There is no question that getting hit by a tropedo is not good for a ship of any type. However from the data presented it looked to me like there was a good chance the 5 torpedos that hit PoW would have been survivable if not for them starting the shaft up again. Now how long they survied in those waters is an open question and ceratianly she would have been in a precarious postiong.
If you are looking for a ship that survived multiple torpedo hits the classic is probably Hornet. She took took hits from 4 bombs, 2 air planes, and 3 torpedos via IJN planes. This started a massive fire and abandon ship was ordered. US DD then fired 400+ rounds of 5" and 9 torpedos at her (I seam to recall 5 hit and detonated). She was still afloat when the Japanese found her and they hit her with 4 24" torpedos which finally sunk her. It would seam to me that absent the additional damage she could have survived both the arial and US torpedos.
Torpedo hits seam to be very much a matter of location. For instance from reading about the sinking of Barnham while she took 3 torpedos the one that detonated her magazines would have been quite sufficient. If it had hit a less critical area on the other hand she might have survived especially so close to port.
There are better accounts on the web but for quick referance I used:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Hornet_(CV-8)
KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
A new survey of PoW's wreck was done last year, by Kevin Denlay:
http://www.anzec.org/view_news_piece.php?news_id=9
I suspect that the survey will indicate that only 5 torpedoes struck PoW. One port side aft, and 4 starboard side. The best data so far, indicates that only the hit which struck the portside aft did fatal damage. Of the other 4 hits, one of which was in the bow, 3 were contained by the SPS (Side Protection System or TDS in USN parlance). So far there is no evidence that PoW's SPS was defeated by the hits, and theoretically her SPS was immune to the 330/440lb aerial torpedo warheads used by the IJN. This is a short essay, that I wrote on this topic:
The Loss of PoW and B prop shaft.
This not an attempt to smear someone, but rather to explain what happened in a way that makes some sense. The idea that the torpedo hit, and then the entire length of the shaft passage flooded (or would have flooded) immediately seems very implausible to me. and very likely, this did not happen. More likely, the initial hit destroyed the strut and stern stuffing glands/bearings prior to the shaft being shut down, but the remaining bearings were progressively destroyed when the shaft with the now unsupported prop was restarted and run up to 150rpm. I don't mean to single anyone out but unfortunately Wildish's name is now part of the public record ( unlike, for example, the officer on SoDak, who tied the breakers together, which may have been done with the best of intentions, but which nearly caused the loss of the ship) and I can't avoid discussion of actions taken, without naming him. The real problem, that led to the loss of PoW, was a lack of a coherent and consistent damage control policy, coupled with a very hurried rush to commission the ship, and the subsequent lack of adequate air pressure testing by the shipyard, of vital compartments. The basic design was sound, and, IMHO, would have sunk more quickly if the machinery spaces were not so highly subdivided
The way I conceptualize the progressive damage to the shaft and bearings/glands, is to imagine a long steel shaft, supported by pillow block bearings spaced at even intervals, along the shaft, with a motor turning the shaft at one end. Now, to simulate the torpedo hit we distort the shaft at the far end sufficiently to cause one or more of the rear bearings to fail. I would expect, each bearing forward of the failed rearward bearings, to fail progressively, if the shaft is kept turning. However, as long as at least two bearings are available to keep that, partial, portion of the shaft true, then they will not fail at that point, and if the shaft is stopped quickly enough, the remaining bearings will not fail.
I've read numerous accounts of ships running with vibrating propellers or shafts that were slightly out of alignment. The shaft bearing must be able to withstand a certain amount of radial (side to side) force, before the bearing/glands will fail. In "Battleship" (Middlebrook), Wildish is quoted as saying this:
"All the main machinery set had an appalling, thumping-vibration and
great clouds of muck, smoke, cordite fumes and dust poured out from
the ventilation trunking. It was clear that the shaft had suffered
serious damage and I gave orders for it to be stopped. This took some
doing at 25 knots. I did this on my own authority. There was no time
to consult. Once stopped, the vibration stopped. Then, and as my
boiler room was still intact, and with thoughts of trying to maintain
ship's speed during the attack, I decided to try running up the shaft
again. As we reduced the 'astern' steam holding the shaft stopped, it
started revolving again (I suppose indicating that the propeller was
still there). However, as we started it going again, a rating reported
that water was entering at the after end of the engine room. He was
dead right. It was pouring through the flexible watertight shaft gland
in the bulkhead. I rather think that we tried to tighten up on this
but it was hopeless.
