Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

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HMSVF
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by HMSVF » Sun May 19, 2019 4:48 pm

Byron Angel wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 3:22 pm
Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 7:19 am
What does this post (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83645) have to do with the wrong statement ("when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot.") posted by Byron Angel here (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=90#p83591) ?
I think someone wants just to take his revenge for being deeply annoyed by facts...


The above-referenced post was offered in an attempt to illustrate, in a polite way, the intellectual error of representing opinion as fact. With respect to your argument about a "wrong statement", let me assure you that I am by no means annoyed, or even surprised.

Your opinion, insofar as I understand your comments so far, currently stands as follows -
[ 1 ] The reason that Prince of Wales lost the gunnery plot was a violent turn to starboard to avoid the wreckage of Hood, followed by the large turn-away to port ordered by Leach to break off the action.
[ 2 ] That Prince of Wales was not under effective fire because no damage from the seven hits had affected the main battery guns of Prince of Wales.
[ 3 ] That the true reason for the turn-away was a loss of nerve on the part of Captain Leach.

Please correct me if I have in any way erred.


B
Byron,

I think the expectation is that POW should have stayed put and been offered up a sacrifice to further enshrine the glory of messrs Lutjens,Lindemann and Schneider.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Sun May 19, 2019 5:47 pm

HMSVF wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 4:48 pm
Byron,
I think the expectation is that POW should have stayed put and been offered up a sacrifice to further enshrine the glory of messrs Lutjens,Lindemann and Schneider.

Hi HMSVF,
Your guess is as good as any I can conjure.

While pondering the subject of Prince of Wales and "effective fire", a couple of thoughts came to mind this morning -

[ 1 ] By the time that Prince of Wales came under fire from Bismarck, I'm estimating that the range must have been within the inner limit of Prince of Wales' side armor immunity zone versus Bismarck's 15in main battery guns. Does anyone have any thoughts on this?

[ 2 ] Santarini presents in his book "Bismarck and Hood" a time-line of the hits scored by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen upon Prince of Wales. If Prince of Wales' gunnery problems were indeed caused by radical own ship maneuvering, this did not seem to thwart the shooting of either Bismarck or Prinze Eugen. Santarini notes the following sequence of hits -

> 0602 – 15in hit on bridge. Entire staff except for Captain Leach and Chief Yeoman of Signals killed.
> 0602+ – Hit of undetermined caliber (15in or 8in) on base of forward HACS, then passing through charthouse.
> 0603 – 15in hit upon midships starboard crane, then deflected through base of funnel.
> 0604 – 8in hit on Boat Deck.
> 0604+ - 15in underwater hit on starboard side amidships.
> 0606-0608 – 8in hit below the waterline abaft Y turret.
> 0610 – 8in hit underwater on starboard side aft near rudder stock. (speculative thought - What if this had been a 15in hit?)
> 0613 – Captain Leach decided to turn rapidly away to the SE and break off the action.

If these are compared to the time notations on McMullen's track chart (assuming consistent corresponding clock times), it appears that these hits were all scored during Prince of Wales' large 160deg turn-away to port and her subsequent starboard and port turns. If this is all, in fact, a correct correlation of data, it suggests some excellent shooting against an opponent evasively zig-zagging away under smoke - a far more challenging target than otherwise prevailed for any ship at any time during the earlier part of the action. And how does that influence conclusions drawn with respect to statistical analyses of German gunnery efficiency?

The more you look into this, the deeper it gets. Note, FWIW - 78th anniversary five days hence.


B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by alecsandros » Sun May 19, 2019 7:31 pm

Byron Angel wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 5:47 pm
[ 1 ] By the time that Prince of Wales came under fire from Bismarck, I'm estimating that the range must have been within the inner limit of Prince of Wales' side armor immunity zone versus Bismarck's 15in main battery guns. Does anyone have any thoughts on this?
British estimates of KGV class immunity zone , FWIR, against 380mm gunfire, was 13000meters for magazines and 15000 meters for machinery.

Post-battle revisions of documents included a provision for keeping a 30deg angle towards the enemy , to counter possible effects of enemy shells "superperforation".

As far as the shell-struck Capt Leach was concerned, his battleship was approaching the outer limits of her IZ, and required to settle on a new course.

