Hits on PoW and Bismarck

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Wadinga wrote: "Alberto, please treat us equally and criticise Antonio for relying on Lagemann's captions"

possibly Mr.Wadinga has not understood yet that NH69722 is showing the first salvo NOT due to Lagemann caption, but due to the careful analysis done by Antonio on the smoke and the expended cartridges on PG quarterdeck....


In order to avoid to use heavy insults, I intentionally avoid to comment on the BS "guns discharge" invented by this very imaginative guy, but I suggest him to look better at the image and relative positions of the ships.....


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

Wadinga wrote: "Alberto, please treat us equally and criticise Antonio for relying on Lagemann's captions"

possibly Mr.Wadinga has not understood yet that NH69722 is showing the first salvo NOT due to Lagemann caption, but due to the careful analysis done by Antonio on the smoke and the expended cartridges on PG quarterdeck....


In order to avoid to use heavy insults, I intentionally avoid to comment on the BS "guns discharge" invented by this very imaginative guy, but I suggest him to look better at the image and relative positions of the ships.....


Bye, Alberto

Brinkmann:

...The enemy opened fire even while closing in. Bismarck was the first to answer [their] fire and shortly thereafter Prinz Eugen, and the battle
developed as described above.... (PE War Diary, p.35)

[northcape]

possibly Mr.Wadinga has not understood yet that NH69722 is showing the first salvo NOT due to Lagemann caption, but due to the careful analysis done by Antonio on the smoke and the expended cartridges on PG quarterdeck....

Bye, Alberto

There isn't anything like this to understand. The "careful analysis" (what does this actually mean - no matter how careful, it is still flawed by tons of assumptions and wrong understanding on many levels) just leads to an interpretation, which one wants to believe or not. But it doe snot represent a fact on which interpretations can be based on, it is just an interpretation itself.

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,


Alberto, please don't curb your heavy insults on my behalf. Every single one undermines your credibility still further and therefore that of your assertions.

and the expended cartridges on PG quarterdeck.

Gee, can Antonio really see through solid steel and round corners to confirm there are no other expended cartridges anywhere on the entire after deck or in the turrets themselves, outside the view of the camera?

There is no target for Bismarck's guns in the 146-1994-055-13 photo- where is PoW? Where is the big cloud of smoke? There is no evidence the last salvo was fired at 06:09 and no evidence the discharge in the photo is fired at PoW or happened at 06:09.

Neither "milestone" is established.


Hi Paul Mercer. Despite the manufacturer's claims and enthusiasm for the wonderfulness of the gyros and stable verticals and RPC and all that in use in 1941, the reality is that lag in the various systems meant manouevring damaged your accuracy. If the weather is bad enough, as on 27th May, the ship may be yawing and rolling and the gyros will struggle to even compensate for these involuntary motions. If you are a little ship whose gunnery cannot hurt the opponent even if you hit him, then salvo chasing makes sense. (HMS Southampton at Jutland, US destroyers at Samar) If you are in Bismarck you want very best accuracy for your big guns maintained, so as to hurt your enemy before he hurts you. Having said that, small gradual infrequent course changes suficient to spoil the enemy's estimation of inclination might inconvenience the enemy without disturbing your own fire control.


Estimates of the closing rate used by McMullen must take into account he apparently used 212T as his estimated course for Bismarck thus creating an artificially high closing rate, applied automatically in addition to his down corrections. These were made based on spotting, because his initial range estimate was far too high. His Dumaresq/Dreyer related his course and speed to the target angle, but the element of the range/rate created by Bismarck's course and speed was based solely on his guess. A guess made when he had no reliable range change information from his rangefinders to inform this estimate.



All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

RN capital ship main batteries, certainly of the early war period, did not feature RPC capability. I might be mistaken, but I don't think that RPC became available for RN battleship main batteries until Vanguard.

"Weaving" was a standard evasive tactic by German warships under close fire as early as WW1. The RN evaluated it and found it effective with little or no hindrance to outgoing gunnery. Course deviations of as little as one point about the base course were found to be sufficient for "Fast" ships (Bismarck would certainly have qualified).

B

[Byron Angel]

Hi Byron,

you wrote: "water, being an incompressible fluid, exerts its pressure everywhere within a filled volume"

Sure, but a simple leaking will not generate ANY pressure at high speed, and it is clear that the bulkhead between XX and XIX was reinforced because of such a dynamic pressure.

