The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

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wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Fri Feb 23, 2018 5:53 pm

Hello Alberto,

Thank you, you did indeed acknowledge Roskill was "inclined to think".

Good enough for me. Stephen Roskill, hugely experienced naval historian, with an extensive list of RN contacts, unparalleled access to records, a predilection to denigrate both Pound and Churchill's reputations and after several years of contact with Tovey towards the end of which he specifically asked him about the "Shores of France" message was "inclined to think" it was never sent on the 26th.

He is inclined to think it was never sent and therefore Tovey was remembering a thing that never happened, and you, without his experience etc etc think it most probable that
the "shores of France" towing signal was actually sent sometimes in the evening of May 26,
Because Tovey was
very detailed about the situation in which he was when he
And because such a signal would be:
logical reaction of a "dreadfully difficult master"
So just like imagining Rodney must have been hit, even though there is no record of it, you allow your supposition in this case to outweigh the actual reality.

The expunging is a delightful additional detail. Aside from being impossible to remove from people's memories as well as numerous records as we have established, is there any explanation what the point of it would be? To make Pound or Churchill look less stupid? Hang on, Tovey doesn't realise Churchill is involved does he?

Or maybe just to explain why nobody would ever be able to find something that was never sent in the first place?

Herr Nilsson,

Thank you for emphasizing with real evidence: the Bay of Biscay is wet, the shores of France are dry.



All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Fri Feb 23, 2018 6:21 pm

Hello everybody,

the facts are :

1) Adm Tovey reliability is no longer in discussion and consequently his letters content must be taken in the consideration they deserve.

2) I have not seen any evidence that Sir Winston Churchill was unreliable when he wrote his 3rd book.
Consequently his statement that does correlate with Adm Tovey ones about a message sent on 26 evening before Bismarck was torpedoed and damaged slowing her down must be taken in consideration too.

3) Roskill and Kennedy, not having found any evidence of the message indicated by both Tovey and Churchill, did provide their own interpretation of the event.
It is very probable that they did not know about the very unusual weather forecast message about the Bay of Biscay area sent to Adm Tovey that night.

4) Neither Roskill nor Kennedy asked Adm Tovey about more details on the message he was referring to, about the night weather forecast of the Bay of Biscay he received and about the 11:37/27 towing home message.

5) On Wellings book about Rodney received radio messages there are not the 00:50/26 and the 11:37/27 messages received by Adm Tovey on KGV. This seems to confirm that some messages were directed ( encoded and encrypted-cypher ) only to Adm Tovey on KGV.


A good reference :

http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.it/2 ... lures.html
The security of the enciphered codebook system depended on the frequent changes of enciphering tables and the introduction of a new codebook after a reasonable period of time.
Obviously the meaning of ‘reasonable’ changed during the war.
The first Naval Cypher was used from 1934 till August 1940.
The next edition Naval Cypher No2 was valid from August 1940 till January 1942.
Its replacement Naval Cypher No4 (as No3 was used in the Atlantic) was valid from January 1942 till June 1943.
So in the period 1940-1943 Cyphers were changed roughly every 1.5 years.
One would expect that the Convoy Cypher would be valid for a similar timeframe or perhaps for security reasons it would have been changed sooner, maybe after 1 year.
Unfortunately Naval Cypher No3 wasn’t changed after 1 year. It wasn’t changed after 1.5 year.
It was actually used from June 1941 till June 1943.


Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Fri Feb 23, 2018 8:19 pm

Hello Antonio,

1)
"Roskill was inclined to think that the "shores of France" signal was not sent on May 26, BUT he wrote that the matter could have been closed ONLY by looking into the original signal log of KGV, that he could not see."


Roskill was Inclined to think the message didn't happen, therefore he thought Tovey unreliable.



2) It's a big book. Have you read it all? Many learned historians say Churchill was "economic with the truth" He said "History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it"

3) So what, Tovey was in the Bay of Biscay, see Herr Nilsson's post

4) We have already established Roskill didn't know about and anyway would not have attributed the mystical significance to a weather forecast. What has been established is that Roskill asked about the "Shores of France" message and it seems clear Tovey did not say "When I talk about that, what I mean is a Bay of Biscay weather forecast". Roskill concluded

5)Somerville picked up the 11:37B - Try again Antonio.

