The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Ellis should have done what he was given freedom to do and move Suffolk to a position directly astern of Bismarck"
Totally agree, AFTER 0141/25 was received by Ellis, he should have done this way, getting read of W-W if he could not follow him during the maneuver. This was his major error.

you wrote: "There would be no point in having ships steaming blindly along "somewhere" on the quarters incapable of seeing Bismarck until they were surprised by the arrival of the first salvoes."
Come on, make up your mind. This is exactly what "your" admiral did the night before, he steamed blindly (in much worse visibility conditions) to cover a possible escape of Bismarck toward south-east, regulating (successfully) on the (inconvenient for you now.....) D/F bearings, with which he "was able to check my position relative to Suffolk by D/F bearings which were of utmost value throughout" (Wake-Walker official report words).... :negative:

Now, if he was right the night before, he SHOULD have done the same with 2 ships to cover even 2 different directions during the night between 24 and 25 May,. Else, he was WRONG the previous night. :think:



As Ellis says in his autobiography (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244#p77033), in no way he should have:
1) kept his 3 ships together at short distance on the WRONG port side of Bismarck, since the late afternoon of May 24 (IMO a severe error in disposing his force for the shadowing),
2) kept Norfolk in close vicinity of PoW ONLY for security (I call it blatant timidity) reasons: had he been worried of Suffolk security he could have left PoW with her and covered with Norfolk another direction..... :oops:
3) lost more than 1 hour after the loss of contact before taking any action with his squadron, while sleeping (IMO a serious negligence).


You speak about what was concluded at the time (with Bismarck sinking hindsight anyway....).
What would have been the judgement for this flag officer, in light of the above, had Bismarck escaped forever and sunk any merchant ship ? :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
kept his 3 ships together at short distance
He didn't. He gave one of them carte blanche to go wherever Ellis liked for optimum radar usage. 30 years later Ellis made up excuses why he didn't.

On the night of the 23rd 24th May Norfolk wasn't guarding against anything. W-W was merely going as fast as possible in the same direction as Bismarck, according to Suffolk, so as to be in the right area the following day. With his limited visibility, far shorter than lethal gun range of Bismarck, he was not seeking to encounter the enemy which could only end in his ship's destruction to no purpose.

You have to understand that
D/F bearings which were of utmost value throughout
Are of utmost value only in terms of discovering Suffolk was not where she said she was, and were better than nothing. They do not give you range so they do not give you position. If you care to read up anything on D/F you would discover that the null effect in signal strength is much less precise at shorter ranges, as would be the case if PoW and Norfolk were attempting to position themselves relative to Suffolk who is using radar to maintain station on Bismarck. Besides by the time the radarless hunter had been made aware the radar equipped victim had veered toward her it would be too late.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "He didn't. He gave one of them carte blanche..... "
Hi Sean,
he did from around 1930/24 until 0141/25. "Carte blanche" was given ONLY after that (and not exploited by Ellis).

you wrote: "On the night of the 23rd 24th May Norfolk wasn't guarding against anything" :shock:

Totally incorrect (I have lost the count of how many intentionally wrong statements you have made recently, ONLY to divert attention and to avoid to come to any conclusion). :stop:
Here (underlined in red) Tovey and Wake-Walker official reports (that you should know by heart....):
Tovey_WW_shadowing.jpg
Tovey_WW_shadowing.jpg (50.56 KiB) Viewed 4673 times
W-W shadowing.jpg
W-W shadowing.jpg (45.71 KiB) Viewed 4673 times
I know a single bearing does not give a position, stop repeating the same obvious words each time... Please see above (W-W report, underlined in green) how several D/F bearings helped Wake-Walker in positioning himself relative to Suffolk.
If you disagree with him, it's your problem, but it is a FACT that he could have done the same in the night from 24 to 25 May with two ships, covering two different directions, in better visibility conditions.