- - -

Per Mullenheim-Rechberg's account of events from his book, "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Account" -

That first hit, forward of the armored transverse bulkhead in the forecastle, passed completely through the ship from port to starboard above the waterline but below the bow wave. It damaged the bulkheads between Compartments XX and XXI and Compartments XXI and XXII and left a one-and-a-half-meter hole in the exit side. Before long we had nearly 2,000 tons of seawater in our forecastle. Our damage-control parties and machinery-repair teams made a detailed inspection of the damage that had been done by the two serious hits and set about making what repairs they could.

>>>>> Water rushing into the ship through a hole 1.5 meters in diameter (the more I ponder this, the more I wonder if this projectile may have detonated just prior to exiting) would have almost immediately filled the compartment; thereafter, water would have been propelled under pressure of the inrushing water through damage areas of the respective bulkheads and deck and into neighboring compartments. M-R's account implies that 2,000 tons of water may well have already been taken aboard the ship before the damage control parties had even had an opportunity to fully assess the situation and execute necessary damage control measures. 2,000 metric tons of water = 2,000 cubic meters of volume; allowing for permeability factors, it strongly suggests that 2,500-3,000 cubic meters of forward compartment volume within the forecastle of the ship was by then already flooded out. That is about one-half the total volume of the forecastle forward of the transverse armored bulkhead beneath the original waterline. Please note that the bulkhead separating sections XIX/XX was in fact the forward transverse armored bulkhead. If that bulkhead had failed, the ammunition handling spaces and magazines of the forward main battery turrets would most likely have flooded out as well.

- - -

More from Mullenheim-Rechberg -
Forward, the anchor windlass room was unusable and the lower decks between Compartments XX and XXI were flooded. Consequently, the bulkhead behind Compartment XX was being subjected not only to the pressure of static water, but, on account of the big hole in our hull, to that created by our forward motion. To keep it from giving way, a master carpenter's team shored it up while the action was still going on.

>>>>> Given that sections XX and XXI were inaccessible, and given the importance of the bulkhead between sections XX/XIX, it is obvious why efforts to shore it against failure were immediately undertaken.

- - -

More from Mullenheim-Rechberg -
After the action, a work party led by the second damage control officer, Oberleutnant (Ingenieurwesen) Karl-Ludwig Richter, attempted to enter the forward pumping station through the forecastle in order to repair the pumps so that the contents of the forward fuel storage tanks could be transferred to the service tanks near the boiler rooms. But the pumps in Compartment XX were under water, those in Compartment XVII did not help much, and the valves in the oil lines in the forecastle were no longer serviceable. When an effort to divert the oil via the upper deck also failed, we realized that the 1,000 tons of fuel in the forward tanks were not going to be any use to us. Lütjens turned down Lindemann's suggestion of heeling the ship first to one side and then the other and reducing speed in order to allow the holes in our hull to be patched.

Later, however, we did slow to 22 knots for a while, which at least allowed matting to be placed over the holes, and the flow of water into the ship was reduced.

The lasting effect of the hits in Compartments XIV and XXI was that, mainly because of water pressure on the forward bulkheads, our top speed was restricted to 28 knots. We were now leaving a broad streak of oil in our wake, which was undoubtedly going to help the enemy's reconnaissance and pursuit. The oil was leaking from the service tanks in Compartment XIV and possibly also from the storage tanks in Compartments XX and XXI.

>>>>> The underlined passage above is what I was referring to when I mentioned that water is an incompressible fluid.


B

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

having agreed about the Bismarck opening and closing fire positions at 05:55 and 06:09, ... lets establish a general agreement for this demo that between 05:55 and 06:03 the Bismarck was either running a course 220° ( my opinion ) ... or 230° ( your opinion ) ... or that " mix " that we can see into the many PoW 4 different maps ( gunnery plot, plan 4, Rowell, general map ).

Lets summarize that among the above 3 possibilities the Bismarck until 06:03 was more or less following the Prinz Eugen.

Now 3 questions to you :

1 ) During these 8 minutes period the Bismarck, ... due to her course, ... was having always her main turrets trained forward the beam, ... and receiving any incoming hit from PoW, coming from forward the beam, ... average 25/18° as for PoW gunnery plot bearing 335°/328° salvoes ( 18 ) fired at her in central control. Do you agree ?

2) My opinion is that the 2 first hits were received into the compartments XIV and XXI and after involved the compartments XIII and XX. Do you agree ?

3) Now we are at the " KEY " moment at 06:03. My opinion is that when Kpt Brinkmann issued the torpedo alarm, the Bismarck turned on 270° ( 50° to starboard ) and soon after the Prinz Eugen followed her. Since your map example does not show this turn, what is your opinion here ?
You do not trust the torpedo alarm being issued by the Prinz Eugen, or the Bismarck reaction to it with her 50° turn to starboard ?