On Wed 17th you said:
The fact that the 11:37 was not " expunged " as Adm Pound guaranteed to Adm Tovey seems confirming this too.
You just said Tovey didn't know about the 11:37B- have you made this up? Pound guaranteed it would not be expunged? :shock:

All the best

wadinga
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Fri Feb 23, 2018 9:02 pm

Hello everybody,

this is what Joseph Wellings did on board the HMS Rodney as far as messages decoding-decyphering :
Wellings_messages_Rodney.jpg
Wellings_messages_Rodney.jpg (20.55 KiB) Viewed 2569 times
as I wrote above the 00:50/27 and the 11:37 /27 were not among the radio messages received on board the HMS Rodney.
Pound_to_Tovey_message_0050_27.jpeg.jpg
Pound_to_Tovey_message_0050_27.jpeg.jpg (23.57 KiB) Viewed 2569 times
Admiralty_fuel_KGV_27_May_at_1137.jpg
Admiralty_fuel_KGV_27_May_at_1137.jpg (41.86 KiB) Viewed 2569 times
This is a fact, and anyone can verify it on the book he wrote.

On his Majesty's service : observations of the British home fleet from the diary, reports, and letters of Joseph H Wellings, assistant U.S. naval attaché, London, 1940-41

https://archive.org/stream/onhismajesty ... 1/mode/2up

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro » Sat Feb 24, 2018 1:30 am

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

the facts are :

1) Adm Tovey reliability is no longer in discussion and consequently his letters content must be taken in the consideration they deserve.

2) I have not seen any evidence that Sir Winston Churchill was unreliable when he wrote his 3rd book.
Consequently his statement that does correlate with Adm Tovey ones about a message sent on 26 evening before Bismarck was torpedoed and damaged slowing her down must be taken in consideration too.

3) Roskill and Kennedy, not having found any evidence of the message indicated by both Tovey and Churchill, did provide their own interpretation of the event.
It is very probable that they did not know about the very unusual weather forecast message about the Bay of Biscay area sent to Adm Tovey that night.

4) Neither Roskill nor Kennedy asked Adm Tovey about more details on the message he was referring to, about the night weather forecast of the Bay of Biscay he received and about the 11:37/27 towing home message.

5) On Wellings book about Rodney received radio messages there are not the 00:50/26 and the 11:37/27 messages received by Adm Tovey on KGV. This seems to confirm that some messages were directed ( encoded and encrypted-cypher ) only to Adm Tovey on KGV.


Bye Antonio :D
1) Agreed. We've proven him unreliable.

2) Churchill stated that a KGV ROOF message was sent on 26 May, butit wasn't sent and doesn't show up anywhere else on earth. Churchill, alas, was also as human and as fallible as Tovey and Ellis, despite his considerable talents and full time research staff.

3) Sending weather reports at irregular intervals due to a changing tactical and strategic situation isn't proof of anything except a changing tactical and strategic situation.

4) Roskill was probably being polite and unwilling to confront an elderly man about his faulty memory and I don't think Kennedy ever corresponded directly with Tovey.

5) As we've discussed not every ship's report listed every message received.

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sat Feb 24, 2018 9:37 am

Hello everybody,

if one analize the available documentation it is easy to realize that :

1) Sir Kennedy was convinced that the 2 " towing " messages, ... the evening of 26th reported by Tovey and Churchill and the 11:37/27 ... have been sent to Tovey.

2) Stephen Roskill searched into what he could still find, ... with no luck since the KGV radio log was destroyed already ... and only after having done it ... expressed his opinion about the 26th possibly never been sent. This was absolutely not based on Tovey memory reliability, ... but solely on the fact that he did not find the message into the Admiralty logs.

Both were not having also the unusual Bay of Biscay weather forecast sent to Tovey at 02:37 that night, ... and consequently Sir Kennedy went for his "quick and dirty " solution of the Tovey memory provided by Paffard, ... being unable to find the answer about this enigma.
Pound_Churchill_01.jpg
Pound_Churchill_01.jpg (55.87 KiB) Viewed 2538 times
I am still of the opinion that this event must be presented to the readers the way we know it now, ... with the whole inputs we have, ... from Tovey being more than fully reliable on his letters to Roskill and Sir Winston Churchill description of it on his 3rd volume.

