richtea wrote:In any scenario at the battle of the North Cape, no matter what combination of surface ships the Kriegsmarine had out there they still
practiced radar silence.
In December in the Arctic this means that they were in almost total 24 hour darkness in a force 10 storm, trying to find a convoy that might be at any position, any distance around them.
The only thing they were using to search with was the Mk 1 eyeball.
So no matter what hypothetical combination of ships you put out there,
unless you completely change the way that the Kriegsmarine operated radar then you will only get one outcome.
It is a common mispreception that radar silence was KM doctrine. It is not correct. There was no set doctrine concerning radar silence, and in fact not even any guidelines concerning this issue until after Scharnhorst was lost. It was up to the on scene commander-case by case. In the case of North Cape as an anti- commerce mission, Bey's order to practice radar silence was the correct course to take prior to his radar detectors indicating the presence of Burnett's cruisers at about 0800 hours. Bey's error was not switching on his active radars in time. This was simply a mistake by the commander on the scene at one point in time. This should not be projected as KM practice or doctrine in general. It was a mistake Bey did not make again, however. He used the remaining aft radar set from that point on. As Tommy points out had the SH not been alone even with its own forward radars out of action the forward sectors could have been covered by a consort.