The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Duncan,
thanks for the info.

I was thinking it was possible for the Admiralty, when required, to send a "private" message to the C.i.C. HF using a reserved ciphering code already during WWII (as it was commonly done already in the '80 at least in the Italian Navy, when I was serving)
I was apparently wrong.


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
and would have been just laughed at in pubs
except everybody apparently forgot about it.

There is of course no explanation why the "Shores of France" should have been expunged and 11:37B not. Except of course such expunging is impossible.
Somerville read the 11:37B. Is that clear enough for you
Obviously not. If the "Shores of France" was intended for Tovey only, who was 11:37B intended for?

I know it's important for you to respond as quickly as possible, so as to dominate the threads, but please take at least some time to invent something vaguely plausible (and entertaining) to shore up the crumbling Ziggurat.



All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

Alberto, your question is easy to be responded.

The coding and cypher do exist ONLY in order to make the possibility to enable the receiver of that message to be hopefully the only one that can read it, ... because he had the way to decode and De-cypher it, ... unless the code was cracked by the enemy like for Enigma.

Otherwise, if the messages were going to be readable by everybody , ... why coding and cypher differently them at all ?

Any person with a minimum knowledge of the radio transmission can explain you this concept.

The original radio message I posted above in fact shows you the dedicated fields for both coding and cypher, ... which was not unique for all the RN, ... but different ... and depending obviously of the distribution list of the message.

You can receive certain messages on Fleet Wave on certain units, ... but you cannot decode and DE-cypher them.

Obviously as high level you were going to send messages as restricted was the distribution list and an higher level of code and cypher was used.

Easy and elementary ... even obvious, ... :wink:

That is the reason why Stephen Roskill at first went to search for the KGV radio logbook, ... and after went to the Admiralty Offices that might have received due to their high level the same message sent by the 1st Sea Lord.
He did not go and look for any warship used during for that operation radio logbook, ... because he knew well what I am stating you above, .. that they might have received it, ... but not decoded and DE-cyphered it and probably not even recorded due to that reason, ... that they were not into that distribution list, ... so unable to do it.

Bye, Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Antonio,
that might have received due to their high level the same message sent by the 1st Sea Lord
Why would the "Shores of France" be coded differently to 11:37B? They are essentially the same message to Tovey, concerning KG V alone, but with different levels of stupidity depending on when they might have been sent. (Talk about grasping at straws!)
but not decoded and DE-cyphered it and probably not even recorded due to that reason, ... that they were not into that distribution list
This is misleading. As I pointed out, the distribution list is the minimum number of people who need to read the message but the use of joint ciphers means that many others decoded and read the message. All ships pick up the message, all ships decode it, those who have addressees make sure the individual named people have read the contents. Reading other people's mail allows others to understand the general situation better.

The reason why much of this material was destroyed was that there was no requirement resources or money to archive a mass of irrelevant information.

There was undoubtedly, somewhere, a special code for Tovey only, but 11:37B saying stay at the scene and get sunk with all your crew, and probably the ship towing you too, and some of those escorting you as well, was not sent in it.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Dunmunro wrote: "All signals sent were apparently decodable by any RN ship"
Antonio Bonomi wrote: "The coding and cypher do exist ONLY in order to make the possibility to enable the receiver of that message to be hopefully the only one that can read it, ... because he had the way to decode and De-cypher it,"
Wadinga wrote: "There was undoubtedly, somewhere, a special code for Tovey only"
Hello everybody,
it looks like my "simple" question got very different answers by now...... :lol:
I asked: "were there in the Royal Navy only "common" codes available to any ship at sea or also "private" codes available for Tovey (as C.i.C HF) only ?"
Only once everybody concurs on the answer, we can discuss why the 11:37 signal on May 27 was received by Somerville (according to the letter posted by Wadinga), but apparently it was not by Wake_Walker on Norfolk (as per Norfolk extract message list in the appendix to his report on June 5), while it had not been received on Rodney (as per Wellings book https://archive.org/stream/onhismajesty ... 1/mode/2up)..... :think: :think: :think:



Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

You seem to have accidentally redacted my post:


There was undoubtedly, somewhere, a special code for Tovey only, but 11:37B saying stay at the scene and get sunk with all your crew, and probably the ship towing you too, and some of those escorting you as well, was not sent in it.

