The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nillson,

many thanks for your responses.

Here what I think and can add to this exchange of evaluations, ... some food for thougths ...:

1) The Bay of Biscay is a known geographical area, ... it is a Bay from Cape Finisterre to Cape Ortegal, ... and not the whole North Atlantic Ocean area like some can incorrectly define a much larger ocean area in the proximity of that bay.
We have maps starting even on 1930's from all over the world defining that bay limits, and I assume that an Officer providing meteorological information should try to relate them precisely enough to be understood and mostly used by the Officer he is providing those information to.
Describing a general weather condition for an area of several hundreds of sea miles without a reference point is useless.
In fact at 7 pm, on the Duty Met. Officer message sent before, he was referring an area of 200 sea miles only and not the whole North Atlantic Ocean, ... and he did not call it the Bay of Biscay.
More, to send information about the sea state, is surely not an indication sent in order to provide information used to evaluate the enemy Luftwaffe flying possibilities for sure.
I have never heard airplanes using the sea state to evaluate a flight possibility, ... unless they are seaplanes.

The questions I am still " puzzled " about are : If that message was just and only a weather update, why was not sent by the Duty Meteorologic Officer like happened before and after but by RearAdm Power ? Why mentioned the Bay of Biscay when it was not mentioned neither before or after by the Duty Met. Officer ?


2) I think personally that Pound at 00:50 asking if he was still chasing, ... the Bay of Biscay weather forecast, ... and the Tigris offering, ... has been messages that Adm Tovey did not like much, ... :think:

3) Same goes for Sommerville asking him ( Tovey ) why he was leaving the battle area without having declared Bismarck being sunk, ... I do not think he liked that message too, ... and had to respond to him the reasons why he was doing it, ... having sent at 18:21 the day before his fuel shortage conditions.

4) Above I wrote those 2 possibilities :

A ) The message both Adm Tovey recall on his letters and Churchill mentioned on his 3rd book has been really sent/received and was later "expunged " from the records by Adm Pound as he personally guaranteed to Adm Tovey.

B ) It can be that both Churchill at first and Tovey consequently later, ... mixed up the things, ... with Churchill sure that what he said to Pound had been timely and promptly executed on the 26th, ... Pound having done it only "progressively" thru the late 26th and the 27th morning, ... and Tovey having realized only after the war and thru Churchill book number 3 the truth about what happened and ordered by whom, ... and having re-constructed backwards based on the Churchill book information that were new to him, ... who generated the inputs and when that was really done in the War Room ... and having consequently associated to that set of timings all the type of unusual messages he received and never responded as far as I can see.

I like to have your opinion about them, and if you have maybe other solutions for this dilemma. Thanks in advance.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Cag »

Hi All

Hi Antonio, would a weather reference for use of future ops or orders for future ops from Tovey as suggested be an answer.

To expunge a signal requires quite a lot of effort, all ships and stations home and abroad would need to be advised to destroy that particular part of a message. In doing so we would require a message to ships/stations overseas to do so. Do we have that?

Do we have the evidence from Pitcairn-jones that I posted that he was sure the message referenced by Lord Tovey was the 11.37B? Do we have evidence that Roskill attempted to find any reference to a shores of France message without luck only finding the 11.37B?

If we have these two pieces of evidence as well as those you mentioned would not the 2nd option be more likely? Once you sift through all the evidence is it not the simplest and most obvious answer that is left the correct one?

Best wishes
Cag.
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

that is surely another possibility for that message mentioning the Bay of Biscay, ... an help provided/anticipated to Adm Tovey in case of the need to extend the operations on that area direction, ... so to South-East, ... either for him with KGV or others he was managing in that moment.
That is the way I read it, ... with an obvious War Room expectation that if that was going to be the case, ... he surely would have had the need to follow the operations in that direction personally.

I imagine that to " expunge " a message sent from all the records is not an easy job.
In fact I was a lot surprised to read into Adm Tovey letter that Adm Pound was in progress of doing it.
Just only the fact itself of having being proposed by Adm Pound is very unusual and important anyway.