So we started all pumps on bilge suction - including putting the
main circulator pump on bilge, instead of sea, suction. It soon became
clear that the pumps could not control the flooding so we prepared to
evacuate. There were certain steps to be taken to enable machinery
to run on for as long as possible under flooded conditions. These con-
cerned stopping sea-water entering the lubricating oil and boiler- feed
water systems. Clearly, as my boiler room was still intact, it would
help if my machinery could run on during the attack.
By the time we had done this, water was up around the control
platform and rising fast. I gave the order to evacuate. As I followed
the rest up, my Unit E.R.A. just ahead of me, the water swirled up in
oily confusion just behind us. I have once since experienced a flooded
machinery space and it is a horrifying, terrifying sight."
However, in Allied BBs (G&D) he says this:
"There was a terrific thump, and the ship whipped around like a
springboard for a few seconds. My turbine started to vibrate at once, and I ordered it to be
shut down ... we checked the unit for the usual important details . . . and we . . .
gradually brought it up to 150 rpm, despite some vibration . . . Very soon after, water began
to pour out of the shaft bulkhead gland, and I tried to keep this flood water down by using the engine room's pumping facilities. It was to no avail. Then we tried using the main circulating bilge suction, which also proved to be unsuccessful. We had to evacuate.... I took the necessary action to prepare the turbine for steaming under flooding conditions.The shaft was turning when we left ... we had just enough time to shore the hatch down for added security before water began to seep around the
edges of the hatch coaming at the joint."
So the torpedo hit, the shaft was stopped, checked for damage, and then run up to 150 rpm (about 1/2 max possible revs), that doesn't sound like instantaneous damage to me. It would guesstimate that we are talking a good 5 minutes at least, to do all that. It fact, he makes it very clear that the shaft had suffered serious damage, and was correctly stopped. However, he also makes it clear that the prop was still attached to the shaft... so the remaining bearings would have had to try and contain the flaying shaft, with the massive prop attached, which was now unsupported at the after end of the shaft passage, due to the failed strut, and naturally it tore up all the remaining bearings/shaft glands, before finally failing at the engine room shaft gland.
Other shafts hits on PoW:
Y Engine Room shut down their shaft after the initial hit, and they did attempt to restart it, but abandoned the attempt after the engine assembly began to vibrate badly. There was no flooding of this space through the shaft. A Engine Room had the turbine come to a sudden halt after the shaft was hit in the 2nd attack. No flooding of this space through the shaft either.
Visible damage to the hull shows that B prop was chewing into the hull after the hit and the strut failed, based upon this, it is difficult to imagine that restarting this shaft did not cause additional damage.
Looking at my analogy to a shaft supported by pillowbock bearings, the failure of the final bearing is inevitable if the shaft is run long enough, as the bearings aft of the final bearing are destroyed. Based upon the damage that the prop, and damaged strut did to the external hull plating, B engine assembly must have been vibrating like hell during the run up to 150RPM. Wildish states there was " some vibration".
The more one reads about the external damage to the shaft and strut, and reads accounts of the internal damage being observed along the shaft, such as bearings being "pulled off" their foundations, it is almost impossible to believe that the final damage, at least to the watertight gland separating B engine room from the Port Diesel Dynamo Room, was not caused by restarting the shaft.
This is also interesting:
"There were certain steps to be taken to enable machinery
to run on for as long as possible under flooded conditions. These
concerned stopping sea-water entering the lubricating oil and boiler- feed
water systems. Clearly, as my boiler room was still intact, it would
help if my machinery could run on during the attack.
By the time we had done this, water was up around the control
platform and rising fast. I gave the order to evacuate.
.... I took the necessary action to prepare the turbine for steaming under flooding
conditions.The shaft was turning when we left ..."
The shaft was running even after they evacuated. It was never shut down.
Time line:
More or less simultaneously:
Shaft and prop hit by one or more torpedoes.
