The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

probably I have found something interesting as far as event timing.

Still on page 282 on the Churchill book " The Grand Alliance " first published on April 1950 :
On this Monday night I went to the Admiralty and watched the scene on the charts in the War Room, where the news steamed in every few minutes.

" What are you doing here ? " I said to the Controller Adm Fraser.
" I am waiting to see what I have got to repair ", he said.

Four hours passed quickly away and when I left I could see that Admiral Pound and his select company of experts were sure that Bismarck was doomed.
Obviously Monday was May 26th, and Churchill apparently arrived at around 8 pm to leave probably soon after midnight, knowing that Adm Tovey was going to engage Bismarck at dawn ( ref. message at 00:09/27th )

Now it should not be that difficult to follow the possible Admiral Tovey logic reasoning.

Churchill was there only on the 26th before midnight, ... and everything was originated by him as he wrote in full detail references, ... so everything Adm Pound sent him during WSC staying into the War Room or later ... was surely decided by Churchill the day before, ... and not by Pound, ... as he incorrectly assumed for 9 years apparently, ... :think:

Bye, Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
dunmunro
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

someone stated that all the messages were received on all warships at sea and on the ground stations ... and it would have been almost impossible to hide or " expunge " a sent message.

Just like everybody could have listen and understood what they were telling each others, ... including the enemy.

But assuming that was true, ... even if cypher and codification was already largely used on radio transmission on WW2 ... and having been myself a Transmission Officer in the Army during my military service, ... I know well what that means, ... It seems to me very strange that Capt ( RN retired ) Russell Grenfell found so many messages on the 27th morning .... but totally missed the 11:37 one ?

Am I right to assume that the first revelation of a " towing home message " was contained into the book of Sir Winston Churchill published on April 1950 ? ... and we know very well what was the text content of that revelation.

Does anybody have an evidence of something known or declared before Sir Winston Churchill ?

The timing Winston Churchill was referencing to about the messages are clear between 18:21 of May 26th, ... and 00:09 of May 27th :
Tovey_1821_fuel_KGV.jpeg
Fuel was a grave anxiety, and Adm Tovey had decided that unless the Bismarck’s speed could be greatly reduced he would have to abandon the chase at midnight. ( ref. msg at 18:21/26th above)

I suggested to the First Sea Lord, and he signalled accordingly, that he should be towed home if necessary, but by then it was known that the Bismarck was actually steaming in the wrong direction.

Her main armament was uninjured, and Admiral Tovey had decided to bring her to battle in the morning. ( ref. msg 00:09/27th below)
Tovey_final_engagement_action_message_0009_27th_May.jpeg
Bye Antonio :D
Antonio, as I've explained, if Churchill was referencing an "expunged" message* then it would be fair game for others to then mention it publicly and/or for the Admiralty Historical Section to include it in their classified research. Yet no one has ever come forward with a recollection of an expunged message.

As I stated earlier Churchill made a mistake (he made many mistakes, unfortunately, in his multi-volume account) in his account of the action, and Tovey whose memory was hazy at best, may have confused the 1137B message with the wording in The Hinge of Fate.

*Which Churchill would not do since he would also be breaking the Official Secrets Act.
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

keep on repeating, ... based only on Sir Kenney/Paffard unfair inputs, ... later used also by Graham Rhys-Jones ... that Adm Tovey memory was not good on those years is an incorrect statement.

Stephen Roskill himself personally wrote it in clear words to Sir Kennedy, ... that not having a solution for this " enigma " found it easier to use that explanation even if absolutely wrong.

Roskill met and spoke for more than 10 years with Adm Tovey, Sir Kennedy and Graham Rhys-Jones never met him as far as I know.

Roskill tried to search for other evidences but did not found any, ... so I doubt I will be able to find new inputs.

Surely I have been able to find inputs of the opposite direction, ... that message at 11:37, ... just like others like the 00:50 one from the 1st S.L. to Tovey, ... seems to have been only on that Admiralty record of messages, ... which is a summary document, ... in fact nowhere else I can find them being received and recorded.

Same goes for the Norfolk radio summary ( CS1 - Extract from radio log covering the operation 856/189 of 5 June 1941 ), ... some messages are there ( 18:21 and 00:09 ) ... some others are completely missed ( 00:50 and 11:37 ) ... :think:

Why many critical messages have been received on board some units, and some others including that one at 11:37 no ?

