Japanese winning move for WWII?

Historical what if discussions, hypothetical operations, battleship vs. battleship engagements, design your own warship, etc.
DAP
Junior Member
Posts: 12
Joined: Fri Jun 11, 2010 4:24 pm

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by DAP » Tue Jun 22, 2010 2:34 pm

Clearly the ONLY winning move is NOT to attack the US. Coincidentally, this would also likely lead to the German defeat of Russia in December of ’41. By keeping a credible threat to Russia in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo the Russians will not be able to move the Siberian divisions west to face the Germans as they launch Operation Typhoon. The Japanese then declare war on Russia (like the Italians declared war on an already mortally stricken France) and claim vast swaths of Siberia into their “Greater East- Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” A magnanimous Hitler cedes the oil rich Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China to his ally. The Japanese Navy launches a series of naval campaigns to defeat British naval power in the western pacific and drives them back into the Indian Ocean. Germany forces Britain to negotiate peace terms with Japan that cedes the remaining British territories in South East Asia (but not India) to the Japanese.

That leaves the Philippine Islands as the only thorn in the Japanese side. I would suggest that the best move would be for the Japanese to ignore or isolate the Philippines. If national “face” demands “Asia for the Asiatics” then Japan should attempt to stir up a local uprising that escalates into a prolonged and intense guerilla war. There should be no direct Japanese involvement.

It will take the better part of a decade for the Japanese Empire to martial enough industrial resources from its new territories to directly challenge the United States. By that time there will be one and possibly a second (Germany) nuclear weapon-armed power. At that point, with national survival at stake, direct conflict must be avoided.

lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3810
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by lwd » Tue Jun 22, 2010 5:07 pm

DAP wrote:Clearly the ONLY winning move is NOT to attack the US. Coincidentally, this would also likely lead to the German defeat of Russia in December of ’41. ....
No. That's not enough. By August of 41 Japan can't win they can only limit their losses and attacking the USSR wouldn't do so. To win they have to go back months or years for a POD with a good expectaion.

lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3810
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by lwd » Tue Jun 22, 2010 5:10 pm

DAP wrote:..A magnanimous Hitler cedes the oil rich Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China to his ally. The Japanese Navy launches a series of naval campaigns to defeat British naval power in the western pacific and drives them back into the Indian Ocean. Germany forces Britain to negotiate peace terms with Japan that cedes the remaining British territories in South East Asia (but not India) to the Japanese.....
Simpy isn't going to work. Germany and France have a peace treaty. Taking French territory and giving it to the Japanese isn't going to help much. Germany can't even give the Dutch East Indies away. None of this by the way helps Japan's energy problem. Nor is the defeat of the USSR in any way guaranteed by such action.

DAP
Junior Member
Posts: 12
Joined: Fri Jun 11, 2010 4:24 pm

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by DAP » Wed Jun 23, 2010 3:54 pm

LWD,

I wasn't suggesting that Japan actually conduct a major attack on Russia in 1941. A spoiling attack would serve nicely. Further, simply maintaining the threat of a major attack would prevent Stalin from pulling his Siberian divisions west to face the Germans as they launched their final assault on Moscow (Operation Typhoon). Without those divisions the Russian Front before Moscow collapses. At the very least the Germans will occupy Moscow. If Stalin does not sue for terms the Germans will further strangle Leningrad - forcing it's capitulation by spring or early summer 1942. It is very likely that Germany will be in possession of all Russia west of the Volga and could very well force peace terms that cede all Russian territories west of the Urals. Further, as part of the settlement, Hitler could force Stalin to surrender the far eastern tracts of Siberia to his Tri-Partite ally at no expense to Germany's position in Europe.