I've underlined the part you left out as it is as important as the part you decided you like. :angel:

Also this belongs here:

Roskill personally refrained from repeating the "Shores of France" or the CMDS story until he had farmed out the latter to Kennedy, after sitting on it for many years.

Roskill deliberately redacts the signal in Churchill and the Admirals, removing the Churchillian "We cannot visualize" identifier and wilfully misrepresents it as if it occurred on the 26th, "break off the pursuit", when even the wording he quotes "remain on the scene" identifies it unambiguously as the 11:37B message of the 27th. Tovey is not pursuing anything on the 27th, Bismarck has been circling on the scene since late evening 26th and Pound knew this long before 11:37B/27.

Roskill knew the idiotic "Shores of France" never existed, but deliberately misrepresents the content of 11:37B as if it had occurred the previous day, in order to damage Pound and Churchill's reputations more effectively. Frustration over Tovey's lack of reports during the Final Action actually provoked 11:37B. On the 27th, not as Roskill dishonestly implies, on the 26th.

Roskill says "After Tovey had returned to harbour Pound apologized to him for the despatch of this signal", but makes no mention of expunging, because he knew that is impossible, and the "adjusted" story economically criticises both Churchill and mouthpiece Pound more effectively.

Other ships may not have recorded the Crapulous signal as it obviously did not apply to them. Bet they had a laugh though. :lol:

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
as I said (and you would have noticed if you just had read my post, instead of being hurried to cover the contradictions in your "side" previous ones :wink: ), the first thing BEFORE speaking of the towing signal at 1137/27, is to understand how the ciphering was used in the Royal Navy and IF signals received by all ships could have been also DECODED by any ship.

You and Dunmunro have given opposite answers: please get an agreement among deniers, possibly posting some evidence/reference of how the ciphering codes were handled in the RN (trying to give a minimum added value to discussion after months of stubborn denial). Antonio is supporting your (Wadinga) view. :lol:
Dunmunro wrote: "All signals sent were apparently decodable by any RN ship"
Wadinga wrote: "There was undoubtedly, somewhere, a special code for Tovey only"

Only then, we can discuss why a certain signal was sent ONLY to Tovey (the "shore of France" one, on May 26, as per Churchill and Tovey accounts) and why another signal was sent to Somerville too (the 1137/27 one, as per Sommerville letter posted by you) as well, but apparently NOT to Rodney (see Wellings book) nor to Wake-Walker(see June 5 extract). :think:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Your latest attempts to imagine a non-existent message was sent in a secret code known only to Tovey himself, is the last refuge of desperation.

There is no division amongst those who understand the truth. Duncan said
"All signals sent were apparently decodable by any RN ship"
and I 100% endorse this, with one addition.
"All signals ACTUALLY sent were apparently decodable by any RN ship"
Imaginary signals of outstanding stupidity drafted by overbearing politicians were not sent at all. Once Winston had toddled off to do something else, I imagine they went straight to the round filing basket.

Neither Churchill nor Tovey said
why a certain signal was sent ONLY to Tovey
this is something you have invented. It is not in Tovey or Churchill accounts:
as per Churchill and Tovey accounts
Well I assume. Since you continue to keep much of Tovey's vague recollections secret, I can only surmise.

What Norfolk and Rodney chose to include in their signals listing was for them to decide. We know there is much more in Duncan's than in either of theirs.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "All signals ACTUALLY sent were apparently decodable by any RN ship"
Hi Sean,
with one exception: the May 26 signal accounted by Churchill and described by Tovey as the "shore of France" message is not present in any list. Pound told to Tovey he was having it espunged......and possibly he succeeded as we don't have any original complete signal log available to check this fact.

While Norfolk list is an extract, Wellings apparently reported in his book all the signals decoded on board Rodney..... Why is 1137/27 "towing" signal missing from his book (as well as the 0050/27 delicate question "assume you are still chasing") ? :lol:


you wrote: "There is no division amongst those who understand the truth." :shock: :negative:

Therefore it should be not difficult to answer uniquely to my question without much blah-blah: was the Royal navy during WWII using a single code (available to any ship) or was there the possibility to address a signal to certain officers (e.g. C.i.C.HF) only ?


you wrote: "Your latest attempts to imagine a non-existent message was sent in a secret code known only to Tovey himself, is the last refuge of desperation."
Absolutely not, as you should remember I have always said that IMO there is another possibility: "the shores of France" signal is just the logical conclusion of Tovey, having received the "Bay of Biscay" weather forecasts from the A.C.N.S. H., corroborated by the May 27 "towing" one and being misled in 1950 by Churchill book, stating that the signal had been actually sent out on May 26.