Stern gland and stuffing box destroyed
Shaft bracket snapped
some flooding into shaft alley
after the hit:
bearing/glands begin to progressively fail
Shaft is shut down. >1minute
damage is now limited to after end of the prop alley. Possible loss of Port Action Machinery(Turbo Dynamo) room.
shaft/turbine in B ER is inspected.
Shaft is restarted >5 minutes
shaft begins "vibrating"
shaft now progressively tears apart the shaft bearing/glands and progressively floods the Action machinery (Turbo Dynamo) room and Diesel Dynamo rooms through which the shaft passes. Crew members report seeing the shaft distort and bearings fail. 2 Dynamos now gone.
Final shaft gland/bearings in the after bulkhead of B ER fails, causing flooding which overwhelms the pumps, causing rapid flooding of that compartment >6 minutes
Shaft and turbine are kept running.
Flailing shaft damages bulkheads to Y BR, which due to power loss and thus pump failure, causes slow flooding and loss of compartment. At some point shaft fails completely and prop detaches.
Harbour machinery room begins to flood through failed trucked access from B ER - eventual loss of two more dynamos.
Starboard Diesel Dynamo fails due to failure of shared cooling water from Port DDR. 5th Dynamo fails. 5 of 8 dynamos now gone. Starboard after dynamo shorts out, due to flooded portside switchboard Room above Port Action Machinery Room. 6 of 8 dynamos now gone, and all power fails in after 1/2 of the ship.
B ER floods completely > 18 minutes.
Shaft flooding leads to flooding loss of 4 Dynamos, B ER, Y BR, and Harbour Machinery Room. 2 other After Dynamos fail due to secondary effects of B prop shaft flooding.
Progressive flooding on Port Side eventually causes loss of the ship. > 2 hours
http://www.anzec.org/view_news_piece.php?news_id=9
I suspect that the survey will indicate that only 5 torpedoes struck PoW. One port side aft, and 4 starboard side. The best data so far, indicates that only the hit which struck the portside aft did fatal damage. Of the other 4 hits, one of which was in the bow, 3 were contained by the SPS (Side Protection System or TDS in USN parlance). So far there is no evidence that PoW's SPS was defeated by the hits, and theoretically her SPS was immune to the 330/440lb aerial torpedo warheads used by the IJN. This is a short essay, that I wrote on this topic:
The Loss of PoW and B prop shaft.
This not an attempt to smear someone, but rather to explain what happened in a way that makes some sense. The idea that the torpedo hit, and then the entire length of the shaft passage flooded (or would have flooded) immediately seems very implausible to me. and very likely, this did not happen. More likely, the initial hit destroyed the strut and stern stuffing glands/bearings prior to the shaft being shut down, but the remaining bearings were progressively destroyed when the shaft with the now unsupported prop was restarted and run up to 150rpm. I don't mean to single anyone out but unfortunately Wildish's name is now part of the public record ( unlike, for example, the officer on SoDak, who tied the breakers together, which may have been done with the best of intentions, but which nearly caused the loss of the ship) and I can't avoid discussion of actions taken, without naming him. The real problem, that led to the loss of PoW, was a lack of a coherent and consistent damage control policy, coupled with a very hurried rush to commission the ship, and the subsequent lack of adequate air pressure testing by the shipyard, of vital compartments. The basic design was sound, and, IMHO, would have sunk more quickly if the machinery spaces were not so highly subdivided
The way I conceptualize the progressive damage to the shaft and bearings/glands, is to imagine a long steel shaft, supported by pillow block bearings spaced at even intervals, along the shaft, with a motor turning the shaft at one end. Now, to simulate the torpedo hit we distort the shaft at the far end sufficiently to cause one or more of the rear bearings to fail. I would expect, each bearing forward of the failed rearward bearings, to fail progressively, if the shaft is kept turning. However, as long as at least two bearings are available to keep that, partial, portion of the shaft true, then they will not fail at that point, and if the shaft is stopped quickly enough, the remaining bearings will not fail.
