Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sat May 18, 2019 7:24 am

Hello everybody,

Mr.Dunmunro has posted wrong information, he has to prove them. I will not loose my time to counter such errors...

I count 8 salvos from minute 9:00 till minute 9:05 and I can give you the sequence numbers: your .pdf is incorrect, check the original salvo plot.


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Sat May 18, 2019 7:35 am, edited 3 times in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sat May 18, 2019 7:30 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sat May 18, 2019 7:24 am
Hello everybody,

you have posted wrong information, you have to prove them. I will not loose my time to counter such errors...

I count 8 salvos from minute 9:00 till minute 9:05 and I can give you the sequence numbers: your .pdf is incorrect, check the original salvo plot.


Bye, Alberto
You claim the data I posted (From Warship 28) is wrong but then won't prove your claim by posting your data? Really?

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sat May 18, 2019 7:37 am

Yes really I claim they are totally wrong: it's a pity you refer to secondary sources only, without checking before and without trusting me when I try to correct you.

As an example, here from the original Rodney salvo plot (ADM_1_11818, thanks to somone, who is not unfortunately anymore on this forum, who has all primary sources) the salvos fired in minute 9:05 vs the wrong .pdf (http://www.sfu.ca/~dmunro/images/Rod_salvo.pdf) lightly posted by Mr.Dunmunro.... Only 1 salvo (sequence number 26) fired in minute 9:05...vs 4 in the wrong .pdf .

Rodney_minute_9-05.jpg
Rodney_minute_9-05.jpg (55.51 KiB) Viewed 833 times

Only 8 salvos from 9:00 till 9:05 and thus a RoF of... 1.33 salvos per minute (approximate calculation, but here it's more than enough to demonstrate that Mr.Dunmunro is wrong.... The correct methodology for calculating a RoF is McMullen's one in PoW GAR).



Now, please,
choose your sources in a better way,
don't ask me to post any other snapshots as I have no more time to loose for you, and
make your excuses to everybody here for posting incorrect information to support your "theories".
Thanks
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sat May 18, 2019 8:14 am

Alberto, if you feel that posting here is a waste of time...

Anyways, it really doesn't make much difference if there was a few typos in the data I posted. Since Rodney did demonstrate during the action that she could fire at two salvos/minute, and if her and KGV had a better sea state with better visibility their salvo rate would have been higher.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sat May 18, 2019 8:21 am

Yes, it 's a waste of time due to your attitude, unwilling to admit when you are evidently wrong and making other people loosing their time...

PoW demonstrated she could fire 3 salvos/minute. So what ? Both KGV and Rodney fired much more slowly than PoW and you cannot demonstrate (not having the original documents) that Rodney ever achieved even a RoF of 2 salvos per minute.
Luckily, Antonio has now all the original salvo plots of all involved ships.


Stop this discussion, after you have been rubbished in such a way and make your excuses to everybody here for posting incorrect information to support your "theories".
Also, don't invent the justification of "typos": the material you provided is full of such errors.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Bill Jurens » Sat May 18, 2019 5:09 pm

Once again, I would ask members to at least try to maintain a reasonable and respectful tone in discussions here. We are clearly, once again, drifting away from that.

As a personal note, even if very precise gunnery information was available for the firing rates and salvo intervals of various ships during the Bismarck sinking, it frankly escapes me how this bears any practical relevance to what might, or might not, have happened at Denmark Strait. (Or, for that matter, what might have happened on 27 May...)

There are protocols, some quite complex, that can be used to compare relative gunnery efficiencies, and (assuming for the moment that they are in some way actually relevant) I'm a bit discouraged not to see them being employed a bit more here. My experience has been that in most analyses, 'Shots Per Gun Per Minute" (SPGPM) --a measure of mechanical efficiency -- and Hits Per Gun Per Minute (HPGPM) -- a measure of fire control efficiency -- , perhaps with "Shots Per Gun Per Minute in the Control Zone" (SPGMCZ) -- complex to describe, but basically the number of straddles... -- encompass the fundamental, though not all, measurements of comparative gunnery performance.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sat May 18, 2019 7:50 pm

Bill Jurens wrote:
Sat May 18, 2019 5:09 pm
Once again, I would ask members to at least try to maintain a reasonable and respectful tone in discussions here. We are clearly, once again, drifting away from that.

As a personal note, even if very precise gunnery information was available for the firing rates and salvo intervals of various ships during the Bismarck sinking, it frankly escapes me how this bears any practical relevance to what might, or might not, have happened at Denmark Strait. (Or, for that matter, what might have happened on 27 May...)

