Herr Nillson's speculation that the first turn away didn't happen until before the ninth salvo makes a lot of sense. It could be that the firing of the ninth salvo was delayed until the ship had steadied on the new course helping explain the very lengthy gap between salvoes, at a time when speed of firing was of the essence. This may be one serious error in Rowell's maps exposed.
However there may be other turns not represented at all, just as this one is mistimed and the further track of PoW after this point is therefore mispositioned. Part of the debate here has for several years doubted the veracity of Rowell's maps, drawn with the best will in the world based on remembrance of what had occurred, because the actual record was destroyed. Now we are revisiting them critically without the need to "press on" so as to prosecute a particular theory, we should re-evaluate evidence.
Busch:
“In Busch's English language The Story of the Prince Eugen (1958) we have
The range was now changing as the British, obeying the last signal of their flagship to open the range, were caught while turning to port, and suddenly steered hard to starboard and towards the Germans, in order to avoid the wreckage of their badly hit comrade”
Hunter-Terry says debris was falling whilst PoW was turning to port. Since the guns, turrets and masts described by other witnesses would not have stayed in the air for very long, seconds after Hood’s explosion at, nominally 06:00, PoW was turning , not to starboard, but to port seconds after 06:00. Leach had to over-ride this turn with another hard turn to starboard, just as described by the witnesses.
As was discussed some time ago Coates' view of Hood could only become obscured by PoW's superstructure if his ship was turning to port already, before the avoidance turn to starboard, exactly as described by Brookes, and as shown on Reimann's plan derived from the ranges from PG's gunnery system albeit with a value offset.Coates:
I saw the "Hood" on our port bow and I saw several salvoes fall astern, just over and ahead. Then one salvo appeared to strike right amidships. I got the impression of a shower of sparks on the boat-deck not far abaft the after funnel about mid-ships. It was followed then by one roll of flame from the after screen which enveloped the after turrets. After that I did not see very much of the subsequent explosion because we had had a hit on the starboard crane which knocked me down. As I got up the "Hood" had disappeared from sight. I do not mean she was sunk, but was obscured by our superstructure. I did not see the explosion. All I saw was the reflection on our own ship. I saw the "Hood" again. I came down off the catapult control platform and we carried on steaming ahead of the "Hood", and all I recognised was the bows forepart. They appeared to be turned completely round.
It is only the "evidence", such as it is, of Y turret's ability to continuously track the target from salvo 9 onwards which contradicts these course changes. The witnesses, British and German are all consistent. PoW turned to port to follow Hood, then had to turn to starboard to avoid her wreck. Leach and Rowell had a life changing experience just a few moments later which might have affected their perceptions, short term memory loss is a common effect of violent trauma I believe.
We have the evidence of the number of rounds fired by each gun, including Y turret, which should be reproduced again here, together with the latest speculative (I believe there is no direct evidence of which gun fired on which salvo) table, based around the perception that 74 guns were able to bear on the target at some time during the engagement. I am unclear as to where the evidence comes from for McMullen to state this. Does the AFCT paper output provide a record of which guns are bearing on the target through time, as well as report of being loaded? The Excel table which has been generated works on the basis that guns remain in their designated groups even though they may have reloaded long before the other group is even ordered to fire. At some point, when the target is bracketed, rapid fire is ordered, guns are loaded as quickly as possible and fired and the ordered grouping presumably breaks down in order to put as many shots on target as possible.
At its simplest, the evidence that Y turret bore on Bismarck continuously from the ninth salvo onwards is based entirely on assumptions about British firing procedure, and it is possible that A arcs were closed again by a hard turn to starboard, and re-opened again , some time after Hood's destruction.
Hello Antonio, i notice the Gefechtsskizze records the British sighting report. At what time on the German track?
All the best
wadinga