Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Mon Jan 08, 2018 11:39 pm

Cag wrote: "Hood PoW Norfolk and Suffolk firing on Bismarck, four ships firing on one ship, with no coordination between battleships or more importantly cruisers? "

Hi Mr.Cag,
Sure ! If only it had been so, on May 24 !
GIC may be a logical choice with two ships firing at one, to avoid confusion, but it's NOT mandatory, it's a choice (a choice we know was made by Holland).
KGV, Rodney, Norfolk and Dorsetshire fired at one ship on May 27 without much coordination, with good results, even if some confusion was made in spotting the fall of shots, at least between KGV and Rodney.

Actually, Hood fired at PG and PoW fired at Bismarck. Had a cruiser (e.g Suffolk) opened fire against the closer target (Bismarck), it would have been exactly the same situation as PG against Hood, probably not confusing at all PoW (as PG did not confuse at all Bismarck). Norfolk, being at almost the same distance from Bismarck and PG could have decided to redirect her fire against PG instead, had her fire been confused by Suffolk fall of shots (again a possibility, I'm not aware that Dorsetshire and Norfolk had any problem among them on May 27).

To avoid possible confusion, on May 24, Norfolk and Suffolk decided NOT to open fire at all, independently one from the other.:oops:
The point is just that the two cruisers had no intention to engage (Ellis said it clearly), feeling themselves as pure shadowers. This behavior was in no way comparable with Lutjens decision to keep PG in the line, using it as a battleship. Tovey thus needed to "embellish" the otherwise poor story from British side.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Cag » Tue Jan 09, 2018 10:32 am

Hi All

Hi Alberto,

so both officers in charge of the ships independently decided not to engage? There must be a reason why they both independantly decided not to do so? It would be an amazing set of coincidences that the RN put two extremely timid officers in charge of sister ship cruisers and sent both of them to patrol the very avenue that was thought likely to be used by an enemy breakout? Only then to find they both decided to do exactly the same timid thing independant of one another.

Perhaps the reason they did not engage was because as again stated independently of one another they knew their role to be follow and flank mark? Would that be more likely? So when they did exactly that no one questioned it afterwards and those at the Admiralty, according to Davies, Tovey and importantly Pound congratulated them on doing it? We do have evidence that shows Davies regarded the Admiralty view as one of satisfaction do we not? Was that embellishment? Toveys initial report is affirmative, was that a pre emptive embellishment written before he knew it was required? Pounds signal is affirmative? A mistaken embellishment?

If they were happy with the actions of the cruisers then there was no 'poor showing' as you put it and no need to embellish anything?

Funnily enough if you read Toveys despatch again you find the DS part to have a great deal of inaccuracy in it, we say there was a delay in the German open fire, but not according to Tovey in his despatch, we say Hood fired on Prinz Eugen, but againt not according to Tovey, are these all examples of embellishments too?

I understand that you believe the cruisers should have opened fire on Bismarck with BC1, I'm happy to accept that view, but I'm not sure that those that were in charge in 1941 shared your view as there is no evidence to support it in fact we have evidences to the contrary.

I'm sure that you would like everyone to realise what you believe is true, that is natural, but when there are independantly written evidences that contradict that belief it is hard for people to realise something that logically does not seem to need realising.

Best wishes
Cag.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Tue Jan 09, 2018 11:14 am

Cag wrote: "Perhaps the reason they did not engage was because as again stated independently of one another they knew their role to be follow and flank mark? Would that be more likely?"

Hi Mr.Cag,
I fully agree with you. They felt themselves as pure shadowers, this may not be considered a crime (an inquiry could have decided if W-W was showing poor or good initiative in his handling of CS1), but, as I said, the comparison with Prinz Eugen was so bad for both of them that Tovey felt the need to "justify" anyway their behavior, unfairly (IMHO) giving the responsibility to Holland for not instructing them to engage.


you wrote: "If they were happy with the actions of the cruisers..... "

I'm really not surprised that officers were supporting their colleaugues decisions against such "delicate" and "sensitive" accusations.....
Everybody (with possibly very few exceptions....) was happy (as Davies reports about the War Room officers) after Bismarck was sunk, with hindsight. Don't you think another judgement would have been done in case she was still free in Atlantic ?