There are protocols, some quite complex, that can be used to compare relative gunnery efficiencies, and (assuming for the moment that they are in some way actually relevant) I'm a bit discouraged not to see them being employed a bit more here. My experience has been that in most analyses, 'Shots Per Gun Per Minute" (SPGPM) --a measure of mechanical efficiency -- and Hits Per Gun Per Minute (HPGPM) -- a measure of fire control efficiency -- , perhaps with "Shots Per Gun Per Minute in the Control Zone" (SPGMCZ) -- complex to describe, but basically the number of straddles... -- encompass the fundamental, though not all, measurements of comparative gunnery performance.

Bill Jurens
For my part, I think I have been quite restrained.

I quite agree that is is not that relevant except to challenge the proposition that PoW's rate of fire was somehow exceptional and could not have been matched by KGV or Rodney. As we discussed in the past the max RoF of the KGV class would be ~4 salvos minute, under ideal conditions.

Finally I did compare straddle rates between KGV and PoW, especially to hi-light the handicap that PoW's radar failures imposed upon her, when fighting against two ships, both employing radar ranging to aid their gunnery.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Sat May 18, 2019 9:36 pm

"no answer from someone who simply wrote a wrong statement: "when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot".
I don't think it's productive to discuss in this way...."


..... I am not by any means surprised by the above response.

B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sat May 18, 2019 9:57 pm

...and I am not by any means surprised by the above obstinate reluctances to simply acknowledge (even the proven) errors...

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Sat May 18, 2019 10:54 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sat May 18, 2019 9:57 pm
...and I am not by any means surprised by the above obstinate reluctances to simply acknowledge (even the proven) errors...

Bye, Alberto

I understand that you truly believe that your reconstruction represents the entire, absolute and infallible truth of Denmark Strait, etc. While that may be your opinion, it is not the opinion of others, including myself, who see a great deal more indeterminacy in play. What you advance as proof often consists simply of a repetition of previous claims and arguments already long ago in dispute.

Cases in point -

> Your personal psychoanalysis of Captain Leach and what you believe to have been his motives for breaking off the action is a perfect case in point. Such a thing is utterly unprovable in terms of any rational definition of the term "proof". Yet you repeatedly press it.

> Your elaborate statistical exercise seeking to demonstrate a superiority in gunnery on the part of Prince of Wales versus Bismarck rests on an assumption, nevertheless presented by you presented as irrefutable fact, that the first hit upon Hood at 0557 was not scored by Bismarck, despite numerous eye-witness testimonies to the contrary from observers closest to the actual event. Why such obduracy? To what end?

I might be wrong, but I suspect that a more nuanced, reserved and objective approach on your part would be most welcomed by all.


B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Bill Jurens » Sat May 18, 2019 10:57 pm

Mr. Virtuani:

Please try to exercise a bit more restraint in the tone and content of your postings here.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Bill Jurens » Sat May 18, 2019 11:26 pm

It is my impression here that most of the discussions, though often in a highly indirect manner, seem to revolve around the following hypotheses, primarily championed by mssrs. Bonomi (who no longer paricipates) and Mr. Virtuani. In essence, I interpret these to be:

a) That a historical analysis and reconstruction of the action at Denmark Strait can be used to justify the conclusion that Capt. Leach of Prince of Wales acted in a cowardly fashion when he chose to disengage from the fight.

b) That this action was recognized for what it was, and thereafter (for reasons which remain, at least to me, unclear) spawned a fairly elaborate 'cover-up' of the circumstances, apparently in order to allow Capt. Leach to retain command of his ship and even to be decorated for his actions.

c) That this subsequent 'cover-up' was so skillfully conducted that it was only during an examination of records some sixty years after the fact that it was finally discovered -- and uncovered -- by Mr. Bonomi and others.

I find the first two of these, highly implausible at best, and the third almost equally improbable. Insofar as proof of 'c' depends upon the prior confirmation of both 'a' and 'b' either simultaneously sequentially, each of which are, to put it charitably, somewhat problematical, the chances of 'c' being true would appear to be vanishingly small, i.e. the product of the probabilities of each. Even if we assign a probability of 20% to each, the chances of 'c' being true is only 0.008, i.e. less than 1%. So far, we really can't seem to get past 'a'.

