Hypothetical: The British detect Bismarck with a ship-borne Walrus at 0900 on 25 May 1941.

[wadinga]

Hi Michael L,

We are at the sensitive boundary of naval tactics and politics here.

The actual timing and origin of the "towing" signal has been debated at length on this site. It was pure Winstonian hyperbole, dictated to and forced upon Pound under extreme pressure as the Prime Minister was about to face a hostile Parliamentary debate in which the loss of Hood, apparent inability to actually sink Bismarck having cornered her and the ongoing disaster in Crete were going to put his position as leader at risk.

Luckily, during the debate, he was able to report the destruction of Bismarck, and this somewhat overshadowed the serious naval losses in the Mediterranean which in part would lead to the loss of Crete, and a serious threat to the Suez Canal. The RAF in the Middle East was seriously under-resourced after the Greek debacle which meant Cunningham operated with virtually no air support under constant Luftwaffe assault.

No naval officer would ever even consider letting KGV run out of fuel, and slow, inefficient RAS at sea in fairly calm conditions was feasible, since pre-war days. This was similar to KM capability at the time, and nothing like the efficient, resource-rich operations the USN developed , later in the war.

Incidentally, Tovey's heroic observance of radio silence highlights the difficulty of the C-in-C actually operating at sea in 1941, rather than gathering information from all resources and issuing instructions to detached units from a shore base instead. Pound and Phillips were interfering with vessel dispositions from the Admiralty, whilst also simultaneously doing the same with Cunningham's operations, who had elected to stay ashore and control his dispersed forces from Alexandria.

All the best

wadinga

[paul.mercer]

Hello Mr dunmunro.
True enough. 'The Admiralty was taking calculated risks when it ordered RN ships to maintain the hunt for Bismarck despite their fuel state, as the Admiralty had provide options to refuel ships at sea.' But I think you have forgotten the last piece of information/advice the Admiralty gave to Admiral Tovey on the matter of fuel. If I recall correctly:

BISMARCK must be sunk at all costs and if to do this it is necessary for KING GEORGE V to remain on the scene then she must do so even if it subsequently means towing KING GEORGE V . [Emphasis added by me.]
1st Sea Lord to C in C HF 11.37B Most Immediate Naval Cypher F.

Pound did apologise for the signal stating it should never have been sent, I think he mentions it should be expunged from the records (any expungement would have been difficult as every ship and station would have received it). Tovey states he believed it came from Pound but also states that if he had known that it in fact had come from Churchill he would have included reference to it in his despatch.
Forum; The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27. https://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=8246

Thank you for your contribution to the hypothetical post:
“I'm not sure what else I can add regarding the potential use of Walrus recon aircraft, except to state that the problems of locating the mothership after a ~6 hour flight, whilst the mothership will have travelled ~150nm, is quite daunting.”
I agree, it would have been daunting. I presume that is why one of the Walrus' crew was an Observer/Navigator. IIRC most aircraft were also equipped with a radio and a Radio Operator.

Kind regards, Michael L.

However, now that you know that the RN had oilers capable of RASing KGV, you can understand that towing KGV would not have been necessary. The signal which appears to have originated from Churchill, basically was authorizing Tovey to take extraordinary risks to ensure Bismarck's destruction, but even if KGV had to remain on scene for another ~12 hours she could have still made it to an Irish port, and another ~12 to 24 hours would have meant rendezvous with an oiler with KGV joining Force H.

It would have been almost certain suicide for the crew of a Walrus attempting a long range recon mission on 25 May. It would have also been problematic for KGV, in that she would have be at an agreed upon in advance fixed position for the Walrus to have any hope of recovery, and KGV would have had to break radio silence, if Bismarck was actually spotted, to give the Walrus an updated position, as KGV would have had to make a rather abrupt change of course to intercept Bismarck.

Hi Michael,
In one of your posts you stated: Could KGV and Repulse slow the Bismarck down in a 'short action'?
If on spotting the KGV and Repulse Lutjens decided to conduct a running fight (as per his orders), that is Bismarck sailing on a southerly course, again, ahead of the pursuing KGV and Repulse, then we are talking a Bismarck stern 4x15 vs a British bow 6x14 and 4x15 (with Repulse to the rear).
In this situation, I respectfully submit that Tovey could not have sustained such a pursuit for more than an hour before Repulse would have to break-off low on fuel. Unless the British scored a decisive hit(s) that slowed Bismarck to at least 20kts, I submit that Tovey would have abandoned the pursuit.