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Since he didn't know how far away Suffolk was, he couldn't know how far away Bismarck was. "Endeavouring" is not doing. So he couldn't effectively stop a turn south in visibility dropping down to a mile in snow showers. Against a radar equipped opponent. Bismarck could just walk round him in the dark. Tovey is just being kind. I thought the whole point of your supposition was that Tovey changed facts to make W-W look good/brave/not timid. :lol:

If do you realise a bearing is not a position, please explain it to Antonio. :D

All W-W could derive (utmost value) is that Suffolk was to the NW of him and proceeding in roughly the same direction. Not as useful as actually knowing where she is and not as useful as knowing where Bismarck is, but it's better than nothing.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
I'm always surprised how you can still try to defend what you have invented instead of admitting you were simply wrong, this time being proven by the two above evidences (Tovey and W-W official reports).... :stubborn:
you wrote: ""....Endeavouring" is not doing.....Bismarck could just walk round him in the dark...."
of course she could, and she could escape even had W-W deployed his three ships around her on 24 night.... or.... she could have been detected visually up to 6 sea miles away.....it's pure speculation.
However endeavouring something is far better than doing nothing !

W-W acted tactically in a correct way on 23 night, execution was not good, because Norfolk sailed too far from Suffolk: for this error both Suffolk wrong transmitted position and W-W timidity (he never checked visually his position while there was still plenty of light) were responsible.

He did very badly in the night of 24, as Ellis clearly wrote (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244), keeping his ships on the wrong side of the enemy (IMO a bad tactical error), keeping all ships together close to PoW vituperated guns for security (for me this is timidity) and loosing precious time before reacting to Bismarck escape (IMO a severe negligence).... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,

Looking at the Rohwer and Schoffield diagram showing the "turnback around" executed by Bismarck and the loss of contact by Suffolk, Ellis' thirty year hindsight makes even less sense. The diagram is reproduced in the Baron's Book as well as Schoffield's. Since several witnesses were consulted it is presumably reasonably accurate.

Having been given carte blanche to position himself for radar advantage, since the bearing to Bismarck c.195T was nearly right ahead on his west of base course zig-zag leg, c.195T, he could simply have extended this and neatly converged with Bismarck's track astern of her. There was no need to lead the formation "drastically round to starboard". He was reporting ranges similar to the previous night, 22,000 yds and this extension of one leg of his zig-zags could have brought him progressively further astern of Bismarck at a similar range.

His patently contrived excuse about "confusion" for the ships conforming to his movements make no sense therefore. The diagram says Bismarck was travelling at only 16kts at this time.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
I'm currently travelling and cannot check the diagram, but I would agree with you that Ellis should have positioned himself differently and possibly reacted differently tothe loss of contact.

However the "carte blanche" came too late, at 0141/25, when darkness was coming.
Wake-Walker kept Ellis with him from 1930/24 to 0141/25, without any reason for 6 hours, and when this "carte blanche" came, Ellis judged it was too late and too dark to change position with the formation.

Ellis did a mistake in this, but the main responsible for the wrong disposition of the ships (on the wrong side of Bismarck) up to 0141/25 was clearly Wake-Walker, worried only about the "security" (as Ellis cruelly accuses) and even loosing precious time when the contact was lost, showing a severe negligence.


Bye, Alberto
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"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

From Ellis' Report of Proceedings
02:10B Adjusted plot by the amount of the difference between Norfolk's reported 01:22B position and her visible position relative to Suffolk. transfer 232 degrees 9.5 miles
So it was by no means "too late" as Norfolk was still easily visible at 02:10.

As the 1941 Ellis owns up, it was his fault for operating so close to the range limit of the Type 284 that his zig-zags took him out of effective range. Even on his turn away legs the target was well within the DCT traverse range. As Dave Saxton has suggested, "resting" the Type 284 was considered necessary, but in this case the result was as bad as it failing in service.