Why Russell Grenfell was not aware about that message at 11:37 on 1948 for his book having spoken to almost everybody involved on the Bismarck operation ?

The study of the wireless transmission document by Adm Tovey, as well as the analyis of the available messages format used at that time may help ... but still it seems to me that every part I study of this whole operation is a source of mystery, ... but on the transmissions I have a good reference base to be used ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Antonio,
Stephen Roskill himself personally wrote it in clear words to Sir Kennedy
Well not in the text Alberto has shown so far. Roskill says nothing at all about the veracity of Tovey's memory. How could he, because he had been in possession of three letters stating that Tovey had been given a direct order to sail to the coasts of France. He was therefore personally aware that Tovey was remembering things that didn't happen, as early as 1950.

In Churchill and the Admirals he highlights the message which Tovey does not recollect at all, (in the letters we have seen so far) sent at 1137B. He says "Pound apologized to him for the despatch of this signal" but of course Tovey recounted him apologizing for a completely different signal, sent at a different time. The 11:37B signal was of course completely stupid, BTW has Alberto told you whether the "stupid" description is in the Roskill letters? It was completely stupid because Bismarck was already completely disabled and had no chance of getting home. Compelling KG V to remain "at the scene" would serve no purpose, except to ensure her destruction by U-boat or aircraft.

The story Tovey imagined and told Roskill was of a message before the Ark's attack had even slowed Bismarck down. In this case, KG V would merely have sailed into the Luftwaffe's slaughter zone with the objective of running out of fuel somewhere close to the "Shores of France" and without ever getting within gun range of Bismarck. He said he would have disobeyed the (imagined) order and broken off anyway, even if it meant a Court Martial (for him). I have seen this description in other books, is this the redacted content from Para 1 which Alberto refuses to show?

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

in any case there are and most likely will remain 2 possibilities :

A ) The message both Adm Tovey recall on his letters and Churchill mentioned on his 3rd book has been really sent/received and was later "expunged " from the records by Adm Pound as he personally guaranteed to Adm Tovey.

B ) It can be that both Churchill at first and Tovey consequently later, ... mixed up the things, ... with Churchill sure that what he said to Pound had been timely and promptly executed on the 26th, ... Pound having done it only "progressively" thru the late 26th and the 27th morning, ... and Tovey having realized only after the war and thru Churchill book number 3 the truth about what happened and ordered by whom, ... and having re-constructed backwards based on the Churchill book information that were new to him, ... who generated the inputs and when that was really done in the War Room ... and having consequently associated to that set of timings all the type of unusual messages he received and never responded as far as I can see.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
dunmunro
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

in any case there are and most likely will remain 2 possibilities :

A ) The message both Adm Tovey recall on his letters and Churchill mentioned on his 3rd book has been really sent/received and was later "expunged " from the records by Adm Pound as he personally guaranteed to Adm Tovey.

B ) It can be that both Churchill at first and Tovey consequently later, ... mixed up the things, ... with Churchill sure that what he said to Pound had been timely and promptly executed on the 26th, ... Pound having done it only "progressively" thru the late 26th and the 27th morning, ... and Tovey having realized only after the war and thru Churchill book number 3 the truth about what happened and ordered by whom, ... and having re-constructed backwards based on the Churchill book information that were new to him, ... who generated the inputs and when that was really done in the War Room ... and having consequently associated to that set of timings all the type of unusual messages he received and never responded as far as I can see.

Bye Antonio :D
A) above is not a possibility for all the reasons previously mentioned.
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

now that no one in this world can put anymore in discussion Admiral Tovey full and complete reliability while writing the letters to Stephen Roskill, ... also his statements about the " towing " message he received and what Adm Pound told him he was going to do by " expunging " the message from the records, ... has become more solid than ever before.

Just for the record ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Antonio,
now that no one in this world can put anymore in discussion Admiral Tovey full and complete reliability while writing the letters to Stephen Roskill, ... also his statements about the " towing " message he received and what Adm Pound told him he was going to do by " expunging " the message from the records, ... has become more solid than ever before.
Hmmm newly deployed "stinky bait" trolled through the water just in front of my nose................... well I just can't resist it! :D

Please reserve this kind of unreasoned and frankly arrogant observation for your private thread to which no-one else is allowed to contribute, and therefore no-one else is interested in visiting. It can be "just for the record" there. You saying something is more solid does not make it more substantial. Just because you choose to believe in your Ziggurat of Supposition does not mean everybody else has to live in it.

