1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

Moderator: Bill Jurens

User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: 1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Post by wadinga »

Hello Herr Nilsson,

Excellent input as always,

D.D.I.C was Deputy Director for Intelligence Centre Admiral "Jock" Clayton who was the one who recommended at least three months' specialist experience as a D/F plotter before achieving reliable results. He set up the team and was in charge of the Operations Intelligence Centre at the Admiralty. Kemp and Denning who actually made the D/F plots reported to him.


By communicating directly with Tovey, and sending him only bearings, as he had apparently insisted, this short circuited the normal command path. Hopefully, hands-on operations people like Edwards were in copy. Was anybody like Edwards or Phillips checking that Tovey's 10:47B "assumed enemy position", anything like OIC's position worked out position? The degree of co-ordination at the Admiralty end seems poor. Routing information through a single point of contact might have ensured co-ordination.

I'll keep digging.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: 1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,

First a slight correction

Admiral Jock Clayton was in charge at OIC. Denning was senior and enlisted Kemp and set the standards for D/F experience.


Inserting additional excellent new information from Herr Nilsson
Tovey was sent "Take all forces of Home Fleet, also Rodney and Ramillies under your orders." by Captain Edwards, Director of Operations Division DOD(H) at 08:36B/25 and apparently repeated at 10:48B.
First set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 06:54Z. Zulu is GMT so this was plus 2 hours in zone B which Admiralty and all British and German ships were using.

This was intercepted at 08:54B/25.
D.D.I.C sent these out at 09:27B TOO and were received aboard KG V at 10:10B

Comment: The unfortunate Lloyd had half an hour, less decoding time to make something of these bearings, before Tovey sent out his 10:47B instruction.

Second set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 07:48Z or 09:48B/25.
D.D.I.C sent these out at 10:30B TOO and were received aboard KG V at 11:06B ie too late for Lloyd to compare with his original plot.
Tovey apparently failed to give his Position Course and Speed in his TOO 10:47B radio silence break when he gave out Lloyd's faulty position and instructed "All Home Fleet units search accordingly." Tom Phillips, subtly or testily, I don't know which, sends "Whenever you break radio silence it would be helpful if you would include position, course and speed. " which is an admonishment to a junior but perhaps a gentle reminder sent to the C-in-C. This is only sent at TOO 14:43, so for hours the Admiralty is in the dark about what Tovey is actually doing.

This shows Tom Phillips VCNS was well aware of the existence and content of Tovey's signal at 10:47 but was he aware of the significance of the position sent out by the C-in-C and the fact that it showed Tovey was sending his forces towards Norway?
Sir Arthur John Power Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Home ACNS (H) chipped in at 10:57B with a message saying the 08:54Z target identified and D/Fd was the same radio fingerprint as the ship transmitting after the Swordfish attack the previous evening ,ie Bismarck.
This message actually read "Radio fingerprints indicate that the ship which transmitted at 08:54B/25 [mistake for 08:54Z] in a position to the eastward of the last known position of Bismarck is the same ship that transmitted a number of messages after the T/B attack last night."

Comment: It is of course of limited interest that the D/F is to the eastward but Power must have seen a position and surely that indicated the more important southward movement of Bismarck

Third set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 08:54Z or 10:54B
This was a repetition of the 07:48Z transmission
D.D.I.C sent these out at 11:39B TOO Reception time in KG V unknown

Your 09:00 (ie Rodney's position, course and speed report) "Act on assumption enemy is proceeding towards a Bay of Biscay port." 11:58B/25 sent by Tom Phillips VCNS to Rodney. Despite the fact that Captain Edwards has put Rodney under Tovey's control, Phillips gives orders as if the Admiralty controls Rodney. Does Phillips realise he is contradicting Tovey?
Then comes utter confusion: "My 11:58B/25. Comply with C-in-C Home Fleet 10:47B/25 acting on assumption enemy is proceeding to Norway via passage between Scotland and Iceland. C.N.S 14:28B/25 to Rodney. C.N.S is First Sea Lord Dudley Pound. He did not author the 11:58 so how is it MY 11:58? Now he countermands Phillips' instruction, but amazingly despite the fact that all the consensus all morning at the Admiralty has been for a French destination he tells Dalrymple-Hamilton to assume Norway!
OIC sends its position estimate of the 08:54Z ie 10:54B interception.
"From D/F bearings the position of the enemy unit transmitting was in approximately 55deg 30min N; and between 31deg and 32 deg W at 10:54B/25. Longitude fix is unreliable.
This is sent by D.D.I.C at 12:28B/25

Comment: This was the last of the Bismarck intercepts at 10:54 Bravo and yet they gave no information about any trend southward during the three intercepts over the two hour period. This is plainly seen in Rhys-Jones book, although he seems confused about the use of Zulu and Bravo time zones. Maybe his source did not differentiate. These signal logs should be trustworthy.