I know well Kennedy, Pitcairn-Jones and Roskill written opinions about that message.
None of them as far as I have understood had the luck to read the Bay of Biscay " weather " message text I have found.
Only having the correct warship full radio log sometimes you can read certain messages.
We do not have the main involved warships full/complete radio logs.
Just some summaries or extract.

I understand that the option B seems to be the more logic having only the 11:37 message.
I am OK with both options, ... either A or B.
In fact also in case of option B, the Adm Tovey re-construction after Churchill book publication, does authorize his version of the facts to be correct, ... being that just the result of the other inputs he got from Churchill book text (day, time, situation, responsible, request to Pound, etc etc ) merging that with the information he got from Pound and he had in his mind being received while at sea.

Just my opinion ...

Bye, Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:

I imagine that to " expunge " a message sent from all the records is not an easy job.
In fact I was a lot surprised to read into Adm Tovey letter that Adm Pound was in progress of doing it.
Just only the fact itself of having being proposed by Adm Pound is very unusual and important anyway.

I know well Kennedy, Pitcairn-Jones and Roskill written opinions about that message.
None of them as far as I have understood had the luck to read the Bay of Biscay " weather " message text I have found.
Only having the correct warship full radio log sometimes you can read certain messages.
We do not have the main involved warships full/complete radio logs.
Just some summaries or extract.
There is, unfortunately, a tendency in people, whose memories are failing, to suspect that the objects of their memory have been tampered with. In Tovey's case this was probably spurred on by Churchill's ambiguous passage presented earlier. We know that Tovey was incorrect about the R.O.O.F. message on the "shores of France" and having failed to find the offending message in the official records, Tovey then probably invented the "expunged" theory to account for that. Again, given that every radio officer, captain and flag officer at sea would have known about an expunging, it seems amazing that no one except Tovey has ever mentioned it...

I am pretty sure that Roskill read the weather message and treated it for what it was...a weather message. Ditto for P-J.
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

did you find that weather message text into the document you proposed ?

I did not.

Did you find it somewhere else into any Royal Navy Official log ?

I did not.

Where according to you Stephen Roskill may have found that message text ?

Tovey received a message containing a clear reference about the Bay of Biscay that night.
He received that " weather message " not from the Duty Met. Officer, about an area several hundreds sea miles distant to south-east from where he was.
He received that message after having received another message asking him if he was still chasing the enemy sailing toward south-east ( Pound 00:50/27th ), all this happened after having previously communicated ( Tovey 18:21/26th ) that he was going to quit the chase of the enemy at 24:00/26th because of a fuel shortage reason on KGV.
Those are all facts that you cannot avoid to consider.

Surely Churchill book text had an impact on Tovey correct re-construction of what he lived personally, and surprised him a lot too given the fact he was thinking the originator of it being Pound at first, ... this either the " shores of France " message he mentioned was received and later expunged or not ( ref. my option A or B ).

According to Roskill Adm Tovey memory and brain was perfectly working during those years, and that countered and eliminated Sir Kennedy offensive ( and with no reason to be ) speculation about Paffard provided possible explanation of his question to him.

You, ... just like Sir Kennedy, ... are sure about certain things and have your way to read them, ... others, ... just like me can have a very different interpretation and way to read those events.

Surely Roskill had a clear opinion about Adm Tovey memory and brain status, and met him on that period for years, ... while Kennedy did not. Roskill made it clear to Kennedy too in writings.
This is another fact.

This is valid for the radio messages as well as for every other subject where certain ways to read the events have been already clearly demonstrated being incorrect, ... and Sir Kennedy in this case failed several times and has been clearly demonstrated being very evidently incorrect on his statements and interpretations.

So, why I have to take his fact interpretation and version for granted about all this ?

I try to find and realize more, ... as usual, ... even if somebody does not like it, ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

did you find that weather message text into the document you proposed ?

I did not.

Did you find it somewhere else into any Royal Navy Official log ?

I did not.

