maega wrote:Third wave agreed.
The US air force had been totally crush in the previous attacks, the fleet sunk or damaged, the Aircraft Carriers awol. What was there to face another wave? Pearl Harbour was now a sitting duck and in those conditions the beneifts of launching a third strike clearly outweighed the "risks" of remaining a few hours more in those waters.
It was a stupid and costly mistake.
Serg wrote:Lucky (for japanese) they do not consider such сrazy idea seriously. They take into account heavy losses in first (55 lost or damaged aircrafts out of 183 i.e one third) and especially second wave (85/167 - half of the second wave attack). And prefered to save aircrews for further battles.
Serg wrote:29 lost in action over Pearl Harbor. This number does not include jettisoned (perhaps as many as 20) and written off aircrafts. Other damaged aircrafts could not be flown until they were repaired by maintenace team. The spare aircrafts would require at least 24 hours to assemble.
The cost of the attack is 78 D3A and 34 B5N that leaving 135-78=57 D3A and 144-34=110 B5N. If the japanese would have retained, for example, about 100 aircrafts against enemy carriers and about 25 B5N for reconnaissance, only 42 attack aircrafts could be employed in a third wave strike and with increasing level of defence they did not achieve the significant result.
tommy303 wrote:Japanese losses (shot down or written off) ...
On the whole, I agree with Serg's take on the chances of success of a third wave. The losses that might be sustained in a third strike could logically be higher than that suffered by the second wave.
Serg wrote:Because fighter opposition developes. On 14 sorties americans make 8-11 kills. What will be if they make, say 50 sorties, against third attack?:-)
Oil tanks were located close to fleet anchorage and will be covered by AA guns and/or smoke.
Serg wrote:You did not see difference between aircrafts in the air and on the land?
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