Post
by alecsandros » Sun Sep 09, 2018 2:52 pm
Hello Antonio,
IMHO, and briefly re-reading the documents that you have linked to in the first post,
the moral blame for the loss of the Bismarck , and overall failure of operation Rheinubung (which didn't attain the objective of disrupting enemy trade routes) falls on the shoulders of Admiral Raeder. He was the one that pressed Adm Luetjens into following an order that was, apparently, considered by Adm Luetjens as nearly suicidal.
Luetjens had previous North Atlantic experience on Operation Berlin (with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau), and he knew how difficult it was to breakout undetected, attack the enemy when and if he was NOT having heavy forces nearby, always mantaining the advantage of superior own speed, and very importantly, never have his ships damaged in any meaningfull way.
He also knew how crucial the training of the crews was.
As known, Op. Berlin was executed between January to March, winter months in which the weather and nightlengths greatly favored the attacker (the raiders).
The proposed Operation Rheinubung in the middle of the year (May 15th was the initial proposed date), with green crews (both Bismarck and P.E. were in their first mission), was very badly received by Luetjens.
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As it was though, with Luetjens in command of the task force, I find him having a curiously offensive spirit, in spite of the growing evidence that the enemy was expecting him, if not outright waiting for him into an open trap:
- Luetjens departed Gottenfagen on May 18th, passed Kattegat on May 20th, and entered Bergen on May 21st. It was impossible for the 2 heavy ships + escorts NOT to have been seen - and reported - by enemy agents. Luetjens actualy sent a message to Group North on May 20th suggesting that he had been spotted. This was the first moment when Luetjens shoudl have considered he had lost the critical element of surprise.
- On May 21st in the afternoon, while still at anchor in Bergen, Bismarck received a radio message from Germany, containing the info that British aircraft had been sent to search for German heavy ships "heading north". This was the second moment when Luetjens must have known he lost the element of surprise.
What could 2 German heavy ships possibly be doing in Bergen ? There were no Russian convoys in May 1941, so they were either a) conducting exercises (improbable as the Baltic was a much safer and economical place for such actions), or b) preparing to sortie in the Atlantic trade routes, just as S/G did several months before, just as Scheer/Spee/etc did before them. If a), the Admiraltly had nothing to fear, but if b), the Admiralty should block the entry paths - just as they tried to do at the start of Op. berlin, when Luetjens was nearly caught by a large British task force, lead by Adm. Tovey.
As it was May 21st , and with British forces concentrated in Scapa, it goes without saying that the Admiralty had ample time to block the entries (before May 24th). What Luetjens didn't know was that the ships were also equipped with surface-search radars, that could also track at night and/or in bad weather.
Nonetheless, forcing the execution of the mission against clear indication that the enemy was expecting his sortie is an example of curiously offensive spirit, at least IMHO.
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- After departing under the cover of darkenss, and then under the cover of fog and clouds, steaming at 24 to 27kts, Luetjens's task force "found" the enemy at 19:30 on May 23rd - first contact with Suffolk/Norfolk. Then and there , and especialy after 5 hours of attempting to shake off the cruisers - to no effect, despite practical zero visibility betwen the 2 task forces - Luetjens had complete information: the enemy knew of his deployment since May 20th; the enemy has surface search radar (or other precise range measuring instruments) mounted on his warships. Therefore, going deeper into the south would bring about enemy ships (directed by the 2 shadowing cruisers), and all convoys would be re-routed anyway based on intelligence provided by the 2 shadowers.
- My impression is that - then and there, at 01:00 on May 24th, Luetjens should have cancelled the mission, either by returning back north of the strait - and from there still to the north, as he did once with S/G, - or by adopting a clear defensive posture, hugging the Eastern shores of Greenland, manouvreing thorugh the icebergs, and keeping a maximum possible distance between him and Iceland. If he would have opted to go back north, the mission would probably, ultimately, get cancelled (as he would have had a hard time breaking off contact with Suffolk BEFORE Prinz Eugen ran out of fuel). If he woudl have opted to go south, he would have probably narrowly miss Hood , and, ultimately dettach Prinz Eugen on May 24th in the afternoon, while Bismarck continued on an ever Southernly course, followed by Suffolk until May 25th (when Suffolk went to Iceland to refuel). Afterwards , Bismarck would find a cargo to refuel on her own, maybe on the 26th or 27th, far in the South... Afterwards, he woudl have 1-2 weeks of roaming on the open ocean, with unknown results.
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- As things went, with Prinz Eugen hitting an iceberg with a propeller, and having slightly reduced speed, Bismarck losing the main forward radar, and Suffolk still mantaining contact , and afterwards Prince of Wales striking Bismarck 3 times - causing flooding and oil loss (thus range loss), the mission was clearly a failure.
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- By then (May 24th 7:00), Luetjens had the complete picture: The British detected him on the 20th, placed radar-patrols immediately in the entries of the Atlantic, and deployed heavy task forces to intercept. The battle with Hood and KGV were only a taste of what was to come - British Air Force, and the Royal Navy, were onto him and were permanently fed with updated info on speed and course, from Suffolk/Norfolk (later from Prince of Wales as well). The German BB was leaking oil, speed was reduced to 28kts, and Prinz Eugen had much to low fuel levels to continue the mission.
- Then and there, there was ABSOLUTELY NO REASON to continue to the South. The Bismarck should have steamed North, with Prinz Eugen, and force his way out of the Denmark Strait. The probable weight of enemies deployed to the NOrth was DEFINETELY lighter then the weight deployed to the SOUTH and EAST. The TIME required to get back to Bergen was MUCH smaller then to get to Brest: 2,5 days versus 4 days - that's an extra 36 hours that the enemy DIDN'T have to attack him.
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- The only excuse I can find for Luetjens rest on the method/way in which Raeder had coerced him into this mission: who knows what sort of discussion they actualy had, and what sort of weight/threats Raeder issued to Luetjens, had the mission failed ?
- Nonentheless, the German KGM high command (and firstly Raeder) were the principal responsibles to the tragic loss of the Bismarck.
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- As for Prinz Eugen's lack of torpedo deployment, with a green crew and at 140hm distance, there was maybe 1 in a million chance to hit Prince of Wales (by then anyway withdrawing at an accute angle). I don't think that any fault sohuld be placed on them, especialy as all the 3 hits on Bismarck had already been scored, and the launching of torps wouldn;t have made any importance over the decisions of Capt. Leach, as the order to disengage had already been issued, Norfolk and Suffolk wouldn;t observe the launch, and there were no other ships in the area to be hit "by accident", by the torpedoes.
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- Those are my thoughts Antonio... Had Bismarck made it to Brest, Luetjens may have been reprehended - or not - depending on what Raeder's position would have been. As it was, Hitler simply became much more weary onto sending heavy ships in the Atlantic, and , in effect, restrained all German heavy ships operations to the Baltic and - later - to the Arctic Ocean...
Best Regards,
