Falklands/Malvinas war naval scenario

[marcelo_malara]

As you may know, this month it is 26 years of the South Atlantic war. In the local forums have been a lot of activity around it, and I imagined this scenario:

On May 21st an English force landed on the Falkland Sound. The sound is 10 nm wide and about 25 nm long in its northern part, separated from the southern one by an island. The sound entrance is about 380 nm from the continent. At that date and latitud, day lasts 11 hours (between astronomic twilights) and the night 13. If the Argentine Navy had assembled a fleet with the old ex-USN destroyers (4 Gearing-Sumner class armed with 3x2 5" and 2 Fletcher class with 5x1 5") they could make that distance at 30 kn in 13 hours. So departing the coast at 6 am, they could enter the Sound at 19 pm (already night). Fighting in the Sound diminishes the capability of the British fleet: the coasts of the Sound are formed by high cliffs and are close, so the radar clutter should make them useless. With no radar to guide missiles, the English fleet would need to revert to the guns, which they had in a less per-ship basis. To verify how a destroyer battle is like, see for example the battle of Narvik, a 5" impact in a un-armoured ship is lethal. The plan is fight a night battle with the British units present, trying to disturb the landing operation, and retire at midnight, so to be out of the Sea Harriers range an dawn.

Doubts:

1-Could the 6 Argentine destroyers aproach the islands undetected?
2-Could they pass the nuclear submarine barrier?

Best regards

[Bgile]

Interesting idea, and it might have been worth trying. I think there were only two British submarines, and there might have been a good chance to get past them with a high speed dash. They can't be everywhere. Not sure how fast the DDs were though ... probably not as fast as they were in WWII, but still they might have made it.

Then they have the British picket destroyers to deal with. I think there were one or two outside the sound some distance at each end weren't there, as picket ships? If they had SSM's it might have been bad for the Argentine destroyers, and no clutter to deal with.

I agree that if they get into the sound they could cause a lot of damage.

[RF]

President Reagan had placed an AWACS spy plane in position to relay information to British forces so given say up to 12 hours warning of this proposed operation the RN would be ready and not allow itself to be trapped. The force would most likely be caught in open waters and destroyed.
It is also likely that the Argentine military codes had been compromised so that the US and British were reading them.

The acid test though is this: why didn't Admiral Aneya try it? He could even have used a feint sortie by the VDM to cause further distraction. But he didn't.

[Bgile]

RF,

Your comment about AWACS "spy plane" is the first I've heard of that. I'm skeptical because AWACS isn't normally considered a "spy plane" - it provides real time radar, not a 12 hour delay and the Harriers would have a much easier time of it than they actually did. The Argentine aircraft would never have been able to surprise the British at all, and they wouldn' t have needed to put picket destroyers in harm's way. In fact, HMS Cumberland was sunk when performing radar picket duty. It also would have been very blatant and Argentina would have squawked big time.

Putting AWACS at the disposal of the British would have required a very complex refueling operation as well ... they'd probably have needed 5 aircraft at least to keep one on station and many refueling aircraft as well. You can get some idea of what this would involve by looking at the problems the British had just conducting heavy bomber missions, let alone loitering there. I believe one of them was interned when it had to land in Brazil, which was neutral.

I can imagine some satellite photo support, but AWACS? Where did you get this information?

[Karl Heidenreich]

I know nothing of AWACS but Marcelo´s scenario is quite intersting. I have been always of the opinion that the Argentine military leadership didn´t work out a real defensive plan for Falklands. Have they done something like a plan and acted with a will full of strenght a lot could have been accomplished. If those destroyers were able to intercept the British landing force with their escorts, then we will have the equivalent of Leyte.

[marcelo_malara]

why didn't Admiral Aneya try it?

Well, Robert, I think that´s obvious, he didn´t consult me!!! Now, seriously:

1-I don´t know if the old destroyers had the 30 kt dash speed capability. they were almost 40 years old by then and I don´t know the state of boilers and turbines.

2-An operation of that kind would risk I think 1000 lives. After the demise of the cruiser Belgrano, which cost 400 lives, I think that so heavy lost of life would rest support to the war, no matter the military outcome of the op.

[RF]

I can imagine some satellite photo support, but AWACS? Where did you get this information?

The BBC in Britain on one of the digital channels ran a series of programmes last year marking the 25th anniversary of the invasion of the Falklands. This included a dramatic re-enactment of the actual invasion events, involving detailed interviews with Governor Rex Hunt, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Defence Secretary Lord Carrington and in particular US Secretary of State Alexander Haig.
It was stated that as part of the close relationship between Thatcher and Reagen the US President felt constrained to help the British, particulary as the Argentine action was seen as unprovoked naked aggression. Initially Haig was sent on a ''shuttle'' between London and Buenos Aires to try to negotiate a settlement, using Pym as his British contact and the three man junta representing the Argentine military.
According to Haig's account he was frustrated by the intransigent atitude of the junta, which he, Haig, initially saw as the obstacle to a political settlement. In the meantime Thatcher was furious that Pym apparently had gone behind her back in attemting to negotiate through Haig and came close to sacking him. Thatcher then went direct to Reagen asking for US covert assistance for a British military attempt to retake the Falklands.
Haig then had a third meeting with Galtieri, Lami Dozo and Aneya in which he told them that they had only one chance now to reach a peaceful settlement. They would not budge saying the British would not fight over the Malvinas. Haig told them bluntly that the British would fight, the British would prevail and that consequently the junta would fall.
After the failure of the Haig mission Reagen telephoned Galtieri, who refused to speak to him. This was described by military observers commenting as a monumental blunder, as ''you do not ignore and snub the President of the United States, even if you are a head of state yourself.'' Angry at the rebuff Reagen then telephoned Thatcher and said the US would be prepared to help the British, but that they must not be seen to do so openly in order not to prejudice US relations with Mexico, Brazil and particulary Chile. It was then agreed over the telephone that the US would deploy an AWAC's aircraft over the south-west arc of the Atlantic, with the US Navy sending direct reports to the British naval Task Force Commander, Admiral Woodward, through the communications link on Ascension Island. It was then stated by a BBC commentator that the AWAC's were used until the retaking of Port Stanley.