you wrote: "Funnily enough if you read Toveys despatch again you find the DS part to have a great deal of inaccuracy...:"

Please, don't mix inaccurate information (mostly coming from innocently conflicting/incorrect witnesses/reports) with intentionally incorrect statements, well demonstrated by now, like the point 19 Y turret jamming before the disengagement (NEVER stated by Leach or by any other witness/report and just invented by Tovey, contradicting his own previous report), or the intentionally misleading point 17 giving the position of the cruisers behind Bismarck by around 15 sm at an undefined timing only to justify their absence at the battle (very astutely phrased by Tovey himself)...... Both points 17 and 19 were explicitly written to answer the doubts about the 2 aspects mentioned in Barnes answer to Tovey despatches..... :oops:


you wrote: "I understand that you believe the cruisers should have opened fire on Bismarck with BC1.....in fact we have evidences to the contrary."

Do you really think anyone in the RN would have criticized them for aggressively opening fire at 05:55, potentially from 9sm (SF) and 13 sm (NF) ? :negative:
Have anyone in the Admiralty criticized Ellis for opening fire at 18:42 on May 24 from 10 sm distance, without having received any order from W-W ? :negative:
Have anyone criticized Norfolk and Dorsetshire for opening fire from around the same distance on May 27 ? Did they receive instructions to do so ? :negative: (despite Tovey says Norfolk was there on May 27 to do..... flank-marking...... :shock: ref: point 81 of despatches).


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Cag » Tue Jan 09, 2018 4:07 pm

Hi All

Hi Alberto I realise that this is pointless as you have your opinion, but could you show me the paperwork that shows Toveys or Pounds or anyone elses revulsion at Norfolk or Suffolk not engaging when Prinz Eugen did? I presume that if you can not is is therefore your opinion that there was some form of comparison?

As to your second statement could you show me the sensitive and delicate questions being asked about the cruisers role in the morning action?

If 15nm is an intentional alteration to what charge does this cover up as the Barnes reference is to not engaging Bismarck with PoW after Hood sank and not anything to do with participation in the morning action. This seems to be a sticking point for you.

If aggressively opening fire caused problems for BC1 yes, Ellis opened fire because he believed his ship was in danger and fired as he turned away doing exactly what a cruiser engaged in following and flank marking would do. Could you tell me if Norfolk and Dorsetshire opened fire with the battleships or later? Does this preclude the chance that Norfolk heading for the enemy at 05.53 was intent on flank marking as stated in her gunnery report or firing on the enemy as done on the 27th?

The problem is that

a) The tactical function of the cruisers was to follow and flank mark, if, as you say, we cannot compare the roles of Prinz Eugen and Norfolk and Suffolk why are we, or why would Tovey?
b) Were the cruisers conducting their tactical role of shadowing an enemy force attempting to break out and conduct commerce raiding, was the PG conducting its tactical role of breaking out into the Atlantic to conduct commerce raiding? Are these two tactical roles the same?
c)The German gunnery was so good that the battle was effectively over before anything else could be achieved, no one, and it may be a good idea to repeat this, 'no one' knows what the sequence of events would have been had Hood not been destroyed. Why was Norfolk heading for the enemy from the time Hood opened fire?

Best wishes
Cag.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Tue Jan 09, 2018 6:19 pm

Hi Mr.Cag,
sorry, this is my mistake regarding the above sentence: point 17 has nothing to do with Barnes answer to Tovey. Only point 19 has.



you wrote: "could you show me the paperwork that shows Toveys or Pounds or anyone elses revulsion at Norfolk or Suffolk not engaging when Prinz Eugen did? "

Hi Mr.Cag,
let me reverse your question: could you show me the paperwork that shows Toveys or Pounds or anyone else praised the decision of 2 heavy cruisers not to engage, being in range to do so ?
I presume that if you can not, than it's only your opinion that they could be fully happy of this kind of behavior.
It was exactly to AVOID any comparison and any question regarding the cruisers role at DS (also as the first board had already unveiled a more correct distance), that Tovey wrote point 17.



Regarding the roles, IMO in a battle there is no role more important than to cause damage to the enemy.
Was the role of Prinz Eugen to engage battleships ? There was a chance to help Bismarck and Lutjens decided to use her, despite her role was different. The same choice was not done by Wake-Walker.