I am not convinced about the Kennedy " quick and dirty " solution ( Tovey memory ) of it that has been put together to justify this event for his book Pursuit, ... ad even if, ... like in other cases before, ... I cannot yet prove that Sir Kennedy was absolutely wrong, ... and only invented nice solutions for the events he was not able to resolve, ... I preffer to remain on Stephen Roskill initial position he wrote to Kennedy :
To sum up, I doubt if this point can be firmly resolved ...


but I do not buy Stepher Roskill final position to Kennedy based solely on the fact that he did not find the message ( despite Pitcairn-Jones help too ) :
... but I reject your ingenuous opinion of two ( 2 ) signals being made
Last statement to confirm Sir Ludovic Kennedy opinion about all this while writing to Stephen Roskill.

I personally think that resolving this enigma " playing " with the memory reliability of Churchill ( as suggested by Stephen Roskill ) or Adm Tovey ( used by Sir L. Kennedy ) is not a correct way to resolve this matter.

It seems to me that when somebody do not find the answers, ... is too easy to justify everything with a memory failure, ... easy, but very often it is absolutely wrong.

It is funny to realize that Stephen Roskill suggested Sir Kennedy to use Churchill memory reliability to solve the matter, ... but Kennedy finally went with Adm Tovey one at the end on his book.

Knowing both memories, ... Tovey and Churchill, ... were perfectly working, ... having both their written statements about this event, ... and having fully realized what Roskill and Kennedy did to try to solve the enigma for a book publication, ... without having found the final solution, ... I will remain on the initial correct Stephen Roskill position about it :
I doubt if this point can be firmly resolved ...
It seems to me more historically correct, ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Sat Feb 24, 2018 5:43 pm

Hello Antonio,
if one analize the available documentation
This is somewhat difficult since your co-author refuses to make it available to anyone but you. However you have said enough to make it clear why so much information had to be redacted from the Roskill letters before the heavily edited highlights were presented above.


Contrary to this observation:
from Tovey being more than fully reliable on his letters to Roskill
From what you have posted it is clear both Roskill and Kennedy suspected Tovey's memories were faulty.

The communications between Roskill and Kennedy make it clear the former was inclined to think, after investigation, there was no "Shores of France" message on the 26th, and thus Tovey's memory was unreliable, but from what you say Kennedy wanted more proof. Apparently the latter suggested both messages existed, as a compromise, which Roskill thought unlikely. Obviously by the time Kennedy got to publication, he too was convinced of Tovey's memory, by Pafford's assessment, which is why he included that opinion in his book.
playing " with the memory reliability of Churchill ( as suggested by Stephen Roskill ) or Adm Tovey ( used by Sir L. Kennedy )
is nonsensical. If,
as Roskill was inclined to think, there was no towing message on the 26th
,

then both these memories have to be faulty, not either/or.

Neither Roskill in Cand the A nor Kennedy in Pursuit said there was a "Shores of France" ROOF message on the 26th, thus disowning Tovey's oft repeated memory, although the former engages in some tricky wording to imply something his footnote says happened on the 27th actually occurred 18 hours earlier.

My speculation, and it is only that, which I outlined above, answers all points. Churchill went off to bed believing a stupid and ill-considered signal had been sent to Tovey on the evening of the 26th. Which he recorded in his book some years later. No such signal was sent. Pound had fulfilled the function described by Davies of stopping the PM sending such messages. The following day a somewhat less stupid and ill advised signal was sent, possibly with further PM inspired interference. When Tovey spoke to Pound on arrival at Scapa, the content of the unsent signal was discussed, about which Tovey was incensed being considerably more stupid than the signal he actualy received. So incensed that ten years later he rememberd the thing which did not happen rather than that which did and is faithfully recorded.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sat Feb 24, 2018 8:17 pm

Hello everybody,

it should be clear that both Kennedy and Roskill considered Tovey and Churchill both fully reliable otherwise they were not going to believe them at first and no one was going to search for that message possibly sent on the 26th.

The fact that the 26th evening message was not found anywhere changed their initial opinions only because Roskill did not beleive that Pound have been able to expunge it from the record, ... and I personally disagree about this consideration made by Roskill.

This changed both Roskill and Kennedy initial opinions ... both looking for that message ... and not having found it they both went for the easier solution.