Then Tom Phillips VCNS jumps in with:
"Good D/F fix at 13:20 [no time zone] puts enemy vessel within 50 miles of 55deg 15min N 32deg W Transmission was on submarine frequency but strength of signals indicates that ship transmitting was surface ship.
VCNS 14:19B25

Then OIC indicates this last intercept for which they send the bearings anyway was probably submarine.
D.D.I.C 15:07B/25
Stung, or reminded by Tom Phillips, Tovey reports his course and speed in a message TOO 16:21B/25 reporting that he is sailing 080T at 25 knots......... ie not towards France. He adds perhaps desperately, since Lloyd has apparently recalculated and discovered his error over the D/F, "Your 14:28, do you consider enemy is making for Faroes?" He has intercepted the confusing instruction to Rodney.
Receiving no answer he reports position, course and speed again at 18:17B revealing he has changed course to 117T that is towards France, at last!
Then to add confusion to confusion "Cancel my 14:28B/25. Proceed on the assumption that the destination of the enemy is a French port." sent by Tom Phillips VCNS at 18:05B/25 to Rodney. So the Vice Chief of Naval Staff countermands the instructions of the Chief of Naval Staff, Dudley Pound.
Then "Admiralty appreciation is that Bismarck is heading for west coast of France." 18:24B/25 from VCNS no addressee listed so presumably all stations.

Going to check OIC Zulu times for interceptions against Bismarck KTB transmission times for long signal and repeats due to Enigma decode problems.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
Herr Nilsson
Senior Member
Posts: 1578
Joined: Thu Oct 21, 2004 11:19 am
Location: Germany

Re: 1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Additional information from Battle Summary No. 5 including some reception times:
25th1.jpg
25th1.jpg (118.44 KiB) Viewed 3693 times
25th2.jpg
25th2.jpg (122.7 KiB) Viewed 3693 times
25th3.jpg
25th3.jpg (41.73 KiB) Viewed 3693 times
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: 1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Post by dunmunro »

This is extracted from the 1942 edition of Battle Summary 5:
The King George V was still proceeding to the south-west when at 1030 25 May “a series of D.F. bearings was received from the Admiralty which indicated that the enemy was breaking back across the Atlantic. The signals appeared to come from the same ship which had transmitted several signals soon after the T/ B attack of the night before; they could therefore be reasonably attributed to the Bismarck. These, bearings, as plotted in the King George V, showed a position too far to the northward which gave the misleading impression that the enemy was making for the North Sea.” 34 This plot placed the enemy in 57 ° N., 33 ° W. 35 at 0852/ 25 (see Plan 6) and had an important bearing on the subsequent proceedings for “it gave the misleading impression that the enemy was making for the North Sea.” (Commander-in-Chief’s despatch, paragraph 52.) To counter this move the Commander-in-Chief turned round at 1047/ 25 to 55 ° at 27 knots to make for the Iceland-Faroes gap. The plotted position was broadcast and all Home Fleet forces were ordered to search accordingly. (Commander-in-Chief’s signal 1047/ 25). The Repulse was no longer with him, having parted company at 0906/ 25 to proceed to Newfoundland to fuel. Meanwhile the Suffolk out to the westward had-been covering all the enemy’s possible courses to the south-west and, on receiving the Commander-in-Chief’s signal (1047/ 25), turned to search to the eastward. Her search to the south-west had been fruitless. The search