Where according to you Stephen Roskill may have found that message text ?

Tovey received a message containing a clear reference about the Bay of Biscay that night.
He received that " weather message " not from the Duty Met. Officer, about an area several hundreds sea miles distant to south-east from where he was.
He received that message after having received another message asking him if he was still chasing the enemy sailing toward south-east ( Pound 00:50/27th ), all this happened after having previously communicated ( Tovey 18:21/26th ) that he was going to quit the chase of the enemy at 24:00/26th because of a fuel shortage reason on KGV.
Those are all facts that you cannot avoid to consider.

Surely Churchill book text had an impact on Tovey correct re-construction of what he lived personally, and surprised him a lot too given the fact he was thinking the originator of it being Pound at first, ... this either the " shores of France " message he mentioned was received and later expunged or not ( ref. my option A or B ).

According to Roskill Adm Tovey memory and brain was perfectly working during those years, and that countered and eliminated Sir Kennedy offensive ( and with no reason to be ) speculation about Paffard provided possible explanation of his question to him.

You, ... just like Sir Kennedy, ... are sure about certain things and have your way to read them, ... others, ... just like me can have a very different interpretation and way to read those events.

Surely Roskill had a clear opinion about Adm Tovey memory and brain status, and met him on that period for years, ... while Kennedy did not. Roskill made it clear to Kennedy too in writings.
This is another fact.

This is valid for the radio messages as well as for every other subject where certain ways to read the events have been already clearly demonstrated being incorrect, ... and Sir Kennedy in this case failed several times and has been clearly demonstrated being very evidently incorrect on his statements and interpretations.

So, why I have to take his fact interpretation and version for granted about all this ?

I try to find and realize more, ... as usual, ... even if somebody does not like it, ...

Bye Antonio :D
One thing that we can be sure of is that Tovey read the 0231B/27 weather report since it was addressed to him. Yet he makes no reference to it in his despatch or in his letters. Similarly neither Roskill nor P-J make mention of it, but like Tovey, this is not proof that they didn't read it.

Stringing together mention of unrelated messages doesn't make them related; the 0231B/27 message was a weather report - nothing more.

Tovey originated the CMDS claim yet NO other source supports his claim.

Tovey originated the "expunged" message claim yet NO other source supports his claim.
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,


you wrote :
One thing that we can be sure of is that Tovey read the 0231B/27 weather report since it was addressed to him. Yet he makes no reference to it in his despatch or in his letters. Similarly neither Roskill nor P-J make mention of it, but like Tovey, this is not proof that they didn't read it.
I am glad you recognize that Adm Tovey surely read the Bay of Biscay message addressed only to him as a fact.

He made no reference about this matter and later commented about it personally ( knowing it was Churchill the source he would have commented on his dispatches, ... as he wrote ) , ... like many other subjects and others matters that he mentioned in an intentional incorrect way and this is very evident also as another fact.

We have in some cases no proof in one way or another, that is why everybody in entitled to have different opinions.
In case of new evidences arising, than one in order to counter them should produce new evidences on the opposite direction to sustain his theory or way to still read be facts as they where before the new evidence as been released.
It is simple, fair and logic too.

Stringing together mention of unrelated messages doesn't make them related; the 0231B/27 message was a weather report - nothing more.
This can be right or can be wrong, it depends of the situation and subject.
I have my way to see and correlate the arguments, ... you have your own.
As far as I can see they are totally different.
Tovey originated the CMDS claim yet NO other source supports his claim.
Tovey alone is more than enough. You tried to define him unreliable based on Kennedy unfair written doubts, despite Roskill clear confirmation of the opposite. I invite you to re-think about it.
In case another source will arise, you as well as some others here in this forum will be on your knees.
Remember what has been surfacing lately about this Denmark Strait research and stay tuned.
Tovey originated the "expunged" message claim yet NO other source supports his claim.
Like above Tovey is enough being absolutely a reliable person when he stated that to Roskill, and nobody anymore can even try to declare Adm Tovey unreliable when he stated those things thanking Stephen Roskill.
Think about a Royal Navy Admiral declaring a statement like that about the intention of a Royal Navy 1st Sea Lord and make your own evaluations of what they could do and accept to be done each others on that period.
This does not surprise me at all given the other evidence of similar occurrences we have at hand.