At DS both SF and NF were in a position at 05:41 to engage, after the battleships had, being at around 9 sm (SF) and 13 sm (NF).
Both maneuvered intentionally to avoid to close range. SF even circled and enlarged to more than 15 sm :shock: , therefore putting herself in the impossibility to engage even had the battle lasted one hour more. :negative:
NF gave up her fairly good position/course and only after 05:50 was back on a converging course; as you wisely say, we cannot know what would have been W-W attitude had the battle lasted more than 10 minutes: his initial move at 05:41 however was very, very poor, this we can say for sure. :stubborn:
In addition in no report he said he was maneuvering in order to be ready to engage had the battle lasted more, therefore I strongly doubt this was his intention, but this is speculation from my side.

Why Ellis opened fire at 18:42 if his role was identical (shadow and flank-mark ONLY) ? He could have made smoke and maneuvered only, when Bismarck attacked. The difference with the morning action is just that Bismarck was firing at her, but this is not a very praiseworthy reason for firing your guns only when under fire..... :oops: If these guns could damage Bismarck at 18:42 (as Ellis himself stated), they could at 05:55 as well, I guess.

Norfolk and Dorsetshire opened fire despite they got no order to do so on May 27, despite Norfolk role was defined by Tovey as being "flank-marking" in point 81 of the despatches.
However, without any special instruction, they CLOSED the enemy while the battleships were engaging Bismarck; they did not open range in these critical minutes, therefore they were ready to open fire soon in the engagement, with very good results. :negative:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Cag » Tue Jan 09, 2018 8:45 pm

Hi All

Hi Alberto, here you go

19.16B 24/5 from Admiralty to Norfolk and Suffolk shadowing by Norfolk has been admirable keep it up and good luck.

Davies letter Roskill papers "the shadowing of Wake-Walkers cruisers could not have been bettered and excited the imagination of all of us. Tom Phillips criticisms of him have no substance whatever and our opinion was that Wake-Walker never put a foot wrong".

Tovey 30th May report, "it is impossible to speak too highly of the magnificent way my Flag and Commanding officers handled their forces- In every case they did exactly what was wanted without any prompting."

Toveys despatch " I had complete confidence in Rear Admiral Wake-Walkers judgement".

"although it was no more than I expected the cooperation skill and understanding displayed by all forces during this prolonged chase gave me the utmost satisfaction. Flag and Commanding officers of detached units took the action I would have wished before or without receiving instructions from me".

Tovey to McMullen reported to Roskill 1962 " Wake-Walkers shadowing tactics were exactly what I wanted".

I can find more for you but all these seem to show approval of Wake-Walker without any mention of any issue regarding non engagement. The thing is that we have evidence of a criticism of Wake-Walker regarding PoW re engaging Bismarck. This is dealt with in WW signal to the Admiralty that specifically allowed a response if his opinion was disagreed with, and it is answered in WW report and Toveys despatch. Those are the facts. Norfolks position from Hood or Bismarck or Prinz Eugen at any time during the morning battle is not relevant to this only criticism.

We also have your opinion which is that WW should have immediately engaged Bismarck, you have put forward conjecture as to what should have happened and on who in high places might have thought what. You have a valid opinion, I'm happy with conjecture but not when conjecture is then somehow meant to transform and represent fact. There is no evidence that WW was under investigation for his action during the morning battle.

Now I realise this is not your view, I'm happy to accept your opinion, I'm happy to discuss conjecture, but not when it seems to be an attempt to turn conjecture into fact, link different things that are not linked to promote conjecture and to, as Tovey put it, have a crack at someone who cannot have a crack back.

Best wishes
Cag.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Tue Jan 09, 2018 9:27 pm

Hi Mr.Cag,
thanks for the references regarding the "admirable" shadowing (I notice you have carefully avoided to post Ellis judgement of W-W wrong and timid shadowing dispositions during the night between 24 and 25 May, but I agree: subordinates judgement of their superiors have to be carefully handled.... :wink: ), however they do not answer my question, not related to shadowing and not based on Tovey version of facts and to his misleading point 17 in the despatches:

I wrote: "could you show me the paperwork that shows Toveys or Pounds or anyone else praised the decision of 2 heavy cruisers not to engage, being in range to do so ?
I presume that if you can not, than it's only your opinion that they could be fully happy of this kind of behavior.
It was exactly to AVOID any comparison (with PG) and any question regarding the cruisers role at DS (also as the first board had already unveiled a more correct distance), that Tovey wrote point 17."




