Japanese winning move for WWII?

[neil hilton]

I
So what if the British and Dutch are turfed out of SE asia?

How are the Japanese to do this completely when the British hold Australia, New Zealand and India?

They would have to occupy totally all three, for which they do not have the logistics.

I think you misunderstand my intention. The 'So what if the British and Dutch are turfed out of SE asia?' was a hypothetical reference to US public opinion ie the man in the streets attitude as to who cares what happens on the other side of the world, especially their attitude to British imperialism. You're right about the logistics thing, absolutely.

[lwd]

...
Actually I meant toned down their actions in China after the oil embargo to assuage US opinion.....

Remember it was the invasion of French-indo China that brought on the oil embargo. What can they possibly do in China that would offset going after the British and Dutch, especially when the three powers have agreed that an attack on one is an attack on all? And when the US has granted port access in advance to the British and Dutch in the case of war?

[lwd]

... I think you misunderstand my intention. The 'So what if the British and Dutch are turfed out of SE asia?' was a hypothetical reference to US public opinion ie the man in the streets attitude as to who cares what happens on the other side of the world, especially their attitude to British imperialism. ....

The US man in the street had pretty much decided by that point in time something was going to have to be done about the Japanese. The wide reporting on events like the "rape of Nanking" and Japanese attacks on US vessels in China had dug the Japanese into a hole they were unliky to get out of without a sessation of aggression. Increasing it especially against countries like Britian and Holland was just going to make the problem worse.

[RF]

I fully concur with lwd's above post.

[neil hilton]

...
Actually I meant toned down their actions in China after the oil embargo to assuage US opinion.....

Remember it was the invasion of French-indo China that brought on the oil embargo. What can they possibly do in China that would offset going after the British and Dutch, especially when the three powers have agreed that an attack on one is an attack on all? And when the US has granted port access in advance to the British and Dutch in the case of war?

My mistake, I got my dates for the various embargos mixed up.

The Japanese commited many many attrocities in China throughout the war, keeping their soldiers on a tighter leash wouldn't have gotten the wests back up so much. Did the Japanese know about the 'attack one attack all' thing?

[neil hilton]

... I think you misunderstand my intention. The 'So what if the British and Dutch are turfed out of SE asia?' was a hypothetical reference to US public opinion ie the man in the streets attitude as to who cares what happens on the other side of the world, especially their attitude to British imperialism. ....

The US man in the street had pretty much decided by that point in time something was going to have to be done about the Japanese. The wide reporting on events like the "rape of Nanking" and Japanese attacks on US vessels in China had dug the Japanese into a hole they were unliky to get out of without a sessation of aggression. Increasing it especially against countries like Britian and Holland was just going to make the problem worse.

Yeah, but would the man in the street have condoned war because of this? Thats the question. US isolationism being what it was?

[lwd]

.... Did the Japanese know about the 'attack one attack all' thing?

That's a good question. It's pretty clear they at least had an idea. For instance:
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/wor ... uses_2.htm

While Konoe was seeking a diplomatic solution, the military was looking south to the Netherlands East Indies and their rich sources of oil and rubber. Believing that an attack in this region would cause the US to declare war, they began planning for such an eventuality.

This site has some good tables and info but the analysis lacks depth
http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/japan-oil.htm
http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1941.htm states:

July 26, 1941 U.S. Freezing of Japanese Credits President Franklin Roosevelt "froze" all Japanese credits in the United States in response to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. The British government adopted the same policy in the United Kingdom as well. This brought American-Japanese trade to a halt. President Roosevelt placed all armed forces in the Philippines under the control of United States and assigned General Douglas MacArthur the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East. President Roosevelt also warned Japanese Ambassador Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura that additional Japanese attempts to expand Japanese military control in the Far East would force the U.S. to take immediate steps to protect American rights and interests.

and

August 17, 1941 U.S. Warning to the Japanese President Franklin Roosevelt warned Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, that the U.S. would be forced to take immediate action to safeguard American rights and interests in the Far East if the Japanese took new military actions in the region.

and

August 24, 1941 British Pledge in the U.S.-Japanese War In the event that negotiations failed and the United States became involved in a war with the Japanese, Prime Minister Winston Churchill pledged British military aid to the U.S.

Other sources describe the agreements as secret or point out that they were "flexable". So I can't find any official statment to that effect and suspect one does not exist. On the other hand Japan was certainly recieving pretty strong hints in that regards. Also the polls that indicated the thinking of the "man on the street" in the US were not classified in anyway and indicated that public opinion in the US had not only turned against Japan but would support war against her.

[RF]

Yeah, but would the man in the street have condoned war because of this? Thats the question. US isolationism being what it was?

The US was isolationist only insofar as it did not want to be involved in other people's wars - such as that in Europe.

