RF wrote:Cumberland was Harwood's most powerful ship, and I would imagine that your stepfather spent some time in the Falklands as Cumberland was assigned as a guardship there in case AGS attacked on the anniversary of the 1914 battle.
Yes, I understand that she ran at full speed all the way from the Falklands, her crew thought she was about to burst her boilers!
I was going to present the panelling to the wardroom of the present HMS Cumberland but she is about to be decommissioned, so I will have to wait until the next one is built.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood and Earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned these defended;
And saved the sum of things for pay.
lwd wrote:
As it was he shot up about 60% of his main gun ammo did he not? An engagement where he tries to maintain the range advantage is likely to be one where he burns up even more ammo for what may well be fewer hits.
This is one scenario. Another is that Harwood in trying to close makes it easier for AGS to take the cruisers out.
If they are not in effective range there's nothing to prevent them from salvo chasing as they close which will decrease P(H). Once they are in range you have pretty much the same situation as the historical battle only GS is trying to keep range which means she may be only firing one turret a good part of the time and making course corrections herself which isn't going to help her gunnery.
I'm not so sure here, given Harwood's battle tactics of dividing his force. At long range AGS can concentrate on Exeter and I think would have a good chance of sinking her before Ajax and Achilles get in range. If that does happen then AGS concentrates on the one close order target presented by the light cruisers. Harwood would be left in the same position as Holland at DS - but with little punching power in return. Which means AGS shouldn't have to chase salvos or alter course too much.....
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
RF wrote:I'm not so sure here, given Harwood's battle tactics of dividing his force. At long range AGS can concentrate on Exeter and I think would have a good chance of sinking her before Ajax and Achilles get in range. If that does happen then AGS concentrates on the one close order target presented by the light cruisers. Harwood would be left in the same position as Holland at DS - but with little punching power in return. Which means AGS shouldn't have to chase salvos or alter course too much.....
You seem to be losing sight of the fact that AGS spent quite some time at relatively close range trying to hit the light cruisers and couldn't sink them.
Whilst at the same time still trying to sink Exeter; it was that distraction that gave Harwood time to close the range.
Ajax had half its guns knocked out; Achilles had most of its fire director personnel as casualties; it was Harwood that finally broke off the action because the AGS fire was getting too hot while his punching power was degraded.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Because AGS is not under such effective initial fire from sixteen six inch guns or the threat of torpedo attack at the closer ranges. AGS will therefore be more effective at the longer distance; the cruisers should be sunk, not least from the steeper angled fire than the more flat trajectories closer in, at least on paper.
All battles will have a degree of uncertainty; I use the word should above in the context that that is the most likely outcome, it is no guarantee that it will be.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Given that GS only has six guns and the British ships can be maneuvering to avoid her fire I suspect that hits will be less frequent. Furthermore given the velocity of the German 11 in guns you aren't going to get much of a plunging fire effect at the ranges we're looking at. It's an analogy full of need for modifiers but if we look at the expected hit info at: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.htm
We see that the US expected an about 4% hits on a Bismarck sized target with an end on profile. Given that the British cruisers would be substantially smaller and indeed most other corrections would be to lower this percentage for the GS we're lookig at a full 6 gun salvo have a P(H) < 22% i.e about 1 hit in 5 salvos. Indeed if we correct for size using a the rectangurlar areas of the two ships we have the P(H) of a single hit go from 4.1% to ~1.5%. Which results in the P(H) of a 6 gun salvo of less than 9% or on average 1 hit in 11 salvoes. That's without correcting for the British ships maneuvering or the lower hieght or smaller size of GS range finders. According to the navweapons page on them the GS carried 120 rounds per gun. So just using the above she has about 11 stored hits before she's out of ammo. Doesn't sound like enough to count on sinking 3 ships and even if it is it leaves her quite vulnerable.
As Captain Dove of the Africa Shell said to Captain Langsdorf, this is all on paper. It isn't battle tested, which would need a new version of the River Plate battle, where Langsdorf follows the long range tactics.