However, that is irrelevant, because we have Capt' Leach's own assesment of the situation - in writting - and his decision of turn away was motivated, primarily, by the loss of HMS Hood, with no mention of IZ whatsoever.
[ 2 ] Santarini presents in his book "Bismarck and Hood" a time-line of the hits scored by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen upon Prince of Wales. If Prince of Wales' gunnery problems were indeed caused by radical own ship maneuvering, this did not seem to thwart the shooting of either Bismarck or Prinze Eugen.
That is because range was 14000-15000meters, and 380mm and 203mm guns had high muzzle velocity, and very flat trajectories. Therefore, the hitting space of the German batteries at such ranges was in the order of hundreds of meters (about 100m for Bismarck at 15000m IIRC, not sure about PE), which, coupled with the inherent quadrant of shell impacts coming from a salvo (each salvo had 4 shots), produced in practice a very large area of possible hits against a ship the size of Prince of Wales. In other words, even a salvo with a MPI significantly off-target still had chances of producing hits.

viewtopic.php?t=2631#p26678
Last edited by alecsandros on Sun May 19, 2019 7:43 pm, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by alecsandros » Sun May 19, 2019 7:39 pm

Byron Angel wrote:
Tue May 14, 2019 8:04 pm


Read the Board of Inquiry remarks and do your own count of definitely affirmed hits and possible/likely hits. I'm not making this stuff up.

It is not a matter of making stuff up,
it's a matter of cross-cheking sources from the other side's point of view.

It's also a matter of visible effects, and expected effects caused by AP vs HE hits.

I have no problems accepting more hits for BS and less for PE, but the body of evidence actually shows that there were between 1 and 3 hits from Bismarck on HMS Hood, and 2 to 3 from Prinz Eugen.

Remember the bird in the sky (the Short Sunderland) , overflying the battle area, spotted HMS Hood as she was burning in 2 places - 1 at the base of the main mast, the other on her aft section. Both "large conflagrations" as the pilot described them were probably caused by 203mm HE shots.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 15-415.htm

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun May 19, 2019 8:40 pm

Hello everybody,
Byron Angel wrote: "..insofar as I understand your comments so far, currently stands as follows -
[ 1 ] The reason that Prince of Wales lost the gunnery plot was a violent turn to starboard to avoid the wreckage of Hood, followed by the large turn-away to port ordered by Leach to break off the action.
[ 2 ] That Prince of Wales was not under effective fire because no damage from the seven hits had affected the main battery guns of Prince of Wales.
[ 3 ] That the true reason for the turn-away was a loss of nerve on the part of Captain Leach.
Please correct me if I have in any way erred. "
1) Correct

2) I never said that. Mr.Angel said that "when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot". This is incorrect. PoW came indeed under heavy fire and was being (lightly) damaged by 7 hits (3 from BS, o/w only 2 were acknowledged at the time (the third was discovered only afterward), + 4 from PG). This however had no direct impact on her main guns (see McMullen). The hard turns had.

3) Again, I never said that, albeit this is obviously a possibility.
Leach himself stated he decided to withdraw after the loss of Hood and not due to any actual gun problem, IZ, etc.
However, due to the fact that the turn away starts at 6:01:30 (see PoW maps), thus the order was given at 6:01:00 or 6:01:10 max (time for a battleship to react to rudder), just after having received the CP hit (as per his report), my personal opinion is that Capt.Leach, already tempted to go away due to Hood loss (his report), with his mind full of his fears about the reliability of his ship guns and crew (see his report), deeply shocked by the 15" shell, immediately (10 secs) ordered a hard turn away under smoke.
Whether he actually panicked on his bridge or he took a reasoned and somehow "cold" (but still militarily timid) decision, we will never know (I personally do hope for him that the second was the case), because a serious (and due) investigation (a BofI and possibly a CM) was never done after such facts (interrogating all the witnesses about their Captain reactions on the bridge and after when he reached the armored conning position): a "sugar-coating" of the whole story was chosen instead.


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Sun May 19, 2019 9:17 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sun May 19, 2019 9:08 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 7:19 am
Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote: "I did compare straddle rates between KGV and PoW, especially to hi-light the handicap that PoW's radar failures imposed upon her"
PoW straddled after 3 minutes from open fire from 21150 yards and straddled again every 2 minutes (despite not having any radar range and with the spray blinding her rangefinders) at ranges varying from 21150 to 16500 yards. RoF was (approximately) 2 salvos per minute.