Suffolk had been ambushed twice previously, and since the British realised Bismarck has radar at least as good as theirs, two protectors close to Suffolk would convince Lutjens not to try the same trick a third time, which he didn't. Shadowing from astern of Bismarck had its dangers. If the enemy turned unseen the range would come down at the combined speeds of the vessels. Bismarck could not get the same closing rate on a target on her quarter. Ellis could have had Bismarck at 15,000 yds on his closing leg and still held Bismarck at the other side of his zig-zag.

Even late-life Ellis discounted his ability to shadow visually, why should it be any different for W-W's other two ships?

Maybe W-W put his deputy on a charge for not waking him as soon as Suffolk reported lost contact. However with only six miles visibility when the enemy started from over 12 miles away, running around in the dark made no sense. Everybody assumed Bismarck had put on a speed surge from 16/20 kts up to full speed- they were wrong.



All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
back from my travel, I could finally look at the diagram that Sean (Wadinga) kindly mentioned above (from my Italian version of the Baron book). Here it is:
Schoffields_diagram.jpg
Schoffields_diagram.jpg (93.14 KiB) Viewed 4547 times
Clearly, from the above diagram, the tactic employed by Lutjens for evading the shadowers was "inspired" (I would even say "dictated") by the fact that all the British ships had been (wrongly) positioned on his port quarter for a long time.
This situation/tactic was created and maintained by Wake-Walker from 1930/24 till 0141/25 (....for 6 hours....), before he finally gave Ellis the freedom to position himself as he considered to be the best.

Ellis undoubtedly did a severe mistake not changing immediately this tactic by moving astern of Bismarck, as soon as he received his "carte blanche" (even if doing so, he would implicitly have criticized Wake_Walker employed tactic in a quite blatant way....). He considered that, in the increasing darkness, such a maneuver would have presented risks of loosing contact with the enemy and of creating confusion among the British ships, while for 6 hours he had proven this "configuration" and considered that the British "were reasonably well settled down" (please see his words here viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244#p77034).

Even if visibility would have been still good enough to maneuver, and thus Ellis did a mistake, the main responsibility for the wrong positioning of the formation stay with the admiral, who, not only did the severe tactical error to keep his ships on the same WRONG east side of the Bismarck (being the far most dangerous move of a fuel-shortage-free Bismarck a turn to westward), but also kept them together when he could "surround" Bismarck quarters in order to make much more difficult such an evading maneuver, working round to westward, making an arc and passing astern of the shadowers.


Of course shadowing from astern had its own dangers, but it was executed successfully the night before, with the radar but ALSO visually, at least until Suffolk could see Bismarck..... This time visibility was better (6 sm) and three ships deployed around Bismarck quarters could cover a considerable extension of waters (12 sm diameter circle), taking their due risks, instead of just "protecting" Suffolk, that needed no special protection, as demonstrated already during the previous night.
Wake-Walker evident timidity here is the only explanation for having kept also Norfolk close to PoW, instead of deploying her to cover another direction (as he did intentionally the previous night).
No more word is needed about his severe negligence in putting "his deputy on a charge for not waking him as soon as Suffolk reported lost contact" (Wadinga words). :negative:



I do think that the (unlikely) loss of a heavy cruiser (at the cost of additional damages inflicted to Bismarck by the other ships that could anyway come close soon and intervene in support and anyway Suffolk would have had the opportunity to regain contat, had Bismarck attacked Norfolk or PoW) was a price that the Royal Navy had to be ready to pay for not leaving Bismarck free in Atlantic..... :think:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Bismarck attacked isolated Suffolk during the circling manoeuvre to starboard that released Prinz Eugen at about 18:30B/24 when Bismarck disappeared in a rain shower. Norfolk and PoW were away to port and could not help until 18:47B. The Baron said the range to Suffolk was only 18,000m. This was the radar protected shadower in daylight and they still managed to get as close as that. It was undoubtedly this incident that convinced W-W concentrating his force was a better idea. His radar asset could have been disabled by just one hit or even by the shock of her own guns which blew out the Bridge windows at this time. This was in daylight.

