Alberto Virtuani wrote: ↑
Fri Apr 05, 2019 9:06 pm
Dunmunro wrote: "the hits were scored within ~70 seconds"
...and mathematically 3 hits in 70 seconds (#1 at second 0, #2 at second 35 and #3 at second 70) are an average of (less than) 1.5 / minute or, if you count the first one, less than 2, not 3 / minute for sure
....even assuming the last one arrived at 6:02:00 exactly
Please, acknowledge the average RoFs (points 1,2,3 and 4 download/file.php?id=3457
) instead of trying to create new (wrong) figures.
3 hits in 70 secs = 2.6 hits/min
Using A&A's methodology and timing:
Bismarck's output = 93 x 38cm rnds (upon which we mostly agree)
~40 x 38cm are fired at Hood = 1 or more hits
~13 are fired at PoW from ~0600:50 - 0603:00 and and score 3 hits
~40 are fired from 0603-0609 (6 minutes) and score no hits.
The statistical improbability of so small a number of rounds fired to score 3 hits stands out, but so does the accuracy of Bismarck's fire if the numbers are correct. In the same or similar time frame PE has scored 4 hits.
It would only take 2 or 3 more minutes of hits (10-20 more) at that rate before PoW's 14in FC system is disabled and/or one or more turrets are destroyed along with a high probability of machinery damage because PoW is outside her immune zone. PoW is then crippled and destroyed by Bismarck and PE's torpedoes. Is it any wonder that Leach turned to open the range?
In another thread I looked at PE's and Bismarck's RoF as carefully as I could:
This is from the Baron:
Lindemann's permission for us to open fire was immediately followed by our first heavy salvo. The Bismarck was in action, and the rumble of her gunfire could be heard as far away as Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland.* I
heard Schneider order the first salvo and heard his observation on the fall of the shot, "short." He corrected the range and deflection, then ordered a 400-meter bracket.* The long salvo he described as "over," the base salvo
as "straddling," and immediately ordered, "Full salvos good rapid." He had thus laid his battery squarely on target at the very outset of the engagement.
So we have the order for full salvos and rapid fire (which implies that more deliberate fire was used elsewhere) and here we can confirm that via
The bearing range-finding station reported 2 contacts off the right bow bearing 20° [2 Dez.J at 25
knots, distance 210 hectometers [21,000 meters]. | received "permission to fire" from the bridge
at 0455 hours and immediately commenced firing a full salvo at 202 hectometers [20,200
meters]. The full [8-gun) salvo was fired using nose fuzed rounds which were stored behind the
gun bairels as ready-to-use ammunition. The observable impacts [shell splashes] could not be
ascribed with certainty as belonging to our own [shells] because of [key punch] perforation
failures in the firing calculator [and thus no range correction report could be made]. Therefore, I
repeated [firing] a full salvo, which turned out to be observable and formed a straddle ladder of
which I could only observe two brief impacts from the lower limiting [rounds of the] salvo, while
the higher and middle [rounds] had to be called questionably too far. The distant impacts were
not visible, since they were concealed by the target. By contrast, [after firing] the bracketing
group an extraordinarily bright fire flash appeared on the enemy ship's aft section at the level of
the aft mast. The fire developed on the portside of the opponent, since the superstructures
stood out as sharp sihouettes. Immediately thereafter | received the order from the ship's
command to "Change target to the left" toward the second opponent [the Prince of Wales],
whereby the fire of "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen" now crossed. I was unable to observe
"Bismarck's" decisive savo because I was no longer in a position to do so. | ordered the
targeting officer [larget designator] to acquire the second target and thus lost the first [targel]
from the [range finder's] visual field of action. Consequently, | did not perceive the detonation of
the first target [Hood].
As was the case earlier, I commenced the second firing with a full salvo followed by a ranging
group [straddle ladder] which zeroed me in as of 0559. Firing for effect was then initiated. The
distance at that time was 160-170 hectometers [16,000-17,000 meters]. During the completion
of ranging fire's effectiveness, | observed two well-placed simultaneous portside rikss which
again were fired by the secondary artillery of the "Bismarck". At around the 8" salvo, the
opponent turned at first hard toward (us).
So Jasper states that he ordered 24 rounds ( 13% of requested output) to be fired in only 3 salvos, all near the first 2 minutes of the action. He seems to imply the use of full salvos after that as well. Anyways, it is clear that the KM would switch between full and half salvos during daylight actions. BWOC, RN battleships used half salvos exclusively during daylight, unless there were insufficient numbers of guns available to fire in which case full salvos might be used as a temporary expedient.
We can see from this that KM RoF would vary considerably depending on the situation and FC solution.
I disagree with A&A on their contention about a metronomic RoF from PE and Bismarck because it is not supported by the historical record, additionally their contention that Bismarck suffered a large loss of 38cm output has absolutely non basis in the historical record nor is their any evidence of loss of output in the photographic record, or even in post war memoirs or war time interrogation or debriefing reports.