You are probably correct, but I wonder if Bismarck was actually fast enough to get away from KGV & Repulse as she had lost the use of 1000 tons of fuel from her forward tank and had a large hole in the bow that had to be shored up so it is doubtful if Bismarck was going at full speed.
Let us not forget that in the first battle, fire was opened by Bismarck at 0553, at 0601 Hood blew up and at 0603 PoW disengaged with Bismarck firing her last salvo at 0609, making for a very short fight. In the final battle the RN opened fire at 0847, Bismarck fired her last shell at 0931 and although the RN kept firing until 10.15 the battle was effectively over in well under an hour, so the odds on KGV and Repulse scoring some damaging hits in that time were very good. Even though it would have been a long stern case for the two RN ships they should have been able to keep Bismarck in range and with 10 RN heavy guns v 4 for Bismarck in a battle, even if it only lasted for 1 hour, the two British ships ought to have scored enough hits which would have slowed her down enough for Rodney and Ramillies to come up and finish the job
L

[Byron Angel]

Hi Paul,
I think it worth mentioning that, in her final battle, Bismarck was very restricted in her speed - probably < 15 kts. AIUI, her steering was uncontrollable at any greater speed.

[Michael L]

Hello Mr dunmunro.

Mr W. Churchill was a titan in his time, but for all the good he did, he also had his faults. The signal sent by Admiral Pound regarding 'towing KGV', on behalf of Churchill reflected poor judgement. As pointed out, Admiral Pound subsequently regretted sending it, and Admiral Tovey rightly ignored it. I am puzzled by how you have tried to ‘sugar coat it’.

Further on the subject of aircraft finding their ‘parent ship’. There were various methods available to recover aircraft. For example, as cited in Admiral Tovey’s Despatch/Report dated 5 July 1941:

40. …The homing beacon of VICTORIOUS had broken down and the return of the striking force unfortunately coincided with a rain squall round the ship. They missed her in the darkness and it was necessary to home them by D/F on medium frequency and to carry out an all-round sweep with a signal projector.
…
67. The flying boat was still shadowing, though her reports now differed widely in position from those of the aircraft of ARK ROYAL. Her signals were made on H/F and her position could not therefore be checked by D/F.

As for your insistence on how launching a Walrus would have been ‘almost suicide mission’, I would like to point out that the Walrus could have landed on Victorious, which was still well within range on 25 May. Walrus aircraft landing on aircraft carriers was not unheard of.

If I might paraphrase, as has been pointed out, ‘we are at the sensitive boundary of naval tactics and forum politics here.’ Kind Sir, let us agree, to disagree.
Regards, Michael L.

[Michael L]

Hello Paul and Byron.

I note your contributions. IIRC, when Bismarck broke contact early on 25 May, the ship put on a burst of speed to 27 knots as it did its lazy circle to the west, north and then east.

I agree that in a tail chase action, with 10 RN heavy guns v 4 for Bismarck, there would have been a tipping point. Either the British would have scored enough hits to cause Bismarck (8x15) to turn and commit to battle with full broadside, or the Bismarck scored damaging hits on the KGV (10x14), assuming it was the lead ship as per Tovey’s instructions to Repulse (6x15) to lag 5,000 yards behind. Unlike the final encounter, Bismarck’s crew would not have been fatigued and, arguably, still confident in their ability after their encounter with Hood (8x15) and PoW (10x14 with some gun problems).

In a toe-to-toe the odds favour the British. But they also did in the Battle of the Denmark Strait. One side would have come out on top, probably the British. But, I respectfully submit that in this hypothetical encounter the Bismarck would have caused more damage on the British, than it did in its final battle. Also, there is a slim chance, but still a chance, that Bismarck may have succeed.

Consequently, I am led to conclude that if Tovey, as he hinted at in his Despatch/Report, had launched his Walrus and detected Bismarck circa 0900 on 25 May, while in all probability would still have sunk the Bismarck, the KGV, and possibly the Repulse, would have had the scars to show for it. Thus, it was fortunate he did not launch his Walrus, and the battle played out how it did, with the British sustaining very little damage indeed.

Yours respectfully, Michael L.

[dunmunro]

Hello Mr dunmunro.

Mr W. Churchill was a titan in his time, but for all the good he did, he also had his faults. The signal sent by Admiral Pound regarding 'towing KGV', on behalf of Churchill reflected poor judgement. As pointed out, Admiral Pound subsequently regretted sending it, and Admiral Tovey rightly ignored it. I am puzzled by how you have tried to ‘sugar coat it’.