Thanks and bye, Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Wadinga wrote: "Alberto, please don't curb your heavy insults on my behalf."

To avoid insults, Mr.Wadinga should not post his usual nonsense like "dis-charging guns" for Bismarck last (depicted) salvo photo.

he wrote; "can Antonio really see through solid steel and round corners to confirm there are no other expended cartridges anywhere"

in case there are, it (hypothetically) may be the second or the third salvo, making even more difficult to move Bismarck from around 220° course until Hood sinking.
Able to see the nonsense contesting the photo timing at 5:55 ? This is valid also for the other two genius (posting Brinkmann and debating the "interpretation" ) who posted the same nonsense above just in the hope to help an untenable position.

he wrote: "Neither "milestone" is established"

Unfortunately for him, he has NO DECENT ALTERNATIVE to Antonio's reconstruction. Milestones are there until they are proven wrong by better ones. Full Stop.



A comment on PoW salvo plot: the bearings and the ranges were coming from the AFCT, there is no way to deny these precise data. The only "guess" is the estimated red track of Bismarck, but the closing rate of Bismarck (almost 5000 yards in 4 minutes as I say from 5:56:10 till 6:00:10, or 900 meters per minute as Mr.Jurens stated viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8329&start=135#p80975, I see no answer to him in this regards by the hooligans/deniers, why ? ) fixes her course to around 220° at a closing relative speed of 30 knots. Incontrovertible and end of Mr.Wadinga's fantasies about a turn away before Hood explosion.


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

@Antonio

First I have to evaluate the picture provided by Alberto. However, it seems to me, that my working hypothesis was probably wrong. It's better to have a clear picture than a blurred one. Fortunately NH 69730 and the "final salvo" are clear and my work wasn't for nothing. The training of the turrets is 100° for NH 69730 and 110° for the "final salvo".

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Byron,

you wrote (from the Baron): "Consequently, the bulkhead behind Compartment XX was being subjected not only to the pressure of static water, but, on account of the big hole in our hull, to that created by our forward motion. "

Once established that Bismarck was on course around 220° during the time Hood was afloat, the shell must have severed in some way the bulkhead between compartment XX and XXI in such a way that water was pressuring the bulkhead between XX and XIX at high speed (forward motion, not only static).
I agree with you that this can be caused by an unfortunate big piece of steel dislocated by the shell (entering and exiting in comp. XXI) and thrown against the bulkhead between XX and XXI, but the most likely path of the shell is obviously through the bulkhead itself, opening comp. XX to sea water through the bulkhead and the exit hole (this last located as a good candidate above the white false bow wave in comp. XX, as per the photo and as per Thorsten reconstruction).

No simple leakage caused by splinters can account for such a dynamic pressure against the bulkhead between comp. XX and XIX. Only a hole open to sea (through the hull or the fore bulkhead) can.


Bye, Alberto

[paul.mercer]

Hello everybody,

finally we seem to have something to start referring to and to work with, … very good.

Thanks to Herr Nilsson for having posted his current opinion about how it went, and for having confirmed the validity of the Prinz Eugen own track on her battle map, … as obvious, ... and for having used it as the correct reference to show in relation to it the Bismarck course according to his current opinion.

I see according to him that Bismarck run that straight line on course 230° true, … depicted in RED.

Herr Nilsson also defined 2 milestones as well on his proposed map, … the 05:55 position of the Bismarck according to the photo NH69722 first salvo, and it is correct in my personal opinion, … as well as the position of the Bismarck last salvo at 06:09 in relation to the Prinz Eugen track, and it is correct as well in my personal opinion.

Does every body agree about it ? I hope so, … even R. Winklareth was in agreement about them, … so I do not expect surprises about it, … but you never know so that is why I am asking, …

Let see how that materialize on the geometrical figure on the tracks and on the relative bearings using the Prinz Eugen original track as agreed and the PoW battle map plan 4 I hope nobody will have problems with, … since it is an official document too.

For me it is a kid game to scale them and place them in the correct relative position one to the other.

Here we go :




We have the Bismarck positions ( 05:55 and 06:09 ) on the 2 RED dots and the PoW positions at the same battle time on the 2 GREEN dots.



Bearings_demo_01.jpg


Now please follow me on this easy geometrical calculation :

1) Bismarck on course 220° firing at Hood while the target was on bearing 155° was having her main guns trained 25°forward her beam at 05:55.
In fact 220 ( bow ) - 90 ( beam ) = 130 and to reach a 155° target you need to add 25° forward the beam.