There is no apparent evidence at all that Tovey ever received the message he actually claimed to have received, including a specific order to continue the pursuit to the Shores of France. That puts considerable doubt on his memory of the CMDS threat from the same telephone conversation and mentioned only in some of his letters which are primarily concerned with ROOF. That he told Roskill, McMullen, Brind, Pafford and nobody else this hotchpotch of imaginary occurrences does not make it true, merely frequently repeated.

Your co-author teases us with a new, as yet unmentioned, supposedly independent confirmation of the CMDS threat, but witholds it, so that it cannot be examined and if necessary, challenged. He also withholds Para 1 of the very letter in which the CMDS threat is best described, which must describe details of the ROOF signal. Possibly details which expose further the unreliability of Tovey's memory at the time.

However, since anybody who dares challenge your suppositions is immediately labelled a Troll, perhaps it is as well these items are kept secret.

Scrolling back to your post of last Tuesday:
Why Russell Grenfell was not aware about that message at 11:37 on 1948 for his book having spoken to almost everybody involved on the Bismarck operation
Are you really suggesting a real ROOF message sent late on the 26th, and has successfully been expunged from the records for reasons unclear and further that a new, spurious and non-transmitted 11:37B has been created and inserted into the record so as to retain the honour for the British Admiralty of sending "the Stupidest and most ill-conceived signal ever sent"? :shock:

Surely a record to be proud of :cool:

All the best

wadinga
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

now that Adm Tovey reliability cannot be discussed anymore, ... despite Sir Kennedy book novel and his related unfair doubts, ... what Adm Tovey wrote is important and must be considered under the light it deserves.

We have had enough of wrong path to follow for years, ... now we can follow the suggested one by the one that lived them.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Antonio,
Are you really suggesting a real ROOF message sent late on the 26th, and has successfully been expunged from the records for reasons unclear and further that a new, spurious and non-transmitted 11:37B has been created and inserted into the record so as to retain the honour for the British Admiralty of sending "the Stupidest and most ill-conceived signal ever sent"?
All the best

wadinga
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dunmunro
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro »

Sergeant, we have crossed some strange boundary here. The world has taken a turn for the surreal.

Clearly, but the question still stands.

l don't know. What do you think?
From Saving Private Ryan.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
instead of posting desperate nonsense, and in order to stay in topic, someone should POST an original message log (NOT one redacted "a posteriori") from a shore station or a ship involved in the operation, to try to demonstrate that the "shores of France" message was not espunged form the records.

I have not seen yet a single one...... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
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"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

correct, ... that boundary is dividing the area where who can still sustain a stubborn and blind position can still survive with his position, ... from the area where that stubborn and blind position cannot be maintained any longer, ...

No more room to play " dummy and deny " now, ... now it is all over for you " deniers at all costs ".

Now the proper historical patient research has given us the result we were looking for and you have lost forever.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Are you saying "prove to me it wasn't expunged by showing me another signal log with it not being there either? Hmm, but surely if it's not there, you'll just say "That proves it was expunged?

We're certainly not in Kansas anymore........................... seems to be somewere near Roswell. :lol:

Here's an easier thing- is the 11:37B the real message Tovey misremembered or has it been inserted subsequently. It would be much easier to add something to the final log than erase something from all the places it would be recorded.

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: " It would be much easier to add something to the final log than erase something from all the places it would be recorded. "
Hi Sean,
absolutely correct. That's why I'm now looking for an ORIGINAL message log because what you say is only true for the redacted message logs we have in our hands, while we don't have yet seen any original (not written afterward) message log.....

In a redacted document it's very easy to espunge a message or to add another, or just to modify the time of origin and the text.....In any case, I don't exclude even the possibility that Tovey may have confused the "Bay of Biscay" weather forecasts (a most clear sign of Admiralty intentions anyway, sent to him only in address while at some 500 sm from the Bay) with the 11:37 signal, having been misled in this by Churchill who said before him that the message had been sent on May 26.

All alternatives are wide open, now that Tovey's reliability is well proven, and the fact that Tovey repeats for 11 years the same text is another clue.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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