Bismarck at DS after the second turn

[wadinga]

Hello All,

We have already established Suffolk reported a gyro problem later in the day and it is likely the poor correlation of her estimated position with navigational reality was due to this. Bearings expressed by her, relative to her gyro, are therefore error-prone.

do not even try to tell me that Suffolk did not have the 1 degree accuracy on the bearings.

She may have had 1 degree resolution but not 1 degree accuracy. "Do not even try to tell me" is at odds with the supposed revised spirit of co-operation operating in this forum. It is only with regard to Jasper's communications with higher authority that the things some here are trying to "tell us" may be at variance with reality.


It is apparently continuously necessary to remind everybody that there is no certificated "time stamping" of logged information in 1941. As perceptive people have pointed out there well be variable delays of minutes in the recording of bearings and estimated distances. Even where there is information taken from a gunnery fire control table there is no surety that it has been previously synchronised with chronometer time. Rowell specifically says the times from the PoW salvo plot may be up to two minutes out, from chronometer time. We know Norfolk's range measurements are at odds with chronometric time.


If PoW's Admiralty Research Laboratory table plot had survived, the sharp turn towards the enemy, made to avoid Hood's wreck and observed and commented upon by Brooke, Busch, Brinkmann, Jasper, Reimann et al would have been delineated. Because the plan of PoW's movements was recreated by guesswork afterwards, and then months later turned into the salvo plot, both these documents are inaccurate records of her path. Because they are contradicted by so many witnesses, they are not "first class" evidence.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,
from what I read above, it is clear that someone doesn't want to "co-operate" at all, finally starting the reconstruction from a milestone point like the 6:00 one proposed by Antonio using Rowell map (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=75#p81348).

While all comments are reasonable (and I do appreciate the moderation of tones from even the most intemperate members), they carefully avoid to propose another starting point or another track,or another approach to be used to build a battlemap, simply because they are aware they cannot find other ones able to get to a different reconstruction than Antonio's final and complete one...



As for the PoW "sharp turn" against the enemy reported by some witnesses, it was actually possibly sharp, but not relevant at all for the course of the ship. The PoW aft turret, already at her extreme forward bearing (it was wooded on course 300°, bearing on 280°, but slowly closing arcs during the battle), did never stop firing every around 20-30 seconds. This is a fact proven by PoW salvo plot and McMullen GAR, thus if this turn was ever done, and it was not only a "rolling" movement, it must have been a less than 10° one.....


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Thank you for reminding me:

As for the PoW "sharp turn" against the enemy reported by some witnesses, it was actually possibly sharp, but not relevant at all for the course of the ship. The PoW aft turret, already at her extreme forward bearing (it was wooded on course 300°, bearing on 280°, but slowly closing arcs during the battle), did never stop firing every around 20-30 seconds. This is a fact proven by PoW salvo plot and McMullen GAR, thus if this turn was ever done, and it was not only a "rolling" movement, it must have been a less than 10° one.

The phrase "it was actually possibly sharp, but not relevant at all for the course of the ship" is both self contradictory and contrary to real, 35,000 ton ship dynamics, clearly seen from Prinz Eugen and recorded on Reimann's diagram. What should be remembered is both Brooke in the after DCT and A V Godding, an artificer in Y turret do not remember it firing at all until after PoW turned towards around Hood and then back onto heading.

Another piece of interesting information. From Battleship,Cruiser, Destroyer by Haines and Coward. "For A V Godding, who was an Ordnance Artificer in Prince of Wales , the technical problems were considerable. Quote ""We were accompanying Hood to Iceland when we were diverted to intercept Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. We closed up at Action Stations and our first action after loading the guns was when the enemy was at about 22,000 yds, and A and B turrets opened fire. Owing to the ship's position, Y turret would not bear on the enemy he held fire until we were about 16,000 yds range. I remember the range because just prior to opening fire, the Royal Marine on the local rangefinder had called out """Range 16,000 yds!""" I was at this time in the gun house. "" " Failure to understand and accept Rowell's own observation on the unreliability of the times on the salvo diagram, means the timing of the 9th salvo when Y is at last able to fire is not necessarily when shown.

did never stop firing every around 20-30 seconds

There is no PoW main armament firing at all between depicted times 05:56:55 and 05:57:55. The salvo after this unexplained extremely-long gap in firing is the one in which Y turret is believed to start firing.