I've read numerous accounts of ships running with vibrating propellers or shafts that were slightly out of alignment. The shaft bearing must be able to withstand a certain amount of radial (side to side) force, before the bearing/glands will fail. In "Battleship" (Middlebrook), Wildish is quoted as saying this:
"All the main machinery set had an appalling, thumping-vibration and
great clouds of muck, smoke, cordite fumes and dust poured out from
the ventilation trunking. It was clear that the shaft had suffered
serious damage and I gave orders for it to be stopped. This took some
doing at 25 knots. I did this on my own authority. There was no time
to consult. Once stopped, the vibration stopped. Then, and as my
boiler room was still intact, and with thoughts of trying to maintain
ship's speed during the attack, I decided to try running up the shaft
again. As we reduced the 'astern' steam holding the shaft stopped, it
started revolving again (I suppose indicating that the propeller was
still there). However, as we started it going again, a rating reported
that water was entering at the after end of the engine room. He was
dead right. It was pouring through the flexible watertight shaft gland
in the bulkhead. I rather think that we tried to tighten up on this
but it was hopeless.
So we started all pumps on bilge suction - including putting the
main circulator pump on bilge, instead of sea, suction. It soon became
clear that the pumps could not control the flooding so we prepared to
evacuate. There were certain steps to be taken to enable machinery
to run on for as long as possible under flooded conditions. These con-
cerned stopping sea-water entering the lubricating oil and boiler- feed
water systems. Clearly, as my boiler room was still intact, it would
help if my machinery could run on during the attack.
By the time we had done this, water was up around the control
platform and rising fast. I gave the order to evacuate. As I followed
the rest up, my Unit E.R.A. just ahead of me, the water swirled up in
oily confusion just behind us. I have once since experienced a flooded
machinery space and it is a horrifying, terrifying sight."
However, in Allied BBs (G&D) he says this:
"There was a terrific thump, and the ship whipped around like a
springboard for a few seconds. My turbine started to vibrate at once, and I ordered it to be
shut down ... we checked the unit for the usual important details . . . and we . . .
gradually brought it up to 150 rpm, despite some vibration . . . Very soon after, water began
to pour out of the shaft bulkhead gland, and I tried to keep this flood water down by using the engine room's pumping facilities. It was to no avail. Then we tried using the main circulating bilge suction, which also proved to be unsuccessful. We had to evacuate.... I took the necessary action to prepare the turbine for steaming under flooding conditions.The shaft was turning when we left ... we had just enough time to shore the hatch down for added security before water began to seep around the
edges of the hatch coaming at the joint."
So the torpedo hit, the shaft was stopped, checked for damage, and then run up to 150 rpm (about 1/2 max possible revs), that doesn't sound like instantaneous damage to me. It would guesstimate that we are talking a good 5 minutes at least, to do all that. It fact, he makes it very clear that the shaft had suffered serious damage, and was correctly stopped. However, he also makes it clear that the prop was still attached to the shaft... so the remaining bearings would have had to try and contain the flaying shaft, with the massive prop attached, which was now unsupported at the after end of the shaft passage, due to the failed strut, and naturally it tore up all the remaining bearings/shaft glands, before finally failing at the engine room shaft gland.
Other shafts hits on PoW:
Y Engine Room shut down their shaft after the initial hit, and they did attempt to restart it, but abandoned the attempt after the engine assembly began to vibrate badly. There was no flooding of this space through the shaft. A Engine Room had the turbine come to a sudden halt after the shaft was hit in the 2nd attack. No flooding of this space through the shaft either.
Visible damage to the hull shows that B prop was chewing into the hull after the hit and the strut failed, based upon this, it is difficult to imagine that restarting this shaft did not cause additional damage.
Looking at my analogy to a shaft supported by pillowbock bearings, the failure of the final bearing is inevitable if the shaft is run long enough, as the bearings aft of the final bearing are destroyed. Based upon the damage that the prop, and damaged strut did to the external hull plating, B engine assembly must have been vibrating like hell during the run up to 150RPM. Wildish states there was " some vibration".
The more one reads about the external damage to the shaft and strut, and reads accounts of the internal damage being observed along the shaft, such as bearings being "pulled off" their foundations, it is almost impossible to believe that the final damage, at least to the watertight gland separating B engine room from the Port Diesel Dynamo Room, was not caused by restarting the shaft.