Further on the subject of aircraft finding their ‘parent ship’. There were various methods available to recover aircraft. For example, as cited in Admiral Tovey’s Despatch/Report dated 5 July 1941:

40. …The homing beacon of VICTORIOUS had broken down and the return of the striking force unfortunately coincided with a rain squall round the ship. They missed her in the darkness and it was necessary to home them by
D/F on medium frequency and to carry out an all-round sweep with a signal projector.
…
67. The flying boat was still shadowing, though her reports now differed widely in position from those of the aircraft of ARK ROYAL. Her signals were made on H/F and her position could not therefore be checked by D/F.

As for your insistence on how launching a Walrus would have been ‘almost suicide mission’, I would like to point out that the Walrus could have landed on Victorious, which was still well within range on 25 May. Walrus aircraft landing on aircraft carriers was not unheard of.

If I might paraphrase, as has been pointed out, ‘we are at the sensitive boundary of naval tactics and forum politics here.’ Kind Sir. Let us agree, to disagree.
Regards, Michael L.

I have provided information showing that Tovey had lots of time before he actually had to break off pursuit and/or the final action. I also provided info showing the RAS options open to Tovey. This isn't 'sugar coating' anything, rather I've provided factual historical data into which we can consider that infamous signal in historical context.

In WW2 there's no GPS, no reliable sat or cell coms, and of Victorious' 15 aircraft, 4 of them got lost and had to ditch even though they were briefed on the likely position of Victorious at the end of their recon flights. In poor visibility navigation in an aircraft relied upon dead reckoning but wind speed and direction was almost impossible to estimate, and even the best navigators could only approximate their positions. Victorious' captain opted to risk revealing her position through the use of a searchlight, and fortunately, she didn't get torpedoed as a result. Without KGV and Victorious breaking radio silence there was no way for a Walrus from KGV to know Victorious' position with any accuracy.

[Michael L]

Hi wadinga.
I suppose it is the old story of centralised versus decentralised command and control.
Some Leaders lead from the front. Rommel being an example that comes to mind.
But, as you point out there are trade-offs.
Kind regards, Michael L.

“I really do not see the signal.”

[Michael L]

Mr dunmunro.

With respect, I believe you have taken me out of context. My reference to 'sugar coating' was in regards to your interpretation of the 'towing KGV' signal/message.

The signal which appears to have originated from Churchill, basically was authorizing Tovey to take extraordinary risks to ensure Bismarck's destruction, ...

That is your interpretation. I happen not to agree with you. Please, let us agree to disagree.

I have on two occasions stated that, "I stand corrected" on the details you have provided regarding RAS/OAS.

1941
February
During her time at Scapa KING GEORGE V embarked two Walrus amphibians equipped with ASV 11N radar. These were the first naval front line aircraft to be fitted with radar.
https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... orge_V.htm

I also agreed with you that the recovery of aircraft at sea is a daunting task. Nonetheless, in times of war, needs must. And, in times of war, sometimes men are sent on missions in the knowledge by those ordering, and those being ordered, that they may not return.

Thank you for your contributions.
Yours respectfully, Michael L.

[dunmunro]

Mr dunmunro.

With respect, I believe you have taken me out of context. My reference to 'sugar coating' was in regards to your interpretation of the 'towing KGV' signal/message.

The signal which appears to have originated from Churchill, basically was authorizing Tovey to take extraordinary risks to ensure Bismarck's destruction, ...

That is your interpretation. I happen not to agree with you. Please, let us agree to disagree.

I have on two occasions stated that, "I stand corrected" on the details you have provided regarding RAS/OAS.

1941
February
During her time at Scapa KING GEORGE V embarked two Walrus amphibians equipped with ASV 11N radar. These were the first naval front line aircraft to be fitted with radar.
https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... orge_V.htm

I also agreed with you that the recovery of aircraft at sea is a daunting task. Nonetheless, in times of war, needs must. And, in times of war, sometimes men are sent on missions in the knowledge by those ordering, and those being ordered, that they may not return.

Thank you for your contributions.
Yours respectfully, Michael L.

I don't know how you can interpret a signal telling an Admiral to run his ship out of fuel in any other way, except as an order to take extraordinary risks. However, as I've shown this was far from an order to undertake a suicide mission.

The issue with the Walrus was when, where, and how to recover the aircraft. Victorious had no interest in engaging Bismarck and could maintain her agreed upon course so that her aircraft would have a reasonable chance of finding their carrier and landing on her flight deck; this was not the case for KGV's Walrus. As we've discussed no other ship authorized a catapult recon mission either, so there seems to have been a consensus amongst the RN ships fitted with catapult aircraft, that they had an unacceptably low probability of safe recovery.