I'm not desperate at all, we just would like to understand the TRUTH, whatever it is, and we cannot ignore what Tovey told, wrote and repeated to Roskill several times for 11 years, while you are just here to deny the evidences and to keep alive your "official" (by now a bit ridiculous, after all the evidences found and discussed in other threads about its almost total unreliability) sugar-coated version of this operation... :negative:

In another thread you have been able to write: "I am devoted to maintaining the reputations, in particular, of two officers..."(viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8249&start=15#p77574). Bravo! A great historical approach, congratulations ! :clap: :clap: :clap:
BTW, I have to acknowledge that, by now, the third officer involved is not anymore your favorite to be defended, after his clear accusations to one of the other two....( viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244) :lol:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto and all,
'We cannot visualise the situation from your signals. BISMARCK must be sunk at all costs and if to do this it is neccessary for KING GEORGE V to remain on the scene then she must do so even if it subsequently means towing KING GEORGE V .
1st Sea Lord to C in C HF 11.37B Most Immediate Naval Cypher F.
Since Antonio has a stock of signals maybe he can see how many use Cypher F, and we can decide whether this stupid message is sent in a different cypher to general traffic. We could then guess whether there is another cypher reserved for the very stupidest signals.

Since Alberto is still being difficult about releasing information about the Roskill letters and we all want to discuss them, here is a chronological round-up:

Interestingly I revisited Cag's posting on page one and this highlighted what Alberto is so desperate to keep secret. The additional elements are in quotes. Apparently Kennedy's note , with dates of two letters in November is wrong. So what?

in another letter to Bellairs (1950) Tovey said it was :
" you are to continue the pursuit right up to the shores of France even if you have to be towed home "
Additional: from Kennedy "Years later Tovey wrote that if he had known it was Churchill, he would certainly have referred to the fact in his despatch" 2nd October 1950
The letter in which he mentions putting the signal in his despatch (WC claiming the signal in his 3rd volume of memoirs and Tovey stating "if known it would certainly have appeared in my despatch) was to Roger Bellairs in October 1950, he also mentions the coast of France and towing home and calls it appallingly stupid as an order and compares it to asking for disaster in a similar manner to the criminal stupidity of the PoW Repulse affair.

in another letter to Roskill (1954) Tovey says that the message was :
" ordering me to continue the chase up to the shores of France, even if the K.G.V. had to be towed back "
"was having it espunged from the records"

Additional from Kennedy "Again in 1954 he was under the impression he had received the signal about KG V being towed home before Ark Royal's last attack and decided that "if Ark Royal failed to damage the Bismarck.....to disobey the signal and turn back while we still had enough oil to get back to an English port."

Kennedy says there were two letters in November 1954 on 11th and 20th, which belongs to which letter is unclear.
Tovey mentions the expungement in a letter dated 20/11/54, Tovey states he has been contacted by a newspaper for comment on Churchills interference with commanders at sea in Roskills 1st volume which he declined to comment on.

He says he is surprised at there are no remarks on the coast of France signal which in his opinion was the most stupidest ill conceived signal ever sent and if known would have given the press a field day. As soon as KGV reached harbour Pound telephoned him to apologise and told him it would be expunged from the records. He claims that on its receipt PoW was severely damaged, Rodney was in dire need of refit and Nelson was unavailable and too slow leaving only KGV available and with any hope of bringing Bismarck to action after she had made good her damage.
In the "Court Martial" letter from December 1961, Tovey wrote that the message was :
" you are to continue the pursuit right up the coast of France, even if it means your ship being towed back "

This is the letter with the 14/12/1961 Paragraph 2 description of the Court Martial threat

But not actually finally because

in one letter (1962), Tovey wrote to Roskill that the text was :
" if necessary she is to be pursued right up to the shores of France, even if the K.G.V. has to be towed home "
In the 1962 letter in response to seeing Roskills articles on DP he mentions the signal again as Roskill must have asked for his recollection on the wording. Again it is "if neccessary Bismarck is to be pursued up to the coast of France even if KGV is to be towed home." Roskill puts a written note that this is not mentioned in the signal 11.37B 27/5/41 BR 1736 (3/50).