This is also interesting:
"There were certain steps to be taken to enable machinery
to run on for as long as possible under flooded conditions. These
concerned stopping sea-water entering the lubricating oil and boiler- feed
water systems. Clearly, as my boiler room was still intact, it would
help if my machinery could run on during the attack.
By the time we had done this, water was up around the control
platform and rising fast. I gave the order to evacuate.
.... I took the necessary action to prepare the turbine for steaming under flooding
conditions.The shaft was turning when we left ..."
The shaft was running even after they evacuated. It was never shut down.
Time line:
More or less simultaneously:
Shaft and prop hit by one or more torpedoes.
Stern gland and stuffing box destroyed
Shaft bracket snapped
some flooding into shaft alley
after the hit:
bearing/glands begin to progressively fail
Shaft is shut down. >1minute
damage is now limited to after end of the prop alley. Possible loss of Port Action Machinery(Turbo Dynamo) room.
shaft/turbine in B ER is inspected.
Shaft is restarted >5 minutes
shaft begins "vibrating"
shaft now progressively tears apart the shaft bearing/glands and progressively floods the Action machinery (Turbo Dynamo) room and Diesel Dynamo rooms through which the shaft passes. Crew members report seeing the shaft distort and bearings fail. 2 Dynamos now gone.
Final shaft gland/bearings in the after bulkhead of B ER fails, causing flooding which overwhelms the pumps, causing rapid flooding of that compartment >6 minutes
Shaft and turbine are kept running.
Flailing shaft damages bulkheads to Y BR, which due to power loss and thus pump failure, causes slow flooding and loss of compartment. At some point shaft fails completely and prop detaches.
Harbour machinery room begins to flood through failed trucked access from B ER - eventual loss of two more dynamos.
Starboard Diesel Dynamo fails due to failure of shared cooling water from Port DDR. 5th Dynamo fails. 5 of 8 dynamos now gone. Starboard after dynamo shorts out, due to flooded portside switchboard Room above Port Action Machinery Room. 6 of 8 dynamos now gone, and all power fails in after 1/2 of the ship.
B ER floods completely > 18 minutes.
Shaft flooding leads to flooding loss of 4 Dynamos, B ER, Y BR, and Harbour Machinery Room. 2 other After Dynamos fail due to secondary effects of B prop shaft flooding.
Progressive flooding on Port Side eventually causes loss of the ship. > 2 hours
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
I've read reports of torpedo/mine damage to as many RN ships as I can find. Many cruisers were struck in the stern, and some nearly had their sterns blown off, while the ships were steaming at high speed. PoW is the only RN ship that seems to have suffered extensive flooding along a prop shaft, AFAIK. If the flooding along B prop shaft was a one off incident, that only effected PoW, then there is a good chance that KGV might have survived the exact same attack. If flooding along B prop shaft had been contained, there is a high probability that PoW's steering would have been restored by the time of the 2nd torpedo bomber attack, which would have reduced the number of hits in that attack, and lessened the overall damage. A third strike by IJN torpedo bombers was planned, but it would have meet RAF (RAAF?) fighters, and since the bombers had no escort, the likely result would have the slaughter of the torpedo bombers. After that, it is unlikely the IJN could have mounted another strike for several more hours, and PoW would have been another 50 to 80nm further south, increasing the likelyhood of fighter cover and the possibility that PoW would have escaped further detection.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
A US cruiser suffered the same type of damage and they had to secure the screw by passing cable or chains or something like that over the side in order to render it motionless so it wouldn't windmill and do further damage. I'm pretty sure this required the ship sitting dead in the water for a while. In PoW's case the shaft was actually detached from the hull mounting and it was a very serious job to keep it from turning if the ship moved. It would have been much larger than the cruiser shaft.
How many aircraft were available to circle PoW to provide full daylight coverage? What type? Most British fighters were pretty short ranged. US carriers were attacked against I suspect much more effective AAA (many cruisers and destroyers) and fighter cover than PoW and Repulse would likely have had from a British Base, and were still hit by bombs and torpedoes. they might have shot down some Japanese aircraft, but I just don't understand how any possible coverage from Singapore could prevent further damage.
How can you possibly look at torpedo holes in a ship which has been sitting on the bottom for many years and say whether of not they'd have caused progressive flooding?
Finally, didn't the Japanese plan a night engagement if the planes failed to sink them?