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Just to be clear, I believe we have established that the towing signal was actually sent during the final battle, at Churchill's insistence, after the battleships had been engaging Bismarck for some time. I have shown a hand written letter from Tovey to Pound sent on arrival in Scapa indicating how angry he remained over such a ludicrous suggestion. Pound agreed it was so stupid and unrealistic it should be expunged from the record....but that was impossible.

Until the plotting of the D/F signal (inaccurate as it was) Tovey had no inkling that Bismarck was astern of him. All search efforts were to the south and west on the assumption she was heading out further into the Atlantic to continue the mission.The most dangerous option. If he had launched Walruses from the ships with him their search would almost certainly have been in that direction. His "wise after the event" idea of searching astern was included in the report. Hindsight is 20/20 vision. He even said he wished he had instructed Holland to lead with PoW. He was very good at hindsight. He could not co-ordinate the search with Wake-Walker without breaking radio silence. If he had launched, and then reversed course at 10:47 when he did break radio silence, the aircraft would almost certainly all have been lost, since he was steaming away from them at high speed and a "Shagbat" especially one festooned with ASV Yagis was really slow.

We can all remain respectful and enjoy the conversation, even if we can't persuade others to agree on every point.

All the best

wadinga

[dunmunro]

With respect to your following opinion.

Tovey probably didn't mention the possibility of refueling in Eire, IMHO, because the despatch was a public document and disclosure of sensitive matters regarding Eire would have caused diplomatic issues for both the UK and Eire governments.

I disagree. The Despatch dated 5 July 1941 was submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by Admiral Sir JOHN C. TOVEY, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet – at the time not a public document. IIRC the Despatch was only released as a public document when it was published in the London Gazette in October 1947. IMHO there were no concerns regarding diplomatic issues for both the UK and Eire governments.

The use of Irish (Eire) ports:

1414/28 From C. in C. Home Fleet
Propose detach TARTAR proceed with all despatch into nearest Irish Port to obtain fuel for full speed.

1457B/28 From D.O.D.H. to C. in C. Home Fleet
Your 1414/28. Approved if unable to reach British Port at a satisfactory speed.
http://www.kbismarck.com/admiralty-war-diary.html

and it is Tovey sending the signal to the Admiralty!


And then this!

28th May

0200: altered course 007°

0800: 53° 14' N., 11° 32' W

0919: altered course 045° (More screen joined)

1100: altered course 040°

1229: Obs. Position 54° 27' N., 10° 29' W

1300: altered course 053°

1428: altered course 065° (More screen joined)

1600 Made Aran Island, Ireland

and thence as requisite to Loch Ewe, arriving at gate 1227, having been delayed 6 hours by fog in the Minches. Rodney detached at 1830 on 28th May to Clyde.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

I will have to check and see if Appendix 1 was part of the despatch published in the London Gazette.

EDIT: Appendix 1 is not in the London Gazette. However, the positions reported at 0800 and 1229 are not consistent with the 1600 entry... I think we need to see KGV's log. This is the header for Tovey's despatch as presented by the HMS Hood website:

This document is a modern transcription of a portion of Admiralty record ADM 234/509. It deals with various aspects of the mission to locate and sink battleship Bismarck in May 1941. This particular portion covers assorted despatches. The original file is held at the The National Archives at Kew, London. This Crown Copyrighted material is reproduced here by kind permission of The National Archives.

So this is not the same as the version in the London Gazette and is drawn from a file that was classified in 1947.

[paul.mercer]

Hello Paul and Byron.

I note your contributions. IIRC, when Bismarck broke contact early on 25 May, the ship put on a burst of speed to 27 knots as it did its lazy circle to the west, north and then east.

I agree that in a tail chase action, with 10 RN heavy guns v 4 for Bismarck, there would have been a tipping point. Either the British would have scored enough hits to cause Bismarck (8x15) to turn and commit to battle with full broadside, or the Bismarck scored damaging hits on the KGV (10x14), assuming it was the lead ship as per Tovey’s instructions to Repulse (6x15) to lag 5,000 yards behind. Unlike the final encounter, Bismarck’s crew would not have been fatigued and, arguably, still confident in their ability after their encounter with Hood (8x15) and PoW (10x14 with some gun problems).

In a toe-to-toe the odds favour the British. But they also did in the Battle of the Denmark Strait. One side would have come out on top, probably the British. But, I respectfully submit that in this hypothetical encounter the Bismarck would have caused more damage on the British, than it did in its final battle. Also, there is a slim chance, but still a chance, that Bismarck may have succeed.