So

did never stop firing every around 20-30 seconds

This is a fact proven by PoW salvo plot and McMullen GAR

is not a fact at all.


Our convenor has drawn attention to gun range vs navigational range but the same is true of bearing. Y turret would have to turn to a considerable left deflection in order to target Bismarck with sufficient lead angle, and if witnesses who were there say it was not able to fire until after Hood's destruction then that is more valid than the opinions of those speculating decades afterwards.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,
apparently there is a lot of confusion here above, mixing what happened before 5:58 with what happened after Hood explosion and again trying to use German documents to reconstruct the track of a British ship....

Wadinga wrote: "The phrase "it was actually possibly sharp, but not relevant at all for the course of the ship" is both self contradictory and contrary to real, 35,000 ton ship dynamics...."

No, it's not. A battleship needs 20-30 seconds to react to the helm. As explained several times, the proven (by McMullen GAR and PoW salvo plot) fact that Y turret never stopped firing around the "depicted time" 06:00 (when the "sharp turn" happened according to all witnesses and at about 16.000 yards distance) demonstrate that no relevant change of course towards the enemy occurred at that time.
The turn accounted by witnesses IMO points to the fact that the helm was simply put hard to starboard to instinctively avoid what would have appeared as a possible danger, and then (after few seconds) it was put hard to port to avoid closing the enemy, having realized no collision was possible due to the distance between Hood and PoW. This just provoked an evident rolling of the ship, with a minimum change of course (no more than 10 °), as evident by the fact that Y turret was continuously firing after 5:58, without any interruption.

I don't need to answer about cherry-picked witnesses ,who even contradict what was written in McMullen GAR and in the PoW salvo plot: the latter don't speak of (or show) any Y turret arcs closure after 5:58, just the fore turrets were wooded after 6:02:xx.
We are not interested here in what happened before 5:58....


I do suggest to substantiate any "alternative scenario" like the above with something solid, at least as the PoW salvo plot and GAR, and mostly to propose an alternative "starting point" to Antonio's one at 6:00 (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=75#p81348), else, in the absence of any credible alternative, we should proceed with the proposed one.


Bye, Alberto

[Bill Jurens]

I am very happy to see that we as a group are indeed apparently making progress now, though perhaps more slowly than wished or anticipated.

I would caution Mr. Virtuani (and to some extent others, acting in conjunction and/or retaliation) that the re-emergence of terms suggesting that other participants "...are not cooperating.", or are "... unwilling to admit", accompanied by instructive emoji's implying that other correspondents need to 'think' or 'stop', along with heavy underlining, etc. for emphasis is not productive, and tends to serve only to polarize viewpoints and divert progress forward. It should be assumed -- really taken as axiomatic -- that although participants may disagree, they are all engaging in an attempt to move the process forward, not back.

So far as technical considerations are concerned, I think there is a fair recognition on all sides that the available historical data is both incomplete and often somewhat -- and at times probably egregiously -- inaccurate. While all, or at least most, would admit that this would rule-out the possibility of an extremely precise and accurate reconstruction of events, it should not -- at least in my opinion -- preclude the search for the best possible and -- this is important -- objective -- approximation. To say that 'perfect' is unattainable, does not mean that 'pretty good' is completely merit-free.

The fact that we seem to be somewhat bogged down in technicalities now should not be taken as discouraging. It really means that we are only at the initial stages of figuring out how to tackle the problem. The issue still resides, in that regard, in a sort of ‘no-man’s-land’ between mechanics, i.e. the basic accumulation and assimilation of ‘facts’, however that might be defined, and historical methodology, which involves how to best link those facts together into the best possible, which most people would probably interpret as the ‘most accurate’, reconstruction. “Facts”, manipulated by poor historical technique, tend to result in misleading outcomes. Similarly, good historical technique, in the absence of well-chosen facts will also lead to sub-optimal results. A careful balance between facts and technique is critical for proper analysis. What I think I see here, often, is an excessive and often counter-productive polarization with a tendency to overemphasise one over the other.

