Battle of Midway: Another perspective

[RF]

There have been quite a few threads examing various ''what if '' scenarios in connection with the overall conduct of this action.

One aspect not considered, from the standpoint of what actually happened on the 3 June 1942, is what would have happened if Nagumo had full strength with Zuikaku and Shokaku in company (I am assuming full availability of these ships here).
Would extra air cover have saved the four carriers actually lost - or would it have been six carriers sunk?

[lwd]

Is the US still at 3 CVs or do they have 4? If 3 they may not even try to oppose the invasion at least initally. What do you propose happened at Coral Sea that didn't historically?

[Karl Heidenreich]

Hi RF and lwd,

I believe this scenario was once discussed in this forum... this "what if": Zuikaku and Shokaku being added to the original 4 IJN CVs. But lwd point is fair: do the USN can have an additional carrier? I believe that means Lexington (I´m building now a 1:350 Trumpeter version of that impressive ship ) was not destroyed at Coral Sea or... let´s see, or to have USS Ranger instead (86 plus aircraft).

The problem, as I see it, is that if we analize the strenght of both fleets and the overall variables then, as in the original scenario, is that IJN MUST WIN. But it didn´t in the original... so, can we assume that our analysis is worth a try?

Best regards

PD. I don´t give a damm, let´s give it a try.

[lwd]

If the Japanese and US CV's miss each other for some reason during what was the Battle of the Coral Sea. The US will have 4 CV's to the Japanese 6. The ratios are a little more in favor of the Japanese but not greatly so. Let's look at some factors that might play a role.
1) US DC is probably not as good. The US institued changes in prebattle preperations as a consequence of the fuel air explosing that sunk Lexington (at least I think that's when they date from).

2) The Japanese weren't using their CV ac to scout so the US is probably goint to get to the same postion before being spotted. Perhaps even closer as Yorktown won't require a lot of work before leaving PH.

If the US gets closer before they launch things get a lot worse for the Japanese as instead of 2 CVs worth of airplanes finding them there's a good chance that 4 CV's worth do. This might leave 2 CV's worth of counter strike. In this case there's a good chance that it's 6 Japanese CVs sunk vs 1 US CV sunk and one more badly damaged or possibly sunk. If they launch from the same point things become more problematic as the question becomes do Lexingtons planes find the Japanese CVs or not. If not then the Japanese have 3 CVs worth of planes to throw at the US force. This could result in a 3:3 or 4:4 CV exchange.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd,

But you are assuming here that McClusky´s and Leslie´s Squadrons did find the Japanese Carriers as they did historically which is why the US won the battle. With another arragement, maybe, the Japanese use the third CV division in another disposition, not just to add to Nagumo´s main attack fleet but... let´s see, as Kondo´s escort and back up for Nagumo once operation against Midway was underway. Then the US always find 4 CV but miss to find the other two, which is likely considering the Japanese inclination to complex operations.

What do you think?

[lwd]

I'm pretty sure the other two were part of the Kido Butai and Japanese doctrine was to keep them together and launch massive raids. I don't think they would have been seperated from the rest and the additional ships might have made them easier to find.

[Bgile]

I haven't seen anything to make me think IJN damage control was ever better than US damage control. Quite the contrary, in fact. US DC did get better as the war progressed, as you would expect.

[lwd]

I meant that US DC at Midway would probably not be as good as it was if it hadn't been for the Battle of the Coral Sea. Loosing a CV due to faulty DC was a big eye opener. For instance I think purging the avgas lines was a post Coral Sea pre Midway DC change.

[MichaelC]

I'm not sure how much chance there was to absorb the lessons learnt at Coral Sea before Midway. The other carriers were already leaving when Yorktown got back and she only stayed long enough in Pearl for a quick 48 hour mending.

Had any of the American ships been bombed with a flight deck full of fueled and armed planes the result would have been a similar holocost to those experience at Midway or later in the war on Bunker Hill/Franklin.

? I believe that means Lexington (I´m building now a 1:350 Trumpeter version of that impressive ship ) was not destroyed at Coral Sea or... let´s see, or to have USS Ranger instead (86 plus aircraft).

You can add Saratoga to your list of what if carriers, she arrived back from repairs and actually met up with Enterprise and Hornet a few days after the battle and transfered planes to them.

