Dave Saxton wrote: ...Furthermore, the design of the German radars meant that it was intergrated within the overall firecontrol system (that was every bit as sophisticated and as effective as the American firecontrol systems) from day one.
That doesn't seam to square real well with this quote:
The end result was an overly complex, very heavy Firing director and very sensitive machinery. This development process continued until the point of chaos was reached. For example, the new battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were found to be incapable of shooting their main guns in the autumn 1939. This could only be corrected after 22,000 yards (!) of useless electrical wires were removed and major modifications were made to the Fire Control circuits and mechanisms.
This means that virtually everytime they used their guns they were in effect gaining RDFC experience. By 1942, the Germans had amassed a vast amount of experience.
Just how many rounds did they fire in that time period? Now subtract those of Bismark at least on her final voyage cause not much of that experiance made it home.
Is it there any other source aside navweaps? I believe that the problem, here, is that we granted navweaps as the only trustful source (which I don´t say it isn´t. I´m just saying about another one).
Because in some regards, I have find some different interpretations of navweaps, let´s say, with things Friedman has stated.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last. Sir Winston Churchill
I just don´t have to prove it. Yamato was seen in action against the USN at Leyte and then was sunk in combat. So, she was in combat against numerical and tactical superior forces. Not against BB, granted, but she was in harms way all along.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last. Sir Winston Churchill
I just don´t have to prove it. Yamato was seen in action against the USN at Leyte and then was sunk in combat. So, she was in combat against numerical and tactical superior forces. Not against BB, granted, but she was in harms way all along.
So what? Iowa was in combat too. Lots of air attack. Enemy planes shot down. Didn't get sunk, though. What do I have to prove? That Iowa can get sunk like Yamato?
The circumstances were not the same: Yamato was in harm´s way, in tactical inferiority. Iowa was part of a huge armada, with tens of AA escorts, air cover, sub screen, name it and it have it. She wasn´t really in danger during the war because, unlike USS Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet, Lexington, Arizona, Washington or South Dakota and a lot others which were at harm´s way during very risky operations, Iowa operated during a time in which the US already was winning. So, no comparison between what happened with Yamato that stood up to fight to the last and ships that made their time escorting CVs (or being escorted by CVs?).
Best regards
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last. Sir Winston Churchill
I find the importance being placed upon BB sea hours to be rather missed placed and of relatively small consequence, so I will limit my comments to setting the record straight concerning the chronology of the Germans bringing naval radar into operation.
Early production sets were delivered to the TVA and to the Artillery and Range Finding schools in early 1937 for tests and evaluation. These were installed on several ocean going vessels large and small. The first of what we call here "RDFC" trials were carried out on artillery school vessels at that time.
The cruiser Koenigsberg became the first large warship to have operational radar in the summer of 1937. This ship and others participated in major Wermacht exersises featuring radar trials in Sept. 1937. The Graf Spee is often cited as the first warship to have operational radar, but it was not taken in hand to be fitted with radar until late 1937. The AGS was however, the first warship to undergoe very extensive and comprehensive radar trails, beginning in Jan 1938, including truely extensive live fire exersices, because Langsdorf was selected to over-see the project, with industry and NVA technicains and consultants aboard.
The AGS trials were "convincing" and proved the effective range of this radar set as 25,000 meters, with successful practice shoots at such ranges.
The AGS was also sent to Spanish waters during the Spanish Civil War were much experience was gained.
This all occured years before the Allies started down the developmental path to their own more comparable decimetric systems. The radar being brought into operational service on some USN warships during 1941 was invariably CXAM. CXAM was hardly comparable to contemporary German or British decimetric radars. The more comparable FB (Mk2) was first installed for initial test and evaluation aboard a cruiser in June 1941.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
Dave Saxton wrote:I find the importance being placed upon BB sea hours to be rather missed placed and of relatively small consequence,
Is it? Historically training time has had a strong correlation with both general and specific qualities of soldiers and sailors alike. The closer this experiance is to actulal combat conditions the better. I find your unsources dismisal rather unconvincing. Especially in the light of statements made by miliatry and history professionals over a significant period of time.
...
This all occured years before the Allies started down the developmental path to their own more comparable decimetric systems. The radar being brought into operational service on some USN warships during 1941 was invariably CXAM. CXAM was hardly comparable to contemporary German or British decimetric radars. The more comparable FB (Mk2) was first installed for initial test and evaluation aboard a cruiser in June 1941.
And this is relevant to the quantitly and quality of experiance gained by the end of 42 mcuh less late war how?
Karl Heidenreich wrote:Is it there any other source aside navweaps? I believe that the problem, here, is that we granted navweaps as the only trustful source (which I don´t say it isn´t. I´m just saying about another one).
Because in some regards, I have find some different interpretations of navweaps, let´s say, with things Friedman has stated.