Bill Jurens

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun May 19, 2019 7:19 am

Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote: "I did compare straddle rates between KGV and PoW, especially to hi-light the handicap that PoW's radar failures imposed upon her"
PoW straddled after 3 minutes from open fire from 21150 yards and straddled again every 2 minutes (despite not having any radar range and with the spray blinding her rangefinders) at ranges varying from 21150 to 16500 yards. RoF was (approximately) 2 salvos per minute.

KGV straddled after 5 minutes from open fire from 20500 yards (despite having a radar range since the beginning) and then straddled every 1.5 minutes (average) at distance varying from 16000 to 12000 yards (a much, much shorter distance, more than compensating for the bad weather and limited visibility).... RoF during the peak period (8:53-9:13) was only 1.7 salvos per minute.

Bismarck was on target by her third salvo (whatever this means) both on May 24 and 27, despite being crippled and erratically moving, thus weather and visibility seem not to have affected much her gunnery in the initial stages of the battle. Her continuous and unexpected turns did.
Please note that the range closure rate (that "confused" the radar operator of KGV...) was even higher on May 24...





What does this post (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83645) have to do with the wrong statement ("when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot.") posted by Byron Angel here (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=90#p83591) ?
I think someone wants just to take his revenge for being deeply annoyed by facts...



Bill Jurens wrote: "I find the first two of these, highly implausible at best, and the third almost equally improbable"
Strictly your personal (but respectable) opinion, of course... however:
a) Running away in front of the enemy (after <1 minute under heavy fire, being hit once (or twice max), still able to fight and giving up the assigned mission) is not really a particular sign of heroism, worth of rewarding. These are facts, proven by the reconstruction of the battle.
b) Read Churchill's comments, the minute of May26 War Cabinet (Pound), Tovey May 31 letter and ADM205/10 papers + see the Tovey's despatches (point 19 and 17): it's clearly written in official archives... No need to demonstrate anything here.
c) The "cover-up" was well evident to (and agreed by) everybody (e.g. see Barnes acceptance of the despatches + ADM205/10...), just it was not talked about in the RN and by (almost) all authors. Mr.Bonomi has unveiled it first, through clear evidences. Just logic and consequential.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Sun May 19, 2019 3:22 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 7:19 am
What does this post (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83645) have to do with the wrong statement ("when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot.") posted by Byron Angel here (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=90#p83591) ?
I think someone wants just to take his revenge for being deeply annoyed by facts...


The above-referenced post was offered in an attempt to illustrate, in a polite way, the intellectual error of representing opinion as fact. With respect to your argument about a "wrong statement", let me assure you that I am by no means annoyed, or even surprised.

Your opinion, insofar as I understand your comments so far, currently stands as follows -
[ 1 ] The reason that Prince of Wales lost the gunnery plot was a violent turn to starboard to avoid the wreckage of Hood, followed by the large turn-away to port ordered by Leach to break off the action.
[ 2 ] That Prince of Wales was not under effective fire because no damage from the seven hits had affected the main battery guns of Prince of Wales.
[ 3 ] That the true reason for the turn-away was a loss of nerve on the part of Captain Leach.

Please correct me if I have in any way erred.


B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by HMSVF » Sun May 19, 2019 4:41 pm

Bill Jurens wrote:
Sat May 18, 2019 11:26 pm
It is my impression here that most of the discussions, though often in a highly indirect manner, seem to revolve around the following hypotheses, primarily championed by mssrs. Bonomi (who no longer paricipates) and Mr. Virtuani. In essence, I interpret these to be:

a) That a historical analysis and reconstruction of the action at Denmark Strait can be used to justify the conclusion that Capt. Leach of Prince of Wales acted in a cowardly fashion when he chose to disengage from the fight.

b) That this action was recognized for what it was, and thereafter (for reasons which remain, at least to me, unclear) spawned a fairly elaborate 'cover-up' of the circumstances, apparently in order to allow Capt. Leach to retain command of his ship and even to be decorated for his actions.

c) That this subsequent 'cover-up' was so skillfully conducted that it was only during an examination of records some sixty years after the fact that it was finally discovered -- and uncovered -- by Mr. Bonomi and others.

I find the first two of these, highly implausible at best, and the third almost equally improbable. Insofar as proof of 'c' depends upon the prior confirmation of both 'a' and 'b' either simultaneously sequentially, each of which are, to put it charitably, somewhat problematical, the chances of 'c' being true would appear to be vanishingly small, i.e. the product of the probabilities of each. Even if we assign a probability of 20% to each, the chances of 'c' being true is only 0.008, i.e. less than 1%. So far, we really can't seem to get past 'a'.

Bill Jurens
Bill,


That’s pretty much it in a nutshell.

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