As to your original hypothetical scenario so much depended on chance sightings on both sides that anything could have happened. Assuming the battle followed it's historical path initially the probability would be more Japenese carriers than just Hiryu survive the initial strike and retaliate. Having not spotted Enterprise and Hornet yet the brunt of the strike falls upon Yorktown (and presumably the 4th American carrier leaving them both heavily damaged.) Nagumo and Spruance both being relatively cautious and having just lost 50% of their force would likely pull back and lose contact thus ending the battle.

[RF]

I was thinking in my post of the situation where Nagumo kept changing his mind on his priority targets, so the crews were changing the ordnance on the Jap planes from torpedoes to bombs and back again - would two more carriers have provided air cover at these times or would they too be changing over the bombs and torpedoes?
I know this is a microsituational view of a particular point in the battle which assumes that everything else that happens did happen, but it is a point that has occured to me.

[lwd]

Probably no change in Japanese tactics. If you are interested in Midway I hardily recommend Shattered Sword the info from the Japanese side has been absent from most accounts available here in the past.

[RF]

Thanks for the reference, I will take a look.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Probably no change in Japanese tactics. If you are interested in Midway I hardily recommend Shattered Sword the info from the Japanese side has been absent from most accounts available here in the past.

The problem is NOT that there are not Japanese accounts or info, the problem is THAT there WAS an "official" account from Fuchida´s that was used by the allies as the gospel of what happened at Pearl and Midway (something similar with Guderian and Manstein´s accounts on the Eastern Front). And Fuchida´s version is that of Nagumo making a mess at both actions. As far as I know, Shattered Sword, brings new information that puts Fuchida on balance about this position (more or less what House and Glantz did with the Kursk battle with their work about the famous eastern front battle).

Some say that Shattered Sword is a very good work and worth reading. I believe I´m gonna order it now!

Best regards.

[Karl Heidenreich]

A thought about this new Midway scenario:

If, by any chance, the USN sent the new CV´s Air Groups against the Japanese they´ll count with three more squadrons: one bomber group, one fighter group and one torpedo group. These groups will help a lot when the Japanese CVs are found but...

According with lwd (which is likely, let´s admitt it), the Japanese doctrine will dictate all CVs massed up as they previously did at Pearl which meant a group of six carriers.

So, we will have a bigger air cover for the CVs because two more are contributing to the overall air defence against a 1/4 bigger attack (not from three CVs but from four).

Basically any early attack as those from the torpedo planes against the Japanese will fail miserably as they did historically. What´s the chance of the torpedo and fighter squadrons to penetrate the zero´s air cover? Not much. The zero´s and the AA from the CV will take them. Maybe a hit, maybe not...

But, here is a thought. If only one Japanese defense group did not engage and maintain it´s flight path over the CVs then McClusky and Leslie´s attacks are doomed also, even with the help of another bomber group. Maybe, not doomed but it´s succes will be more difficult because the zeros will descent upon them and break their attack. Let´s say that McClusky managed to hit Kaga and Hiryu but that´s it...

The Japanese will have Akagi, Soryi and two more CVs (numerically the original group) to search and find the USN CVs. Then, and only then, we will meet the decision in an entirely new enviorment. At this point the inteligence gap that favoured the USN will be useless becuase, by that moment, the game will start anew. And the weight of the superior trained Japanese crews can shift the balance in favour of the IJN.

Well, there it is...

[Karl Heidenreich]

Reading again this thread I come to terms with "doctrine" and it´s different approach of USN and IJN. Japanese CV doctrine already believed and stressed the use of masive strikes from combined CVs. Also the IJN knew that whilst launching so many aircraft those orbiting were expending a lot of fuel, so each carrier launch only half it´s available aircraft per turn, and it was the sum of all these "choikai" were the ones that delivered the "blow".
The USN doctrine was quite different; they don´t stressed the use of combined CV (this lack of doing so showed as quite dangerous at Midway) but the launching of a single massive strike from individual CVs. And they launched at the same time ALL their airgroup.

So... if having two more CV at Midway then Kido Butai would have two more CAP when the USN groups arrived.... whilst that same case would not be the same with the USN CVs.

Best regards.