There is, of course, an understandable tendency for those who have worked on this particular issue for extended periods to assume that the problem has, in effect, already been solved. In that regard, Mr. Bonomi has, all things considered, been very cooperative and patient in supporting attempts to move the process forward. Few would argue with the contention that his reconstruction(s) represent the result of many many hours of tedious and diligent work. The question then might be – to take a schoolbook analogy – as in our old mathematics classes, do we grade for the answer, or grade for the work?

Along similar lines, we might also attempt to decide whether it is better to proceed inductively or deductively. In other words, are we better to cast Mr. Bonomi’s reconstruction(s) aside completely, and attempt to begin again ‘from scratch’ – i.e. attempt to rebuild from source documents upwards -- or do we take Mr. Bonomi’s reconstruction as a viable (though admittedly somewhat flawed) starting point and work backwards into the source data in order to refine – and potentially, at least in places, substantially modify – Mr. Bonomi’s graphical hypotheses?

I don't know.

Moving forward, I would suggest:

a) As mentioned above, a recognition of the critical need to maintain a respectful and non-combative tone in discussions, i.e. the application of constant effort to prevent our debate from deteriorating (again) into a bar-fight. This is really the most important item. Even the most argumentative team is better than a aggregation of adversaries.

b) Some idea from participants as to whether they would feel it most appropriate to begin from scratch and work upward, or begin from Mr. Bonomi’s reconstruction (or some other starting point) and work backwards, i.e. whether we reconstruct upwards from existing primary documents assuming that no current reconstruction is in and of itself satisfactory, or whether we use Mr. Bonomi’s most recent track charts (or some other source) as a fundamental template, which we submit for critical analysis and refinement.

c) I think it is still a good idea, at least so far as the factual aspect of the discussions is concerned, to have someone – or some group – create and post a collection of agreed upon ‘exhibits’ so that other participants can easily and quickly make reference to them during discussions.

My apologies, if some are offended, for pontificating if such has occurred. I bear, sometimes, I feel, the scars of too many years in the classroom – i.e. tendencies to over-state, pontificate, and at times become almost intolerably redundant.

Best to all...

Bill Jurens

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello Mr.Jurens,
as per your request, I will avoid in the future any further usage of terms that you suggest should be avoided, as well as emoji's. I hope everybody will do the same.

However, may I kindly (but firmly) ask you to caution also the other member who used as well the bold and underlining (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=135#p81441, viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=135#p81441) and the usage of terms like "speculation" (a word I have carefully avoided, even if more than justified answering the above posts where another member invented his own Y turret firing events, calling it very euphemistically an "alternative scenario"), referred to an historical reconstruction ? Would you please avoid to address by name only me here ?

Thanks for playing a "super-partes" role as moderator.



Regarding your point c), the set of agreed evidences, I think the PoW salvo plot and McMullen GAR are among them, while Brooke and Godding witnesses simply are not.



Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Bill Jurens,

thanks for your summary.

The fact that you will choose to use my 2005 work as base reference or not is of course up to you here in now.

It exist and is there anyhow, and I am OK in both cases, as it must be.

I am sure that being this battle re-construction in certain way pretty easy now to be put together, we are going to reach that level pretty soon anyhow.

This simply because many responses are already available today and long discussed already, so it will be a very fast process to reach some decision making points where we never had an agreement so far, since years.

Once we will reach that level we will verify the fact that everybody is only engaged in an attempt to move the process forward, and not back.

I am looking forward to it and I am sure that patiently we will be there.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello All,

I apologize if the use of bold and underlining to emphasize important points such as the significant difference between resolution and accuracy, rather than forcibly expressing opinions about what is of interest or not, has offended anybody.


My main point is that neither British nor German maps are truly "first class" primary evidence and should be analysed for correspondence with other evidence before accepting any of their content. Neither is an original plotter output, in both cases being secondary evidence being produced sometime after the action, in some cases months afterwards. Rowell specifically goes out of his way to inform the Hood enquiry that the times on the British maps may be wrong. He says they are accurate relative to one another but not in absolute terms. This is significant. As such Rowell's salvo plot does not prove these shots were fired at the times depicted. If Rowell had said the fire-control instrument was synchronized, it would be different, but he specifically wants the enquiry to realise the times may be wrong in absolute (chronometer) terms.