by the Victorious and Galatea’s cruisers to the north-west had been equally empty. Nothing had been sighted. The Victorious landed on her six Swordfish at 1107/ 25. One failed to return36 and she remained for some time calling it. The Galatea, Aurora and Kenya on receiving the Commander-in-Chief’s signal (1047/ 25) to search in the direction of the D.F. position had turned to 85 °. The fuel state was beginning to affect them. The Hermione was down to 40 per cent, and had to be detached to Hvalifjord (Iceland). The remaining cruisers had to reduce to 20 knots to economise. The King George V still had 60.6 per cent. left.
34. Commander-in-Chief’s despatch, paragraph 52. A first set of bearings of signals made by enemy at 0654/ 25 was sent out by Admiralty at, 0927/ 25 and was received in King George V at 1010/ 25. A second set made at 0748/ 25 went out at 1030/ 25 and was received at 1106/ 25. (King George V’s signal log.)
35. The Bismarck seems to have been actually some 60 miles to the southward.
36. The Victorious lost two Fulmars on 24/ 25 May and two Swordfish during searches on 25/ 26 May. One landed alongside a ship’s lifeboat, empty, but stored with provisions and water; the crew were nine days in her before being rescued by a merchant vessel.

At 1100/ 25 the King George V, the Suffolk and the Prince of Wales were making north-eastward towards the D.F. indications of the enemy’s position at 0852/ 25. The Rodney was in about 52 ° 34’ N., 29 ° 23’ W., some 280 miles to the south-eastward on the route to the Bay, and had decided at 0800/ 25 to remain there, but on receiving the Commander-in-Chief’s signal (1047/ 25) she too turned to 55 ° and proceeded eastward. Nothing had been seen of the enemy and his proceedings were shrouded in uncertainty. The Admiralty had, however, come to the conclusion that Admiral Lütjens was steering for Brest and at 1023/ 25 directions were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Force H and 1st Cruiser Squadron to proceed on that assumption. 37 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, in the Norfolk had already come to this conclusion, and in view of the paucity of cruisers to the south-east was proceeding eastward on a course, 100 °. Meanwhile Bismarck’s course38 seems to have been about 125 ° which would put her at 1100/ 25 about 165 miles east of the King George V, whose south-westerly track she seems to have crossed at 0800/ 25 about 100 miles astern. The heavy sea prohibited the use of the King George V’s Walrus, as it would have involved the loss of the plane and the exposure of the flagship to submarine attack while picking up the crew. “The accuracy of the information issued by the Admiralty throughout this stage of the operation and the speed with which it was passed out were beyond praise,” 39 A clear view of the situation was given to all the forces concerned and the Commander-in-Chief was able to preserve wireless silence. In the absence, however, of definite reports it was difficult to be certain of the position of the enemy. The D.F. bearings in the morning had not been very definite. At 1100/ 25 the Renown (Force H), then in 41 ° 30’ N., 17 ° 10’ W., was ordered to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding to Brest. She shaped course accordingly and prepared a comprehensive scheme of air search. At 1108/ 25, the Rodney was told to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding to the Bay. A couple of hours later a good D.F. fix at 1320/ 25 located an enemy unit within a 50-mile radius of 55 ° 15’ N., 32 ° W. This was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief at 1419/ 25 (received at 1530/ 25). The enemy’s route was still in doubt and at 1428/ 25, the Rodney was told by the Admiralty to cancel the signal of 1108/ 25 (giving the Bay as the enemy’s destination), and to comply with the Commander-in-Chief’s previous instructions40 on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding to Norway via the Iceland-Scotland passage. A couple of hours later, at 1621/ 25, came a query from Admiral Tovey who was still steering to the eastward, 80 ° at 25 knots – “Do you consider that enemy is making for Faroes?” As evening drew on, opinion evidently hardened in favour of the Biscay destination, for at 1805/ 25 the Admiralty signal of 1428/ 25 to the Rodney was cancelled and she was told to act on the assumption that the destination of the enemy was a French port. Finally at 1924/ 25 the Commander-in-Chief

and all other forces and vessels were informed that the Admiralty considered that the Bismarck was making for the West Coast of France. It was 1810/ 25 when the Commander-in-Chief turned accordingly to the south-east. He had no definite information. Aircraft had seen nothing. The Victorious, away to the northward in 57 ° 59’ N., 32 ° 40’ W. flew off six Swordfish41 at 2110 to search between 80 ° and 180 ° for 100 miles. They saw nothing but the Suffolk (in 56 ° 55’ N., 31 ° 17’ W.). On the route to Biscay a sweep was flown by Coastal Command flying boats in the evening out to 30 ° W., but nothing was seen of the enemy, who probably crossed 30 ° W. at about 1600/ 25. So ended, in an atmosphere of dimmed hope and dulled expectancy, a day of search and disappointment. The Bismarck was lost. Behind her lay the gallant Hood. In the south the Renown and Ark Royal breasting the heavy Atlantic seas were pursuing steadily their northward way.
Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1941 At 1030 on 26 May the Bismarck was sighted by a Catalina plane of Coastal Command, approximately in square BE 16, 600 miles west of Land’s End. Anti-aircraft gunfire from the Bismarck caused the plane to lose contact...