I'm inclined to think that Navy Weaps is a bit on the conservative side, but of course I could be wrong. It only takes one heavy hit deep in the bowels to disable a light cruiser.
I would expect Navy Weaps to call the DS battle wrong too, as Hood and POW should have prevailed - on paper. But they didn't.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
RF wrote:As Captain Dove of the Africa Shell said to Captain Langsdorf, this is all on paper. It isn't battle tested, which would need a new version of the River Plate battle, where Langsdorf follows the long range tactics.
I'm inclined to think that Navy Weaps is a bit on the conservative side, but of course I could be wrong. It only takes one heavy hit deep in the bowels to disable a light cruiser.
Langsdorf was critized by other german artillery officers like P.Schmalenbach for using torpedoboat-tactics (german small destroyer). They felt Langsdorff used his ship sub-optimal decreasing the chances of hitting the enemy by strong maneuvers leading to prolonged shot in.
Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!
RF wrote:... I'm inclined to think that Navy Weaps is a bit on the conservative side, but of course I could be wrong.
It's not really a matter of Navweapons being "conservative". The data in that table is from a naval war college study during WWII. It could still be conservative on the other hand as I've pointed out if you start correcting for differences between the two situations (Iowa firing at Bismarck to GS firing at a British light cruiser) most of the corrections look to me like they would lower the P(H) and do so by a considerable amount.
It only takes one heavy hit deep in the bowels to disable a light cruiser.
Indeed statistics and luck are going to play roles here. But if it's a 3 on one the GS has to get lucky several times and the British only once and as the British can put out more rounds they have a better chance of getting "lucky".
I would expect Navy Weaps to call the DS battle wrong too, as Hood and POW should have prevailed - on paper. But they didn't.
I don't see anywhere in that site where they "call" battles. However I agree the odds were with the British in that battle but some times that's not enough. The same would be true I suspect in any confrontation of a panzershiffe vs 3 British cruisers. If there were a 100 such battles the Germans would almost assuredly win some. I doubt however the majority would end up as German victories at even the tactical level and at the strategic level it would be even worse.
On the basis of a three on one I would agree with you.
But the essence of my scenario is that it isn't three on one.
By dividing his force Harwood is potentially creating two actions, separated by time. AGS has the longer reach, and concentrates on Exeter first, at long range. Normally I would expect Exeter to be sunk before Ajax and Achilles can get in range.
The second action involves AGS targetting the light cruisers after Exeter is out of the picture. And by keeping them as one firing unit Harwood would make it easier for the Germans.
In that scenario I think the odds would be on AGS as the more likely winner. It does of course imply some hindsight, but given Harwoods pre-determined tactics and Langsdorf initially underestimating the true forces against him, it could have turned out that way if Langsdorf avoided rushing in.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd wrote:
odds were with the British in that battle but some times that's not enough.
Note that at DS the odds initially were roughly even, because the after turrets of Hood and POW didn't bear at what proved (for Hood) to be the critical point.
For Harwood the same factor applies - in trying to close AGS his after turrets didn't bear so he had only half fire power. And when Ajax turned full on it was the after turrets that were knocked out by one 11 inch shell.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
RF wrote:...But the essence of my scenario is that it isn't three on one.
By dividing his force Harwood is potentially creating two actions, separated by time. AGS has the longer reach, and concentrates on Exeter first, at long range. Normally I would expect Exeter to be sunk before Ajax and Achilles can get in range.....
I wouldn't consider this 2 seperate actions. Furthermore I'm not sure I would expect Exeter to be sunk that quickly. If GS is trying to keep the range open then she is either maneuvering her self or masking half her main battery and potentially both. Furthermore this presupposes that the engagement takes place in day light and good seeing conditions.
RF wrote:
lwd wrote:
odds were with the British in that battle but some times that's not enough.
Note that at DS the odds initially were roughly even, because the after turrets of Hood and POW didn't bear at what proved (for Hood) to be the critical point.
....
No the odds weren't even. The British had the option of maneuvering to make full use of their broadsides. Furthermore that only addresses main guns and neglects the point that the British had two ships with battleship caliber guns and heavy armor.