2) Bismarck on course 220° firing at the PoW while the target was on bearing 130° was having her main guns exactly at her beam at 06:09 as for the above.
In fact 220 ( bow ) - 90 ( beam ) = 130° and you are right on the target at the beam with your main turrets.

In fact we can see the Bismarck firing her last salvo at 06:09 here :


Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1984-055-13%2C_Schlachtschiff_Bismarck%2C_Seegefecht.jpg


We can take few degrees tolerance of course on my easy demonstration here, … since I am rounding the numbers a bit to make it easier for everybody to follow me on this one, … but they seems very close to the Bismarck beam to me.

Does everybody agrees about the above ? If not : why ?


Bye Antonio

Hi Antonio,
In the above picture showing Bismarck firing it looks like that she is already down by the bow and 'pitching', also, would the large wake behind her stern be caused by the tips of her props coming out of the water as described by the Baron ?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I see what you mean and I have personally to congratulate your fairness for your above new evaluations, ... a very rare attitude lately here in, ... and that is why I sincerely applaud it ...

This said, I suppose we are now in agreement that after 06:03 the torpedo alarm from the Prinz Eugen did cause the Bismarck to turn around 50° to starboard from course 220° ( probably ) to course 270° ( most likely ) and we can see the Bismarck both in the PG film as well as on some photos with her main gun turrets trained backwards from around 15° degrees forward her beam to around 35° degrees after the beam.
More or less for a couple of minutes the Bismarck sailed on that direction on course 270° and after she turned south again back on a course of around 220°.

This is where your work becomes very interesting and important for me to realize what you are evaluating, ...and you know perfectly we long discussed about it already many years ago, ... but at that time I had different priorities and we did not go so deep about it as it deserve.

Now, if you agree we can concentrate on it and try to see what can be done and agreed among us here in.
There is exactly where photos NH 69729, the NH 69730 and the final salvo one the Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1984-055-13 do apply.

In reality I would like to start from the Bismarck second turn start from 270° to 220°, ... so, a bit earlier.

There are few photos rarely published and know by few persons, I am sure you have them too, ... and are very poorly taken pics.

This because on that moment on the Prinz Eugen there were more that one person making photos.
Surely Lagemann, Fritz Otto Busch, J.C. Schmitz-Westerholt, one Luftwaffe pilot, and we have also pics taken from the film recorded by the PK cameraman too, ... so we can have up to 5 different photo sources and the photo quality difference seems to confirm it obviously.

What I am interested now is to try to determine the best we can the Bismarck course from the second turn until her cease fire at 06:09.

I am OK about opening a dedicated thread about it of course. What is your opinion about it ?

@ Paul Mercer,

you asked me :

In the above picture showing Bismarck firing it looks like that she is already down by the bow and 'pitching', also, would the large wake behind her stern be caused by the tips of her props coming out of the water as described by the Baron ?

This is a very interesting question and no doubts that Bismarck in that moment was already suffering the effect of the first PoW hit on her bow, ... since something like 13 minutes already, ... assuming PoW first straddle having caused that hit at 05:56, ... my opinion is that YES, we can see those effects you mentioned already in this photo, ... as well as in a photo taken after, ... more evidently.

Bye. Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

You carefully highlight one of the main (of many) illogicalities in your assertions:

3) Now we are at the " KEY " moment at 06:03. My opinion is that when Kpt Brinkmann issued the torpedo alarm, the Bismarck turned on 270° ( 50° to starboard ) and soon after the Prinz Eugen followed her.

PG GHG gives a warning to which Brinkman does not react to, except to send a message to the flagship. You have claimed, I believe, to have witness information about the transmission of this warning - would you care to mention who and how, or are you withholding this until your book is ready for sale? Then the flagship having received this warning, the fastest method was German TBS, but they had restrictions on use, so maybe lights or flags, turns before the ship giving the warning and only then does Brinkman have his own helmsman change course. To be of any value this torpedo warning would have had to give direction of the threat and/or suggested course.


In fact the Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1990-061-27 for instance shows Prinz Eugen sailing at 90 degrees different course and cutting across Bismarck's bows whilst the flagship fires at the target on her port beam. Brinkman actually turns hard (much more than 50 degrees) in response to the imaginary torpedoes, risking collision with the flagship, which is still firing on her port beam, and has not reacted at all to any torpedo warning. The Gefechtskizze is adjusted to remove all traces of this anomaly and since there are no contemporary documents showing Bismarck's course which would highlight this discrepancy, it is only obvious in the photos. Information reaches Brinkmann's superiors and they conclude that the Gefechtskizze is "useless and worthless" but no replacement has yet been published/discovered.