The Germans could, would, and historically did force the Vichy French government to surrender French Indo-China to the Japanese. The Dutch East Indies were a source of oil that the Japanese coveted. Possession of the former French colonies places the Japanese in a much better strategic position to seize those assets and drive the remaining British naval units out of South-East Asia. Additionally, German advances in Europe and Axis advances in Africa and the Middle East would force the British to move major naval and land assets out of the Pacific to defend India, Eygpt, and the Middle-eastern oil.

lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3810
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by lwd » Wed Jun 23, 2010 5:24 pm

DAP wrote:... I wasn't suggesting that Japan actually conduct a major attack on Russia in 1941. A spoiling attack would serve nicely.
Would it why?
Further, simply maintaining the threat of a major attack would prevent Stalin from pulling his Siberian divisions west to face the Germans as they launched their final assault on Moscow (Operation Typhoon).
Possible but not likely. The Soviet strength in the Far East never fell all that much. Sure they moved units West but they raised new ones. And there's the question of what happens if a Soviet counter atttack cause significant losses to the Japanese. Remember they've got a war with China runing. A serious reverse in the north and they could be in trouble.
Without those divisions the Russian Front before Moscow collapses.
Perhaps but perhaps not. And it's unlikely that they wouldn't have sent at least some forces West in any case.
At the very least the Germans will occupy Moscow.
Actually that's the best the Germans could hope for rather than the least.
If Stalin does not sue for terms the Germans will further strangle Leningrad - forcing it's capitulation by spring or early summer 1942.
Perhpas but I don't see this as likely.
...
The Germans could, would, and historically did force the Vichy French government to surrender French Indo-China to the Japanese.
Did they? My understanding is that the Japanese pretty well handed the French a faite acompli (sorry if I butchered the French).
The Dutch East Indies were a source of oil that the Japanese coveted. Possession of the former French colonies places the Japanese in a much better strategic position to seize those assets and drive the remaining British naval units out of South-East Asia.
As they did historically. It's not at all clear however how they do so without the US entering the war. Such an entry without PH at the beginning leaves them in a pretty precarious position.
Additionally, German advances in Europe and Axis advances in Africa and the Middle East would force the British to move major naval and land assets out of the Pacific to defend India, Eygpt, and the Middle-eastern oil.
What additional advances in Africa and the Middle East.

User avatar
Karl Heidenreich
Senior Member
Posts: 4808
Joined: Thu Jan 12, 2006 3:19 pm
Location: San José, Costa Rica
Contact:

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by Karl Heidenreich » Wed Jun 23, 2010 6:05 pm

lwd:
Would it why?
Even Stalin did everyhting on his side to avoid a war with Japan whilst he was fighting Hitler. Basically, and this is the main German mistake, you don't want to fight in two fronts simultaneously, is bad for your health.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill

DAP
Junior Member
Posts: 12
Joined: Fri Jun 11, 2010 4:24 pm

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by DAP » Wed Jun 23, 2010 6:36 pm

LWD,

The Russians transferred approximately (60) of their front line Siberian Divisions away once it was confirmed that the information provided in September 1941 by the spy, Richard Sorge, as to future Japanese military intentions, allowed the Russians to begin the transfer of approximately (60) of their front line Siberian Divisions away from the Japanese Kwantung Army Front. There remained a great deal of concern within Stavka that the Japanese would take advantage of the situation in European Russia to renew their attacks in Manchuria and against the Russian Naval base at Vladivostok.
Even a Japanese spoiling attack by the Kwantung Army would have insured that the Russians, at the very least, delayed the redeployment of divisions westward. Certainly they would not have moved all (60) divisions in the face of an impending attack.

Operation Typhoon was nearly won by the Germans as it was. Without the Siberian reinforcement Army Group Center would have completed the encirclement, reduction, and capture of Moscow. Moscow was the center of communication and rail transport for the country. Its isolation and capture would completely disrupt the military defense of the country. Once Operation Typhoon was successfully concluded, forces were to be transferred to the Leningrad Front to complete the encirclement of Leningrad by cutting off the lifelines across frozen Lake Lagoda and severing the Murmansk Lend-Lease route of supplies. At least that was the intention of the German General Staff for “future conduct of military operations.”

As the Dutch East Indies were not a possession of the United States, there would be no reason for the US to legitimately declare a pre-emptive war on Japan. It was only the attack on Pearl Harbor that forced the US to shed its neutral, isolationist ways. No Pearl Harbor attack + No German Declaration of War in 1941 = No US Declaration of War in time to prevent the Japanese from seizing South-East Asia.