KGV straddled after 5 minutes from open fire from 20500 yards (despite having a radar range since the beginning) and then straddled every 1.5 minutes (average) at distance varying from 16000 to 12000 yards (a much, much shorter distance, more than compensating for the bad weather and limited visibility).... RoF during the peak period (8:53-9:13) was only 1.7 salvos per minute.

Bismarck was on target by her third salvo (whatever this means) both on May 24 and 27, despite being crippled and erratically moving, thus weather and visibility seem not to have affected much her gunnery in the initial stages of the battle. Her continuous and unexpected turns did.
Please note that the range closure rate (that "confused" the radar operator of KGV...) was even higher on May 24...





KGV opened fire at 0848 at 24600 yds using radar ranges. Norfolk claimed hits from Rodney's 3rd or 4th salvo but Rodney opened fire on an incorrect range and could not have straddled, so if there were straddles at 0848 they had to come from KGV. After the first two salvos, KGV incorrectly spotted on Rodney's salvos, until ~0852. PoW was the only ship engaging Bismarck and could not have similar problems.

KGV recorded 14 straddles from salvos fired from 0853 to 0913 with a straddle from the 'A' salvo fired at 0853 which was stated to also be an observable hit. The range from KGV to Bismarck at 0853 was ~20500 yds and the range at 0913 was ~12k yds.

Bismarck opened fire on Rodney at 0850 at a range of ~22k yds and despite firing a large number of salvos at Rodney and then, from ~0900 at KGV, she scored no hits, even when the range fell to 12k yds.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun May 19, 2019 9:24 pm

Hello everybody,

I see no admission can come from Mr.Dunmunro about the wrong data he has posted (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) and no excuses at all to the other forum members.... what a strange behavior....


Let's stay at what is written in the GARs. Do you really believe someone can straddle and hit at the very first salvo from almost 25000 yards ? This would have really been a "lucky hit"....

KGV reported a straddle only from 20500 yards (before she had difficulties in estimating the range too) and then 14 straddles from 16000 to 12000 yards.


Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Sun May 19, 2019 9:37 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sun May 19, 2019 9:36 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 9:24 pm


KGV reported a straddle only from 20500 yards (before she had difficulties in estimating the range too) and then 14 straddles from 16000 to 12000 yards.
Source please.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun May 19, 2019 9:38 pm

KGV GAR.... You know it very well...

Now, excuses please for having posted incorrect information (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) !
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sun May 19, 2019 9:42 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 9:38 pm
KGV GAR.... You know it very well...

Now, excuses please for having posted incorrect information (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) !
Give me the exact quote.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Sun May 19, 2019 9:45 pm

Excuses for posting wrong info (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) ? None

Waste of time ? Again and again...

KGV_GAR.jpg
KGV_GAR.jpg (28.18 KiB) Viewed 758 times

and now, double excuses are strongly required....
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sun May 19, 2019 10:10 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 9:45 pm
Excuses ?


You have made a mistake here and appear to have misread the GAR.
Page 141:

...and despite the smoke the situation was situation was good and fourteen straddles were reported from 0854 and 0913.

On page 144:
...However at 0853 a range of 20,500 yards was obtained
and a double salvo spread 200 yards each side of 'this was fired. The 'A' salvo
straddled and gave the first hit actually observed...

...From 0853 until 0913 zig-zagging on RD/F minus straddle correction was
used. - This correction was varied according to. the fall of shot reports but the
mean straddle correction was down 200 on R.D/F which corresponds to that
found in practice firings The rate of rate of fire over this period was 1.7 salvos
per minute.

4. Fourteen straddles were observed and several probable hits were were reported
although these were not easy to see..
The range at 0853 was 20500 yds and this was the first of the 14 straddles observed from 0853-0913.

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by dunmunro » Sun May 19, 2019 10:13 pm

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 9:45 pm
Excuses for posting wrong info (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) ? None

Waste of time ? Again and again...