How many aircraft were available to circle PoW to provide full daylight coverage? What type? Most British fighters were pretty short ranged. US carriers were attacked against I suspect much more effective AAA (many cruisers and destroyers) and fighter cover than PoW and Repulse would likely have had from a British Base, and were still hit by bombs and torpedoes. they might have shot down some Japanese aircraft, but I just don't understand how any possible coverage from Singapore could prevent further damage.
How can you possibly look at torpedo holes in a ship which has been sitting on the bottom for many years and say whether of not they'd have caused progressive flooding?
Finally, didn't the Japanese plan a night engagement if the planes failed to sink them?
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
Wildish indicates that they were able to keep the shaft from turning by using the astern turbines.Bgile wrote:A US cruiser suffered the same type of damage and they had to secure the screw by passing cable or chains or something like that over the side in order to render it motionless so it wouldn't windmill and do further damage. I'm pretty sure this required the ship sitting dead in the water for a while. In PoW's case the shaft was actually detached from the hull mounting and it was a very serious job to keep it from turning if the ship moved. It would have been much larger than the cruiser shaft.
How many aircraft were available to circle PoW to provide full daylight coverage? What type? Most British fighters were pretty short ranged. US carriers were attacked against I suspect much more effective AAA (many cruisers and destroyers) and fighter cover than PoW and Repulse would likely have had from a British Base, and were still hit by bombs and torpedoes. they might have shot down some Japanese aircraft, but I just don't understand how any possible coverage from Singapore could prevent further damage.
How can you possibly look at torpedo holes in a ship which has been sitting on the bottom for many years and say whether of not they'd have caused progressive flooding?
Finally, didn't the Japanese plan a night engagement if the planes failed to sink them?
A squadron of Buffaloes arrived about 10mins after PoW sank. Here's an IJN account of the action:
http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/pilot.html
Force Z was sunk about 180-200nm from Singapore, by sea and about 150nm by air, and about 400nm from the IJNAF base at Saigon. The nearest IJN surface forces were about 400nm away, at the time of the sinking.
the only serious progressive flooding that occurred was on the portside along B prop shaft. The hull inspection will probably confirm that there was no other damage on the port side except in the vicinity of B prop shaft.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
By Buffalo you mean the old Brewster Buffalo? How well do you think they would do against Bettys and Zeros?
I will have to look at my reference material, but there was mention of the unfortunate location of crew's restrooms above the TDS and flooding that occurred over the top of the citadel and on into other spaces. IIRC there was mention of doors located in engineering bulkheads where they could become distorted and leak, and that trunked access should be used in the future. In general I think there was progressive flooding from all the torpedo hits, but maybe I'm in error.
I will have to look at my reference material, but there was mention of the unfortunate location of crew's restrooms above the TDS and flooding that occurred over the top of the citadel and on into other spaces. IIRC there was mention of doors located in engineering bulkheads where they could become distorted and leak, and that trunked access should be used in the future. In general I think there was progressive flooding from all the torpedo hits, but maybe I'm in error.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
Barham was on her beam ends when she blew up. Are you suggesting she wouldn't have sunk? Admittedly those were submarine torpedoes.lwd wrote: Torpedo hits seam to be very much a matter of location. For instance from reading about the sinking of Barnham while she took 3 torpedos the one that detonated her magazines would have been quite sufficient. If it had hit a less critical area on the other hand she might have survived especially so close to port.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
As far as I know, the bombers lacked an escort. However the Buffalos did sight a Betty that had stayed to observe the sinking, but the Betty proved faster and got away.Bgile wrote:By Buffalo you mean the old Brewster Buffalo? How well do you think they would do against Bettys and Zeros?
Had the engine room not flooded then power to the pumps would not have been lost, so damage control would have been far more effective.I will have to look at my reference material, but there was mention of the unfortunate location of crew's restrooms above the TDS and flooding that occurred over the top of the citadel and on into other spaces. IIRC there was mention of doors located in engineering bulkheads where they could become distorted and leak, and that trunked access should be used in the future. In general I think there was progressive flooding from all the torpedo hits, but maybe I'm in error
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
There were no Zeros present with the final strike force, and the unarmoured Betty's would have been slaughtered, even by Buffaloes.Bgile wrote:By Buffalo you mean the old Brewster Buffalo? How well do you think they would do against Bettys and Zeros?
