Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Have the rest of us seen this wording (ie original - not passed through the Conspiracy Filter)?.....I am interested to see what Ellis' opinions based on his faulty memories of an incident many, many years previous are."

Hi Sean,
sorry for being unable to help you here, as, if I do, you will suspect me to use the "Conspiracy Filter".
Also, despite I have re-written recently several documents in order to post them, you seem not willing to trust their content anyway (e.g. the Roskill letter to Kennedy). Your above insinuations about Ellis memory once again point to this final result, due to your side-taken approach.
I guess someone else can loose his time to answer your question.


Bye, Alberto


P.S. I think anyway that my summary :"wrong and timid dispositions" is correct, when referred to Ellis judgement of Wake-Walker shadowing in the night between 24 and 25, as you will check yourself, despite you have not trusted me.

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto, please no more games, its getting a little childish now. I'm afraid, a solid argument, a discussion and even conjecture I can cope with, deciding who is allowed to use what references with hypocrisy and trying to create fact from opinion I can't. I accept your opinion but it's not fact.

I do believe I've answered your questions, it seems as though you don't accept those answers or deny that they are relevant, I'm afraid this time the old fall back position of calling people deniers is a bit silly, as you seem to be the one denying the documented evidence or promoting a personal opinion on what someones actions should have been as the opinion of the Admiralty, or trying to link two different things to prove a covering up process for critisism of an officer who did not actually face that critisism. But I guess tactics are tactics.

The fact remains that Wake-Walker was only threatened and criticised for not re engaging Bismarck with PoW, he was not threatened or criticised for not engaging during the morning action. As for my opinion what do you propose I base it on?

On the evidences that so far I've found, or that have been presented here regarding what was thought or reported or signalled including official reports, letters, papers and documents, or your personal opinion on Wake-Walker? At the moment I'm also looking at other files from those actually involved that so far have not been looked at, still trying to find any other form of answer.

I understand that Wake-Walker was human with strengths and failings like all humans, whatever you think of him we know he did actually face life threatening danger during the Bismarck operation and he did not head for the safety of Scapa as has been suggested. We know he continued to pursue Bismarck after Hood had been sunk and continued the search thereafter and did not cease until he fired torpedoes into Bismarck on the 27th.

Now we can all have opinions of the man, his actions, his command of his ships etc etc. We can speculate on whatever, but we cannot promote personal opinion as fact and expect people to dismiss documentry evidences and simply believe the opinion. We also cannot accept biography opinion regarding one subject but then call another part that just happens to contradict our opinion as a lie.

I accept your opinion.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "I do believe I've answered your questions, "

Hi Mr.Cag,
no, you haven't. Read my questions, I repeated the very last one at least twice...... Now I'm tired of your attitude.

you wrote: "The fact remains that Wake-Walker was only threatened and criticised for not re engaging Bismarck with PoW, he was not threatened or criticised for not engaging during the morning action"

I already told you several times already: everybody was aware he did not re-engage, while very few people were knowing at which distance the cruisers actually were and it is a fact that ONLY Tovey version (meant to mislead about their real distance) went to the printers, allowing NO CRITICS. However (in case you will be kind enough to answer my question above, you will see that this version would have been surely "challenged" by someone intending to evaluate the facts).



"I understand that Wake-Walker was human with strengths and failings like all humans, whatever you think of him we know" (your words):
1) he did actually turn away from Bismarck in the evening of May 23, never seeing her anymore until 05:41 next day (visual shadowing was well possible before 23:52/24 and after 03:21/25, as Suffolk visual sightings demonstrate),
2) he turned immediately to port to avoid to close on Bismarck, despite an "enemy in sight" message at 05:41, not taking any initiative to engage with his cruisers,
3) he did not open fire being in (albeit extreme) range (even when Hood exploded and PoW was in clear difficulties),
4) he did not exercise a proper leadership immediately after Hood explosion (at what time did he send the first message to PoW ?),
5) he did immediately turn away (at 6:00 exactly...),
6) he did refuse to re-engage (albeit "kindly asked" by the Admiralty),
7) he did very poorly manage the shadowing during the night between 24 and 25 (as per known official reports and Ellis autobiography)....


I still accept your opinion as well......


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I like to have your opinion about Kpt H. Brinkmann note on the PG battle map where he wrote to have received at 05:55 from " Flotte ", so from Adm Lutjens ( Flottenchef ) the target selection.

This text you can read :

Von Flotte : Auf den Gegner am weitesten links -> Translated -> Fleet : On the opponent furthest left ( PoW )

Immediately followed by : Auf Rechten Gegner -> Translated -> To the right enemy ( Hood )

Here in :

http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrai ... tlemap.gif

@ CAG,

similarly, I never asked you what do you think about RearAdm Wake-Walker signed Norfolk distance declaration change from 20.000 yards on Hood board 1 to the 30.000 yards on Hood Board 2, ... using an intentionally false document like " The Plot " is, ... just made on purpose for that declaration change support ?

