Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

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dunmunro
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Thu May 16, 2019 6:32 pm

This was the official finding of the Walker Board inquiry:
HOOD opened fire at approximately 0553 on May 24th, her course then being 300 degrees, range about 26500 yards. BISMARCK and PRINCE OF WALES opened fire very shortly afterwards. According to the statements from survivors of BISMARCK, PRINZ EUGEN also fired at HOOD over the BISMARCK (See C.B.4051(24) OF August 1941, page 14)...

Very shortly after 0555 a fire was observed somewhere on the port after end of the boat deck of HOOD. We consider it established that this fire was caused by a hit from BISMARCK's third salvo. It burned with a clear flame and appeared to spread and then die down. Just before 0600 V.A.C.B.S. hoisted a signal for a further turn of 20 degrees to port together, (the range at the time being about 16300 yards) but it was never executed as at 0600 HOOD blew up and sank in just under 3 minutes.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9to144.htm
If we use the timing as per PoW's salvo chart we get open fire:
Hood->~0552:30
Bismark and PoW at 0553


So a fire on Hood at ~0555 caused by Bismarck's 3rd salvo, and from that Bismarck must have opened fire prior to 0555.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu May 16, 2019 6:41 pm

Hello everybody,

ignoring the insisted evidently wrong speculations about Bismarck open fire time....

"PoW's report does detail all loses of output "
No it doesn't and you know very well that this is an incorrect statement. Many single failures are not detailed in PoW report. The only aspect that makes PoW GAR superior to KGV is that the first gives at least the total numer of ordered shots vs shells fired.KGV's not even this.

No way to build a reliable KGV chart (you have assumed, based on speculations, the total ordered shots, therefore your work is very interesting but deprived of any solidity).

Your POW chart (very good, at the time it was done) was totally superceeded by the publication of Barben's details about many additional failures. The PoW GAR, much more detailed than KGV's one, does not list all single failures: how many failures are pure guesses in your original reconstruction (please answer and don't forget I can post it to show them) ? For PoW you had at least the total numer of failures to work with, for KGV you have just invented a figure. Sorry for that.


"We also know that Barben's report was sent to the Admiralty"
Source please ?




Re. Type 284 radar, no way to say that KGV same radar would have behaved better than PoW's one. Sorry again.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Thu May 16, 2019 7:36 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Thu May 16, 2019 6:41 pm
"We also know that Barben's report was sent to the Admiralty"
Source please ?

You provided it:
Re: PoW readiness for active service
Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sat Apr 20, 2019 11:04 pm

:ok: Hello everybody,
Wadinga wrote: "Recently I have accessed the Vickers report confirming that only one practice main armament firing took place during which each gun fired six rounds..."
Totally incorrect statement (extensive redactionWJJ)

What Mr.Wadinga has "accessed" (extensive redaction. WJJ)is evidently only Mr.Barben (Vickers foreman in charge on board PoW during the operation) 2 pages attached report in which the last gunnery trial on May 15 is mentioned, with 6 shots fired by each gun, with 60 shells delivered (perfect, but no indication of the RoF at which the guns were fired, I suspect very slow due to the exceptional 100% output efficiency....).

(Redaction WJJ) he should be aware that Vickers report is made up of around 20 more pages written by Mr.Wilkinsons (the chief engineer and designer of the 14" turrets) who describes at length the gunnery trials at sea, done in early May at his presence (with work that never stopped "day or night"), much more extensive than the mentioned final trials (replenishment of ammunition and gun cleaning was even needed after those extensive trials...), with the conclusions, lessons learnt and actions put in place, all included in a report sent to the Admiralty (containing also with the exact number of rounds fired in total). [Font modification WJJ}




The above quoted sentence is another vain attempt to still support the "fairy tale" of the "poor green ship that could only fire 6 rounds per gun before having to face a ship at the peak of her efficiency" and similar things...


Bye, Alberto
My emphasis to indicate the statement clearly.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Thu May 16, 2019 7:52 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Thu May 16, 2019 6:41 pm
Hello everybody,

ignoring the insisted evidently wrong speculations about Bismarck open fire time....

"PoW's report does detail all loses of output "
No it doesn't and you know very well that this is an incorrect statement. Many single failures are not detailed in PoW report. The only aspect that makes PoW GAR superior to KGV is that the first gives at least the total numer of ordered shots vs shells fired.KGV's not even this.

No way to build a reliable KGV chart (you have assumed, based on speculations, the total ordered shots, therefore your work is very interesting but deprived of any solidity).