The annotation on Rowell's salvo plot indicating A arcs open at 05:57:45 does not seem to fit with the track since the heading has not changed since 05:55 nearly three minutes earlier and Bismarck has drawn further ahead during that time, as shown by the bearing change. This of itself suggests the straight track depicted is not an accurate representation at all, since with no course change the condition could not change. A arcs should have been open since 05:55 if they are open at 05:57:45.

Leach says in his narrative "A turn of 2 blue at 0555 opened "A" Arcs at "Prince of Wales" ninth salvo." Salvo 9 didn't happen at 05:55 at all, but nearly three minutes later, according to the timing on the salvo plot.

I believe McMullen's GAR says nothing about the time or even on which salvo Y turret was able to join in. It merely notes that it had a failure to fire on Salvo 11. Thus the only firm evidence is that Y turret could bear on salvo 11. That it could bear earlier is based on recent evaluation of PoW's course, Bismarck's bearing and published firing arcs and Leach's observation which is actually self-contradictory. Since there is no firm evidence and Brooke's and Godding's statements say that Y turret could not bear and did not fire before the manoeuvre around Hood's wreck, when the range had dropped to only 16,000 yds, I used the term speculation to describe the other situation because there is no firm evidence Y turret could bear earlier. Speculation is defined as "the forming of a theory or conjecture without firm evidence." If McMullen's GAR recorded Y turret's performance on salvo 9 that would be firm evidence.

I cannot see that significant witness statements by individuals in or near Y turret should be ignored merely because they do not agree with Rowell's map which exhibits the internal inconsistencies noted.

The Gefechtsskizze does not depict Bismarck's relative position at all. It's depiction of the British vessels' movement is completely different to that of Reimann's sketch even though they both use the same PG track. We all know and accept that Brinkmann was instructed to replace this version of the Gefechtsskizze with an improved version which has not come to light.

German witnesses say PoW turned hard towards them, not that it wobbled a bit. Do we really have to reproduce the quotes again to prove this?


All this seems in line with Bill's observation that the available historical information is incomplete and inaccurate, often being individually self contradicting, as well in conflict with other pieces of evidence. From a synthesis of this we might create a most probable speculative solution which cannot be precise or necessarily termed better than any other.

All the best

wadinga

[Bill Jurens]

My thanks to the correspondents who noted the use of emojis and boldface, etc. My concern is not that they be used at all, but that once the process starts, it can quickly get out of hand, where presentation ends up taking precedence over information. Basically statements of fact or conjecture should in most cases be able to stand on their own, i.e. without additional visual theatrics.

that being said, there certainly are certain instances where it's important to draw particular attention to some particular part of a sentence, etc. I'd suggest that whenever possible writers select minimal options, i.e. the least visually-invasive tactic necessary to draw attention to the particular issue in question. In that regard, simple underlining should be adequate, with italics, as (one hopes) I have employed in the paragraphs above.

The key, I think is to at all costs avoid looking upon our discussions as being inherently adversarial, and instead try to focus upon arriving upon some sort of general consensus. As the old song goes "Accentuate the positive, eliminate the negative, latch on to the affirmative, and don't mess with Mister In-between...".

There was some discussion earlier regarding the difference between "gun range", "navigational range", and "actual range". In my intended usage, the latter two may be considered synonymous. I read 'gun range' to be the range -- or ranges -- displayed on various parts of the fire control equipment, and 'navigational range' to be the actual physical distance being measured. So far as bearings are concerned, I would consider it reasonable to assume that the measurement has been taken to the number of significant figures quoted, e.g. that 223 degrees actually lies somewhere between 222 and 224 degrees in bearing. This works well (I think) unless the last significant figure is a 5 or a 0. In those cases, the situation becomes more difficult to decipher, i.e. a reading of (say) 225 degrees may mean a value between 224 and 226, or may represent a rather approximate reading between (say) 220 and 230 degrees. The most probable value must be somehow, if possible, extracted from the context.