Also, what is your opinion about the intentionally smartly and misleading written Adm Tovey dispatches point 17 about Norfolk and Suffolk very generic distances declaration, ... with no precise reference time associated ?

Obviously I have my personal opinion and I will keep it, ... but I like to have your opinion about it, ... and of course you are absolutely entitled to keep it too.

I just like to know it clearly.

Thanks and Bye, Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto, if his superiors were happy with his shadowing tactics if they were of the opinion that he never put a foot wrong which part of that do you not consider an answer?

Obviously from your list it shows clearly your dislike for Wake Walkers conduct during the operation, and that's your view, I am not trying to change it. I'm trying to point out that WW never faced criticism for any part of your list, please see my previous list of quotes for confirmation. As for Toveys despatch I'm afraid I have to answer this with a question,

Could you tell me was the Hood enquiry report produced?
Was Wake-Walkers report produced?
Was Leach's report produced?
Was Wake Walkers gunnery and RDF report produced?
Was the PoW GAR report produced?
Was Rowells map, Plan 4 and the PoW GAR map produced?
Were the Norfolk and Suffolk strategical maps produced?
Was Suffolks/Ellis report produced?
Were the German survivor reports produced?
Were the relevant reports included in Toveys despatch?
Was Toveys despatch produced?
Were these reports available to the Admiralty?

One final question could you tell me when Toveys despatch was printed ie went to the press?

Hi Antonio, your answers are,

I was of the opinion that both the Hood enquiries were set up to find out why Hood sank as one of the matters that required investigation.

The 1st boards approximation of 10nm was incorrect, I believe we all accept this, the plot I think was the boards attempt to allow more information to be gathered especially as the Suffolks reports and maps which were absent in the 1st board (as were PoW). At the moment I'm afraid to say there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the 15nm was an intentional alteration in one enquiry to stop a critisism of WW and Ellis as neither were actually facing such a critisism, but obviously I cannot say for sure and so will not state this as fact, that is my point.

Again I cannot say for sure that Tovey intentionally mislead the board to stop a unsubstantiated critisism, he is describing how it was Holland's intention that the cruisers might engage Prinz Eugen. He seems to forget to mention that Wake-Walker never received orders from Holland to do so, but does state Prinz Eugen was the lead ship, do we know how far away PG was?

If I may ask you the same questions Alberto has refused to answer,

Do the documents you reference say exactly 20000 yds or 30000 yds or do they quantify them by stating approximately?
Having carried out your battle map analysis was the 20000 yd estimate correct?
When Blake states that his diagrams may require correction but are sufficient for the purpose, was there an attempt to correct them?
Is the attempted 30000 yd correction estimate correct?
Were these corrections due to the gathering of Suffolks maps?
Was this map included in the Hood enquiry report or Toveys despatch?
What has this to do with the critisism of WW regarding the re engagement of Bismarck by PoW?

If you are both happy with your findings, and secure in your opinion, I am happy to accept this. My problem is the constant attempts to put forward this opinion on WW as a fact and the seemingly endless attempts to make everyone else accept it as fact too.

Best Wishes
Cag.

[dunmunro]

As requested here is the relevant Admiralty War Diary entries for operations against Bismarck. I believe I have included all relevant pages:

http://www.sfu.ca/~dmunro/images/Bismarckops.pdf

note that while the war diary often included important radio signals it does not contain all signals.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Mr.Cag,
I think I have already answered your main point, that W-W was criticized only for not re-engaging (something that was heard loud and clear in the War Room and by Churchill) while he was NOT criticized for not engaging during the morning battle BECAUSE his cruisers real distance from the enemy was not exactly known (except to few officers involved) and it was "covered" by Tovey incorrect statement at point 17 of his despatches, surely circulated within the Admiralty already before their publication.
The despatches set for everyone the "official version" of the whole operation (internally first and publicly later).

I repeat (for the third time, as you are clearly unwilling to answer) my key question: do you really think a Court Martial for not re-engaging would have not questioned Wake-Walker regarding his "shadowing" and regarding the DS battle ?


I assure you that I still accept your positive judgement of W-W as officer, despite the more or less shameful ACTIONS (facts not opinions) I have listed in my last post. Please accept mine one and let's close this pointless debate.


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
thanks a lot for this list, Duncan, most interesting !


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I like to have your opinion about Kpt H. Brinkmann note on the PG battle map where he wrote to have received at 05:55 from " Flotte ", so from Adm Lutjens ( Flottenchef ) the target selection.