There is nothing sacred about navweapons. It simpy has a lot of relevant infor in one place where it's easy to find and is relativly trustworthy. I've found at least some errors on the site (in one case it's contradictory which implies at least one of the sides is wrong). Because it's on the net it's also easy to referance. I can for instance post the url and a short quote and any reader with questions can go check out the site and the full statement. They also list sources on at least some pages which allows for even more research on the part of the enterprising reader. The least helpful referance is saying x says y. There can be extrenly difficult to look up (not giving a source or referring to "secret" sources is admittedly worse). Giving a quote from a book along with the title author and location is good but we don't all have access to all the useful books out there.
In short navweapons is my first stop in discussing these issues. If someone raises what looks like legitimate issues with navweapons I'll search further time providing.
Karl Heidenreich wrote: [The circumstances were not the same: Yamato was in harm´s way, in tactical inferiority. Iowa was part of a huge armada, with tens of AA escorts, air cover, sub screen, name it and it have it. She wasn´t really in danger during the war because, unlike USS Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet, Lexington, Arizona, Washington or South Dakota and a lot others which were at harm´s way during very risky operations, Iowa operated during a time in which the US already was winning. So, no comparison between what happened with Yamato that stood up to fight to the last and ships that made their time escorting CVs (or being escorted by CVs?).
I'm confused as to what your point is here. Are you talking who had the most impressive war record? or which was the best ship from a technical standpoint? As for operating in a time when the US was winning so was the Gambier Bay it didn't help her survive. The Iowa was at risk and was attacked by Japanese planes and would not have reacted well to a hit and especially multiple hits by long lances which some of her opponents were armed with.
Are you talking who had the most impressive war record? or which was the best ship from a technical standpoint?
Well, the best war record of any WWII ships must be Warspite´s or USS Johnson or some small destroyer somewhere, maybe USS Yorktown. But, between those two ships, is obvious that Yamato had both arguments at her favour:
She was a much better ship.
She had a better war record.
All Iowas put together hardly were in such dangerous situations as Yamato, which speaks good about USN leadership, because they did whatever to achieve tactical superiority anywhere, anytime.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last. Sir Winston Churchill
Hello Bgile,
I have attached answers after asterisks, so please read on...
Iowa and New Jersey achieved straddles at 35,000+ yds.
*** using HE shells which give large splash. Why they didn't hit?
BTW, seems, Yamato achieved straddle at 40,000 yds:"Both of the YAMATO's forward turrets open fire at a distance of 20 miles. Of her six forward rifles only two are initially loaded with AP shells, the remainder with Type 3s. The YAMATO's F1M2 "Pete" spotter plane confirms that the first salvo is a hit".
Suppose there is no aircraft spotting? For various reasons it wasn't usually available or was ineffective.
*** I don't quite understand question. Aircraft spotting sometimes was effective sometimes not. Just as radar spotting.
Please explain how the Japanese are going to fire at a range of 18,000 yds at night. Usually you can't see the target at that range. Oldendorf could have opened fire at 26,000 yds but was ordered not to do so. I dispute your claim that his fire was ineffective. It's like claiming it took 10+ torpedoes to sink a certain ship because that is how many actually hit her before she sank. The fact that his fire was not needed to sink Yamashiro is irrelevant.
*** Good question. I don't know exactly how Japanese detect and fire on a target at 18,000 yds. But they did it often without radar. I can give some examples:
1 Battle of Savo. Chokai's lookouts reported shapes of Vinsennes group at 18,000 yds.
2 Second Battle of Guadalcanal. The ships headed by Hashimoto had been able detect (Shikinami at first) and shadow the Task Force 64 under the command of Rear Adm. Lee at 18,000+ yds. Battleships (equipped with the newest SG) detect Japanese considerably later.
3 Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Omori's two heavy cruisers open fire at about 18,000 according to map. And they win own duel against 4 CLs.
From other side the Americans had some knowledge about that. According to San Francisco War Damage Report she was apparently hit by 14" AA shell which came from a battleship at 17.000 yds on Friday 13. Here lay possible reason explained why Olendorf's battleships with limited AP ammo begin firing before the Japanese got inside his effective range.
As estimated Yamashiro was hit by 4 torpedos of which two in battleship action. It is more than enough for old battleship. For comparison Kongo and Kirishima both were hit by 2 or 3 torpedos and sunk afterwards. The Fuso eat single torpedo and broke into pieces. It is not surprising that few medium caliber shells possibly hit on Yamashiro at about 15K yds and start the fires. If it is remembered that during battleship action the allies had expended 3,635 8" and 6" shells. But I want to see documentary evidence which could confirm 16"-14" hits.
Oldendorf's ships had the mk8, not the mk13.
*** Correctly, Mk13 became available in 1945, when Yamatos were at the bottom of Pacific. Speech about Mk8 & Mk3.
Whether Yamashiro was sunk by gunfire is not relevant to this discussion. It's very hard to sink a battleship with gunfire.
*** Agreed. Accurate gunfire usually in the first place knocked out FC and armament. Seems, Yamashiro is not the case.
If the Japanese could fire at night at 18,000 yds, why didn't they fire at one of the US battleships? Why didn't at least some of their ships fire at Washington while she was destroying Kirishima?