Now we have more information in which it becomes ever more clear that Roskill knew from early on that "Shores of France" did not exist.
He says he is surprised at there are no remarks on the coast of France signal which in his opinion was the most stupidest ill conceived signal ever sent and if known would have given the press a field day.


Roskill has no remarks in November 1954 because he can find no confirmation. If anybody had the resources and contacts to check all possibilities including the memories of numerous service personnel from KG V and elsewhere who would surely have remembered "the stupidest ill conceived signal" sent in any cypher, Roskill did, and he does not converse with the surprised Tovey on it because he has no confirmation.
In the 1962 letter in response to seeing Roskills articles on DP he mentions the signal again as Roskill must have asked for his recollection on the wording.
These are presumably The Times articles Roskill wrote in 1961, and Roskill has asked again for Tovey's recollection of the wording, because all he can find is the 11:37B. Seven years of banging on about the "Shores of France" and despite Roskill's best efforts he can't find such a message.

By the time Churchill and the Admirals comes out Roskill has given up on finding his Silver Bullet, the stupidest Shores of France" signal ever sent, and decides to disguise bits of the 11:37B and artfully imply they were sent on the 26th. Did he imagine evil Pound had achieved the impossible and erased not only all hard copies but even the existence in the memories of all but Tovey of the "Shores of France".

Or did he simply look at the other messages like me and conclude Tovey had imagined it?
From the signal log Pound sent "Your 23:47 gave your course as 030T. Assume you are still chasing." 00:50/27. Is the direct order "Continue to the Shores of France" supposed to happened on the 26th?

Pound is supposed to have given a direct order, realises Tovey is ignoring it, crucially just after midnight, when he has said he will break off the chase, and says "assume". Assume you are still following my direct order even though it looks like you are sailing back to the UK? Or maybe the Direct Order never actually happened at all. Pound receives no response from Tovey, the man who is apparently disregarding this Direct Order. The Admiralty sends him a weather forecast, and later a message claiming there are two German ships in the area, later retracted.

Did the imaginary "expunging" of the "Shores of France" signal also include modifying other signals sent around the same time, to make its disappearance less obvious?
All the best

wadinga
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

some useful information about : Royal Navy Ciphers Used During WW II

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/s ... hp?t=14509

I like to underline in particular this statement :
So far as I am aware, the Royal Navy used hand or book ciphers for operational messages up until 1943, ....
Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Kennedy says there were two letters in November 1954 on 11th and 20th, which belongs to which letter is unclear."
Hi Sean,
thanks for providing me an additional reason not to give you any information, in addition to having repeatedly accused me to hide and redact them ! :clap:
It was told to you here few days ago: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8246&start=135#p77523 that there were not two letters, just one, dated 20 / 11 / 1954 (written a bit more large than previously to help you reading it :wink:).... the "two letters on 11 and 20 November" being a (trivial compared to others) error from Kennedy......
It looks like you don't read what is written to you, or you forget things that have just been discussed, or.... you are simply unable to understand them.... :think:
In any case, I see no value in providing you any new info: please go on parroting your favorite "authority", Kennedy...... :lol:

you wrote: "Roskill has given up on finding.....the stupidest Shores of France" signal ever sent.....or did he simply look at the other messages like me and conclude Tovey had imagined it?
All your long speculation on what Roskill thought about the message is just ignoring the fact that Roskill just concluded that the exact date of the signal could not be proven because he had not found the KGV original signal log (this point is clearly mentioned in a letter he wrote in 1972 :wink: ), even if he tended to exclude the May 26 one.

Whatever was Roskill conclusion, he had not seen the text of the "Bay of Biscay" signal, the one sent by an Admiralty flag officer (ACNS H) who addressed it to Tovey only at 0231/27 implicitly mentioning the "shores of France"......


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
he had not seen the text of the "Bay of Biscay" signal
How exactly do you know that? Are you suggesting that was secret too?