Bye, Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nillson,

many thanks for your responses.

Here what I think and can add to this exchange of evaluations, ... some food for thougths ...:

1) The Bay of Biscay is a known geographical area, ... it is a Bay from Cape Finisterre to Cape Ortegal, ... and not the whole North Atlantic Ocean area like some can incorrectly define a much larger ocean area in the proximity of that bay.
We have maps starting even on 1930's from all over the world defining that bay limits, and I assume that an Officer providing meteorological information should try to relate them precisely enough to be understood and mostly used by the Officer he is providing those information to.
Describing a general weather condition for an area of several hundreds of sea miles without a reference point is useless.
In fact at 7 pm, on the Duty Met. Officer message sent before, he was referring an area of 200 sea miles only and not the whole North Atlantic Ocean, ... and he did not call it the Bay of Biscay.
More, to send information about the sea state, is surely not an indication sent in order to provide information used to evaluate the enemy Luftwaffe flying possibilities for sure.
I have never heard airplanes using the sea state to evaluate a flight possibility, ... unless they are seaplanes.

The questions I am still " puzzled " about are : If that message was just and only a weather update, why was not sent by the Duty Meteorologic Officer like happened before and after but by RearAdm Power ? Why mentioned the Bay of Biscay when it was not mentioned neither before or after by the Duty Met. Officer ?


2) I think personally that Pound at 00:50 asking if he was still chasing, ... the Bay of Biscay weather forecast, ... and the Tigris offering, ... has been messages that Adm Tovey did not like much, ... :think:

3) Same goes for Sommerville asking him ( Tovey ) why he was leaving the battle area without having declared Bismarck being sunk, ... I do not think he liked that message too, ... and had to respond to him the reasons why he was doing it, ... having sent at 18:21 the day before his fuel shortage conditions.

4) Above I wrote those 2 possibilities :

A ) The message both Adm Tovey recall on his letters and Churchill mentioned on his 3rd book has been really sent/received and was later "expunged " from the records by Adm Pound as he personally guaranteed to Adm Tovey.

B ) It can be that both Churchill at first and Tovey consequently later, ... mixed up the things, ... with Churchill sure that what he said to Pound had been timely and promptly executed on the 26th, ... Pound having done it only "progressively" thru the late 26th and the 27th morning, ... and Tovey having realized only after the war and thru Churchill book number 3 the truth about what happened and ordered by whom, ... and having re-constructed backwards based on the Churchill book information that were new to him, ... who generated the inputs and when that was really done in the War Room ... and having consequently associated to that set of timings all the type of unusual messages he received and never responded as far as I can see.

I like to have your opinion about them, and if you have maybe other solutions for this dilemma. Thanks in advance.

Bye Antonio :D
Hello Antonio,

1) Yes you're right and I agree about the Bay of Biscay, but obviously members of the Royal Navy used it in different ways. Our interpretation is irrelevant. We simply don't know what Power meant.

Well, the Duty Met. Officer obviously had the duty to send weather forecasts every 12 hours. Possibly Powers just wanted to help and ordered an additional forecast, which was sent in his name. Who knows?

2) Tovey already had answered at 0009.
Hand on heart - is it usual to send hidden messages in the form weather forecasts in the Italian Navy?

3) Like... dislike... unfortunately Facebook and its Messenger were invented much later.

4) IMHO we can rule out that there was any ROOF signal at may 26th. Fact is there is just one signal we know of.
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

1) I see your point and I agree. No one will probably ever know to what message Adm Tovey correlated that " shores of France " written declaration to Roskill.
Surely the Bay of Biscay in the today available messages is the closest reference we have to the " shores of France " ... and at least geographically we surely both agree on this point, ... :wink:

2) Usually not in any navy, ... but if I look at the way Adm Pound communicated to Wake-Waker his " strong "desire he had for him to re-engage the Bismarck with PoW, ... instead of directly ordering him to do it like any superior in any navy should have done, ... than I start thinking about any way to " pass along or suggest directions " was valid ... :think:

3) I " LIKE " your response, ... but according to Roskill Adm Tovey was not happy at all about those messages, ... even many years after the war ended.