I will have to look at my reference material, but there was mention of the unfortunate location of crew's restrooms above the TDS and flooding that occurred over the top of the citadel and on into other spaces. IIRC there was mention of doors located in engineering bulkheads where they could become distorted and leak, and that trunked access should be used in the future. In general I think there was progressive flooding from all the torpedo hits, but maybe I'm in error.
The flooding that occurred over the top of the TDS on the port side, could not have occurred if B engine did not flood, as the ship's draught would not have been deep enough, for this to happen. There was evidence of poor DC and the failure to close WT doors, etc, and, as I mentioned earlier there were WT failures of compartments that should have been WT, probably due to the hurry to commission PoW.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
The account I read indicated a magazine explosion very shortly after the torpedo hits. It's possible I misread it or it was wrong.Bgile wrote: ...
Barham was on her beam ends when she blew up. Are you suggesting she wouldn't have sunk? Admittedly those were submarine torpedoes.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
"Japanese fighters arrived too late to take part in the action". Doesn't that imply that if the Buffalos had the fuel to stick around they would have encountered the zeros?dunmunro wrote:
There were no Zeros present with the final strike force, and the unarmoured Betty's would have been slaughtered, even by Buffaloes.
The flooding that occurred over the top of the TDS on the port side, could not have occurred if B engine did not flood, as the ship's draught would not have been deep enough, for this to happen. There was evidence of poor DC and the failure to close WT doors, etc, and, as I mentioned earlier there were WT failures of compartments that should have been WT, probably due to the hurry to commission PoW.
PoW should have had pressure tests after the Bismarck action and subsequent repairs. Were these not perfomed?
Also, there were apparently doors between compartments within the engineering spaces. Experience during the war showed that those almost always failed with torpedo damage, even if they were in good shape. This is because the bulkheads would warp and while they might still be watertight, the doors weren't. That is why doors in those spaces were eliminated entirely and replaced with trunk access in later ships.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
AFAIK, none of the IJN strike forces had a fighter escort. PoW was not holed in any places that would have required pressure testing after her engagement with Bismarck."Japanese fighters arrived too late to take part in the action". Doesn't that imply that if the Buffalos had the fuel to stick around they would have encountered the zeros?
PoW should have had pressure tests after the Bismarck action and subsequent repairs. Were these not perfomed?
The loss of B ER also led to the loss of the two Dynamo's in the adjecent Harbour Machinery Room, cutting off power to Y BR, leading to its flooding from a very slow leak. There was flooding into compartments through WT doors and trunks, in the spaces above the portside Action Machinery Room and Diesel Dynamo room, and subsequently into the rear 5.25" magazine, but this was exacerbated by the failure to shut down B prop shaft, and there was flooding through a collapsed trunk that was shared between B ER and the Harbour Machinery Room.
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
Yes that is really tragic that the Brewster Buffaloes that were supposed to provide aircover for POW were not there.
dunmunro wrote:I suspect that she would have survived. KGV had some advantages over PoW. She was not damaged during fitting out, and there is a much higher possibility that all her compartments were properly air pressure tested for watertightness. Her crew was better trained, and there is the chance factor. Only one of the 5 to 7 torpedoes that hit PoW actually did damage that caused a significant loss of buoyancy. The circumstances surrounding this hit are such that it was unlikely to be repeated - even an identical hit in the same location was unlikely to cause the same degree of flooding on KGV. If KGV took PoW's place, there is a high probability that she would have survived until aircover showed up, and after that maybe a 60/40 chance that she can make it to Singapore.RF wrote:
Do you think KGV would have survived on 10th December 1941 if she had been in POW's place?
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
Here is the results of a recent survey of the PoW/Repulse wrecks:
http://www.explorers.org/expeditions/re ... ersion.pdf
http://www.explorers.org/expeditions/re ... ersion.pdf
Re: KGV in POW's place on 10th December 1941
I find it strange that this "hypothetical naval scenario", which argues in favour of the allies, has to stick rigorously to the facts, without the flights of fancy that are allowed when discussing other hypothetical scenarios.
regards
Ian
regards
Ian