you wrote: "There is no evidence that WW was under investigation for his action during the morning battle."

thanks to point 17...."it was Tovey's version which went to the printers" (Graham Rhys-Jones, "The Loss of the Bismarck") :wink:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby dunmunro » Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:04 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Cag wrote: "Hood PoW Norfolk and Suffolk firing on Bismarck, four ships firing on one ship, with no coordination between battleships or more importantly cruisers? "

Hi Mr.Cag,
Sure ! If only it had been so, on May 24 !
GIC may be a logical choice with two ships firing at one, to avoid confusion, but it's NOT mandatory, it's a choice (a choice we know was made by Holland).
KGV, Rodney, Norfolk and Dorsetshire fired at one ship on May 27 without much coordination, with good results, even if some confusion was made in spotting the fall of shots, at least between KGV and Rodney.

Actually, Hood fired at PG and PoW fired at Bismarck. Had a cruiser (e.g Suffolk) opened fire against the closer target (Bismarck), it would have been exactly the same situation as PG against Hood, probably not confusing at all PoW (as PG did not confuse at all Bismarck). Norfolk, being at almost the same distance from Bismarck and PG could have decided to redirect her fire against PG instead, had her fire been confused by Suffolk fall of shots (again a possibility, I'm not aware that Dorsetshire and Norfolk had any problem among them on May 27).

To avoid possible confusion, on May 24, Norfolk and Suffolk decided NOT to open fire at all, independently one from the other.:oops:
The point is just that the two cruisers had no intention to engage (Ellis said it clearly), feeling themselves as pure shadowers. This behavior was in no way comparable with Lutjens decision to keep PG in the line, using it as a battleship. Tovey thus needed to "embellish" the otherwise poor story from British side.


Bye, Alberto


NF and SF both feared that Lutjens would immediately turn and run from Holland's trap and from what we know it appears that the only reason this didn't happen is that Lutjens didn't identify Hood and PoW immediately.

Brinkman received no orders to remain in the line and the KM stated that he acted independently from Lutjens.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Cag » Wed Jan 10, 2018 10:27 am

Hi All

Hi Alberto, if you don't see that WW superiors were happy with all aspects of his actions, ie 'he never put a foot wrong' etc then we have another piece of evidence of the fact that we have deniers on both sides, as there is only evidence to suggest those in power were unhappy with his response to their enquiry as to what to do with PoW, nothing else.

We know why he did not use PoW to re engage
a) he was of the opinion she did not have the speed to force an action
b) he was of the opinion that her fighting efficiency and gunnery problems were not adequate enough to take on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.
c) he was of the opinion that the most important criteria (see the 11.26b 1st Sea Lord message) was to deliver Bismarck to the C in C and the Home Fleet, not to push the enemy West and away from those forces.
d) he gave those opinions and gave his superiors the opportunity to over rule them as he did not use the phrase Intend in his signal which implies actions already decided upon and consequently do not call for a reply (AFO 156/34 dated 24/01/35).

The reason I've not included your Ellis description is easy to answer, the morning of the 25th of May has as little to do with the re engagement of Bismarck by PoW after Hood sank, as has trying to link the morning battle of the 24th May with it.

There is little point in asking you to find evidence of displeasure at the cruisers non engagement as

a) they were fulfilling their tactical function of follow and flank mark. Suffolk had the rdf capability and had to remain unmolested, Ellis was attempting to contact Hood on the gunnery channel, why? Norfolk was heading directly at the enemy after Hood opened fire, why? If we look at the often quoted on this forum fighting instructions is it not an instruction that cruisers should head toward the centre of the engagement between heavy forces?
b) The battle was too short for them to have attempted to do anything else even if they intended to. No one knows the intended furure movements of Wake-Walker as BC1's tactical positioning was confirmed at 05.50 and Hood sank at 06.00. Is that correct?

Again what has the erroneous 15nm (it certainly was not 10nm as first reported in the Blake inquiry) to do with PoW not re engaging Bismarck? I will say this again to give you yet another opportunity to agree to disagree on this matter without anyone seeming to have won or lost which seems an important factor, I accept your opinion on Wake-Walker, I accept your view on his actions, but these are opinions and not facts.