4) I see your opinion, ... and in reality we do have just only one message at hand now regarding the " towing home ".
I am OK with it, ... as I wrote above, ... but this automatically means that both Churchill at first on his book number 3 ... and consequently Tovey after directly following/reporting Churchill incorrect inputs while writing about it to Roskill ... did not associate correctly the event with the date.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,
1) I see your point and I agree. No one will probably ever know to what message Adm Tovey correlated that " shores of France " written declaration to Roskill.
Surely the Bay of Biscay in the today available messages is the closest reference we have to the " shores of France " ... and at least geographically we surely both agree on this point,
Reading Norman Franks' book Conflict Over the Bay, concerned with the Coastal Command battle against U-boats, on P 60 he points out that their targets stuck together for AA defence out to 15 degrees west. Equally the Bay of Biscay RAF attack area "derange" went as far west as this. This was the area considered as the Bay of Biscay by both sides in WW II,

However the attempt to correlate the "Shores of France" remembered by Tovey and repeatedly quoted in his letters can have nothing to do with a weather forecast.
2) but if I look at the way Adm Pound communicated to Wake-Waker his " strong "desire he had for him to re-engage the Bismarck with PoW
There is no indication Pound had a strong desire for Wake-Walker to re-engage. No-one in the account of War Room activities provided by Alberto (Davies account) says that there was one expressed. The only shared opinion amongst those present was that Wake-Waker's actions were correct and this approval was signalled by Pound himself in the "admirable" message. If Pound did have the opinion you ascribe to him it would have been expressed by a clear, direct order. It wasn't.
and in reality we do have just only one message at hand now regarding the " towing home
Yes indeed we do, 1137B on the 27th. So this statement is correct.
but this automatically means that both Churchill at first on his book number 3 ... and consequently Tovey after directly following/reporting Churchill incorrect inputs while writing about it to Roskill ... did not associate correctly the event with the date.
My underlining.
Tovey alone is more than enough. You tried to define him unreliable based on Kennedy unfair written doubts, despite Roskill clear confirmation of the opposite.
However you have stated "did not associate correctly the event" which means you accept he is unreliable. Furthermore he has invented the phrase "Shores of France" which nowhere appear in any signal and says that this was a direct order from Pound, another figment of his imagination.

I am indebted to Alberto for providing these direct quotes from Tovey's letters:
in one letter (1962), Tovey wrote to Roskill that the text was:
"if necessary she is to be pursued right up to the shores of France, even if the K:G.V. has to be towed home"

in another letter to Bellairs (1950) Tovey said it was: "you are to continue the pursuit right up to the shores of France even if you have to be towed home"

in another letter to Roskill (1954) Tovey says that the message was "ordering me to continue the chase up to the shores of France, even if the K.G.V. had to be towed back"

Finally in the "Court Martial" letter from December 1961, Tovey wrote that the message was: "you are to continue the pursuit right up the coast of France, even if it means your ship being towed back"
Tovey remembers direct orders in 3 out of 4 letters "you are to continue" , "ordering me to continue" and "you are to continue"

One person's recollection is never "enough" without confirmation by independent witnesses and preferably from contemporary documentation. Roskill does not provide either about Tovey's recollections of the "Shores of France" or CMDS..... he merely repeats the latter and ignores the former.

Unfortunately for the evaluation here, Alberto refuses to supply the full wording of Paragraph one of Tovey's December 1961 letter from which he has supplied an excerpt "you are to continue the pursuit right up the coast of France, even if it means your ship being towed back". If we had the full wording it would help. Maybe you can persuade him.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

from Robin Brodhurst book biography of Adm Pound.