Geometrically, I think it is important to consider that the natural drift in measurements etc. is only cumulative between successive reliable measurements, and usually not really cumulative even then insofar as positive and negative errors tend to cancel out. This is covered, often in great detail in (often older) textbooks on terrestrial surveying and in textbooks on Geometric Dimensioning and Tolerancing technique. Simplifying things somewhat, it's often considered that the accumulation of random (as opposed to systematic) errors accumulates roughly as the 'sum of squares', i.e. if we have fourteen measurements each equally probable to be 10 meters over or under, the net error is likely to be somewhere in the vicinity of 11.8 meters, not 140. If the number of measurements between successive reasonably reliable benchmarks is reduced, the error reduces as well. If for example, one had two shorter legs of seven measurements, the mean error would shrink from about 11.8 meters to around 8.4 meters.

I think if we can agree upon a number of key measurements along the track charts as being sufficiently accurate to be considered as 'benchmarks', and concur as to what the likely measurement error might be at each of those benchmarks, then we may be able to move forward towards reconstructing a 'most probable' reconstruction, acknowledging of course, that it still represents an approximation. While I don't think that we can expect great precision to result from such an exercise, I don't think it represents an entirely futile process either.

To return to my earlier mathematical metaphor, a close examination of the possible techniques to be employed in attempting such reconstructions, i.e. an examination of the way the 'work' might best be accomplished, may in the end be at least as valuable as the production of a correct 'answer' to the particular problem we are facing.

Best from Winnipeg...

Bill Jurens

[northcape]

Regarding bearings, I still think that the current discussion misses one essential point: The superposition of systematic instrument error (poor calibration due to limited number of astronomical fixes) and random reading errors (as in Bill Juren's example). Even if the reading is perfectly accurate (say up to 0.1 degree), this does not mean that the actual bearing is true within this range as we don't know the instrument error.

How large can the instrument error be to expected in the DS situation? 0.1 degree? 1 degree? 10 degrees? I don't know, and nobody else so far has any comments on that. But it is a fact that this instrument error exists.

I've read that reciprocal bearings exist which could give a good estimation of the effect of the instrument error (under the assumption that they were taking at the same time, and that the cocks were synchronized). It would be very interesting to see this table.

When is the instrument error relevant? When the two individually established tracks will be correlated into a relative position to each other.

Even if the instrument error would be in the range of 5 degrees, would it effect the establishment of a battle map? Depends on the accuracy (in terms of relative positioning) and resolution this map is expected to represent. Therefore it would be interesting to hear about such an expectation from the authors of the map, in quantitative terms. The discussion would benefit since we would move away from subjective and unclear descriptions like "the best map" or "the most accurate map".

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

starting from the Rowell map at 06:00 ( Exhibit B of the Hood Second Board ) and applying on top of it the Prinz Eugen original track we obtain this figure at 06:00.

Map_1cm_1000meters_scale.jpg

(69.5 KiB) Not downloaded yet

It is a " quick and dirty " cut and paste version of the map I think does make sense to start from as a reasoning base.


If everybody agrees about it we can start working toward the adjustments and the refinements and more correctly realize a new version of it.

I agree with Wadinga statements about the PoW maps and tracks to be deeply analyzed for some turns inconsistencies, and as I wrote several times I think Herr Nillson time ago did propose a very valid alternative solution for it we need to carefully analyze.

Same goes for the timing marks on the Prinz Eugen own track, not all precisely marked where they should have been in scale.

Bye Antonio

[Algonquin-R17]

Hello everyone,

Just a few ongoing thoughts;

1 - the current moderated discussion is so much better than before.

2 - the issue of the degree of turn for the avoidance maneuver of the POW re the Hood, this was not just a squirrel running across the roadway, but the towering catastrophic explosion of a sister battleship. Debris was falling beyond the ships last position, sailors dead or alive could be in the water, in my view a wide birth would be necessary and automatic, they were relatively close and in the same direction except one suddenly stopped.

3 - I do wish I had the capability Antonio possesses to draw a battle map, at this time I do not. I think that if someone could overlay in different colors one concept of a map with another concept of all 6 ships it would reveal in graphic form the divergence of an opinion. This point could be identified with a number or letter. Support material for these points of divergence can therefore be grouped together. As the map evolves the supporting material is available for reference at a later time. Rather like leaving bread crumbs on a trail. This may not seem important now however if and when we reach a point where 2 maps are visually represented by their supporters and the underlying purpose, or as is colloquially referred to as the 800 pound gorilla in the room, is analyzed it may have some importance.