Your opinions about negligence are noted but hindsight is 20/20 and are your opinions. Rhys-Jones for instance seems to approve of W-W's disposition given the factors above.
Even late-life Ellis discounted his ability to shadow visually, why should it be any different for W-W's other two ships?
All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "It was undoubtedly this incident that convinced W-W concentrating his force was a better idea"
Hi Sean,
if you prefer to think that this was the reason why W-W decided not to take any risk anymore even with his spendable own cruiser, keeping both SF and NF together with the PoW big guns, I have to respect your opinion. Ellis has another opinion and I share his one.
At 18:30, from 9 sm, no actual damage was done to Suffolk by Bismarck salvos anyway as well as no real damage was done to Norfolk the night before from 7 sm.....

For sure a circle of 12 sm diameter visibility around three ships decently positioned (or even quickly deployed after the loss of contact from the original wrong position) would have made extremely difficult for Bismarck to escape (or would have given a limited chance to regain the contact), at the cost of taking (unlikely) risks for Norfolk (and even many less for Suffolk and PoW).


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Since I know you love to chop things up into individual strands I have moved this here.
this is not in doubt but I have never said that SF or NF should have engaged Bismarck on their own.....a totally different thing is to maneuver a cruiser to scout for PoW and the HF, getting close to Bismarck, ready to run away at the very first flash....
You can't see anything, you can't see anything.........Boom, you're dead.
getting close to Bismarck
How do you get close to something you can't see? Using hindsight from many years later? Or by guesswork as to where another ship is that you also can't see, but can see the Bismarck on radar except that sometimes even she gets surprised because radar is in its infancy. This is the first extended shadowing by radar................ever.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "You can't see anything, you can't see anything.........Boom, you're dead"
Hi Sean,
I have always liked your style of writing, but despite the dramatic effect, you are totally wrong.

You see up to 6 sea miles away that night... over 6 sm, you see the flash, you order an evading maneuver and, when the shots fall (20 seconds later), you must be so unlucky to be directly hit at the very first salvo, fired with cold guns and based on pure radar range (good), bearing (I don't know how good...) and estimated course/speed (quite bad with the radars of 1941, as radar is in its infancy for Germans too). :negative:
It had never happened, in all the previous hours, that Bismarck could hit at the very first salvos, and she never tried to fire her salvos by radar only, they were always visually directed and radar aided (Norfolk was not hit by three salvos of Bismarck fired from 6 sm on opposite course because of her evading maneuvers at 2030/23, when W-W was not yet so intimidated by Bismarck guns and he was correctly trying to do something to support Suffolk shadowing.... :oops: ).
By the time Bismarck can fire a second salvo, your ship has actually changed course (and future position in a quite unpredictable way for Bismarck), it starts to be covered by smoke and we all know that Bismarck was unable to hit PoW when she evaded under smoke, despite having already acquired the range at 7 sm by daylight......


If you position yourself correctly, checking Suffolk transmitted information and D/F bearings (as Norfolk DID already for the whole night before, see W-W report.....), you can cover at least one or two other escape directions with 12 sm diameter circles of visibility. If you keep within 6 sm from Suffolk at times, you can see her and directly check your position based on her information.
The night before Norfolk could not see Suffolk at all and still tried to cover a southeast escape direction (see W-W report).


Of course not wanting to take any (even limited) risk anymore on May 24 evening, W-W tactic was simply perfect, but, as a result of his own and Ellis errors, Bismarck did evade. :kaput:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

You are kidding, right? :D
you see the flash, you order an evading maneuver and, when the shots fall (20 seconds later), you must be so unlucky to be directly hit at the very first salvo, fired with cold guns and based on pure radar range (good), bearing
I have to cast my mind back to the early days to remember the hysterically-accelerated activity supposed to have occurred aboard PoW with a 35,000 ton battleshipzig-zagging about right and then left in the 50 seconds between Hood blowing up and the supposed CP hit.