We have been teased with the supposed existence of a secret document from Jasper to no less than the Head of the Kriegsmarine which can only surely be a private complaint about the way Jasper is scapegoated in the KTB for wrong ammunition selection, being given no target designation before open fire and whose accurate firing is disrupted by the enormous over-reaction to a spurious warning from a new-fangled, untested and extremely unreliable GHG system. This has given warning of a supposed torpedo threat which could only have been launched by a vessel which was never closer than 14,000 yds away, and timing-wise would have had to have launched these weapons from considerably further away than 14,000 yds of any possible impact point, and on an azimuth for deflection similar to her own heading.

There is of course no mention of torpedo avoidance manoeuvres in the Baron's account, despite the fact that he is personally charged with warning of any vessel close enough to be a torpedo threat.


All the best


Wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Apparently, until his next "imaginative fantasy" attack, Mr.Wadinga has given up his crazy theory of Bismarck turning away on course 270° at 5:55 or anyway before Hood explosion.... .
Possibly my explanation (closing rate of almost 5000 yards in 4 minutes from 5:56:10 till 6:00:10 on around 220° viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5752&start=930#p80769)
+ Mr.Jurens statement (steady closing rate of 900 meters from 5:55 till 6:03 viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8329&start=135#p80975)
+ Mr.Nilsson proposed course of 230° (thus around 220° viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8329&start=150#p80997 and that, for a short period before 6:03 makes sense, despite a closure rate not fully respected)
+ photo NH69722
have finally convinced this stubborn denier not to insist on such a nonsense.


However, as usual, without even admitting his pitiable failure (with all consequences on Bismarck RoF vs PoW), he is back with:

Wadinga wrote: "To be of any value this torpedo warning would have had to give direction of the threat and/or suggested course."

PG_torpedoes.jpg (28.73 KiB) Viewed 1152 times

Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

The only

pitiable failure

round here is the inability of yourself and your co-author to persuade anybody (outside of a single location in Romania) your Ziggurat of Supposition has any basis in truth after blathering on about it for many years.

Mainly because you ignore the ludicrous illogicality of most of it and blindly keep restating it as if repetition makes it true . PG would have to tell Bismarck where the torpedoes were coming from in the warning message. The indications on the Gefechtsskizze are more proof of the spurious unreliable warnings from this overrated piece of kit.


We could do with some help from German speakers. "Laufbahn" seems to translate as runtrain. Is the other Gerausche? Something about smoke or trail? It would appear the dotted line hitting the track at 03 was supposed to indicate torpedo noise on relative bearing 278 degrees ie just forward of the port beam. Then later at 06:03 it is 220 relative when the ship is supposed to have executed two 50 degrees course changes in 2 minutes, back onto the original course. That does not "comb" any torpedoes coming from forward of the beam. Then another noise train is drawn at 07 coming from another direction. As we know the only person in PG's 1300 strong crew to see torpedo trails in the water was Brinkmann.

Yet another Torpedo gerausche at 06:14:30 causes the most violent turn yet onto a NNW heading, spookily similar to the apparent heading depicted in Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1990-061-27 except of course that must have happened some time well before 06:09 as PG is crossing ahead at right angles to Bismarck course and which is firing on her beam. In fact the famous underexposed photograph looking at Bismarck's starboard bow from PG is just what you would see from PG heading NNW, except this heading only happened after 06:14, according to the Gefechtsskizze. Also Bismarck is firing in this famous photograph which can't be happening after 06:14. Weirdly, distant splashes of a very short salvo from PoW are depicted on the Gefechtsskizze at this time, which is very like salvo 18 that really happened about 06:03/4. I can't read the annotation which has the time for this "phantom" salvo from PoW, but it's position doesn't make any sense because it is well off line between PG and PoW. It's time doesn't make any sense because PoW didn't fire after the Local control salvoes.


When Jasper says the ship "turned three times" he calls turnaway and back a single turn, which means he kept on target through the first two double turns depicted at 04 and 07 but lost sight of the target from the forward control at the point shown as 06:14 which would really be 06:04.

And of course Leach saw an enemy "turn away" at about 06:03/4 and turning to NNW is truly "turning away", not a mere 50 degree turn instantly reversed and back on same heading within a minute or so according to the Gefechtsskizze.. It's almost as if that shockwave impact gave Leach the temporary ability to see what PG would do 10 minutes in the future, according to the Gefechtsskizze.

OR, now I'm thinking the unthinkable. The times on the Gefechtsskizze track are wrong by ten whole minutes! They are recorded ten minutes late.

All the best

wadinga