Incidently this TV programme also mentioned, without going into detail, the role of GCHQ in Cheltenham, England in breaking into Argetine military communications.

Bgile, I hope this answers your query.

[RF]

why didn't Admiral Aneya try it?

Well, Robert, I think that´s obvious, he didn´t consult me!!! Now, seriously:

1-I don´t know if the old destroyers had the 30 kt dash speed capability. they were almost 40 years old by then and I don´t know the state of boilers and turbines.

2-An operation of that kind would risk I think 1000 lives. After the demise of the cruiser Belgrano, which cost 400 lives, I think that so heavy lost of life would rest support to the war, no matter the military outcome of the op.

Which means they would be especially vulnerable on the return journey.....

Incidently the TV programmes mentioned in my above post to Bgile also staged a projected military battle between the entire Argentine surface fleet and the British naval Task Force. This scenario had similarities to the Battle of Midway except that all of the advantages lay with the British who were able to use intelligence sources to engage and sink the entire Argentine fleet without the two British carriers coming under attack. In fact the British losses in this computer simulated battle were less than the actual losses suffered in retaking the islands.

[marcelo_malara]

About the speed capabilities of the old ex-USN ships, I recently read in Conways Fighting Ships that the Belgrano was torpedoed while sailng at 10 kt. Can anyone confirm this?

[lwd]

.... I'm skeptical because AWACS isn't normally considered a "spy plane" - it provides real time radar, not a 12 hour delay and the Harriers would have a much easier time of it than they actually did. ...

The US was apparently sharing intelligence with the British. However if they had an AWACS in the area (not a spy plane as you state) they probably didn't have a direct feed to the British. Also the AWACS is optimized for arial targets not sure how good it is/was at picking out surface targests especially at relativly low speeds.

[marcelo_malara]

If they had an AWACS (which has "look-down" capability) the low level attacks would have been detected, for example against the Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor.

[lwd]

Indeed but my impression is that US intel assets reported up the chain to US command and that the latter decided how much to share with the British. This would mean that an incoming air raid might well be detected by an AWACs plane but the British might not reiceve word of it intime to make use of the info. Especially if the US was sending the intel to London via DC. I do seam to remember hearing that we had AWACS planes in the area but I'm not sure what the coverage was (It how close or what % of the time). In any case I'm not sure if they were looking for ships or what they could see of them.

[Bgile]

I must say I'm amazed. What base would they have used for them? I know the Brits had to refuel the Vulcans - I think twice - for just a bombing mission to Stanley. Imagine having a plane loiter in the area. In any case if it had been in direct communication with the British fleet the Argentine air attacks would probably have met with disaster. The various accounts mention difficulty picking up incoming aircraft until a short time before the attack, so it must not have been real time support.

As it was, provision of the AIM-9L missile to the British for use by the Harriers was a real game winner and made a big difference in the air battle.

[RF]

Marcelo,

From what I recall the CO of HMS Conqueror stated in his log that the speed of Belgrano was constantly changing, but was fired at when she was doing about 12 knots.

The details of the logistics of the AWAC's operation was not discussed on the BBC series. No doubt it was, and is, a very sensative military secret.
What I suspect, and there is no hard corroboration for this, is that the US involved two South American countries, Uruguay and Chile, as stop-off points for tanker planes refuelling USAF aircraft. I have also seen speculation that the British also used Montevideo as a covert refuelling facility and related intelligence activites.
I am also aware that Chile, presumably through Reagan's close links with Pinochet, provided secret support to at least one unit of the British SBS engaged on covert activities in both mainland Argentina and in the Falklands prior to the British landings in San Carlos Bay.

Given the evident relationships at the time, particulary with Bill Casey, Reagan's personal election campaign manager in both the 1976 and 1980 US primary and presidential elections, installed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Reagan's Easter Island deal with Pinochet, and the hospitality later given by Thatcher to Pinochet when he visited Britain for hospital treatment and the Labour Government in connivance with the Spanish tried to have him arrested in Britain, this admittedly very circumstantial evidence does lend support to my thinking. But it is all conjecture, however there is a saying in Britain that there is no smoke without fire.

[RF]

Incidently for the record, it was the unamed BBC narrator on the TV series who described AWAC's role as a spy plane. My post merely repeated the description given.