Best wishes
Cag.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Wed Jan 10, 2018 11:23 am

Dunmunro wrote:"it appears that the only reason this didn't happen is that Lutjens didn't identify Hood and PoW immediately."

Hi Duncan,
:negative:

Group West – Uhrseitgruppe 05.52 - 24.5 - Bin im gefecht mit 2 schweren einheiten . Flottenchef
Translated means : Time 05.52 – May 24 - I'm engaged in combat against 2 heavy units. Fleet Commander

(ref. OKM 15543, please see also here : http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&p=58010&hilit=Lutjens+message+engaged#p58010)




you wrote: "Brinkman received no orders to remain in the line and the KM stated that he acted independently from Lutjens."

Well, he received orders for engaging PoW (see below), then Hood, then again PoW.....and he did not receive orders to leave the line.

Flotte_Orders.jpg
Flotte_Orders.jpg (5.07 KiB) Viewed 50 times

(please see PG battlemap here http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/pg_battlemap.htm, "Flotte" = "Lutjens" ).


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Wed Jan 10, 2018 11:48 am

Cag wrote: "There is little point in asking you to find evidence of displeasure at the cruisers non engagement"

Hi Mr.Cag,
of course there is not, as there is little point in asking you to find evidence of praise at cruisers not engaging when in range..... :lol:

I see you don't like this but the reality is that only Tovey's version "went to the printers" (point 17, cruisers too far behind to join battle) and was accepted by everyone until now.

Short answer to your questions:
a) 1) Ellis tried to flank-mark, you are right.
2) I think Norfolk as well was intended to flank-mark on May 27 (Tovey despatches, point 81), but she fired her guns at the same time..... why?
3) Fighting Instructions does not prevent a flag officer from showing personal initiative, almost always praised in the RN. PG fighting instructions obliged her to leave the line but Lutjens just ignored them, and won. This is the annoying confrontation that Tovey avoided with his astutely misleading point 17.
b) Battle could have lasted hours, after the turn to North at 05:41, Suffolk was too far behind to join the battle.
Had the battle lasted more, Norfolk could have joined, you are right, but we have no proof of this and the initial move from Norfolk (the turn at 05:41) was NOT at all in this direction.


I have already admitted that the distance has nothing to do with the re-engagement. It was my mistake. :stop:
However, of course, also the distance (as well as the previous night "shadowing") would have been strictly scrutinized by a Court Martial (having in their hands the Hood board(s) contradictory declarations). Don't you think so ?


Bye, Alberto
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Cag » Wed Jan 10, 2018 2:57 pm

Hi All

Hi Alberto, well no one reading this can deny that on repeated occasions I've offered the hand of peace and compromise but I'm not sure that is your purpose. I'm not sure there is any real merit in answering your points, as the fact that WW never faced any questioning regarding his role in the morning action seems not to be important, suggesting that he may have is. But,

Ellis tried to flank mark- yes I agree, why would he not if his role was to do so?
Norfolk tried to flank mark on the 24th did she not? On the 27th Norfolk sighted Bismarck at 07.49 and opened fire at 08.53.
Again this masterly avoidance by Tovey is only your opinion, not a fact, how can one masterly avoid criticism of a person for something that they have not been criticised of? You keep on telling me that I should not compare the roles of the Norfolk and Prinz Eugen, yet you yourself do it constantly, is this not hypocrisy?
We have no proof of WW coming under scrutiny for not engaging in the morning action either but it does not stop you asserting it as a fact. What was Norfolk doing heading toward the enemy from the time BC1 opened fire up to Hood exploding, wasting fuel or personal initiative?

The first boards estimate of the distance to Hood was wrong, don't you think so? The second boards estimate of the distance to Hood was wrong, was it not? Is the calculated distance to Hood closer to 15nm than it is to 10nm? Are the words used on documents and witness testimony approximately or exactly?

Again you say that you accept that Norfolks distance has nothing to do with the re engagement but then constantly try to link it with WW decision not to re engage.

To be honest Alberto I, probably like many others before me who have left these discussions, am getting tired of hypocrisy, hyperbole etc. There is no suggestion WW was under scrutiny for the morning action but it serves no purpose as you have to link the 15nm despatch statement to something to have a crack at WW.