The Germans were fighting in North Africa before, during, and after Barbarossa. Any sort of successful conclusion to the Russian campaign will result in redeployment of land and air units to reinforce the Afrika Korps. Rommel had a plan to sweep through Egypt and join up with forces sweeping south from the southern Caucuses but lacked the troops. Presumably post Russian collapse he would have the requisite forces.

User avatar
neil hilton
Senior Member
Posts: 334
Joined: Tue Apr 27, 2010 2:31 pm

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by neil hilton » Thu Jun 24, 2010 10:44 am

The battle of Khalhin Gol from May to Sept 1939, where the Red Army decisively beat the Kwantung Army convinced the Japanese not to attack the USSR during the war, instead of linking with Germany through Russia they decided to attempt to link through India. So a spoiling attack in the north would only open another front for the Japanese and screw up all their plans in the south.

From what I remember reading the German attempt to encircle Moscow in late 1941 was right at its last gasp when the weather changed and stopped them cold (no pun intended). There was no chance after that to complete the encirclement until 1942. German equipment couldn't cope with the cold temperature. The USSR Siberian divisions could cope with the cold and they threw the Germans back, Hitler said stand or die, the German army stood and died but saved their equipment. So it was the weather that stopped the German encirclement of Moscow not the Siberian transfers from the east.

Any possible reinforcements to Rommel in North Africa would have had to have been sent across the Med. Running the gauntlet of RN submarines and surface ships and RAF airpower from Malta. Very few axis transport ships made it. At the end of that ordeal axis troops and supplies had to be transported eastward for over a thousand miles on a single road most of it dirt. The iron laws of logistics, not possible. Rommel was a very good commander but he wasn't a logistician, he was defeated by his own success, ironic.

As for 'sweeping south through the Caucasus' that was a fanciful idea of Hitlers that was also not possible IMO. That area has a lot of very nasty terrain, mechanised forces would find it virtually impossible to go through. And the logistics would be horrible.
Veni, vidi, verrimus!
I came, I saw, I swept the floor!

User avatar
IronDuke
Member
Posts: 81
Joined: Thu Apr 01, 2010 8:28 pm
Location: Australia
Contact:

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by IronDuke » Thu Jun 24, 2010 2:51 pm

I don't say that a Japanese attack on the Soviets in 1941 would have been a winning move for them, but it would have been less of a losing move than attacking the US and British Empire...
"It only takes two or three years to build a ship but three hundred to build a tradition" Admiral Cunningham RN

lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3810
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 24, 2010 6:26 pm