Consequently, I am led to conclude that if Tovey, as he hinted at in his Despatch/Report, had launched his Walrus and detected Bismarck circa 0900 on 25 May, while in all probability would still have sunk the Bismarck, the KGV, and possibly the Repulse, would have had the scars to show for it. Thus, it was fortunate he did not launch his Walrus, and the battle played out how it did, with the British sustaining very little damage indeed.

Yours respectfully, Michael L.
Hi Michael,
Thanks for your reply, you may well be right in your assumption, but the point I was trying to make is that with 10 heavy guns firing at Bismarck it shouldn't take long for her to take some serious hits - far less than the approximate hour that Repulse had before she had to disengage to refuel. Of course there was always the danger of Bismarck landing some damaging hits on KGV (or Repulse ) but bearing in mind the relatively short time it took for Bismarck to range on Hood and PoW on Bismarck and the same between BM, Rodney and KGV it is doubtful if the chase would have lasted very long, much less than one hour. As you say, the odds would be on the RN
On another point re the order to tow the British ships if the captains concerned had refused point blank to obey that order. would they have been Court martialed?

[paul.mercer]

DOUBLE Post!

[Michael L]

Hi Paul.
It is interesting to speculate if the 'tow KGV' was an actual 'order' or 'guidance'.
I think Court Martial(s) would be the subject of a separate Post - if it hasn't already been done.
Cheers, Michael.

[Michael L]

Dear Members.

As we know the 'combat part' of the Bismarck Saga for the Royal Navy lasted from 23 May to 27 May 1941. Approximately five weeks later, on 5 July the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, submitted his official Despatch, Sinking of The German Battleship Bismarck on 27th May, 1941. It appears that this Despatch (93 paragraphs) included some ‘post-battle analysis’ conducted by Admiral Tovey (and his Staff?) – details based on hindsight. One such piece of analysis caught my attention:

48. The enemy's courses west of south were being covered by SUFFOLK and, to a lesser extent, by NORFOLK and PRINCE OF WALES. KING GEORGE V worked across to the south-westward to cover a southerly course, allowing for an increase of speed by the enemy. Consideration was given to flying off the Walrus from KING GEORGE V to search the perimeter astern of the ship and so cover a south-easterly course of the enemy; but the swell was such that the sacrifice of the aircraft would almost certainly result, and I did not wish to expose KING GEORGE V to U-boat attack whilst picking up the crew. Subsequent analysis shows that such a search might possibly have located the BISMARCK.

It was this ‘speculation’ by Admiral Tovey that ‘a search by a walrus might have detected the Bismarck’ which prompted me to post this hypothetical.

Having explored the scenario of Bismarck initially doing a runner, with KGV and Repulse in pursuit, I would like to change the direction of the discussion to a toe-to-toe encounter battle - although admittedly this has been already touched upon.

Hearsay evidence from German survivors claim that during the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the Bismarck’s Captain, Kapitän zur See Lindemann, was keen to pursue the damaged PoW, but was overruled by Admiral Lütjens. The hypothetical scenario I respectfully submit for Members to consider is that on spotting the KGV and Repulse, Lindemann convinces Lütjens to stand and fight. How do Members see this hypothetical scenario playing out?

In the Battle of the Denmark Strait, both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen initially fired on the lead ship, Hood. But then Prinz Eugen was ordered to shift it’s fire onto PoW. Would Bismarck have concentrated on the lead British Ship, KGV? Or would it have split its fire with forward turrets firing on one ship, and aft turrets on the other?

The Naval History website page for KGV has the following entry:

25th – At 0013 hours the CinC Home Fleet in KING GEORGE V signalled to RA CS1 in NORFOLK that he hoped to engage the BISMARCK, with KING GEORGE V and REPULSE at about 0900/25/5/41, which was about Sunrise, and from the eastward.
The CinC then signalled REPULSE, whose armour was inferior to HOOD's, that in the engagement she was to keep 5000 yards outside of him and not to engage until KING GEORGE V had opened fire.

What do Members think Tovey’s tactics for an encounter battle would have been?
Would he go in line astern with Repulse lagging behind 5,000 yards? Like Vice-Admiral Holland did with Hood and PoW - though they were closer together.
Or would he have followed Commodore Harwood’s battle plan at the Battle of the River Plate, and directed Repulse – with it’s greater speed – to diverge from KGV, thus attacking Bismarck from two different angles/directions?

Respectfully submitted for interested Members consideration as part of this hypothetical scenario.
Kind regards, Michael L.