to the ones that do not have this great series of books.
Bye Antonio

This is Churchill's description of the battle:

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

few considerations reading thru the 2 parts posted :

1) Hood and PoW were supposed to engage the enemy with 2 or 3 cruisers, there was a " general Plan " according to the Admiralty.

2) PoW retreating did cause a " sharp disappointment " to Churchill.

3) Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed -> It is incorrect ! Only Suffolk did it. The statement " their signals " should not be there, given the enourmous difference in shadowing and sending radio signals between the 2 heavy cruisers.

4) Hood open fire time is correct at 05.52 ( in reality 05.52 and 30 secs ), there is no open fire listed for the German warships, we know from the German documents and the Admiralty ( Royal Navy Admiralty Battle Summary Nr. 5 last version on 1948 ) that it happened 2/3 minutes after at 05.55.

5) Hood explosion time is correct at 06.00, according to almost all the available reports and documents both sides.

6) The PoW under fire, cause of retreat and damages are a mix between Tovey dispatches and the Admiralty minute of September 1941, they do not correspond to the event correct sequence, since PoW started her retreat before having received the majority of the hits, ... and there is no mention to the Y quadruple turret jamming ... ... we know why it is like that.

7) Churchill obviously felt also the need to justify RearAdm Wake-Walker decision not to re-engagé the enemy with PoW and 2 heavy cruisers, and we know why as well. The fact that PoW was considered not being a match for the Bismarck is particularly important. Never after DS and May 27th, ... so the Bismarck experience and chase, ... a KGV class battleship was going to be considered to engage the Tirpitz one on one. At least 2 KGV class warships were needed, or better one KGV class jointly with a 16 inch US Navy fast battleship.

8) To hold the enemy " under observation " is a very unusual statement to be read, but we know how that was done from a " comfortable safe distance " and we know the final result of that very careful effort, resulting on the lost of the enemy while into a very critical convoys area on that moment, ... with a special reference to the convoy W.S. 8B with 40.000 British soldiers.

Bye Antonio

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

few considerations reading thru the 2 parts posted :

1) Hood and PoW were supposed to engage the enemy with 2 or 3 cruisers, there was a " general Plan " according to the Admiralty.

2) PoW retreating did cause a " sharp disappointment " to Churchill.

3) Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed -> It is incorrect ! Only Suffolk did it. The statement " their signals " should not be there, given the enourmous difference in shadowing and sending radio signals between the 2 heavy cruisers.

4) Hood open fire time is correct at 05.52 ( in reality 05.52 and 30 secs ), there is no open fire listed for the German warships, we know from the German documents and the Admiralty ( Royal Navy Admiralty Battle Summary Nr. 5 last version on 1948 ) that it happened 2/3 minutes after at 05.55.

5) Hood explosion time is correct at 06.00, according to almost all the available reports and documents both sides.

6) The PoW under fire, cause of retreat and damages are a mix between Tovey dispatches and the Admiralty minute of September 1941, they do not correspond to the event correct sequence, since PoW started her retreat before having received the majority of the hits, ... and there is no mention to the Y quadruple turret jamming ... ... we know why it is like that.

7) Churchill obviously felt also the need to justify RearAdm Wake-Walker decision not to re-engagé the enemy with PoW and 2 heavy cruisers, and we know why as well. The fact that PoW was considered not being a match for the Bismarck is particularly important. Never after DS and May 27th, ... so the Bismarck experience and chase, ... a KGV class battleship was going to be considered to engage the Tirpitz one on one. At least 2 KGV class warships were needed, or better one KGV class jointly with a 16 inch US Navy fast battleship.

8) To hold the enemy " under observation " is a very unusual statement to be read, but we know how that was done from a " comfortable safe distance " and we know the final result of that very careful effort, resulting on the lost of the enemy while into a very critical convoys area on that moment, ... with a special reference to the convoy W.S. 8B with 40.000 British soldiers.

Bye Antonio

1) There was no general plan, just Holland's plan.

2) Yes and why not?

3) Both cruisers shadowed Bismarck.

4) The Admiralty documents ( Official reports from PoW, Norfolk and Suffolk and the Blake and Walker boards) and Bismarck interrogation reports show Bismarck opening fire within one minute of Hood.

5) This time was estimated and it was probably wrong, as per both Norfolk and Suffolk's official reports.

6) Churchill's account is very abbreviated and omits much detail - this is true of all his WW2 books and they cover about one year of the war per book.

7) Churchill makes it very clear, over the course of an entire paragraph, that it was PoW's lack of training and battle damage that made her unlikely to be a match for Bismarck (sometime I think you must be reading something entirely different than what I posted??!!) The Admiralty always wanted a clear superiority over any potential opponent.

8) Churchill's account incorporates information that he was given after the events but also how he thought and felt during the events. This is a subtle aspect of his histories and it takes a considerable amount of study to separate the two.

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

the most updated Official Royal Navy Admiralty document about the Bismarck chase is called Battle Summary Number 5 and contains what I wrote you above and not what you like to beleive.