DAP wrote:LWD,

The Russians transferred approximately (60) of their front line Siberian Divisions away once it was confirmed that the information provided in September 1941 by the spy, Richard Sorge, as to future Japanese military intentions, allowed the Russians to begin the transfer of approximately (60) of their front line Siberian Divisions away from the Japanese Kwantung Army Front. There remained a great deal of concern within Stavka that the Japanese would take advantage of the situation in European Russia to renew their attacks in Manchuria and against the Russian Naval base at Vladivostok.
Even a Japanese spoiling attack by the Kwantung Army would have insured that the Russians, at the very least, delayed the redeployment of divisions westward. Certainly they would not have moved all (60) divisions in the face of an impending attack.
If the Soviets were convinced the Japanese were going to attack in Siberia they would not have felt as free to send the divisions west. That however doesn't mean that they wouldn't have. There's also the chance that they would have launched a spoiling attack vs teh Japanese forces in Manchuria. From what I can find it's not clear that the Japanese Kwangtun army ever had more than 25 divisions and certainly didn't have the armor or artillery of the Soviets. A successful spoiling attack could potentially unhinge the Japanese position in China and free up even more troops than historical all be it on a somewhat later schedule.
Operation Typhoon was nearly won by the Germans as it was.
I disagree. They almost got to Moscow but that's a lot different from winning.
Without the Siberian reinforcement Army Group Center would have completed the encirclement, reduction, and capture of Moscow.
Perhaps but that is far from certain. And there would have likely been some reinforcements just not as many as historical at least in the short term. But the Germans were stopped before Moscow in large part due to logistics and the non Asiatic troops. Enciricleing and reducing would require much more effort than just getting in sight of the city. Nothing here is going to improve the logistical situation of the Germans and particularly the encircling part would need that. Then there's actually taking the city and holding it. Note that neither Stalingrad nor Leningrad fell to German forces.
Moscow was the center of communication and rail transport for the country. Its isolation and capture would completely disrupt the military defense of the country.
While a transport and communication nexus I think your conclusions about it's fall are somewhat excessive. Much of the area that it was critical for would be under German control at this point. Then there's the question of could they hold it. If Moscow had fallen or was near falling would the Soviets run the risk of pulling troops out of Siberia even in the face of a Japanese attack? I think so.
... As the Dutch East Indies were not a possession of the United States, there would be no reason for the US to legitimately declare a pre-emptive war on Japan.
The US had an agreement with the British and Dutch that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. While it wouldn't be guaranteed to get the US in the war it combined with the attack on the Soviets would come awfully close. If not then there would be an incident that would in short order. Note that Roosevelt had given the British and Dutch permission to use US ports if they were attacked by Japanese forces.
It was only the attack on Pearl Harbor that forced the US to shed its neutral, isolationist ways.
Not so. The polls from the time period showed that the majority of the US population saw war with Japan as a necessity in the near future and the sympathy for Britain and antaganism toward Germany were rising.
No Pearl Harbor attack + No German Declaration of War in 1941 = No US Declaration of War in time to prevent the Japanese from seizing South-East Asia.
Possibly no declaration of war in 41 but almost guaranteed in 42. The Japanese took South-East Asia historically. It didn't help them. In this situation once the US gets in the war they are in a significantly worse position.
The Germans were fighting in North Africa before, during, and after Barbarossa. Any sort of successful conclusion to the Russian campaign will result in redeployment of land and air units to reinforce the Afrika Korps.
Again logistics very much limited the forces the Germans could devote to Africa. Freeing up troops in Europe doesn't result in additional cargo ships in the Med.
Rommel had a plan to sweep through Egypt and join up with forces sweeping south from the southern Caucuses but lacked the troops. Presumably post Russian collapse he would have the requisite forces.
Source PLS.

lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3810
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by lwd » Thu Jun 24, 2010 6:28 pm

IronDuke wrote:I don't say that a Japanese attack on the Soviets in 1941 would have been a winning move for them, but it would have been less of a losing move than attacking the US and British Empire...
I suspect it results in pretty much the same thing although they might get better terms.

User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7529
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by RF » Fri Jun 25, 2010 7:49 am

lwd wrote:
DAP wrote:..A magnanimous Hitler cedes the oil rich Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China to his ally. The Japanese Navy launches a series of naval campaigns to defeat British naval power in the western pacific and drives them back into the Indian Ocean. Germany forces Britain to negotiate peace terms with Japan that cedes the remaining British territories in South East Asia (but not India) to the Japanese.....
Simpy isn't going to work. Germany and France have a peace treaty. Taking French territory and giving it to the Japanese isn't going to help much. Germany can't even give the Dutch East Indies away. None of this by the way helps Japan's energy problem. Nor is the defeat of the USSR in any way guaranteed by such action.
There never was a peace treaty between Germany and France, only an armistice which allowed Germany to occupy part of France and neutralise the French colonial empire. That is why Churchill had to attack the French fleet in July 1940, in case it fell under German control.
Neither did Germany have any leeway on the French and Dutch colonies in the Far East - under the Tripartite Pact both Germany and Italy ''recognised the leadership of Japan'' in creating its empire in east Asia which effectively means that Indo China and the East Indies were under that treaty allocated to Japan anyway. It was simply a matter of Japan seizing them - which they did.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.