Roskill pointed to Churchill fault memory having caused Tovey to declare the event in that way, ... logic, pragmatic and coherent, ... and covering both declarations with a unique solution.

Kennedy preferred not to follow Roskill suggested solution and went for his own different solution using Paffard description of Tovey later life style and memory, ... and used it to justify with this reason Tovey much earlier declaration, ... without even considering Churchill book written declarations about it, ... and by doing this showed his very limited respect for the historical truth, ... his fear to attack Churchill with his book, ... and no respect at all for Tovey.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by dunmunro » Sat Feb 24, 2018 11:26 pm

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

it should be clear that both Kennedy and Roskill considered Tovey and Churchill both fully reliable otherwise they were not going to believe them at first and no one was going to search for that message possibly sent on the 26th.

The fact that the 26th evening message was not found anywhere changed their initial opinions only because Roskill did not beleive that Pound have been able to expunge it from the record, ... and I personally disagree about this consideration made by Roskill.

This changed both Roskill and Kennedy initial opinions ... both looking for that message ... and not having found it they both went for the easier solution.

Roskill pointed to Churchill fault memory having caused Tovey to declare the event in that way, ... logic, pragmatic and coherent, ... and covering both declarations with a unique solution.

Kennedy preferred not to follow Roskill suggested solution and went for his own different solution using Paffard description of Tovey later life style and memory, ... and used it to justify with this reason Tovey much earlier declaration, ... without even considering Churchill book written declarations about it, ... and by doing this showed his very limited respect for the historical truth, ... his fear to attack Churchill with his book, ... and no respect at all for Tovey.

Bye Antonio :D
If they thought Tovey and Churchill "fully reliable" then they would have simply accepted that a KGV ROOF message was sent on the 26th. However, prudent and cautious historians do not accept any source as reliable unless confirmed by another independent source.

The "easier solution" is that Tovey read Churchill and then imagined a KGV ROOF message was sent on the 26th and both Roskill and Kennedy seem to have independently come to this same conclusion; Tovey's memory was faulty.

Even if Pound was able to expunge it from Admiralty records, he could not erase it from USN, RCN (Cdn Armed Forces were independently commanded through Ottawa and Pound could not tamper with RCN files without Cdn War Cabinet approval), KM records nor from people's memories, yet no one has come forward and reported it.

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Feb 25, 2018 9:46 am

Hello everybody,

it is very easy to realize that both Churchill as well as Adm Tovey correlated that message being sent and received on the elapsed timeframe between the 18:21/26 fuel shortage message sent by Adm Tovey at containing his intention to disengage at midnight in case, ... and the Bismarck damage reducing her speed that was resolving the matter, ... until the 00:09 message sent by Adm Tovey where he declared his intentions to engagé the Bismarck in the coming morning.

To have 2 persons, ... Sir Churchill and Adm Tovey, ... with memory problems but both remembering exactly the same situation is at least suspicious.

If that was the case, it is for sure that Adm Tovey memory was directed to remember the event incorrectly by Churchill book declarations.

This is a point that Sir Ludovic Kennedy knew very well, ... but he intentionally avoided to declare it on his book Pursuit, ... choosing the more comfortable and easy " Paffard way " to try to resolve the mattter only accusing Tovey for a potential " memory problem " and not Sir Winston Churchill that did it at first and forced Tovey to declare it in compliance.

Just this act is dismantling Sir Kennedy version of the story, ... invented by him on purpose using both Paffard and Tovey for his convenience avoiding to list Sir W. Churchill.

Sir Churchill in this case was surely the main and first responsible of the memory failure, ... just as Stephen Roskill perfectly realized and suggested to Kennedy that intentionally avoided to list the Prime Minister as responsible for the memory failure.

But as Stephen Roskill stated, there is the very high possibility that this point will never be firmly resolved.

If the message on the 26th evening was sent and received and later expunged by the records just like Adm Pound told to Adm Tovey, ... then both Churchill and Tovey were remembering well the story and simply the message that was surely coded and cyphered at the higher level ( coded higher then every ship Commander and/or every Flag officer ) is no longer available on the summary list's we have available today.

This version of the story is more in line to the workroom controls, directions and message reactions at every message received we are seeing all the way thru this operation being done by the RN Admiralty after a certain point.

We have examples of messages missing on many list's, ... and several official documents intentional alteration and modification, ... so it is not going to be a big surprise.