37. “Proceed on assumption enemy turned towards Brest.” Received Norfolk 1045/ 25.
38. From Commander-in-Chief’s track chart. The Admiralty plotted her by D.F. bearings at 1054/ 25 in approximately 55 ° 30’ N, and between 31 ° and 32 ° W. (Signal to Commander-in-Chief 1228/ 25, received in King George V at 1401/ 25.) (See Plan 6.)
39. Commander-in-Chief’s despatch, paragraph 53. 40. i.e., of 1047/ 25 to search towards the D.F. position of 0852/ 25 in 57 ° N. 33 ° W. 41. Flown off 2110/ 25; landed on 0005/ 26.
40. i.e., of 1047/ 25 to search towards the D.F. position of 0852/ 25 in 57 ° N. 33 ° W. 41. Flown off 2110/ 25; landed on 0005/ 26.



GH Bennett. Bismarck: The Chase and Sinking of Hitler's Goliath . University of Plymouth Press. Kindle Edition.
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: 1941 Criticism of Royal Navy Officers' tactics

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,

Inserting additional excellent new information from Herr Nilsson and Dunmunro,
Tovey was sent "Take all forces of Home Fleet, also Rodney and Ramillies under your orders." by Captain Edwards, Director of Operations Division DOD(H) at 08:36B/25 and apparently repeated at 10:48B.
First set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 06:54Z. Zulu is GMT so this was plus 2 hours in zone B which Admiralty and all British and German ships were using.

This was intercepted at 08:54B/25.
D.D.I.C sent these out at 09:27B TOO and were received aboard KG V at 10:10B

Comment: This was Lutjens' routine report that he was being shadowed by a battleship and two heavy cruisers. He was apparently unaware he had lost his shadowers hours before.
Comment: The unfortunate Lloyd had half an hour, less decoding time to make something of these bearings, before Tovey sent out his 10:47B instruction.

Second set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 07:48Z or 09:48B/25.
D.D.I.C sent these out at 10:30B TOO and were received aboard KG V at 11:06B ie too late for Lloyd to compare with his original plot.
Comment; This was a full transmission of Lutjens' long report, sent in four segments, as recorded in the Bismarck KTB. OIC calculated 55deg 15min N 31 deg W. (Hinsley British Intelligence Vol I)
Tovey apparently failed to give his Position Course and Speed in his TOO 10:47B radio silence break when he gave out Lloyd's faulty position and instructed "All Home Fleet units search accordingly." Tom Phillips, subtly or testily, I don't know which, sends "Whenever you break radio silence it would be helpful if you would include position, course and speed. " which is an admonishment to a junior but perhaps a gentle reminder sent to the C-in-C. This is only sent at TOO 14:43, so for hours the Admiralty is in the dark about what Tovey is actually doing.

This shows Tom Phillips VCNS was well aware of the existence and content of Tovey's signal at 10:47 but was he aware of the significance of the position sent out by the C-in-C and the fact that it showed Tovey was sending his forces towards Norway?

Comment: Tovey's 10:47B/25 with its incorrect position was received in the Admiralty at 11:16B/25 (Hinsley ) but nobody thought it strange that both the separate OIC bearing sets suggested a location to the south, whereas Tovey's was to the North.
Sir Arthur John Power Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Home ACNS (H) chipped in at 10:57B with a message saying the 08:54Z target identified and D/Fd was the same radio fingerprint as the ship transmitting after the Swordfish attack the previous evening ,ie Bismarck.
This message actually read "Radio fingerprints indicate that the ship which transmitted at 08:54B/25 [mistake for 08:54Z] in a position to the eastward of the last known position of Bismarck is the same ship that transmitted a number of messages after the T/B attack last night."