This text you can read :

Von Flotte : Auf den Gegner am weitesten links -> Translated -> Fleet : On the opponent furthest left ( PoW )

Immediately followed by : Auf Rechten Gegner -> Translated -> To the right enemy ( Hood )

Here in :

http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrai ... tlemap.gif

@ CAG,

similarly, I never asked you what do you think about RearAdm Wake-Walker signed Norfolk distance declaration change from 20.000 yards on Hood board 1 to the 30.000 yards on Hood Board 2, ... using an intentionally false document like " The Plot " is, ... just made on purpose for that declaration change support ?

Also, what is your opinion about the intentionally smartly and misleading written Adm Tovey dispatches point 17 about Norfolk and Suffolk very generic distances declaration, ... with no precise reference time associated ?

Obviously I have my personal opinion and I will keep it, ... but I like to have your opinion about it, ... and of course you are absolutely entitled to keep it too.

I just like to know it clearly.

Thanks and Bye, Antonio

I think that Vizeadmiral Schmundt's opinion is what should be considered.

I understand that you think the plot is "an intentionally false document" but I don't agree and W-W acted responsibly when he presented evidence that the 20k yd range was incorrect.

The ranges in point 17 are supported by the range estimates, made at the time, onboard SF and NF. Tovey's main clause in point 17 is that PE was stationed ahead of Bismarck and thus was not a ready target for W-W's cruisers since they could not close the range on PE without coming within easy range of Bismarck's main armament, before Bismarck was engaged. You also believe that Bismarck withheld fire until ~0555 which, if true, would have further complicated SF and NF's ability to engage PE since it would have delayed SF and NF's understanding of Lutjen's intentions regarding whether he would fight or flee.

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Dunmunro thank you for that much appreciated.

Hi Alberto if you look back I think I have answered that question? The reasons for non engagement are explained, if you agree WW thought his role was to shadow and his shadowing tactics were affirmed not criticised then he did what was expected? So again just for you no I don't think it would be investigated as that was not the charge that was threatened.

Im not sure I have positively affirmed any one? I think I have tried to put forward the documented evidence. I have not implied a critisism, put forward ifs and maybe's and asked people to assume them to be a fact.

The first board gave Norfolks distance as 10nm during the period of the threat of CM. Therefore any initial critisism would be based on this distance would it not? Do we have any evidence that there was a critisism as his tactical function was to follow and flank mark and it was the tactical function of BC1 to engage Bismarck?

The Admiralty used all the reports that were fully set out in Toveys despatch, they had access to all reports made from all involved including both Hood enquiries. As I've stated during the whole of this thread, I accept your view but it is not myself that keeps implying critisism of WW that we have no evidence of occurring? I accept your view, but I'm not sure that it was the same one as was held by the Admiralty?

I totally agree the discussion is pointless as we are discussing implied critisism that did not happen and trying to link a incorrect 10nm and 15nm alteration to a threatened charge of non re engagement.

I think you asked about Suffolk firing later during the chase, I found this but Im not sure this is what you meant. This is similar to Suffolks fire at 06.19 in response to a perceived threat.

Ellis reports that at 18.41 Bismarck opened fire on Suffolk, she returned fire and her 3rd salvo appeared to straddle at 21 125 yds (rdf indicated 20 700yds) he later states that PoW fire was erratic, possibly due to her bridge control area damage, and comments on the possibility of Suffolks shells hitting Bismarck in a similar way given a spin of the wheel by lady luck. So a 21000 yd hit would be considered lucky or is it that any hit would damage something vital? I'm not sure.

This is for Wadinga to answer his question.

Ellis mentions Tovey and the Admiralty signals regarding U boats and at 19.31 CS1 signalling Suffolk to zig zag independantly. He also mentions at 21.06 CS1 signalling giving Suffolks position on his stb beam and then CS1 taking station astern of Suffolk with PoW following to support Suffolk. CS1 told Suffolk to get into RDF range at dusk.

He mentions his ships shadowing position being handicapped by having Norfolk and PoW astern and PoW being silhouetted by the afterglow which to Ellis made no sense. He mentions some confusion due to mist at midnight, the Madoc sighting and at 01.24 the PoWs third engagement with Bismarck. The confusion cleared to show the ships were too broad on the enemys port quarter due to the Bismarcks change of course.

At 02.05 CS1 signalled Suffolk to act independantly to operate its rdf with Norfolk and PoW astern. Ellis decided to continue to zig zag due to the light night and relative slow speed of the ship and that it was eventually due to the experimental nature of the rdf use and fatigue of the crew that delayed the realisation that Bismarck had changed course. The rdf was rested on the outward leg of the zig zag.