KGV_GAR.jpg


and now, double excuses are strongly required....
Alberto, you have misread the GAR which itself contains a typo [ranges for the section II heading are incorrect] on page 144, as you can see by reading paragraph 3 on page 140 . The section headings give the average ranges over those periods and not the ranges from the beginning and the end. Perhaps I should post the entire GAR so forum members can read this for themselves?

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Byron Angel » Mon May 20, 2019 12:26 am

Alberto Virtuani wrote:
Sun May 19, 2019 8:40 pm
Hello everybody,
Byron Angel wrote: "..insofar as I understand your comments so far, currently stands as follows -
[ 1 ] The reason that Prince of Wales lost the gunnery plot was a violent turn to starboard to avoid the wreckage of Hood, followed by the large turn-away to port ordered by Leach to break off the action.
[ 2 ] That Prince of Wales was not under effective fire because no damage from the seven hits had affected the main battery guns of Prince of Wales.
[ 3 ] That the true reason for the turn-away was a loss of nerve on the part of Captain Leach.
Please correct me if I have in any way erred. "
1) Correct

2) I never said that. Mr.Angel said that "when finally taken under effective fire by Bismarck Prince of Wales completely lost the plot". This is incorrect. PoW came indeed under heavy fire and was being (lightly) damaged by 7 hits (3 from BS, o/w only 2 were acknowledged at the time (the third was discovered only afterward), + 4 from PG). This however had no direct impact on her main guns (see McMullen). The hard turns had.

3) Again, I never said that, albeit this is obviously a possibility.
Leach himself stated he decided to withdraw after the loss of Hood and not due to any actual gun problem, IZ, etc.
However, due to the fact that the turn away starts at 6:01:30 (see PoW maps), thus the order was given at 6:01:00 or 6:01:10 max (time for a battleship to react to rudder), just after having received the CP hit (as per his report), my personal opinion is that Capt.Leach, already tempted to go away due to Hood loss (his report), with his mind full of his fears about the reliability of his ship guns and crew (see his report), deeply shocked by the 15" shell, immediately (10 secs) ordered a hard turn away under smoke.
Whether he actually panicked on his bridge or he took a reasoned and somehow "cold" (but still militarily timid) decision, we will never know (I personally do hope for him that the second was the case), because a serious (and due) investigation (a BofI and possibly a CM) was never done after such facts (interrogating all the witnesses about their Captain reactions on the bridge and after when he reached the armored conning position): a "sugar-coating" of the whole story was chosen instead.


Bye, Alberto

My apologies. I must have been corresponding with another party using the same name.

B

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Re: Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Mon May 20, 2019 7:32 am

Hello everybody,
is someone trying to find a "revenge" for the bad error made (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83637) ? A childish behavior IMO.


Dunmunro wrote: "You have made a mistake here and appear to have misread the GAR...you have misread the GAR which itself contains a typo...on page 144, as you can see by reading paragraph 3 on page 140 ."
Not at all. You are just superficially reading and mentioning the documents. Please try to be more precise referencing the material you post.
Pag 140 and 141 of ADM 234-509) are not from the KGV GAR. You are reading the high level narrative of Capt.Patterson, not the gunnery report: we cannot know whether the narrative or the GAR is right in their interval subdivision when stating that 14 straddles were obtained. For sure in the GAR there is no "typo", in case just a repeated, confirmed "error" (see GAR snapshot).

KGV_GAR_intervals.jpg
KGV_GAR_intervals.jpg (55.31 KiB) Viewed 692 times

In any case, even if the GAR is wrong and the narrative is right and you "prefer" to discard the GAR, distances varied from 20500 (first straddle) to 12000 yards ("last" straddle), a much shorter distance than PoW on May24 (21150 - 16450), therefore nothing really changes in the comparison (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=135#p83648) between KGV and PoW.

This discrepancy between GAR and narrative, just confirms that KGV report is extremely poorly written, as I always said, when you were trying to build a salvo plot based on such a report...

The excuse of "typos" is so often used by this forum member that it start to become his own "mantra", when inconvenient information is found in the official documents. Please open your eyes and face reality instead of looking for "typos" everywhere.


Byron Angel wrote: "My apologies. I must have been corresponding with another party using the same name"
Apologies accepted (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8552&start=150#p83658). Errors are just human. Persisting in errors is devilish.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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