In China US property and commercial interests were being damaged by the Japanese, the US was thus more hostile towards Japan, particulary after the Panay incident.

[lwd]

... Yeah, but would the man in the street have condoned war because of this? Thats the question. US isolationism being what it was?

Here are some poll results from the time:
Nov 41
http://institution.gallup.com/documents ... Y=AIPO0254
Question qn3 Should the United States take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan?
... % N
Yes 73.58 2209
No 17.32 520
No Opinion 9.09 273

Question qn4 Do you think the United States will go to war against Japan some time in the near future?
... % N
Yes 53.11 1597
No 26.90 809
Undecided 19.99 601

[RF]

This poll result came just a few weeks prior to the PH attack. The wording of the two questions and the responses to them do suggest to me that had they been asked six months or one year earlier the responses would have been only a few percentage points less hostile to Japan.

[neil hilton]

My concerns about the US public opinion regarding war with Japan before PH are historical precedence.
1. Wilson only took the US in to ww1 in the 3rd year of the war and only then after that Zimmerman telegram thing.
2. How many US ships were sunk by uboats before US declared war on Nazi Germany. It was Germany who declared war on the US.
3. Even nowadays pre 911 the US pretty much ignored Al Queada but after 911 the US is raging around the world kicking over all the stones and shaking all the trees.
The point I'm trying to make here is that the US only tends to go to war when actualy attacked first.

And those poll results, there is a big difference betwwen 'risking war' and actual war. Also the qn 4 yes to war result is a majority but it is very far from unilateral. A democracy that declared war with those polls I believe would be in serious trouble with internal divisions, riots, mass protests etc etc. The price of democracy. With such division Roosevelt would be able to contribute very little to the war in terms of troops on the ground.
It is clear though that Roosevelt was preparing the population for inevitable war.

[lwd]

Roosevelt may well have been able to get a declaration of war vs the Japanese or even the Germans prior to PH. However he clearly did not want to go to war with only a few percentage points of the vote in his favor. There was also the fact that his miliatry advisors told him that the US would be "ready" for war in mid 42 and ready for offensive operations late in 42. If you look at the series of questions concerning Britain and Germany there is also a clear ant-German trend. Roosevelt saw the US entry in the war as a necessary thing but he was in no hurry as long as the US position was improving. Indeed more support may have reached Britain and later the Soviets with the us officially "neutral" than would have done so if we were at war. For instance there was a pretty massive shipment of arms and ammo (including ~1,000 artillery pieces) declared "surplus" to US Army needs, "sold" to a "private" company, which then sold them to Britain all between Dunkirk and the end of June 1940. If the US were at war I'm not sure that the army would have parted with the equipment quite that easily.

[neil hilton]

Roosevelt may well have been able to get a declaration of war vs the Japanese or even the Germans prior to PH. However he clearly did not want to go to war with only a few percentage points of the vote in his favor. There was also the fact that his miliatry advisors told him that the US would be "ready" for war in mid 42 and ready for offensive operations late in 42. If you look at the series of questions concerning Britain and Germany there is also a clear ant-German trend. Roosevelt saw the US entry in the war as a necessary thing but he was in no hurry as long as the US position was improving. Indeed more support may have reached Britain and later the Soviets with the us officially "neutral" than would have done so if we were at war. For instance there was a pretty massive shipment of arms and ammo (including ~1,000 artillery pieces) declared "surplus" to US Army needs, "sold" to a "private" company, which then sold them to Britain all between Dunkirk and the end of June 1940. If the US were at war I'm not sure that the army would have parted with the equipment quite that easily.

These military advisors predicting US 'readiness' in mid 42, is that accurate do you think? Considering things like operation 'drum roll' and the defences in the Phillipines etc. Or were they just being optimistic? Would 6 months make that much of a difference?
If the Japanese had managed somehow to keep the US out of the war for those extra 6 months (assuming they could secure say the Dutch East Indies without bloodshed) would that make a difference to the Japanese position?

Heres another thought. Yamamoto predicted, quite accurately, the inevitable US reaction to PH with his '6 months to run wild' saying. But this thread has postulated that his strategy in those 6 months and later was questionable. Does this suggest Yamamoto would have made a better politician than admiral. Or is that too controversial?

[Bgile]

The first Essex class carrier wasn't available until Dec of '42, and I would think that would make a significant difference. I don't think the USN added any new carriers in all of '42, did they?

The Philippines might have been in a lot better shape militarily by mid '42 though.

[neil hilton]

The first Essex class carrier wasn't available until Dec of '42, and I would think that would make a significant difference. I don't think the USN added any new carriers in all of '42, did they?

The Philippines might have been in a lot better shape militarily by mid '42 though.

This brings up the question of how much army reinforcement the Phillipines would need to be more defensible. And how much the US would be willing to post overseas before war is actually declared, again considering public opinion and home defence.