That is what this whole thread is about, to suggest one thing and suggest it is linked to another, again, for the last time I'm afraid, I understand your viewpoint on WW, I accept your view of his actions from first sighting Bismarck to firing torpedoes at her on the 27th. His shadowing tactics, his ship movements, his zig zag manoeuvres, etc etc. Despite the fact that senior officers at the Admiralty state that they felt he never put a foot wrong you believe he did. I accept that.

But this is your opinion, I accept this, it is the opinion of others, I accept this. Other forum members do not hold this view, hopefully we can all accept each other's viewpoint, Antonio is happy to hold his view and accept others, I'm just not sure why you feel it necessary to try to turn conjecture and opinion into a fact that must be accepted by everyone?

Best wishes
Cag.

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby wadinga » Wed Jan 10, 2018 4:42 pm

Hello Alberto and Cag,

I notice you have carefully avoided to post Ellis judgement of W-W wrong and timid shadowing dispositions during the night between 24 and 25 May,


Have the rest of us seen this wording (ie original - not passed through the Conspiracy Filter)? If not can somebody post this, please? I am interested to see what Ellis' opinions based on his faulty memories of an incident many, many years previous are. "Hindsight is 20/20 vision"

Cag, I am sure you realise the whole point of starting this new thread is to try to present it as a "proven truth" that the Counties were at some point in effective gunnery range, whilst burying the mass of evidence disproving Antonio's speculative mapping.

Thanks

All the best

wadinga
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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby dunmunro » Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:13 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Dunmunro wrote:"it appears that the only reason this didn't happen is that Lutjens didn't identify Hood and PoW immediately."

Hi Duncan,
:negative:

Group West – Uhrseitgruppe 05.52 - 24.5 - Bin im gefecht mit 2 schweren einheiten . Flottenchef
Translated means : Time 05.52 – May 24 - I'm engaged in combat against 2 heavy units. Fleet Commander

(ref. OKM 15543, please see also here : http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&p=58010&hilit=Lutjens+message+engaged#p58010)




you wrote: "Brinkman received no orders to remain in the line and the KM stated that he acted independently from Lutjens."

Well, he received orders for engaging PoW (see below), then Hood, then again PoW.....and he did not receive orders to leave the line.

Flotte_Orders.jpg

(please see PG battlemap here http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/pg_battlemap.htm, "Flotte" = "Lutjens" ).


Bye, Alberto


Antonio doesn't believe that message since he states that Lutjens withheld permission for Bismarck to open fire (despite the evidence from three RN ships). The KM also seems to have had its doubts about the veracity of the PE war diary since they state that no fire division orders were given:
The cruiser did not receive a signal for fire division – indeed no battle signals were given at all – although this is unusual, it can be explained that the Chief of Fleet either considered the placing of the cruiser into the fire lee as self-evident and did not feel a fire division signal was not required or that the situation was so clear that a fire division signal was superfluous.
But I do agree also with the commander that a directive could be expected by him, particularly, since this is customarily always done when sailing in the line of battle.
http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg003.html

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Re: Wake-Walker : To engage or not to engage ?

Postby Alberto Virtuani » Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:31 pm

Cag wrote: "Hi Alberto, well no one reading this can deny that on repeated occasions I've offered the hand of peace and compromise but I'm not sure that is your purpose.....To be honest Alberto I, probably like many others before me who have left these discussions, am getting tired of hypocrisy, hyperbole etc. ....I'm just not sure why you feel it necessary to try to turn conjecture and opinion into a fact that must be accepted by everyone?."

Hi Mr.Cag,
thanks for your nice wording, if discussing and being put in front of solid arguments annoys you, it's entirely YOUR PROBLEM, not mine.

I can say exactly the same of you:
No one reading this can deny that on repeated occasions I've offered the hand of peace and compromise, even recognizing my errors and explaining patiently several times the same points to you to allow your comprehension, but I'm not sure that is your purpose. :negative:
I will not loose my time anymore to answer your questions as you don't even take time to answer mine ones.
To be honest, Mr.Cag, I am getting tired of the hypocrisy of the deniers.
I'm not sure why you feel it necessary to try to turn excuses and omissions to fact that must be accepted by everyone.


Let's say that you keep your view and I keep mine.


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Wed Jan 10, 2018 6:49 pm, edited 4 times in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)


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