The Bismarck tracks her unwitting victim with radar, we believe at least the aft unit is operational, closing in with accurate range and approximate bearing as a fire control solution. The instant the target swims into sight an accurate visual bearing is acquired and Bang! Then in 20 seconds this has to be recognised and a 10,000 ton cruiser has to evade the incoming shells.
By the time Bismarck can fire a second salvo, your ship has actually changed course
You have looked at the Schmalenbach film? How many seconds between salvoes?
checking Suffolk transmitted information
Did you notice how big the transfer was, Suffolk's gyro is still giving poor DR. Also
If you position yourself correctly, checking Suffolk transmitted information and D/F bearings
you can't position yourself with a single D/F bearing, you have no measurement of distance. You don't know if you are 6 miles or 60 miles from the invisible Bismarck. Until she hits you.

Since you are an expert on geometry, (which is apparently beyond me :cool: ) you can explain the value in flanking ships remaining 12,000 yds from Suffolk, assuming she trails Bismarck at about 20,000 yds?

Bismarck did evade, but Lutjens never knew it as he told SKL he was still being shadowed and sent his long winded signal.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The loss of contact (May 24 / 25)

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
I'm not kidding, it's you who tries to build a dramatic scenario saying:
"You can't see anything, you can't see anything.........Boom, you're dead"
apparently you are mixing up a surprise torpedo strike from a silent submarine with a gun action.....


you wrote: "The Bismarck tracks her unwitting victim with radar"
possibly, but in the whole operation until the morning on May 25 she NEVER opened fire directed ONLY by radar. She was in visual sight when she ambushed Norfolk at 2030/23 from 6 sm on opposite course. She may have tracked Norfolk before with the radar (I don't have any evidence, do you ?) but for sure she opened fire after Norfolk was in sight (see W-W report).
Still only splinters came on board because it is extremely difficult to hit a ship under smoke taking avoiding maneuvers.
PoW (a bigger ship) was not hit anymore (in daylight from 7 sm) after she took avoiding maneuvers under smoke both by Bismarck in 1+ minutes (3 salvos) and by PG in 2+ minutes (9 to 10 salvos), while the German ships were still on stable course and had already consistently straddled and hit PoW.
IMHO not many chances for Bismarck to hit Norfolk or PoW coming out from darkness from 6 sm at night, having to adjust her fire.


"How many seconds between salvoes? "
Sure, when getting the range estimation with 400 meters scaled salvos, Bismarck fires quickly, as per Baron account. However, when you have to spot the fall of shots and adjust the fire, then at least 20 seconds (flight time) is needed + 10 seconds for spotting/corrections. Norfolk at 2030/23 got 3 salvos and she could 1) react to surprise (as per your observation.... :wink: ), 2) reverse course and 3) get back in the mist, for sure it was not in 10 seconds......possibly 2 minutes.... :negative:


"you can't position yourself with a single D/F bearing"
Wrong. Wake Walker could already and should have done the same on May 24 night. Norfolk did exactly this on May 23, positioning herself based on Suffolk transmitted position and SEVERAL D/F bearings, you may find this inconvenient for your agenda but please read W-W and Tovey official reports to find a confirmation of what I'm saying.
W-W shadowing.jpg
W-W shadowing.jpg (45.71 KiB) Viewed 4490 times
Tovey_WW_shadowing.jpg
Tovey_WW_shadowing.jpg (50.56 KiB) Viewed 4490 times
Sean, you have to make up your mind here: either W-W and Tovey intentionally falsified their above reports embellishing the May 23 night shadowing of Norfolk, or during the May 24 night W-W acted differently because of his "security concern" (timidity), keeping all his ships together on the wrong side of Bismarck.
Your choice, for me he acted correctly on May 23 (trying to cover another direction) and very poorly on May 24 (in better visibility and having 3 ships). :kaput:


you wrote: "Bismarck did evade , but Lutjens never knew it as he told SKL he was still being shadowed and sent his long winded signal."
so what ? Lutjens did a mistake. W-W had already failed his mission !


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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