Wadinga wrote: "Holland....was forced by circumstances to take the approach he did and came so close to achieving a lethal concentration of force at a decisive range against an enemy under orders to avoid such a situation under all circumstances. "
dunmunro wrote:Thanks so much for that. I found the open fire time for Bismarck especially interesting.
...fighting with one hand only when it had got two............certainly wanted some very good reason.........
He should have learned instead 1) not to send any clearly unprotected ship against a modern battleship anymore
clearly unprotected ship against a modern battleship
the enemy was sighted in the most extreme visibility just where plotted
Wadinga wrote: "Alberto, you have long accused W-W of not sending a clearly unprotected ship against a modern battleship in low visibility well inside lethal gun range."
Wadinga wrote: "Norfolk is an unprotected ship, Suffolk is an unprotected ship..."
Paul Mercer wrote: "should recollections made often much later be taken at face value...?"
I’m not sure whether he was still a serving officer, but if so, would he have had one eye on the fact that the RN and the Admiralty, like other Services was very hierarchical who did not take criticism of their senior officers and their actions lightly, particularly if it was to be published for all to see?
have been written to embellish the story or at least to try to justify the "debatable" aspects of the story.
full use of her high speed
wadinga wrote:Hello All,
Attached is the only criticism of tactics by VCNS Tom Phillips which I found in my initial study of ADM 205/10.
VCNS comments on Tovey's Report and considers Dalrymple-Hamilton should not be favourably mentioned in any communique or be considered for awards
Tom Spencer Vaughn Phillips was not a popular staff officer with many who served under him, and his lack of popularity flavours much of the comment on his later command of Force Z and his responsibility for its destruction. However, this appears to be a case where he is particularly ungenerous to Rodney's captain, since as we can see from the signal log, and even his own comments, the Admiralty sent a series of contradictory instructions to Rodney with regard to their estimate of Bismarck's destination, starting with a contradiction to Tovey's 10:47B estimate based on the faulty D/F plotting. Of course, he, VCNS, never sent the Admiralty best guess location for the D/F position of Bismarck to anybody until far too late either. A vastly more serious blunder.
This analysis by the VCNS was actually done when he had reports and charts to go on, as opposed to any premature opinions he might have formulated based on limited information whilst the Bismarck operation was still on. His criticism is entirely unjustified IMHO for the failings above, and there seems to be some question when Rodney actually turned SE. Phillips says 21:00 whereas Rhys-Jones map shows a turn at 19:00 ie as soon as Phillips' latest contradiction was received and decoded.
In the event, Pound and Alexander ignored this churlish comment and Dalrymple-Hamilton received the praise he richly deserved. Based on very limited information, he had passed over Bismarck's future track not so many miles ahead of her, and with a bit of luck might have intercepted. Of course it was his guns which largely battered the Bismarck to bits later on.
Nowhere in this document is any other officer blamed for any shortcomings during the operation. That means Leach and Wake-Walker.
All the best
However this thread is about 1941 criticism of the actions of certain officers and the fact that none has been found of Wake-Walker or Leach. I still find it astonishing that these notes by a quite junior officer were presented straight to Pound. Their naivety is shown by the suggestion that Holland delayed opening fire too long, eg because PoW's guns could range to 36,000 yds they should have opened fire at that range.
Users browsing this forum: Google Adsense [Bot] and 6 guests