Karl Heidenreich wrote:lwd,
But the overall firepower of Oldendorf´s vessels will be greatly diminished having have to split his forces to engage Kurita as well.
And those forces at the northen side of the battle would be fighting a much powerfull force which includes a BB that has an overall IZ against everything they are firing at it.
On the other side the Japanese could also fire from a much far position because everybody will be relying in the opticals. RDFC uselsullness will be diminish.
The cruisers longer and more powerfull firing range will prove a strong oposition for the PTs and destroyers on the southern section of the battle.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:... Moreover, we can speculate that we have some two options here that could have, very well, worked in real life:
1. All the forces (7 BBs including the BB killers Yamato and Musashi) go though the northern route and try a break through San Bernardino and catch the light CVs at Samar.
2. All the forces (Kurita, Nishimura and Shima) try a break through Surigao (this is Willmott´s big "if") and confront Oldendof´s bathtubs there.
I can, also, add that if the Japanese wait long enough to try to do a daylight break instead of a night action, it will deny the USN BBs of what can be regard as their main advantage of RDFC. ...
Not really. Radar is still useful in conjunction with opticals as it gives better ranges particularly at long range. It will also see through smoke. The US PT boats and DDs will likely be making a lot of smoke. The US is also likely to be able to keep spotter planes in the air which the Japanese will have a hard time doing.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:lwd:Not really. Radar is still useful in conjunction with opticals as it gives better ranges particularly at long range. It will also see through smoke. The US PT boats and DDs will likely be making a lot of smoke. The US is also likely to be able to keep spotter planes in the air which the Japanese will have a hard time doing.
You´re right and the anyway it seems that the Japanese will never have chosen a day action over a night one. They seem to be convinced about their night fighting superiority which was, of course, mistaken....,
I'm not convinced of that. They were becomeing very aware of what US radar could do. The problem was they were also aware of what US avaiation could do. Reading Tully's book it is clear that they just didn't quite have the fire control to make use of the type 93s that night. Given a daylight engagement they might have and they could have had considerable impact.
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