How close was the final battle?

[dunmunro]

Hello all,
no comment would be needed to above post.


KGV Gunnery Control.jpg



KGV Enclosure N.3_Section II_3.jpg


Willingness to read and understand what is written in KGV GAR should be enough to judge whether there were problems or not with 284 personnel training (interpretation of echoes) and cooperation with Gunnery Control / TS (acceptance of radar ranges into AFCT).

KGV 284 set was technically perfect (even superior to its specifications/expectations at that time) but its valuable outcome was only fully exploited after 08:53, due to radar "art" not being fully understood yet. KGV gunnery clearly suffered in very first minutes engagement, due to this 'problem'.

hans

This was the first long range engagement fought by the RN using radar ranging. There was no guidebook or rules on how to fight the engagement using radar ranging, consequently, while there were suggestions on how to do things more efficiently in the future, KGV was breaking new ground in terms of radar FC and there was no way to have prepared better than was done. The other factor was that KGV and Rodney fought the action whilst on separate courses, in open order, so that there was no clear time sector between KGV and Rodney's salvos and this combined with the defect in KGV's Fall of Shot Hooter, caused issues regarding optical salvo spotting unrelated to Type 284 radar, but which caused confusion to the entire 14in FC team.

These two quotes are from Radar at Sea:

Captain Ellis of HMS Suffolk:

...when I took command of the Suffolk and found her newly fitted
with a centimetric [50cm] gunnery radar outfit, not a soul could tell me
a thing about its possible tactical applications, I had to figure that one
out for myself, from such basic knowledge as I had, or could add to
experimentally at sea ...

• During January and February 1941, Eagle lent one of her observers,
Lieutenant D. G. Goodwin (with his Bigsworth board), to Valiant to direct
the former's two fighters during Fleet operations. 'Valiant was one of the
first ships fitted with radar,' wrote Captain Goodwin in 1983, 'but the
idea of actually using it to direct our own aircraft (as opposed to merely
detecting the enemy) was startlingly new. We hadn't a clue how to do it
and it was a shambles - but rather exciting and fun!

[Byron Angel]

Hello all,
no comment would be needed to above post.


KGV Gunnery Control.jpg



KGV Enclosure N.3_Section II_3.jpg


Willingness to read and understand what is written in KGV GAR should be enough to judge whether there were problems or not with 284 personnel training (interpretation of echoes) and cooperation with Gunnery Control / TS (acceptance of radar ranges into AFCT).

KGV 284 set was technically perfect (even superior to its specifications/expectations at that time) but its valuable outcome was only fully exploited after 08:53, due to radar "art" not being fully understood yet. KGV gunnery clearly suffered in very first minutes engagement, due to this 'problem'.

hans

One point worthy of note is that the projected gunnery range computed on the basis of of the 0853 20,500 yard radar range reading, after allowing for adjustment for ( a ) rate of change of range and ( b ) the double-salvo range interval of plus/minus 200 yards over/short relative to the projected gun range, the A/B ranges salvo ranges entered on the salvo plot would probable have read something like .....

20,500 yds minus 500 yds (~30 sec closing of range at combined 30 kts) = ~20,000 yds base range with salvos A and B landing at ~19,800 and 20,200 yds ..... or thereabouts in very rough terms (insufficient data to get anything more precise).


Byron

Wish we had that salvo plot data.