Your POW chart (very good, at the time it was done) was totally superceeded by the publication of Barben's details about many additional failures. The PoW GAR, much more detailed than KGV's one, does not list all single failures: how many failures are pure guesses in your original reconstruction (please answer and don't forget I can post it to show them) ? For PoW you had at least the total numer of failures to work with, for KGV you have just invented a figure. Sorry for that.


]
Source please ?




Re. Type 284 radar, no way to say that KGV same radar would have behaved better than PoW's one. Sorry again.


Bye, Alberto
Single failures are only detailed when only a single rnd is missed, otherwise the failure is identified and the number or approximate number of rounds missed is detailed. Typically these also state at what salvo the problem occured at, and when the salvo number is stated, we then have a good estimate of when the incident occurred.

Barben's report, if true, would only make a minor variation to my PoW salvo chart (subtracting 3 rnds from B turret and adding two rnds to Y turret).

My KGV Salvo chart does have errors (and I've made it clear that some estimation was necessary) but those errors are small because I know, from the GAR that all of the failures that caused large losses of output happened after 0920. There's a huge difference between making a estimate (with error bars) and simply pulling something out of thin air, that has non historical basis.

We can say confidently that if PoW's type 284 radar worked properly then she would have obtained more straddles and more hits, and we can say confidently that if KGV replaced PoW and KGV's output and radar performance matched the results obtained on 27 May, that she would have scored more than twice as many hits as PoW, in the same timeframe, assuming Bismarck did not radically alter course in response to a higher hit rate.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu May 16, 2019 8:43 pm

Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote:""Single failures are only detailed when only a single rnd is missed, otherwise the failure is identified and the number or approximate number of rounds missed is detailed."
Not at all [commentary redacted WJJ] . How many failurea are accounted for in PoW GAR ? Answer please. [Commentary redacted WJJ]


I repeat my previous question to you:
I have asked you: "how many failures are pure guesses in your original reconstruction (please answer and don't forget I can post it to show them) ? "
No answer yet....


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Thu May 16, 2019 9:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu May 16, 2019 8:45 pm

Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote: "My emphasis to indicate the statement clearly."
Therefore you have totally misunderstood what I have written (albeit nothing should have misled you, except possibly the "moderator" redactions to my quoted post), as I have never said that Barben's report was sent to the Admiralty...

However, for a reason you know very well, I will not explain to you why Barben's report was never sent to the Admiralty. Read more carefully what I have written.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Bill Jurens » Thu May 16, 2019 9:04 pm

Mr. Vituani wrote:

"However, (reason is here: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8523&p=82952&hilit=keep+word#p82952), I will not explain to you why Barben's report was never sent to the Admiralty."

I am confused. Are you suggesting that you are withholding the actual reason why the report was not submitted to the Admiralty was because the reason itself can be considered copyright? If the reason itself is not copyright -- and I honestly cannot see how it could be -- can it not be shared with the rest of the group?

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Thu May 16, 2019 9:12 pm

@Bill Jurens:
I have said time ago (and everybody should have understood, by now...) that I will not provide any more info re. Vickers report.

However I cannot allow that a clumsy misinterpretation of what I have written is sold here as a fact. I repeat, I have no evidence that Barben's report was sent to the Admiralty and I just asked to Mr.Dunmunro where this info was coming to him: not from me.

The choice to explain or not something to someone is still mine, I hope....
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Bill Jurens » Thu May 16, 2019 9:26 pm

OK.

Might you clarify one more time your reasons for not sharing any more information on the Vickers report, apparently with anyone?

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Thu May 16, 2019 9:37 pm

I admit that now I am confused regarding the Barben report as Alberto's quoted statement seems to indicate that it was included in the Wilkinson report, that was sent to the Admiralty.

Here is my original PoW salvo chart:

Image

you'll note the caveats that I included in the above.

As for KGV's lost output, it probably would be best if the entire report is posted here so that forum members can judge for themselves. I identified ~14 lost rounds that were not clearly stated as being after 0920. I estimated that half of these would have occurred before 0920 so that at 0920 KGV had requested ~208 rnds and actually fired ~196:

Image

I discussed the above, at length, in the topic:

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6834&start=45

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Fri May 17, 2019 3:22 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Thu May 16, 2019 4:41 pm
"when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot."
PoW "lost the plot" after 6:00, when the ship initially heeled violently due to avoiding maneuvers and then turned hard away at full speed under smoke, not because she was "under fire".
>>>>> Do I understand correctly that you consider being hit seven times, including three (or possibly four) 15-in hits, in a matter of a few minutes as being of no particular tactical concern? Admiral Santarini seems to think so. He considered Prince of Wales to have been "hard hit" (page 48) and described Leach's decision to break off the engagement as "an objectively valid decision" (page 54).