And even if he had, he would have thought it irrelevant. Which it is. Are you seriously suggesting a weather forecast is A Direct Order? :lol:
this point is clearly mentioned in a letter he wrote in 1972
Thanks for extra info.
From the signal log Pound sent "Your 23:47 gave your course as 030T. Assume you are still chasing." 00:50/27. Is the direct order "Continue to the Shores of France" supposed to happened on the 26th?

Pound is supposed to have given a direct order, [using a secret cypher no-one else can decode] realises Tovey is ignoring it, crucially just after midnight, when he has said he will break off the chase, and says "assume". Assume you are still following my Direct Order even though it looks like you are sailing back to the UK? Or maybe the Direct Order never actually happened at all. Pound receives no response from Tovey, the man who is apparently disregarding this Direct Order. The Admiralty sends him a weather forecast, and later a message claiming there are two German ships in the area, later retracted.

Did the imaginary "expunging" of the "Shores of France" signal also include modifying other signals sent around the same time, to make its disappearance less obvious?
BTW do read what I write?
Apparently Kennedy's note , with dates of two letters in November is wrong. So what?
:lol:

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Are you seriously suggesting a weather forecast is A Direct Order?"
Hi Sean,
just as much an order as "request your intentions as regards PoW re-engaging" (1st S.L. 14:45B/24 to C.S.1).... :lol:
or just as much a "menace" as "assume you are still chasing" when you get a direct course to UK (30°) in the last C.in.C. HF. P.C. signal.... :wink:

W-W understood perfectly the "message" inside the "intentions" signal (as confirmed by Kelburn), I guess Tovey, being a far smarter guy than W-W, saw clearly that someone sending him the weather forecasts of the Bay of Biscay, just expected him to continue the pursuit up to the "shores of France". It's not very difficult to be understood. :negative:

Whether this signal was a repetition of the explicit order already given, or just the clear implicit expectation of the Admiralty, after having already kindly reminded that the assumption was he was still chasing, I honestly don't know.


you had written: "Apparently Kennedy's note , with dates of two letters in November is wrong. So what?"
but then, in the same post, you wrote: "Kennedy says there were two letters in November 1954 on 11th and 20th, which belongs to which letter is unclear."
Unfortunately for you (and sadly for me), I read what you write. :stop:
I would say either you are a bit confused, or possibly, compiling too long posts, just to have people reading again and again your same speculation, you forget what you have just written above.... :lol:

I do suggest you, once again, to get some info before making a fool of yourself, as you have recently done in this forum....


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Just because you tell me a thing...............doesn't necessarily mean you are right. When I see the material myself, I'll know.
Kennedy says there were two letters in November 1954 on 11th and 20th, which belongs to which letter is unclear."
It was left when I cut and pasted in the new information from Cag about Roskill's enquiries over several years trying specifically to find the non-existent "Shores of France" message. The information you have withheld, so as to keep up the pretence that Roskill had not already realised, much earlier, that Tovey's memories were unreliable, before he handed the documentation over to Kennedy.

New Info:

I have already shown Roskill, having failed to find the "Shores of France" after a search lasting (now we know) several years, deliberately misleads the reader in Churchill and the Admirals by suggesting the words of the 11:37B were sent the previous day. He can do this because the only person claiming the "Shores of France" ever existed is dead and cannot be confronted.

Your frankly preposterous theory that a weather forecast is the actual cryptically phrased Direct Order makes no temporal sense either. By 02:13/27 when it was sent, everybody knew Bismarck was circling and did not need to be pursued to the coast of France or the Costa Blanca or anywhere else.
Pound is supposed to have given a direct order, [using a secret cypher no-one else can decode] realises Tovey is ignoring it, crucially just after midnight, when he has said he will break off the chase, and says "assume". Assume you are still following my Direct Order even though it looks like you are sailing back to the UK?
Then Tovey ignores the assume signal for hours giving the Admiralty no more information and Pound does nothing about it, but arranges for Tovey to get a weather forecast for a place he no longer needs to go to?

Antonio didn't discover the weather forecast which is recorded in Welling's listing, so it wasn't sent in the mysterious "Tovey's eyes only cypher" you have recently invented.

If I wanted to make a fool of myself on this forum I'd find the competition pretty stiff :lol:

All the best

wadinga
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