Comment: It is of course of limited interest that the D/F is to the eastward but Power must have seen a position and surely that indicated the more important southward movement of Bismarck

Third set of bearings from intercepted transmission at 08:54Z or 10:54B
This was a repetition of the 07:48Z transmission
D.D.I.C sent these out at 11:39B TOO Reception time in KG V unknown

Comment: OIC's position for these was 55 deg N 31 deg W. This appears to be another full retransmission of the Lutjens Long Signal which I do not believe is recorded in the recreated Bismarck KTB.
Your 09:00 (ie Rodney's position, course and speed report) "Act on assumption enemy is proceeding towards a Bay of Biscay port." 11:58B/25 sent by Tom Phillips VCNS to Rodney. Despite the fact that Captain Edwards has put Rodney under Tovey's control, Phillips gives orders as if the Admiralty controls Rodney. Does Phillips realise he is contradicting Tovey?

Then comes utter confusion: "My 11:58B/25. Comply with C-in-C Home Fleet 10:47B/25 acting on assumption enemy is proceeding to Norway via passage between Scotland and Iceland. C.N.S 14:28B/25 to Rodney. C.N.S is First Sea Lord Dudley Pound. He did not author the 11:58 so how is it MY 11:58? Now he countermands Phillips' instruction, but amazingly despite the fact that all the consensus all morning at the Admiralty has been for a French destination he tells Dalrymple-Hamilton to assume Norway!

OIC sends its position estimate of the 08:54Z ie 10:54B interception.
"From D/F bearings the position of the enemy unit transmitting was in approximately 55deg 30min N; and between 31deg and 32 deg W at 10:54B/25. Longitude fix is unreliable.
This is sent by D.D.I.C at 12:28B/25

Comment: This was the last of the Bismarck intercepts at 10:54 Bravo and yet they gave no information about any trend southward during the three intercepts over the two hour period. This is plainly seen in Rhys-Jones book, although he seems confused about the use of Zulu and Bravo time zones. Maybe his source did not differentiate. These signal logs should be trustworthy.

Further Comment: Apologies to Mr Rhys-Jones there are two transmissions two hours apart creating Z/B confusion.
The D.D.I.C 12:28B/25 of the first intercept position is received in KG V at 14:01B. Only one worked out position is sent, instead of the three available from three independent intercepts. After seeing this, less than an hour later Tovey must have received Pound's incomprehensible instruction to Rodney to follow his (Tovey's) instruction to head for Norway! This arrives at about the same time Phillips' message below arrives giving him the 13:20B position meaning a southbound routeing for Bismarck, contradicting what his superior has said at about the same time 14:19B and 14:28B!
I imagine just after this is when a desperate Lloyd, in receipt of three sets of bearings, possibly little idea of what stations they apply to, and two OIC worked out positions, both of which are very different to his, is sent back to his charts to "sort things out". In the meantime KG V sails a compromise course which is letting Bismarck get away. Confusion continues for hours.

Then Tom Phillips VCNS jumps in with:
"Good D/F fix at 13:20 [no time zone] puts enemy vessel within 50 miles of 55deg 15min N 32deg W Transmission was on submarine frequency but strength of signals indicates that ship transmitting was surface ship.
VCNS 14:19B25

Then OIC indicates this last intercept for which they sent the bearings anyway was probably submarine.
D.D.I.C 15:07B/25

Stung, or reminded by Tom Phillips, Tovey reports his course and speed in a message TOO 16:21B/25 reporting that he is sailing 080T at 25 knots......... ie not towards France. He adds perhaps desperately, since Lloyd has apparently recalculated and discovered his error over the D/F, "Your 14:28, do you consider enemy is making for Faroes?" He has intercepted the confusing instruction to Rodney.

Receiving no answer he reports position, course and speed again at 18:17B revealing he has changed course to 117T that is towards France, at last!

Then to add confusion to confusion "Cancel my 14:28B/25. Proceed on the assumption that the destination of the enemy is a French port." sent by Tom Phillips VCNS at 18:05B/25 to Rodney. So the Vice Chief of Naval Staff countermands the instructions of the Chief of Naval Staff, Dudley Pound.
Then "Admiralty appreciation is that Bismarck is heading for west coast of France." 18:24B/25 from VCNS no addressee listed so presumably all stations.

Comment: I consider that the constantly vacillating contradictions inherent in Admiralty intelligence sent to Tovey that day, meant when he complimented them so fully on their invaluable assistance he was in fact writing with sarcastic humour! However his own failures in obstinately refusing worked out positions and in not reporting his intentions when breaking radio silence at 10:47B mean he had a big hand in creating that chaos.


For Dalrymple-Hamilton and Frank Lloyd to be singled out for opprobrium as was attempted was most unfair.

Any other information welcome.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Post Reply