The Admiralty war room description:
Brodhurst_war_room_01.jpg
Brodhurst_war_room_01.jpg (98.37 KiB) Viewed 1036 times
Brodhurst_war_room_02.jpg
Brodhurst_war_room_02.jpg (82.97 KiB) Viewed 1036 times
The message at 11:37 :
Brodhurst_messages_USN_Austin.jpg
Brodhurst_messages_USN_Austin.jpg (81.13 KiB) Viewed 1036 times
Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

from Corelli-Barnett book " Engage the enemy more closely ".

Churchill presence description :
Corelli_Barnett_War_Room_description_Roskill_Davis.jpg
Corelli_Barnett_War_Room_description_Roskill_Davis.jpg (62.39 KiB) Viewed 1035 times
Thre message at 11:37 :
Corelli_Barnett_message_01.jpg
Corelli_Barnett_message_01.jpg (85.77 KiB) Viewed 1035 times
Corelli_Barnett_message_02.jpg
Corelli_Barnett_message_02.jpg (41.36 KiB) Viewed 1035 times
Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Antonio,

Very nice secondary sources but we have original documentation to work with instead.

Have you noticed that the American witness quoted in Brodhurst, no doubt relying on memory, gets the date of Hood's sinking wrong?
Tovey remembers direct orders in 3 out of 4 letters "you are to continue" , "ordering me to continue" and "you are to continue"

One person's recollection is never "enough" without confirmation by independent witnesses and preferably from contemporary documentation. Roskill does not provide either about Tovey's recollections of the "Shores of France" or CMDS..... he merely repeats the latter and ignores the former.

Unfortunately for the evaluation here, Alberto refuses to supply the full wording of Paragraph one of Tovey's December 1961 letter from which he has supplied an excerpt "you are to continue the pursuit right up the coast of France, even if it means your ship being towed back". If we had the full wording it would help. Maybe you can persuade him.
These direct orders and the Shores of France message didn't happen and yet Tovey kept on about them for 11 years and more often than his CMDS recollection.

Can you ask Alberto which letter Tovey described the ROOF signal in as the "Stupidest" etc?

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

from Corelli-Barnett book " Engage the enemy more closely ".

Churchill presence description :


Thre message at 11:37 :


Bye Antonio :D
So I assume you now accept that there was only the 1137b/27 ROOF message?
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

someone stated that all the messages were received on all warships at sea and on the ground stations ... and it would have been almost impossible to hide or " expunge " a sent message.

Just like everybody could have listen and understood what they were telling each others, ... including the enemy.

But assuming that was true, ... even if cypher and codification was already largely used on radio transmission on WW2 ... and having been myself a Transmission Officer in the Army during my military service, ... I know well what that means, ... It seems to me very strange that Capt ( RN retired ) Russell Grenfell found so many messages on the 27th morning .... but totally missed the 11:37 one ?

Am I right to assume that the first revelation of a " towing home message " was contained into the book of Sir Winston Churchill published on April 1950 ? ... and we know very well what was the text content of that revelation.

Does anybody have an evidence of something known or declared before Sir Winston Churchill ?

The timing Winston Churchill was referencing to about the messages are clear between 18:21 of May 26th, ... and 00:09 of May 27th :
Tovey_1821_fuel_KGV.jpeg
Tovey_1821_fuel_KGV.jpeg (59.2 KiB) Viewed 925 times
Fuel was a grave anxiety, and Adm Tovey had decided that unless the Bismarck’s speed could be greatly reduced he would have to abandon the chase at midnight. ( ref. msg at 18:21/26th above)

I suggested to the First Sea Lord, and he signalled accordingly, that he should be towed home if necessary, but by then it was known that the Bismarck was actually steaming in the wrong direction.

Her main armament was uninjured, and Admiral Tovey had decided to bring her to battle in the morning. ( ref. msg 00:09/27th below)
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Tovey_final_engagement_action_message_0009_27th_May.jpeg (30.05 KiB) Viewed 925 times
Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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