User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7529
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by RF » Fri Jun 25, 2010 7:53 am

Karl Heidenreich wrote:
Even Stalin did everyhting on his side to avoid a war with Japan whilst he was fighting Hitler. Basically, and this is the main German mistake, you don't want to fight in two fronts simultaneously, is bad for your health.
Hitler was actually fighting on three fronts, indeed by sending some forces to the Far East you could actually say he was fighting his war on four fronts!! Positively brain blowingly fatal!!!
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.

DAP
Junior Member
Posts: 12
Joined: Fri Jun 11, 2010 4:24 pm

Re: Japanese winning move for WWII?

Post by DAP » Fri Jun 25, 2010 5:06 pm

LWD,
I suppose we’re getting a little far afield, discussing the German invasion of Russia on the “Japanese Winning Move” thread but I’ll try to answer your questions and statements:

[/quote]
If the Soviets were convinced the Japanese were going to attack in Siberia they would not have felt as free to send the divisions west. That however doesn't mean that they wouldn't have. There's also the chance that they would have launched a spoiling attack vs. the Japanese forces in Manchuria. From what I can find it's not clear that the Japanese Kwangtung army ever had more than 25 divisions and certainly didn't have the armor or artillery of the Soviets. A successful spoiling attack could potentially unhinge the Japanese position in China and free up even more troops than historical all be it on a somewhat later schedule.

Actually STAVKA ordered Russian forces in Manchuria not to provoke further Japanese aggression because they were contemplating the transfer of forces to defend European Russia. In order to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army they would need to maintain their mobile and artillery units in theater rather than transfer them. Similarly, they would need to maintain those units to repel any Japanese aggression. A threatened or genuine spoiling attack by the Japanese would likely prevent the transfer of those units in time to forestall a successful German conclusion to Operation Typhoon. I would refer you to the archived OKH Operational Reports Oct – Dec 1941 against the Kalinin (3rd & 4th Panzer Armies) and Bryansk (2nd Panzer Army) Fronts and especially those reports detailing the fighting along the Moscow-Volga Canal and Krasnya Polyana. The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov, G. K. (1971) are another fascinating, corroborative source.
Without the Siberian reinforcement Army Group Center would have completed the encirclement, reduction, and capture of Moscow.
Perhaps but that is far from certain. And there would have likely been some reinforcements just not as many as historical at least in the short term. But the Germans were stopped before Moscow in large part due to logistics and the non Asiatic troops. Encircling and reducing would require much more effort than just getting in sight of the city. Nothing here is going to improve the logistical situation of the Germans and particularly the encircling part would need that. Then there's actually taking the city and holding it. Note that neither Stalingrad nor Leningrad fell to German forces.

German forces on the Moscow Front, by mid-November 1941 actually outnumbered Russian forces. Stalin asked Zhukov whether Moscow could be successfully defended and ordered him to "speak honestly, like a communist." Zhukov replied that it was possible, but that reserves were desperately needed. Additional sources detailing the near collapse of the Moscow Front in 1941 are: Jukes, Geoffrey (2002). The Second World War: The Eastern Front 1941–1941 and Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Guderian, Heinz (1951).
Moscow was the center of communication and rail transport for the country. Its isolation and capture would completely disrupt the military defense of the country.
While a transport and communication nexus I think your conclusions about it's fall are somewhat excessive. Much of the area that it was critical for would be under German control at this point. Then there's the question of could they hold it. If Moscow had fallen or was near falling would the Soviets run the risk of pulling troops out of Siberia even in the face of a Japanese attack? I think so.

I would refer you to “Whispers in the Dark.” Published in: Intelligence and National Security, Volume 4, Issue 2 April 1989, pages 401 – 405 which details the secret Russian plans to send peace feelers to the Germans if Moscow were to be captured. These plans were endorsed by Stalin. When the military situation had stabilized by early 1942, Stalin had his principle agents (those briefed with the peace proposals) executed. This would insure that Stalin was seen as the “Defender of Mother Russia.” The NKVD records, however, were not destroyed. And it is from those sources that we learn of the political impact on the war resulting from the fall of Moscow. The Military advantages from capturing the enemies capital should be well understood by all.
... As the Dutch East Indies were not a possession of the United States, there would be no reason for the US to legitimately declare a pre-emptive war on Japan.
The US had an agreement with the British and Dutch that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. While it wouldn't be guaranteed to get the US in the war it combined with the attack on the Soviets would come awfully close. If not then there would be an incident that would in short order. Note that Roosevelt had given the British and Dutch permission to use US ports if they were attacked by Japanese forces.