Any average historian at this point must explain the above on a footnote, ... and not write an invented shortcut version of the story like Sir Kennedy did on his book looking for a scoop., ... intentionally accusing somebody ( Tovey ) but carefully avoiding to accuse somebody else ( Churchill ) because it was not convenient for him.

Now it should be finally clear to everybody that Tovey memory and brain were perfectly working, ... just like Stephen Roskill underlined to Kennedy, ... since we have a second source for the Court Martial Story he remembered very well, ... and we have here the evidence that in case of a memory failure, ... it was Churchill the first to fail and in this case Adm Tovey can only be accused of having followed his incorrect ( not demonstrated yet, and they can be correct ) declarations, ... and nothing else.

Again, ... most likely we will never be able to resolve this one ... but at least we now know that Sir Kennedy was inventing things for his convenience/book, ... and this is not a new discovery, ... and Tovey memory and brain were perfectly working.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Mon Feb 26, 2018 2:12 am

Hello Antonio,

That was a very self contradictory post.

Constant reiteration:
Now it should be finally clear to everybody that Tovey memory and brain were perfectly working
and Tovey memory and brain were perfectly working.
and then puts forward the suggestion that Tovey remembered something that didn't happen because Winston wrote in a book??
with memory problems but both remembering exactly the same situation
Churchill doesn't remember the "Shores of France". He says
The Bismarck was 400 hundred miles from Brest, and no longer able to steer thither."
What would be the point of ordering anybody to continue to the "Shores of France" later in the same paragraph, after an enemy who wasn't going there? His recollection of the signal is after Bismarck's rudder was jammed not before. Even he says,
but by then it was known Bismarck was steaming in the wrong direction
The whole account of Monday noight by Churchill is muddled in timing, and the the words
and he signalled accordingly
is the very limited confirmation it happened. No time expressed, nothing about it being so important it was sent by special cipher "For Your Eyes Only" . No response apparently required or put forward by the C in C ordered to sacrifice his flagship and crew in a vainglorious gesture.

Kennedy's rationalisation is the obvious, logical answer which Roskill kind of uses in Churchill and the Admirals except he can't resist trying to mislead the reader on timing and thus further denigrate Pound and Churchill. There was only ever one signal, whatever was considered the previous day. Tovey remembered things that didn't happen.

If the CMDS threat is confirmed by another source..........show it. :D

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Mon Feb 26, 2018 8:49 am

Hello everybody,

this is what Sir Ludovic Kennedy simply forgot to mention on his book Pursuit :
Churchill_towing_signal.jpg
Churchill_towing_signal.jpg (122.84 KiB) Viewed 2387 times
Sir Kennedy preferred to invent the " Paffard " solution and only unfairly wrote about Adm Tovey memory, even if he knew this Churchill book content perfectly and the fact that it has been the only reason why Adm Tovey disclosed his facts version about it.

Just this fact tells the whole story about how reliable Sir Kennedy was as historian ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Mon Feb 26, 2018 10:30 am

Hello Antonio,

The renowned and highly respected investigative journalist Kennedy describes exactly the same matter throughout page 225 in my copy of Pursuit, beginning the chapter "Epilogue" so he did not
simply forgot to mention.
Since he includes volume 3 of Churchill's book in his sources, he probably noted the former PM's muddled and illogical sequence of events and as the redacted Roskill/Kennedy material apparently shows, still hidden from us BTW, after consultation with Roskill came to a workable solution which they both followed for their books. This was that there never was a transmission on the 26th, therefore "signalled accordingly" is an error and a message about towing was never sent until 11:37B.

At the time the "Shores of France" is alleged to have been sent, Churchill's phrase "Meanwhile the King George V and the Rodney were drawing near" is completely incorrect. They were not drawing near but actually being left further behind since Bismarck was travelling faster than Rodney. They only started drawing near after Ark Royal's successful attack. Churchill's account is muddled and unclear as might be expected since he was attempting to handle the simultaneous disaster around Crete and generally run the United Kingdom as well! As self-appointed Minister for War as well as Prime Minister he had too much on his plate to understand all the intricacies of every situation but an unfortunate predilection for interfering with them anyway. His pet interest in the Bismarck chase was just a tiny part of his overall responsibilities. That he muddles the sequence of events in his book is not surprising and his blithe assumption that since he wanted a thing to happen it subsequently actually occurred is typical of the superficial control he could achieve, and the specific research he did when writing his book.