Sorry Duncan, ... you better accept the reality as it is and it shows, ... from the British original updated documents made available at the KEW ( London ) Public Record Office Archives.

Bye Antonio

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

the most updated Official Royal Navy Admiralty document about the Bismarck chase is called Battle Summary Number 5 and contains what I wrote you above and not what you like to beleive.

Sorry Duncan, ... you better accept the reality as it is and it shows, ... from the British original updated documents made available at the KEW ( London ) Public Record Office Archives.

Bye Antonio

Battle Summaries are just histories compiled by RN historians - they are not "official" in any sense. In any event, I'm certain that you don't find Battle Summary 5 to be completely accurate or do you?

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote and asked :

Battle Summaries are just histories compiled by RN historians - they are not "official" in any sense. In any event, I'm certain that you don't find Battle Summary 5 to be completely accurate or do you?

Sorry, the Battle Summary Number 5 is the Official position of the Royal Navy Admiralty regarding those events, in fact you can find on it even clear corrections of other previously released official documents.

The most evident demonstration of what I am stating is the 06.13 for PoW retreat by Adm Tovey dispatches corrected back to the more credible 06.03 according to the PoW maps.

The same correction being done for the Bismarck opening fire time at DS, ... once they had at hand the German official documents, ... tells the whole story and closes the debate.

Like it or not that is the Royal Navy most official authority, ... the Admiralty.

Bye Antonio

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote and asked :

Battle Summaries are just histories compiled by RN historians - they are not "official" in any sense. In any event, I'm certain that you don't find Battle Summary 5 to be completely accurate or do you?

Sorry, the Battle Summary Number 5 is the Official position of the Royal Navy Admiralty regarding those events, in fact you can find on it even clear corrections of other previously released official documents.

The most evident demonstration of what I am stating is the 06.13 for PoW retreat by Adm Tovey dispatches corrected back to the more credible 06.03 according to the PoW maps.

The same correction being done for the Bismarck opening fire time at DS, ... once they had at hand the German official documents, ... tells the whole story and closes the debate.

Like it or not that is the Royal Navy most official authority, ... the Admiralty.

Bye Antonio

RN policy is not dictated by the RN Historical Branch.

Antonio Bonomi wrote:
The most evident demonstration of what I am stating is the 06.13 for PoW retreat by Adm Tovey dispatches corrected back to the more credible 06.03 according to the PoW maps.

...and corrected their mistake in 1950 and changed it to 06:13 again.

Hello everybody,


Dr. Erich Grove publication of the Battle Summary Number 5 on 2002 :

https://books.google.it/books?id=fcpEAQ ... 05&f=false
Bye Antonio

Hello everybody,


Commander L. J. Pitcairn-Jones D.S.C. revised, expanded and updated also this book on the Artic Convoys from the original wartime Battle Summary Nr. 22 for the Royal Navy Admiralty - Naval Staff History section :


https://books.google.it/books?id=Fzw9X7 ... es&f=false

Bye Antonio

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you are showing the base document, ... without the Commander L. J. Pitcairn-Jones D.S.C. revision, expansion and updates he made on it after it was released at first.

Dr. Erich Grove published on 2002 the revised, expanded and updated version of that base document, it is very simple, since the modifications are done on the exact same base document number, .... so it can only have been done after it, ... obviously ... otherwise no same base document to write into.

In fact the Plan 4 on the updated version does contain the manually traced bearings on it, while the base document does not as you can easily verify yourself.
Consequently, they modified the reference on Plan 4 on that statement, from 06.13 to the more credible 06.03 that the Plan 4 clearly shows, since the 2 modifications are connected obviously, and in fact they wrote it on the modification explanation on the bottom of the page.

They should have changed the document date, version and reference number, but please do not ask me why they did not do it.

Bye Antonio

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you are showing the base document, ... without the Commander L. J. Pitcairn-Jones D.S.C. revision, expansion and updates he made on it after it was released at first.

Dr. Erich Grove published on 2002 the revised, expanded and updated version of that base document, it is very simple, since the modifications are done on the exact same base document number, .... so it can only have been done after it, ... obviously ... otherwise no same base document to write into.

In fact the Plan 4 on the updated version does contain the manually traced bearings on it, while the base document does not as you can easily verify yourself.
Consequently, they modified the reference on Plan 4 on that statement, from 06.13 to the more credible 06.03 that the Plan 4 clearly shows, since the 2 modifications are connected obviously, and in fact they wrote it on the modification explanation on the bottom of the page.

They should have changed the document date, version and reference number, but please do not ask me why they did not do it.

Bye Antonio

It should be obvious to one and all that Commander L. J. Pitcairn-Jones was acting in his capacity as a historian, in making, or not, revisions to Battle Summary 5. The idea that Pitcairn-Jones, with the stroke of a pen could, somehow, change or enact official policy in the RN and Admiralty is absolutely ludicrous.

Hello everybody,

facts, ... and not personal opinions ... but carefully researched Official original documentation.

Enjoy ...


Bye Antonio