Bob

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,
let's use mathematics to see what McMullen's GAR says or not.

Wadinga wrote: "I believe McMullen's GAR says nothing about the time or even on which salvo Y turret was able to join in. It merely notes... ...If McMullen's GAR recorded Y turret's performance on salvo 9 that would be firm evidence."

The GAR http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm "merely notes" that the ordered shots were 74 in 18 (semi-)salvos (= salvos of 5 guns, when bearing).
18x5=90 potential ordered shots in total (if all guns bearing) but 90-74 = 16, therefore 16 shots were lost due to Y turret not bearing yet.
Y turret (semi-)salvo = 2 shots, 16/2 = 8 lost (semi-)salvos, therefore Y turret joined exactly at (semi-)salvo 9 (as per Leach account and PoW salvo plot) and fired the last 10 salvos only, as this mathematical calculation demonstrates.
Thus McMullen's GAR "implicitly" clearly says that Y turret fired from salvo 9 on only, and the PoW salvo plot statement about "arcs open" simply confirms this.
"Ad abundantiam" we have found at Churchill Archives the report (dated June 1st, 1941) from Mr.Barber (Vickers Armament foreman on board PoW during the engagement) confirming that "Y turret bore on the target for the last 10 salvos only" (extract from a report of Mr.Wilkinson, director at Vickers Armaments).

Any residual doubt yet from anybody ? (agreement on this point is welcome, in order to make the discussion progressing)

Wadinga wrote: "If Rowell had said the fire-control instrument was synchronized, it would be different, but he specifically wants the enquiry to realise the times may be wrong in absolute (chronometer) terms. "

Luckily, despite Rowell cautious (and diplomatic) disclaimer, we do have Leach's own open fire time in his narrative attached to Tovey despatches ("PoW opened fire at 05:53") and we have the German recorded time for British ships open fire, being 5:53 as per PG KTB, therefore the error cannot be up to 2 minutes, but (if any) it is possibly well below 1 minute.
Any residual doubt here as well ?

Algonquin-R17 wrote: "... if and when we reach a point where 2 maps are visually represented by their supporters..."

Hi Bob,
this is exactly what we are asking for since long time now: a decently credible alternative to Antonio's reconstruction, without any success to date.
As a matter of facts, I have not seen yet even an alternative "starting point" proposal from anybody, instead of the one defined by Antonio here viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=135#p81452

Does this mean that everybody is in agreement at least with this proposed "starting point" ?



Bye, Alberto


P.S. Regarding the turn to avoid Hood remains, please keep in mind that PoW was already some 200 meters on HOOD starboard side (they were not sailing in line, see Diagram A here http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 1_to59.htm), thus no turn was strictly needed, but I do agree that the extent of the shock may have caused the order to put the helm hard to starboard, immediately corrected back however, as the ship did never turn by more than 10° in any case because arcs were still open and Y turret was regularly firing on bearing 330° (on 325° and course 280° the turret would have been wooded), as per salvo plot + McMullen's GAR + Mr.Barben's report.

[dunmunro]

Wadinga wrote: "If Rowell had said the fire-control instrument was synchronized, it would be different, but he specifically wants the enquiry to realise the times may be wrong in absolute (chronometer) terms. "

Luckily, despite Rowell cautious (and diplomatic) disclaimer, we do have Leach's own open fire time in his narrative attached to Tovey despatches ("PoW opened fire at 05:53") and we have the German recorded time for British ships open fire, being 5:53 as per PG KTB, therefore the error cannot be up to 2 minutes, but (if any) it is possibly well below 1 minute.
Any residual doubt here as well ?

Leach and Rowell also state that Bismarck opened fire well before 0555, and both were eyewitnesses to that.

[Alberto Virtuani]

...but we are not interested in this specific discrepancy between British witnesses and German official reports here, and we should try not to mix everything together, staying on topic. We speak about the proposed "starting point" at 6:00 to reconstruct the battle.

Can we consider there is general agreement about Antonio's proposal at 06:00 ? viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8335&start=135#p81452
In alternative please produce another complete "starting point", in the same format, using official tracks.


Bye, Alberto