Kennedy did not "invent the Paffard situation" and as a responsible and reliable historian consulted with Tovey's former confidante to establish the likelihood the former C in C might remember things that didn't happen. Which Paffard confirmed. In this respect Roskill is shown somewhat wanting, but since he cites Kennedy on both the CMDS matter and the ROOF signals he clearly approves Kennedy's rationalisation

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Mon Feb 26, 2018 11:23 am

Hello everybody,

it is a duty of an historian to list the evidence and the correct sources supporting a reasoning and a conclusion reached, ... it is not correct to provide only a pre-digested and own rationalized version of the facts without providing the evidence supporting it, ... and it is even worst to intentionally avoid to provide the evidence of the opposite that the author had available being released by the persons he was directly referring to.

Here is Sir Ludovic Kennedy and you can compare it with Sir Winston Churchill book statements I provided above :
Kennedy_msg_towing_version_01.jpg
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Churchill wrote the message was delivered according to his desire by Pound, just before they realized that the Bismarck was damaged and consequently steering in the wrong direction, ... so around 10:30 pm more or less.
Kennedy above statement does not report correctly Churchill statement.

Kennedy_msg_towing_version_02.jpg
Kennedy_msg_towing_version_02.jpg (32.29 KiB) Viewed 2362 times
Again, according to Churchill ( and Tovey too ) the message was delivered before Bismarck was damaged by the Swordfish.
This is not what Kennedy wrote, ... there is no mention of this possibility on Kennedy narrative and notes.

Kennedy_msg_towing_version_03.jpg
Kennedy_msg_towing_version_03.jpg (29.37 KiB) Viewed 2362 times
There is no mention of Adm Pound telling Adm Tovey that the delivered message on the 26th evening was going to be expunged from the records.
Kennedy once again despite having evidence about this possibility avoided to mention it on his narrative.

No correlations with Sir Churchill book statements and no correlation with Adm Tovey letters that Sir Kennedy had both on his hands.

We can read only Sir Kennedy interpretation and version of the facts, ... which is a lot different than the sources Kennedy partially listed at the end.


Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga » Mon Feb 26, 2018 5:57 pm

Hello Antonio,
and it is even worst to intentionally avoid to provide the evidence of the opposite that the author had available being released by the persons he was directly referring to.
The only actual evidence, which is the non-existence of the "Shores of France" ROOF message, either in hard copy or anybody's memory apart from Tovey's, is what contradicts both Churchill and Tovey's accounts, and is judged more reliable by both Kennedy and Roskill after consultation and the latter's search for any sign of its existence. Churchill's sequence of events is extremely muddled, jumping backwards and forwards in time, without clarifying this for the reader.
delivered according to his desire by Pound, just before they realized that the Bismarck was damaged
Churchill has described the successful Ark Royal attack and goes on to describe Vian's torpedo attacks in the early hours of the 27th long before he talks of the signal. Then only after this he describes his movements, arriving at the War Room and talking to Bruce Fraser. He says he was there for four hours. Then he quotes Lutjens' final message concluding "Long live the Fuehrer!" and even the despatch of German bombers which happens on the 27th and U-boats to the rescue and includes the toothless U-556's encounter with Ark Royal many hours before the successful T/B attack. Then he retrospectively refers to Tovey's message planning the abandonment of the chase at midnight and then at last gets around to his intervention and the supposed signal.

There are more time jumps than the Back to the Future trilogy.

KG V was not drawing near to Bismarck before Ark Royal's successful attack. They were drawing near after it. After it there was no need to tell Tovey to "Continue to the Shores of France". If Churchill's account was accurate, "he would have said KG V and Rodney were being left trailing further and further behind and the C in C quite reasonably decided he would have to abandon the chase at midnight. I didn't like this, drafted a stupid signal which the First Sea Lord quite sensibly ignored, and I toddled off to bed once I realised Bismarck was cornered.

Roskill and Kennedy both want to get the CMDS story out in Pursuit. Highlighting Tovey's unreliable recollection of a non-existent signal, which was actually his first priority in all his letters, will make this "scoop" less newsworthy. And believable.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"

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