*** I don't know exact answers. But I can add my own questions. Why the American battle line didn't fire at Mogami when Yamshiro was disabled or why didn't separate fire between two targets early in battle? At 01.13 Atago and Takao each fired eight torpedos at Washington. Why Washington didn't fire at heavy cruisers at the same time?
(quote)This was possibly the best battleship gun ever put into service. Originally intended to fire the relatively light 2,240 pound (1,016.0 kg) AP Mark 5 projectile, the shell handling system for these guns was redesigned to use the "super-heavy" 2,700 pound (1,224.7 kg) AP Mark 8 before any of the USS Iowa class (BB-61) battleships were laid down. This heavier projectile made these guns nearly the equal in terms of penetration power to the 46 cm (18.1") guns of the Japanese Yamato class battleships, yet they weighed less than three-quarters as much. (end quote)
*** I respect patriotic sentiments. But note that it is subjective opinion and there is no sense to consider gun without mountings. As a matter of fact "According to an American report produced after the war, the most reliable and ACCURATE main-armament weapon of the war was the British twin 15-inch Mk I". Raven & Roberts, British Battleships of WW2, page 411. They assume that "the German twin 15-inch probably ran a close second".
Mr. Jurens' suspicion is that there may have been an oblique reference to an alignment problem in some document that was taken out of context; perhaps they were waiting for parts.
*** I heard that the part of archives documents was destroyed for reasons not yet known in the late seventies or in the eighties. It is a first.
Why Mr Jurens didn't ask Mr Friedman about his source? I don't understand. And what reason for his conclusion?It is impossible to find something without exact knowledge.
Where exactly can I find this table?
*** The same "Accuracy of gunfire of the main batteries of US battleships" submitted by the Statistical Research Group (i.e SRG), Prinsenton University.
Exact index is AMP report No 79.2R / SRG-P No.42.
Mr Jurens knows this report. He used it in his article.
New Jersey definitely had problems with dispersion when returned to service. It had something to do with the powder and it's long period of storage. The problem went away when new powder was provided.
*** Not so long period. It's only fifteen years since Vietnam. And I don't understand why powder charges were not checked or tested beforehand. That interesting, Navy officials initially blamed the spotters for the poor performance. What a strange thing to happen. But you are right, return to WW2.
OK Serg, you are right. Radar didn't help with gunnery, even at night. At least not US radar. British radar seemed to work OK against Scharnhorst, but of course that was British. Japanese could shoot just as accurately with visual means, evern at 18,000 yds. US guns were substandard and inaccurate at long range. We only defeated the Japanese because we were lucky and were reading all the IJN message traffic and we could build things fast. We were stupid to keep returning the old battleships to service because they were useless and couldn't hit anything.
Are you talking who had the most impressive war record? or which was the best ship from a technical standpoint?
Well, the best war record of any WWII ships must be Warspite´s or USS Johnson or some small destroyer somewhere, maybe USS Yorktown. But, between those two ships, is obvious that Yamato had both arguments at her favour:
She was a much better ship.
She had a better war record.
All Iowas put together hardly were in such dangerous situations as Yamato, which speaks good about USN leadership, because they did whatever to achieve tactical superiority anywhere, anytime.
It's not at all clear that eitehr is true.
Indeed by many defintions of better Iowa was clearly superior to Yamato. For instance she fit in well with US plans and doctrines and was at sea for most of the war after she was commissioned. The Yamato on the other hand was in port most of the time. The Iowa saw combat quite a few times the Yamato what 3 times? maybe 4 or 5 depending on how you define it. How many planes did Yamato shoot down? vs how many did Iowa shoot down? How much fire support did they engage in? How many times did they engage opponents with surface gun fire?
Yamato repersented a waste of resources. The fact that Shinano was to be completed as a CV rather than a BB shows the Japanese appreciated this. Truly they were magnificient ships in some senses but the Yamato class can hardly be considered better ships or having better war records than the Iowas.
Serg wrote:Seems it is impossible to discuss such questions seriously with you. I can to discuss facts but not implicit belief.
When you do such absurd things as to indicate that at 18Kyds in the dark of night visual FC is better than radar FC I can go no further.
US sources are often critical of their own systems because they want to make them better. You are trying to make a point and you ignore all the good evidence. This is common and everyone does it, but I've just become exhausted trying to debate people who ignore one side of the issue. Perhaps someone else will, but I'm just not up to it anymore I'm afraid. The evidence of these ship's record over 50 odd years of service is quite different from what you picture. They were called back into service many times because their guns were so valuable and yet you somehow think they were not.
Have you ever stood bridge watches and tried to see things on a dark night? It's very difficult, even with flares, and flares are quite limited in range. I don't think they had them that could go 18,000 yds, and searchlights couldn't either. I really think there was some mistake to say that firing that far at night without radar could be all that effective. Maybe on a really clear night with a full moon. You seem to argue that radar was useless, and that is simply absurd. It was a very, very effective system when it worked well.