He describes Wake-Walkers decision to keep the partially crippled PoW close to the Suffolk as correct for the security of Suffolk and it's rdf capability although PoW gunnery at 01.24 whilst still light was not impressive. He states WW had called him over to port of Bismarck and the enemy's movements broadened the bearing and became unsuitable for single ship shadowing but that any drastic move to stb would have caused confusion and loss of contact. He states that the shadowing seemed reasonably settled with only the chance of Bismarck altering away undetected whilst on his ships outward leg of the zig zag was being carried out and the radar was rested.

He does not say or suggest a timid nature of WW but if Ive missed that I hope Alberto may be able to point it out for me, thank you in advance Alberto.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I agree with all you wrote above, ... now I start recognizing the Dunmunro I was used to talk to.

I have studied and noticed the " mismatches " also on the German side, ... not only on the British side.

Schmundt versus Brinkmann in that case is one of them, ... and that is why I have asked and interviewed Hans Henning Von Schulz that was the responsible on board Prinz Eugen of the communications with Bismarck, ... and the one also " managing " Schmundt and the KM command after Brinkmann early responses, ... writing also the Bismarck re-constructed war diary.

What we have demonstrated about " The Plot " is known, everybody can realize it now.
You think that WW acted responsibly changing is first signed declaration ( not a very responsible act anyhow from him at first ) but I think that using his ship ( Norfolk ) tactical original plot to do it, should have been a much better solution, .. for him as well as for the Suffolk.
The fact that " The Plot " cannot stand on his feet and that the S&N tactical plots disappeared are surely not a positive event.

Your explanation about point 17 is probably the most correct version of the facts, ... at least at the very early and surprising stage of the battle ( PG being ahead and not back to BS ), ... but it is not what anyone will realize reading Adm Tovey point 17.
What the point 17 is totally missing are the 2 " enlargement "actions taken by N&S at 05:41.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

As requested here is the relevant Admiralty War Diary entries for operations against Bismarck. I believe I have included all relevant pages:

http://www.sfu.ca/~dmunro/images/Bismarckops.pdf

note that while the war diary often included important radio signals it does not contain all signals.

Here is an updated pdf which starts with loss of contact with Bismarck and continues to 29 May. I reviewed the source document carefully and included all pages pertaining to Bismarck. This pdf contains the infamous signal to Tovey to sink Bismarck (p.54) even if it means towing KGV.


http://www.sfu.ca/~dmunro/images/Bismarckops2.pdf

[wadinga]

Hello Dunmunro,

Once again congratulations on bringing a goldmine of new source material to this debate.



There is so much to mine from this I just don't where to start

So much better than ploughing through endless repostings of debunked fantasist theory!

Thanks for the outline of Ellis' late life recollections. (Also to Alberto). Like many he is prone to knowing hindsight but it is clear he was given a free hand to select a position to give the new fangled radar the best chance of hanging on to Bismarck. Bismarck had reversed course on him previously, and he had sometimes reacted with a circle even when Bismarck had in fact not changed course, so it was prudent to give him extra protection. I suspect Suffolk had a gyro problem which meant her DR was very poor, so keeping her within sight was important and neither Norfolk nor PoW had worthwhile or operational radar.

Settling down to reading.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

while the missed morning battle engagement was going to be a trouble for RearAdm Wake-Walker only in case on an inquiry that never occurred, ... the missed re-engagement in the afternoon, after being asked about it from the Admiralty was a problem that was clearly addressed by Adm Pound to Adm Tovey.

Here the original letter of Adm Tovey to Stephen Roskill clearly mentioning it :

Tovey_Roskill_Court_Martial_1961.jpg (111.62 KiB) Viewed 1128 times

We know now the real reason of the point 23 into Adm Tovey dispatches and the consequent approval by the Admiralty written by Sir Barnes in September of 1941.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Antonio, the only idea that there was a missed opportunity to engage in the morning action in the view of those experts in the Roskill files was due to there being no attempt to signal the intent that they were to do so, or any attempt to concentrate on the cruisers using the estimated plot held by AC(Q) aka Holland. The idea as to whether both co's of both cruisers had the same 'timid' intention at the same time has also been discussed and it would be an incredible coincidence of timidity unless they were of the opinion they were there to follow and flank mark wouldn't you think?

The Pitcairn Jones letters also agree with the Royal Naval Staff College and training college that there was no signal or attempt to concentrate with the cruisers prior to the battle. Are these competent officers wrong or perhaps have a timid nature too?

The reasoning for Wake-Walkers decision not to re engage has also been discussed, the PoW Y turret problem, her continued gunnery defects, the danger of pushing Bismarck West etc etc.

Hope this helps

Best wishes
Cag.