If the Japanese move North (or do nothing December, 1941) there is no reason for the US to declare war on Japan. They already cut off oil and steel exports to Japan as a punishment for their war in China. There was no declaration of war against Japan when the Japanese fought the Russians in 1939 so it seems unlikely that the US would declare war just because the Japanese were conducting military exercises along their shared border with Russia.
It was only the attack on Pearl Harbor that forced the US to shed its neutral, isolationist ways.
Not so. The polls from the time period showed that the majority of the US population saw war with Japan as a necessity in the near future and the sympathy for Britain and antagonism toward Germany were rising.

There is a great deal of difference between public polling data – which began to show some shift in attitudes against some of the “European belligerents” and away from strict neutrality – and national righteous indignation in the wake of a sneak attack resulting in thousands of casualties. Yet even in the face of the Pearl Harbor attack the US government maintained a “Germany First” strategic view. Without Pearl Harbor it would have taken considerably longer to garner the political support to declare war even though the government was secretly fighting the Germans in the North Atlantic prior to Germany’s Declaration of War against the US.
The Germans were fighting in North Africa before, during, and after Barbarossa. Any sort of successful conclusion to the Russian campaign will result in redeployment of land and air units to reinforce the Afrika Korps.
Again logistics very much limited the forces the Germans could devote to Africa. Freeing up troops in Europe doesn't result in additional cargo ships in the Med.

But it does provide the requisite air cover. A successful conclusion to the war with Russia would certainly free up forces to move south into the caucuses and into Persia. That would most likely result in Turkey joining the Axis powers – just as they aligned with the Central Powers in WWI.
Rommel had a plan to sweep through Egypt and join up with forces sweeping south from the southern Caucuses but lacked the troops. Presumably post Russian collapse he would have the requisite forces.
Source PLS.[/quote]

Rommel’s plan for the conquest of Egypt, Palestine, and the Middle East were incorporated into "Fall Blau" (Operation Blue) which detailed the German Army’s Stalingrad and Caucuses campaign. Planners theorized about a possible advance to western Kazakhstan to secure the eastern frontiers. German plans to capture western Kazakhstan certainly existed as railway nets and territories in west Central Asian countries along lines of advance to the Middle East in order to aid the Afrika Korps in the African Campaign, with the additional purpose of seizing Persia. Linked to these plans, the German Army planners conceived some operations to project Operation Barbarossa on a greater scale, extending to the Caucasus area, and other extensions of Barbarossa including Turkey, Iraq and Persia. Also, during General Von Kleist's Invasion (Operation Blue) of the Caucasus, there were German units (including certain Arabs, Caucasians and Central Asian SS volunteer groups) whose goal was to occupy the Caucasus region and Central Asia, enlarging General Erwin Rommel's forces in Alexandria via the Middle East. In relation to a German Persian invasion, a tripartite military pact was signed on January 18, 1942, where the three Axis Powers agreed to draw an operational line of demarcation at 70° east longitude (west of Bombay), which also was the frontier of their respective spheres of influence. See also: Reichskommissariat Kaukasus and, more chillingly Yad Vashem Studies (Vol. 35, no. 1), “‘Elimination of the Jewish National Home in Palestine’: The Einsatzkommando of the Panzer Army Africa, 1942,” Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers tell the hitherto undocumented story of Nazi plans to murder the Jews of the Middle East. As Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps advanced across North Africa and began planning the invasion of Palestine from its Egyptian base, SS-Obersturmbannführer Walter Rauff began organizing the special Einsatzkommando that would follow Rommel’s troops in order to murder all the Jews living there.

Post Reply