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Thu May 16, 2019 4:41 pm
In no place (official reports, interview, letters) McMullen complained about having been "disturbed" in his gunnery performance by incoming shells/fall of shots (he was by the spray over the fore turrets rangefinders), as logical (even the Baron was not much "disturbed" when Bismarck was under an awful concentration of fire from 4 ships on May 27, until his own rangefinder was directly hit...).
>>>>> Absence of evidence is, as they say, not evidence of absence. The above is IMO altogether conjectural.


B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Fri May 17, 2019 7:18 am

Hello everybody,
"Alberto's quoted statement seems to indicate that it was included in the Wilkinson report"
Please post the statement where I say that or simply admit you have just misinterpreted....



Thanks for posting the original proposed PoW salvo chart that demonstrates that in the PoW GAR 6 out of 19 failures (1/3) are not accounted for and were just assumed by Mr.Dunmunro: of course Barben's report change completely the chart. In any way, no GAR details all the failures, leaving out several "minor" problems.

Re.KGV we don't have any idea how many shots were lost, thus no reconstruction can be done, especially for the first "perfect" minutes (?) that Mr.Dunmunro is imagining: there is a dedicated thread for this (www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6834
), please re-open it, if wanting to propose something new, as the above KGV chart is just a speculation based on an assumed and unknown RoF for KGV, due to her GAR that is very poorly written.
The only way to assume something for KGV would be to say that at least 1/3 of failures are not accounted for (as per PoW's one) and that the RoF cannot be assumed to be the same of Rodney as 16" design RoF (1.5 spgpm) was worse than 14" (2 spgpm) + Rodney had to maneuver many more times to keep in front of Bismarck, wooding her turrets in the second part of the battle.


"Do I understand correctly that you consider being hit seven times, including three (or possibly four) 15-in hits, in a matter of a few minutes as being of no particular tactical concern? "
Please don't put in my mouth what I have not said: I said that the hits did not affect PoW gunnery, they were the hard maneuvers to affect it.

If someone writes a wrong statement saying that the hits were the cause for PoW loosing gunnery precision, he has to admit it, not to switch the discussion to the always debatable "tactical" decisions.


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Fri May 17, 2019 9:10 am, edited 3 times in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Fri May 17, 2019 7:18 am

Hello everybody,

despite the attempts to speak of other aspects (speaking of KGV GAR or "tactical" aspects),

I still don't see (from people who said McMullen shooted poorly in the first minutes...viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=75#p83562 and viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=75#p83564) any different proposal how he could have corrected the initial range over-estimation better than he did (with only 2 corrections in less than 3 minutes), following the British firing methodology at Denmarck Strait (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=75#p83563 and following).

Have everybody decided to simply "tactically retreat", not answering or changing topic, instead of fairly acknowledging that Santarini's authoritative and supported judgement about McMullen's "superb performance" when adjusting his fire is obviously fully correct?


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Fri May 17, 2019 1:38 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Fri May 17, 2019 7:18 am
"Do I understand correctly that you consider being hit seven times, including three (or possibly four) 15-in hits, in a matter of a few minutes as being of no particular tactical concern? "
Please don't put in my mouth what I have not said: I said that the hits did not affect PoW gunnery, they were the hard maneuvers to affect it.

If someone writes a wrong statement saying that the hits were the cause for PoW loosing gunnery precision, he has to admit it, not to switch the discussion to the always debatable "tactical" decisions.

There seems to be difficulty communicating. Perhaps the issue could be sub-divided into more easily digestible components. Here is a simpler question -

Why did Prince of Wales take such radical evasive action?

B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Fri May 17, 2019 1:43 pm

Hello everybody,
Q.E.D. (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&p=83612#p83611)

I don't see any "difficult communication" at all, just I see clearly the unwillingness to admit someone has put in my mouth what I have not said:
I wrote: "PoW "lost the plot" after 6:00, when the ship initially heeled violently due to avoiding maneuvers and then turned hard away at full speed under smoke, not because she was "under fire" viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=90#p83593
Here another simpler question: "what was the impact of the 7 shells on PoW main guns ?" Please answer as I do below to your "simpler"question.

Leach took evasive maneuvers becuase of Hood sinking and ordered a hard turn away because... of his own fears (you asked me why...).


In any case, there was no impact on PoW main guns action and direction as a consequence of the 7 received hits (3 from Bismarck o/w only 2 acknowledged at the time, and 4 from PG). Full Stop.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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